State of Louisiana v. Emilio Taylor

Shreveport LA - Criminal defense attorney represented Defendant who was charged with armed robbery (count one) and the additional enhancement penalty for use of a firearm (count two).

On May 24, 2018, as Family Dollar employees, Destini Hall ("Hall”)

and Clark Remedies ("Remedies”) were closing the store, a man wearing 2

sunglasses, a hat, and a bandana over his face, entered the store. After

Remedies exited the restroom near the rear of the store, the man held

Remedies at gun point and forced him back toward the front of the store,

where he demanded that Hall empty the contents of the register into a pink

bag. Next, the man ordered Remedies to open the safe, and after Remedies

refused, he struck Remedies on the head with the gun. Once the safe was

opened and its contents placed into the pink bag, the man forced Hall and

Remedies to the back of the store, where he then exited through a back door.

Remedies identified the man who robbed the store as Taylor to

responding officers. On May 31, an arrest and search warrant were executed

at Taylor's home. Officers arrested Taylor, and during the search of his

home, recovered approximately $1,595 dollars in cash and a nine-millimeter

handgun. On January 23, 2019, by amended bill of information, Taylor was

charged with one count of armed robbery with the additional penalty of use

of a firearm. On February 11, 2020, a jury trial commenced. In addition to

video surveillance of the robbery captured by store security cameras, the

following testimony was provided at trial.

First, Hall testified that on May 24, 2018, she worked the closing shift

at the Family Dollar on Lakeshore Drive when the store was robbed. Hall

stated that a few minutes after she started counting the money in her register,

she heard talking and then saw a man walking toward the front of the store

holding a gun to Remedies' head. The man approached Hall, told her he

didn't want to hurt anyone, gave her a pink bag, and ordered her to put the

money from the register into the bag. Hall then testified that the man

ordered Remedies to open the safe. After Remedies stated that he couldn't, 3

the man repeatedly hit Remedies on the head with the gun until Remedies

eventually opened the safe, and Hall was then told to place the money from

the safe into the pink bag. Hall then testified that she could see some of the

details of the weapon that the man used. In particular, she noted that the

man used a semi-automatic gun and that the handle of the gun appeared as

though it had "a brown trim on the handle.” Hall then reviewed the

surveillance footage of the robbery and confirmed that the events of the day

in question were accurately reflected in the video and consistent with her

testimony.

Next, during Remedies' examination, he reviewed the surveillance

footage and confirmed that the events of the robbery were accurately

reflected in the video. In particular, Remedies testified that after he emerged

from the restroom in the back of the store, he was confronted by a man in

shades, a hat, and a bandana over his face. He stated that the man forced

him to the front of the store and hit him over the head with a gun after he

initially refused to open the store safe upon demand. Remedies stated that

he immediately told responding officers that the man who robbed the store

was Taylor. Although Hall testified that she had neither seen nor worked

with Taylor before, Remedies testified that he was able to positively identify

the perpetrator as Taylor because he used to work with Taylor.

Specifically, Remedies stated that he was able to recognize Taylor by

his voice and build. Remedies testified that two days prior to the robbery,

Taylor texted him, wondering if he was at work. Remedies testified that

Taylor called and asked if he would help rob the store, to which he declined 4

and asked Taylor not to rob the store. After the call, Remedies stated that he

reported this information to the store's district manager.

Corporal Robert Cerami ("Cpl. Cerami”) of the Shreveport Police

Department ("SPD”) testified that in May 2018, he assisted in the execution

of the search warrant for Taylor's residence. As a result of the search, he

testified that cash and a handgun located within a dresser were recovered.

On cross-examination, Cpl. Cerami testified that although the handgun and

cash were recovered from the search of the home, no pink bag, hat, or

bandana was ever discovered.

Following Cpl. Cerami's testimony, Detective Richard Turpen ("Det.

