DINH NGUYEN vs HOA NGUYEN

Daytona Beach, FL - Divorce lawyer represented Appellant with appealing the orders denying his motion to vacate/set aside default judgments .

Appellant argues that the county

court lost monetary subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this case once

Appellee, Hoa Nguyen, filed her counterclaim seeking to enforce an oral

contract for the sale of real property, where the counterclaim explicitly sought

damages exceeding $15,000 exclusive of costs and attorney's fees. At the

time Appellee's counterclaim was filed, the county court's monetary

jurisdiction ended at $15,000; thus, Appellee's claim should have been

immediately transferred to circuit court. Accordingly, we reverse the

appealed orders, quash the default final judgment and amended default final

judgment, and remand to circuit court for further proceedings consistent with

our opinion.

On September 10, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se eviction complaint in

county court against Appellee, claiming that she stopped paying rent for a

condominium (the "Property”) he owned. In response, Appellee submitted

her pro se "Letter of Explanation” claiming that while she was dating

Appellant, he did not ask her to pay rent nor had they entered into any

contract that required her to pay rent. However, when Appellee discovered

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that Appellant was still married, their relationship changed, and Appellant

asked her to pay rent.

Appellee then retained counsel who filed a Verified Answer, Affirmative

Defenses, and Counterclaim on behalf of Appellee on September 20, 2019.

Later, Appellee vacated the Property which Appellant claims led him to

believe that the lawsuit was over; thus, among other reasons, he did not

respond to Appellee's counterclaim. Appellee moved for entry of a default,

which drew no response from Appellant. On November 1, 2019, the county

court entered a default final judgment and on January 14, 2020, entered an

amended final default judgment in favor of Appellee and against the

Appellant. The amended final judgment awarded Appellee $10,300 in

attorney's fees, $4.95 in taxable costs, and $41,500 for the breach of the oral

contract Appellee claimed existed whereby Appellant was to sell the Property

to her in exchange for monthly installment payments she had made. The

amended final judgment also created an equitable lien on the Property which

Appellee later sought to enforce by moving on January 17, 2020, for an order

setting a judicial sale of the Property.

Appellant retained counsel who filed an appearance on January 17,

2020, and filed an emergency motion to vacate the amended final judgment

based on excusable neglect which also was included within Appellant's

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simultaneously filed proposed answer to the counterclaim. Included within

that motion was Appellant's argument that Appellee sought relief outside the

county court's jurisdiction and that the case should be transferred from

county court to circuit court based on the counterclaim seeking damages in

excess of the county court's monetary jurisdiction and for seeking an

equitable lien which Appellant argued was only available in circuit court.

At the hearing held by the county court on May 13, 2020, Appellant

began to argue that the county court lacked subject matter and monetary

subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Appellee interrupted Appellant's

argument and objected to the court entertaining that argument, asserting that

the only issues to consider were whether Appellant's failure to respond

resulted from excusable neglect and whether he had acted with due diligence

to set aside the default. The county court sustained Appellee's objection and

advised that it would not entertain further argument on the issue of subject

matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, the county court stated that any such

argument regarding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction had to be clearly

noticed and set for hearing in the future.

The parties submitted written closing arguments as directed by the

court. Appellant argued in his written closing argument that the county court

lacked subject matter and monetary subject matter jurisdiction given the

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nature of and monetary amount of relief sought in the counterclaim. The

county court entered a written order on June 15, 2020, in which it denied

Appellant's motion to set aside the default amended final judgment, finding

a lack of excusable neglect and a lack of due diligence. Consistent with its

earlier oral ruling sustaining Appellee's objection, the order denying

Appellant's motion made no ruling regarding or any mention whatsoever of

subject matter jurisdiction.

On July 16, 2020, Appellant filed another motion to vacate/set aside

the final judgment and amended final judgment, specifically arguing that the

default final judgment and amended default final judgment were void due to

lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the jurisdictional amount asserted

in the counterclaim. Appellee filed a response in opposition to Appellant's

motion to vacate/set aside the final judgments, arguing that Appellant was

attempting to bring the same arguments previously addressed by the county

court. In his reply, Appellant argued that the June 15, 2020 order did not

address the jurisdictional issue and merely adjudicated the threshold issues

of excusable neglect and due diligence.

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On November 9, 2020, the county court held a hearing on Appellant's

second motion to vacate and Appellee's motion for attorney's fees during

which the county judge stated:

At the prior hearing, I found that there was no excusable

neglect. Since that time, there's been no appeal to that ruling.

At the hearing, that last hearing that we had to vacate, the

issue of whether there was subject matter jurisdiction was raised.

It wasn't just raised in passing, it was raised in detail during the

hearing, in closing arguments, and was raised by both parties.