Turpen”) of the SPD, who also participated in the arrest and search of

Taylor's home, testified that Taylor was found hiding in the attic of his

home, and after Taylor's oral and written consent was obtained, a handgun

and cash were recovered. 1

Det. Turpen also reviewed the surveillance

footage and testified that during the robbery, the perpetrator's hat fell off and

revealed that the man's hair was styled into what was described as "puffs” or

"pom-poms.” To this, outside the presence of the jury, it was noted that

during Det. Turpen's investigation, Taylor made a phone call to his

girlfriend in jail on May 26, 2018. During the monitored call, Taylor's

girlfriend asked if he wanted her to do his hair when she got out of jail, to

which Taylor responded that he had already had his hair done.2

Within the



1 Det. Turpen identified the handgun as a Browning nine-millimeter handgun

semiautomatic, with a black tarnished colored barrel trigger, with a wooden handle or

grips. The amount of cash recovered from the home was approximately $1,595, and the

identified amount taken from the store during the robbery was a little more than $3,000.



2 The trial court limited the State's questioning regarding the jail call regarding

Taylor's hair on the basis of relevancy. Specifically, the court stated that, "[t]he only

thing I think you should be entitled to let the jury know is that some girl asked him if he 5

presence of the jury, Det. Turpen stated that on the date of Taylor's arrest,

his hair was styled into longer thinner dreads, and that he monitored the jail

conversation between Taylor and his girlfriend and confirmed that the two

discussed Taylor's hair.

At the close of testimony, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict

and Taylor was convicted as charged. The trial court denied Taylor's

motion for a new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal. On March 11,

2020, the State of Louisiana ("the State”) tendered a sentencing offer of 25

years at hard labor without benefits for the armed robbery charge, with a

consecutive 35-year sentence for the enhanced firearm penalty. In

exchange, the State offered to dismiss a pending charge for attempted

murder and would forgo filing a habitual offender bill. On June 25, 2020,

Taylor rejected the State's offer, the State filed a second felony habitual

offender bill, and the habitual offender hearing commenced that day. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Taylor to thirty-five years

at hard labor, without benefits, with a five-year sentence for the enhanced

firearm penalty. This appealed followed.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In Taylor's first assignment of error, he asserts that there was

insufficient evidence presented at trial for the State to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the offense in question. In particular,

Taylor notes first that although Remedies claimed to have recognized the



wanted her to do his hair and he said, no, he'd already taken care of it.” Likewise, the

defense noted its objection to the admission of the call as irrelevant and speculative. 6

man who robbed the store as Taylor by his voice and build, the description

provided by both Remedies and Hall, as well as the video footage itself, was

simply of a man wearing a hat, shades, and a bandana covering his face.

Taylor argues that the hairstyle of the man seen in the video was

styled into "puffs” or "pom-poms,” and Taylor's own hair, at the time of the

arrest, as corroborated by Det. Turpen, was styled into longer dreads. The

State argued at trial that a phone call between Taylor and his girlfriend, in

which she asked if Taylor wanted her to do his hair, explained the difference

in hairstyles of Taylor at the time of the arrest as opposed to the man in the

video. To this, Taylor argues that throughout the duration of the phone call,

no corroborating evidence was discussed to confirm that Taylor ever

changed the style of his hair after the robbery occurred. Specifically, Taylor

notes that during the conversation with his girlfriend: 1) the pair never

discussed a robbery at any point; 2) Taylor never stated what he would

possibly want her to do to his hair; 3) there was no mention of Taylor getting

any sort of extensions placed in his hair to give him longer dreads; and 4)

Taylor never stated when he got his hair done, only that he had already

gotten it done so there was no need for his girlfriend to do it.

In addition to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his style of

hair in connection with the robbery, Taylor contends that the testimony of

Remedies was also insufficient to prove that he committed the robbery.

Taylor asserts that although Remedies claimed that Taylor contacted him

through both text and a phone call a few days prior to the robbery to solicit

Remedies' help in robbing the store, evidence of the conversation was never

presented. Taylor points out that phone records were never introduced to 7

show that Remedies had in fact received a phone call or text from Taylor,

although Det. Turpen testified that he saw a text message that inquired about

whether Remedies was at work. Taylor notes that even though Remedies

claimed to have reported the conversation to the district manager of the

store, no one was called to testify to confirm that the conversation occurred.

Finally, Taylor argues that the only physical evidence recovered, the

cash and handgun, did not match the description provided by Hall and

Remedies. Taylor asserts that the amount of money recovered from his

home did not match the amount allegedly taken from the store. Taylor

argues that approximately $1,595 was recovered from his home, whereas

Det. Turpen testified that approximately $3,000 was taken from the store,

although both Remedies and Hall testified that they were unsure as to the

amount taken. With respect to the gun, Hall testified that the gun was a

semiautomatic with a brown trim on the handle; in contrast, Remedies

testified that the gun was brown and silver. However, the handgun

recovered from Taylor's home was described as having a black tarnished

colored barrel and a wooden handle or grip. Cpl. Cerami and Det. Turpen

testified that the gun found in Taylor's home would not be the only gun

which would fit the description provided. Moreover, Taylor notes that no

effort was made to see if the gun recovered from his home contained

Remedies' DNA, nor were any of the identifying items seen on the man in

the surveillance footage found in his home.

In contrast, the State maintains that the evidence produced at trial

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor committed the armed robbery.

Specifically, the State argues that the testimony of the witnesses, particularly 8

that of Remedies, was sufficient to identify Taylor as the perpetrator. The

State argues that Remedies' testimony established that before the robbery, he

had known Taylor for more than a year because the two worked at Family

Dollar together and Taylor would often frequent the store to purchase

personal items. The State notes that Remedies testified that a few days prior

to the robbery, Taylor contacted him to help rob the store. From his

repeated interaction with Taylor, coupled with the conversation about

robbing the store, Remedies was able to positively identify Taylor by his

voice and physical build on the date of the robbery, even though Taylor

attempted to disguise his person.

The State further notes that Remedies had ample time to identify

Taylor: he was within Taylor's presence from the moment he exited the

restroom in the back of the store, he was held at gunpoint and forced to the

front of the store as Hall emptied the contents of her register into a pink bag,

he was made to open the safe, and he was then forced to the rear of the store.

Considering Remedies' past association with Taylor and the events and

duration of the robbery, the State argues that Remedies made a positive

identification of Taylor on the date in question. Importantly, however, the

State notes that the jury, after having heard the testimony presented, found

Remedies to be a credible witness, and that this credibility call should not be

overturned.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim in a criminal case is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 9

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979);

State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 05/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert denied, 541 U.S.

905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). The Jackson standard, now

legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art 821, does not afford the appellate

court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that

of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 02/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517;

State v. Steines, 51, 698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224, writ

denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797.

The Jackson standard also applies in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court which reviews the sufficiency

of the evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence

by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

When the direct evidence is viewed as such, the facts established by the

direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that

evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of

the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983).

Likewise, if a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438; see also, State v. Mingo, 51, 647 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So.

3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. The appellate

court will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution

and determine whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable

that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v. 10

Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584, writ not cons., 12-

0062 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1256.

In the absence of any internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with physical evidence, the testimony of the witness, if believed by the trier

of fact, alone, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v.

Elkins, 48,972 (La. App. 2 Cir. 04/9/14), 138 So. 3d 769, writ denied, 14-

0992 (La. 12/8/14), 152 So. 3d 438; State v. Wiltcher, 41,981 (La. App. 2

Cir. 05/09/07), 956 So. 2d 769. Where there is conflicting testimony

concerning factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the

weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36, 180 (La. App.

2 Cir. 09/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied, 02-2595 (La. 06/27/03), 847

So. 2d 1255. The appellate court neither assesses the credibility of witnesses

nor reweighs evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d

442. Rather, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury's

decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.

State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/30/03), 827 So. 2d 508, writ

denied, 02-3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422.

Moreover, in a case where a defendant claims he was not the person

who committed the offense, the Jackson standard requires that the

prosecution negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v.

Green, 38, 335 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/12/04), 873 So. 2d 889, writ denied, 04-

1795 (La. 11/24/04), 888 So. 2d 227; State v. Powell, 27,959 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/12/96), 677 So. 2d 1008, writ denied, 96-1807 (La. 2/21/97), 688 So.

2d 520. Positive identification by one eyewitness or victim may suffice to 11

support a conviction. State v. Hughes, 05-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d

1047, 1051; State v. Green, supra.

In the present case, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, we find that the evidence produced at trial was

sufficient to convict Taylor of the charged offense. Here, Taylor was

charged with armed robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:64, which states in

pertinent part:

Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to

another from the person of another or that is in the immediate

control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed

with a dangerous weapon

Likewise, Taylor was charged with use of a firearm in violation of La. R.S.