So, although it's not adjudicated in the order, it was discussed by

the parties and it was considered and was not a grounds for

going back on the order.

At the November 2020 hearing, the trial court orally scheduled the

judicial sale date for December 9, 2020, but the written order scheduling the

sale for December 9, 2020, was not entered until December 7, 2020. The

county court orally denied Appellant's second motion to vacate the default

judgments during this hearing but did not enter a corresponding written order

until February 3, 2021. In its written order, the county court found that

Appellant's second motion was barred by res judicata. The Property was

sold during that judicial sale to a third party.

Appellant moved to vacate the sale asserting irregularities in the

proceedings leading up to the sale and based on the county court's lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Once again, the county court ruled that

Appellant's subject matter jurisdiction argument was barred by res judicata.

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Appellant timely appealed both the order denying Appellant's second motion

to vacate/set aside the default final judgment and amended default judgment

and the order denying Appellant's motion to vacate the judicial sale of the

condominium.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

"Questions of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.”

Stanek-Cousins v. State, 912 So. 2d 43, 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). "[A] lack

of subject matter jurisdiction renders a judgment void, 'and a void judgment

can be attacked at any time, even collaterally.'” Hardman v. Koslowski, 135

So. 3d 434, 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Strommen v. Strommen, 927

So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)).

It is clear that at the time Appellee filed her counterclaim, it exceeded

the monetary subject matter jurisdictional limits of the county court. See §

34.011, Fla. Stat. (2019). Furthermore, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure

1.170(j) states:

If the demand of any counterclaim . . . exceeds the jurisdiction of

the court in which the action is pending, the action must be

transferred immediately to the court of the same county having

jurisdiction of the demand in the counterclaim . . . . The court

must order the transfer of the action and the transmittal of all

documents in it to the proper court . . . .

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Thus, the relief, transferring the case to circuit court, initially requested by

Appellant was appropriate, and his argument that the county court lacked

jurisdiction was well taken.

Res Judicata

However, "even an erroneous determination on the question of subject

matter jurisdiction may become res judicata on that issue if the jurisdictional

question was actually litigated and decided, or if a party had an opportunity

to contest subject matter jurisdiction and failed to do so.” State, Dep't of

Transp. v. Bailey, 603 So. 2d 1384, 1387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Appellant did

not timely appeal the first order denying his motion to vacate the default

judgments; thus, if the matter was actually litigated or waived, then Appellant

would be barred by res judicata.

We find that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was clearly not

litigated. When Appellant attempted to argue at the first hearing that the

county court lacked jurisdiction, the county court sustained Appellee's

objection. The written order denying Appellant's first motion to vacate

referred only to the court's finding that there was a lack of excusable neglect

and a lack of due diligence. As noted above, the written order did not rule

on or even mention subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant certainly did not

waive the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, having requested the case to

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be transferred to circuit court in his written motion, orally attempting to argue

the county court's lack of jurisdiction during the hearing, and explicitly

arguing the lack of jurisdiction in his written closing arguments.

In Bailey, the appellee filed a motion for summary judgment which was

granted by the trial court. 603 So. 2d at 1385. A final judgment was entered

for the appellee, and no appeal was brought. Id. The appellant filed a motion

for relief from judgment, which was denied by the trial court. Id. at 1385–86.

The appellant did not appeal that order. Id. The appellant then filed a second

motion to set aside the award of prejudgment interest with a more detailed

subject matter jurisdiction argument. Id. After the second motion was denied,

the appellant appealed. Id. The First District held that res judicata did not

preclude the appellant's argument because the subject matter jurisdiction

argument was raised but not argued before the trial court and the trial court's

order was not sufficiently specific to indicate that the trial court ruled on the

merits of the jurisdictional question. Id. at 1387.

When analyzing whether res judicata bars Appellant from asserting a

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we must consider the overall purpose of

res judicata, which is to "preclude parties from contesting matters that they

have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate [which] protects their

adversaries from the expense and vexation [of] attending multiple lawsuits,

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conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by

minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979). Here, due to Appellee's objection

being sustained, Appellant was not given a full opportunity to litigate the

issue of subject matter jurisdiction during the first hearing.

Furthermore, we agree with the principle that "the doctrine [of res

judicata] should not be so rigidly applied as to defeat the ends of justice.”

Neidhart v. Pioneer Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 498 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1986). We likewise adhere to the concept that if there is any doubt as

to whether the parties have had their day in court, that doubt should be

resolved in favor of full consideration of the matter. Id.

For the reasons set forth above, we find that Appellant’s subject matter

jurisdiction argument was not barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we

reverse the appealed orders, quash the default final judgment and amended

default final judgment, and remand this matter to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with our opinion including entry of an order setting

aside the sale of the Property.