14:64.3 which provides:

When the dangerous weapon used in the commission of the

crime of armed robbery is a firearm, the offender shall be

imprisoned at hard labor for an additional period of five years

without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

The additional penalty imposed pursuant to this Subsection

shall be served consecutively to the sentence imposed under the

provisions of R.S. 14:64.

The evidence in this case, namely the testimony provided by Remedies,

clearly establishes that Remedies was able to positively identify Taylor as

the man who robbed the store.

Remedies testified that he not only worked with Taylor for over a

year, but that even after Taylor stopped working at the Family Dollar, he

continued to see him whenever Taylor would purchase items from the store.

Although Taylor argues that none of the identifying articles of the man in the

surveillance footage were found in his home, that Remedies and Hall

provided differing descriptions of the gun used, the amount of money

actually recovered differed from what was taken at the store, and the fact the 12

style of his hair was different than the hairstyle of the man as seen in the

surveillance footage, we note that the jury weighed the evidence presented

and made a credibility determination as to Remedies' testimony. Because

great deference is given toward a jury's decision to either accept or reject the

testimony of a witness in whole or in part, this Court will not re-evaluate the

credibility of a witness or reweight the evidence presented. Despite these

inconsistencies, the jury unanimously determined that Remedies'

testimony—that he was absolutely certain that Taylor was the perpetrator of

the offense—was true.

Therefore, we find that, in the absence of any internal contradiction or

irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, Remedies' testimony, as

believed by the trier of fact, was sufficient to support a factual conclusion of

Taylor's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Habitual Offender Proceeding

In Taylor's second and third assignments of error, he argues that he

was improperly adjudicated as a second felony offender. Taylor argues that

the trial court failed to properly advise him of his rights under La. R.S.

15:529.1 and the transcript of his previous felony conviction failed to reveal

advisement of Taylor's right to a jury trial. With respect to Taylor's first

assertion, he specifically claims that the trial court failed to properly advise

him that he was entitled to 15 days in which he could file an objection to the

multiple offender bill, and was subsequently deprived of the opportunity to

avail himself of the days to prepare an objection to the habitual offender

allegations. 13

Taylor notes that La. R.S. 15:529.1 (D)(1)(a) states that if a defendant

denies the allegations of the habitual offender bill of information, he shall be

given 15 days within which to file particular objections to the bill. Given a

plain reading of the statute, Taylor argues that the failure to strictly comply

with the mandates of this statute is error patent. Although this error is not

generally regarded as error patent, Taylor nevertheless maintains that the

statute provides a mandatory 15-day delay period which should not be

assumed to be waived in the absence of an explicit waiver. Because the trial

court failed to advise him of this right, Taylor argues that this matter should

be set aside and remanded to provide Taylor adequate opportunity to file

written objections.

Taylor further argues that his adjudication as a second felony offender

should be set aside because the guilty plea forming the basis of his prior

offense used to adjudicate him as a second felony offender was inadequate.

Taylor argues that his February 2015 guilty plea for unauthorized entry of an

inhabited dwelling could not be used as a predicate offense in the habitual

offender proceeding because he was not properly advised at that time that he

had a right to a jury trial, only that he had a right to a trial; thus, his plea was

not given freely and voluntarily. Consequently, the State failed to satisfy its

burden of proof in this matter and his adjudication should be set aside.

In response, the State concedes that Taylor was not advised of or

given a 15-day delay period before the hearing commenced. However, it

maintains that Taylor's failure to contemporaneously object to the

commencement of the hearing should bar him of any review of this claim

because La. C. Cr. P. art 841(A) provides that "[a]n irregularity or error 14

cannot be availed of after a verdict unless it was objected to at the time of

the occurrence.” Accordingly, the State asserts that a defendant's failure to

raise an objection in opposition to any procedural irregularity during the

hearing bars him from appellate review on the matter.

In the alternative, the State argues that even if this Court should find

that the failure to advise Taylor of his La. R.S. 15:529.1 rights is error

patent, the failure should nevertheless be considered harmless error. The

State notes that the failure to advise a defendant of his constitutional rights

to remain silent, to a formal hearing, and to have the State prove that he is a

multiple offender during a habitual offender proceeding is error patent, but

may be considered harmless error. State v. Lynn, 52,125 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/15/18), 251 So. 3d 1262, writ denied, 18-1529 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d

1129; State v. Goosby, 47,772 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/6/13), 111 So. 3d 494, writ

denied, 13-0760 (La. 11/1/13), 125 So. 3d 418; State v. Delaney, 42,990 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 975 So. 2d 789; State v. Mason, 37,486 (La. App. 2

Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So. 2d 1077.

The failure to advise of these rights is "not considered reversible error

where the defendant's habitual offender status is established by competent

evidence offered by the [S]tate at a hearing rather than by admission of the

defendant.” Because these constitutional rights and the 15-day delay period

are encapsulated within the same statute, the State argues that the same

principle should likewise apply if the failure to advise a defendant of the 15-

day delay is considered error patent. The State asserts Taylor's status as a

second felony offender was established by competent evidence such that he 15

suffered no prejudice in the delay; thus, the error should be regarded as

harmless and Taylor's adjudication should not be set aside.

With respect to Taylor's assertion that the State failed to satisfy its

burden in proving he was a second felony offender because the transcript

used to adjudicate him as such was "imperfect,” the State contends under

State v. Shelton, 621 So. 2d 779-80 (La. 1993), it was not required to

produce a "perfect” transcript” or to prove Taylor actually waived his Boykin

rights when he pled guilty to the predicate offense. Instead, the State argues

it can meet its burden through the introduction of a "guilty plea form, a

minute entry, an 'imperfect' transcript, or any combination thereof.” State v.

Roland, 49,660 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/15), 162 So. 3d 558, writ denied, 15-

0596 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So. 3d 1174. The State notes that after Taylor pled

not guilty to the habitual offender bill, it introduced the bill of information

and the minutes and fingerprint attachment sheet from the plea in Taylor's

prior conviction, which was sufficient to prove that Taylor committed the

previous offense.

After it satisfied its burden, the State contends that the burden then

shifted to Taylor to produce some affirmative evidence showing an

infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in taking the plea.

Taylor failed to produce any evidence to show that there was any

infringement of his rights or an irregularity occurred in his prior guilty plea.

Moreover, Taylor failed to challenge the validity of his prior guilty plea by

filing a motion to quash the habitual offender bill. As such, the State argues

that it satisfied its burden of proof at the habitual offender adjudication, and 16

this assignment of error is not properly before this Court for review and

should not be considered.

In addressing both assignments of error, we find merit in Taylor's

arguments and set aside his adjudication as a second-felony habitual

offender and remand this matter to the trial court. Taylor contends that his

status as a second felony offender should be set aside because the trial court

did not advise him of his 15-day delay period in which he could file an

objection to the habitual offender bill. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) provides

in part:

Whereupon the court in which the subsequent conviction was

had shall cause the person, whether confined in prison or

otherwise, to be brought before it and shall inform him of the

allegation contained in the information and of his right to be

tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require

the offender to say whether the allegations are true. If he denies

the allegation of the information or refuses to answer or

remains silent, his plea or the fact of his silence shall be

entered on the record and he shall be given 15 days to file

particular objections to the information, as provided in

Subparagraph (b) of this Paragraph.

(Emphasis added).

However, La. C. Cr. P. art 841(A), known as the contemporaneous

objection rule, provides:

An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict

unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence. A bill of

exceptions to rulings or orders is unnecessary. It is sufficient

that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made

or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires

the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court,

and the grounds therefor.

(Emphasis added).

Subsequently, case law has generally held that a failure to raise an

objection prior to the habitual offender hearing precludes a review on 17

appeal. State v. Seals, 95-0305 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So. 2d 368, cert. denied,

520 U.S. 1199, 117 S. Ct. 1558, 137 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1997); State v. Williams,

47,733 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/13), 110 So. 3d 246; State v. Davenport, 43,101

(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/19/08), 978 So. 2d 1189; State v. Common, 13-488 (La.

App. 5 Cir 2/26/14) 132 So. 2d 1282; State v. Hill, 16-0123 (La. App. 4 Cir.

6/1/16), 194 So. 3d 1262; State v. Drummer, 99-0857 (La. App. 4 Cir.

3/15/00), 756 So. 2d 610); State v. Langley, 95-2029 (La. App. 4 Cir.

9/4/96), 680 So. 2d 717. Therefore, a defendant must either orally or by

written motion make a contemporaneous objection or response to the alleged

error or it constitutes a waiver. State v. Braziel, 42,668 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10/24/07), 968 So. 2d 853; State v. Qualls, 40,630 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/27/06),

921 So. 2d 226.

However, we find that the particular facts of this case are

distinguishable from these cases and warrant appellate review. For example,

in State v. Common, supra, the defendant objected to his adjudication as a

second felony offender, in part, because he was not advised that he had 15

days to file an objection to the bill or was given the opportunity to avail

himself of the 15 days. Id. The Fifth Circuit determined it was unnecessary

to advise the defendant of this right under La. R.S. 15:529.1 because he

admitted to the allegations in the multiple offender bill. Id. Moreover, the

court noted that the defendant was properly advised of his right to remain

silent. Id. As such, the court determined that the 15-day time period in

which the defendant had to object to the multiple offender bill was

inapplicable. Id. 18

Similarly, in State v. Drummer, supra, the defendant claimed that his

adjudication as a multiple offender should be set aside because the trial court

failed to give him 15 days to file objections to the multiple offender bill.

The Fourth Circuit noted that not only did the defendant fail to

contemporaneously object to the error, but he was given an opportunity to

research the issue. Id. Specifically, the court noted that the multiple

offender bill of information was filed, and the hearing took place on October

9

th, to which the defendant objected to the predicate offense and the hearing

recessed until October 23rd

. Id. Accordingly, the court found that even if

there was any error in failing to grant the defendant 15 days, the defendant

was not prejudiced because of the allotted extra time. Id. See also, State. v.

Langley, supra (the Fourth Circuit found that the defendant was given an

additional 30 days from the date on which the habitual offender bill was

filed such that the failure to advise him of his 15 days to object was without

merit.).

Further, in State v. Williams, supra, the Second Circuit found that a

defendant who was not provided 15 days to object to the allegations in the

habitual offender bill lacked merit to bring the claim. Although the

defendant did not answer the allegations in the habitual offender bill, he was

afforded an adequate opportunity to prepare for the hearing and file a motion

to quash in response. Notably, the bill was filed on December 15, 2011, but

the hearing did not take place until March 2, 2012. The court found that

because the defendant failed to object and was ready to proceed at the

hearing, his assignment of error lacked merit. 19

Finally, in State v. Davenport, supra, the defendant argued that his

status as a multiple offender should be reversed because the State did not file

the multiple offender bill until the hearing had already commenced. Id.

This Court noted that the State filed a supplemental discovery response on

January 17, 2007, and the hearing was conducted on March 14, 2007 at

which time it was stated that the habitual offender bill would be filed. Id.

Importantly, counsel for the defendant stated he was aware that the bill

would be filed and that he had received discovery related to the bill. Id. The

record reflected that the trial court informed the defendant that he was

"entitled to discovery in connection with this matter within 15 days of said

arraignment.” Id. Moreover, the defendant did not object to the late filing

of the bill or that he was not given any delay to respond to the bill. Id. This

Court held that any error in the late filing of the bill was harmless because

the defendant's counsel was aware that the bill would be filed and the State

provided him with discovery regarding the prior conviction two months

prior to the hearing. Id.

In the present case, we acknowledge that although Taylor never made

a contemporaneous objection to the failure to advise him of the 15 days, he,

unlike the defendant in State v. Common, supra, as reflected by the record,

never admitted to the allegation that he was a second felony offender in the

multiple offender bill. Moreover, the period of time between which

supplemental discovery was filed, the multiple offender bill was filed, and

the hearing occurred did not adequately afford Taylor the opportunity to

assess the discovery or research the issue in order to object to the bill. In

particular, the defendants in State v. Drummer, supra, State v. Williams,20

supra, and State v. Davenport, supra, were each afforded adequate

opportunity in which to receive discovery and respond to the multiple

offender bill. Moreover, the record in State v. Davenport, supra, reflects

that not only was counsel given two months in which to prepare, but counsel

stated at the hearing that he was not only aware that the State would file the

multiple offender bill, but that he received discovery on the matter well in

advance of the hearing.

Although the State in this case offered Taylor a sentence deal on

March 11, 2020, which included an agreement not to pursue the habitual

offender bill, we note that the State filed supplemental discovery on June 24,

2020, which was titled "Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for

Discovery,” and detailed that the response included a certified lab report.

On June 25, 2020, after Taylor rejected the offer, the State filed the habitual

offender bill, and the hearing took place that same day. Taylor, unlike the

defendants in the above-mentioned cases, was not provided with the entirety

of the State's discovery until the day before the hearing commenced and it

was not titled as discovery concerning the habitual offender hearing. The

trial court neither recessed the matter in order to give counsel time in which

to research and prepare for the hearing, nor does the record reflect that

counsel was aware of the previously filed discovery because there was no

discussion of the filing during the hearing.

Moreover, in turning to the language of the statute itself, La. R.S.

15:529.1(D) states, in part, "[i]f [a defendant] denies the allegation of the

information or refuses to answer or remains silent, his plea or the fact of his

silence shall be entered on the record and he shall be given [15] days to file 21

particular objections.” The principles of statutory construction are well

settled. Words and phrases must be read with their context and construed

according to the common and approved usage of the language. La. R.S. 1:3.

"The word 'shall' is mandatory and the word 'may' is permissive.” Id.;

McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 10-2775 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So. 3d

1218; Powell v. J & R Enterprises-Shreveport, LLC, 47,013 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/11/12), 91 So. 3d 1185.

Every word, sentence, or provision in a law is presumed to be

intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is given to each

provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed.

McGlothlin, supra, citing Colvin v. Louisiana Patient's Comp. Fund

Oversight Bd., 06-1104 (La. 1/17/07), 947 So. 2d 15, and Moss v. State, 05-

1963 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So. 2d 1185. A statute must be "applied and

interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed fair

purpose and intention the Legislature had in enacting it.” Holly & Smith

Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-0582 (La.

11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 1037. Courts are bound, if possible, to give effect to

all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause or word as

meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to and preserving

all words can legitimately be found. McGlothlin, supra.

La. R.S. 15:529.1 is clear and unambiguous. The provision is

mandatory and requires that a defendant be given 15 days in which to

respond to a habitual bill of information filed against him if he either denies

the allegation of the information, refuses to answer, or remains silent. In

response to the multiple offender bill filed against him, Taylor remained 22

silent; as such, he should have been afforded 15 days in which to file

objections to the bill. Therefore, it is our position that Taylor was not

precluded from bringing this error on appeal despite not having objected to it

at trial.

In the alternative, the State, in comparing the 15-day delay

requirement to a defendant's constitutional rights, namely the right to remain

silent, to a formal hearing, and to have the State prove that he is a multiple

offender, argues that the failure to advise Taylor of his rights is harmless.

As a general proposition, before a defendant's admission to his status

as a multiple offender is accepted, the trial court must specifically advise

him of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the State to prove his

identity as a multiple offender, and his right to remain silent. La. R.S.

15:529.1; State v. Grimble, 51, 446 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/5/17), 224 So. 3d 498;

see also, State v. Odom, 34,054 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/1/00), 772 So. 2d 281.

The failure to properly advise a defendant of his rights under the habitual

offender statue constitutes error patent on the face of the record and requires

that the adjudication be vacated. State v. Grimble, supra. In the present

case, Taylor was not properly advised of his rights. The trial court stated:

All right, Mr. Taylor, you've been charged as a second offender

under our law and the state has to prove, of course, that you are

a second offender. And that's what we'll having a hearing

about to discuss today is to determine whether or not the state

can prove that you are guilty as a second felony offender. I

don't know what else to advise you of. Obviously, you have a

right to appeal any decision that's made here today as to

whether you are a second offender or not, but I don't know

what other rights I need to advise you of so we'll proceed with

the hearing.

During this colloquy, we find that the court failed to properly advise

Taylor of his right to have 15 days in which to object to the bill, which23

constitutes an error on the face of the record. In the comparison of this right

to the right to remain silent, this Court acknowledges that the failure to

inform a defendant of his right to remain silent during a habitual offender

proceeding, under certain circumstances, may be considered harmless error.

State v. Lynn, 52,125 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 251 So. 3d 1262, 1272-73,

writ denied, 18-1529 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1129; State v. Goosby, supra;

State v. Delaney, 42,990 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 975 So. 2d 789; State v.

Mason, 37,486 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So. 2d 1077.

The State cites State v. McCadney, 98-3026 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/19/00),

761 So. 2d 579, as further evidence that the failure to advise of the 15-day

delay should not be considered error patent. However, we note that the

Fourth Circuit, in arguendo, considered the delay as error patent. The court

stated, ". . . even assuming this is an error patent-being discoverable by the

mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings-defendant cites no

prejudice as a result of any such error, failing to suggest any defects relating

to any of his prior convictions. Therefore, defendant would not be entitled

to any such relief based on such error.” Id.

Distinguishably, we find that unlike the defendant in State v.

McCadney, supra, in the failure to advise of the 15 days, Taylor was

prejudiced. Specifically, Taylor noted that the transcript used to convict him

as a second felony offender reflected that during his previous conviction, he

was not advised of his right to a jury trial. Therefore, despite the State's

assertion that because it produced competent evidence to adjudicate Taylor

as a multiple offender, the failure to advise him of this right was harmless is

inaccurate. 24

The failure to advise a defendant of these rights is considered

harmless error when the defendant's habitual offender status is established

by competent evidence offered by the State at the hearing rather than by

admission of the defendant. State v. Nobles, 53,453 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1192; State v. Lynn, supra; State v. Hart, 10-905 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 5/10/11) 66 So. 3d 44. Louisiana's habitual offender law, La.

R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), states, in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, the district

attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt on any issue of fact. . . A person claiming that a

conviction or adjudication of delinquency alleged in the

information was obtained in violation of the Constitutions of

Louisiana or of the United States shall set forth his claim, and

the factual basis thereof, with particularity in his response to the

information. The person shall have the burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by

the response. Any challenge to a previous conviction or

adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence

is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

In State v. Shelton, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the

State's burden of proof in a habitual offender proceeding as follows:

If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information,

the burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior

guilty pleas and that defendant was represented by counsel

when they were taken. If the State meets this burden, the

defendant has the burden to produce some affirmative evidence

showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural

irregularity in the taking of the plea. If the defendant is able to

do this, then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the

plea shifts to the State. The State will meet its burden if it

introduces a "perfect” transcript of the taking of the guilty plea,

one which reflects a colloquy between judge and defendant

wherein the defendant was informed of and specifically waived

his right to trial by jury, his privilege against self-incrimination,

and his right to confront his accusers. If the State introduces

anything less than a "perfect” transcript, for example, a guilty

plea form, a minute entry, an "imperfect” transcript, or any

combination thereof, the judge then must weigh the evidence

submitted by the defendant and by the State to determine

whether the State has met its burden of proving the defendant's 25

prior guilty plea was informed and voluntary, and made with an

articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights.

In the instant case, Taylor neither admitted to nor denied the

allegation in the habitual offender bill. Instead, at the hearing, the State

presented evidence in the form of the bill of information, the minute entry,

and the fingerprint attachment sheet from Taylor's prior conviction.

Assuming that the State met its initial burden under State v. Shelton, supra,

the burden shifted to Taylor to produce affirmative evidence showing an

infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the

pleas. Only if this was done, would the burden then shift to the State to

prove that the pleas were constitutional through a "perfect” transcript or

some other means. State v. Shelton, supra.

Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the State did

not file the supplemental discovery until the day before the hearing and it is

not clear from the record that Taylor even received it before the hearing.

Further, the judge did not advise Taylor of his right to a 15-day delay period

in which to file objections and incorrectly applied the law to the habitual

offender bill. Based on theses facts, we must vacate the habitual offender

sentence adjudicating Taylor as a second felony offender and remand this

matter for further proceedings.

Excessive Sentence

In Taylor's final assignment of error, he argues that the imposition of

his sentence as a second felony offender is unconstitutionally harsh and

excessive because the court failed to consider his personal history or any

mitigating factors, and instead, relied on the same factors used to convict

him of the firearm enhancement as an aggravating factor. We note that the 26

trial court imposed a sentence of 35 years for the charge of armed robbery.

This sentence is only two years more than the legislatively prescribed

minimum for a second-felony offender convicted of armed robbery and falls

below the midrange sentence for this particular offense. Nevertheless,

because we vacate Taylor's habitual offender proceeding, this assignment of

error is rendered moot.

For the aforementioned reasons, Taylor’s conviction is affirmed; the

adjudication of Taylor as a second felony offender is vacated and remanded

for further proceedings.