Scott Wadsworth, et al. v. Poornima Sharma, et al.

Baltimore, Maryland personal injury lawyer represented Plaintiffs, who sued defendants on negligence theories.





At common law, a personal action died with the person. Therefore, the moment a person passed away, any cause of action that person could maintain against another could no longer be brought. This common law rule left family members of decedents without recourse for injuries suffered during the decedent's lifetime. To remedy that consequence, state legislatures adopted their own version of a wrongful death statute, often modeled after the Lord Campbell's Act-England's statute modifying the common law rule. In pertinent part, Maryland's Wrongful Death Act, first enacted in 1852, provides that "[a]n action may be maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death of another." Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ") § 3-902(a). Generally, spouses, parents, and children of the decedent may bring wrongful death claims. CJ § 3-904(a)(1).



In wrongful death claims, plaintiffs face the challenge to demonstrate that the defendant proximately caused the decedent's death. Therefore, in an attempt to balance perceived inequities that occur under traditional causation principles, some jurisdictions have adopted the loss of chance doctrine. In the medical malpractice context, the loss of chance doctrine allows the plaintiff to recover if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's negligence caused the loss of chance of a better outcome, including survival. Other jurisdictions, including Maryland, have rejected the doctrine in favor of maintaining well-settled proximate causation principles, thus leaving to the state legislature the decision of whether to alter the proximate causation standard.



In this case, we revisit the loss of chance doctrine. Consistent with the plain language and legislative history of CJ § 3-902(a) and our prior decisions, we hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and the Court of Special Appeals correctly decided Mr.



Wadsworth's wrongful death claim because he pleaded a loss of chance case, which is not recognized in Maryland. Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals.



* * *



In 1852, the General Assembly enacted the Maryland Wrongful Death Act to abrogate the common law principle that a personal action died with the person. Parker v. Hamilton, 453 Md. 127, 134 (2017); Stewart v. United Elec. Light &Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 333-34 (1906). At common law, "if an injury were done either to the person or property of another for which damages only could be recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person to whom or by whom[] the wrong was done." Stewart, 104 Md. at 333-34 (emphasis omitted). Maryland's Wrongful Death Act is based on England's Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, which is also known as the Lord Campbell's Act. The Lord Campbell's Act provided that



§ 1. [W]hensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect[,] or default is such as would (if death had not ensued), have entitled the party injured to maintain an action, and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances, as amount in law to felony.



§ 2. [E]very such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by, and in the name of, the executive, or administrator, of the person deceased; and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury, resulting from such death, to the parties respectively for whom, and for whose benefit, such action shall be brought[;] and the amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before mentioned parties, in such shares as the jury, by their verdict, shall find and direct.



Fatal Accidents Act 1846, 9 &10 Vict. c. 93 (Eng.). Every state has a similar statute, often based upon the Lord Campbell's Act, remedying the common law rule. Parker, 453 Md. at 135.



As enacted in 1852, the Maryland Wrongful Death Act "strongly resembl[ed]" the Lord Campbell's Act. Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 215 (2013). In pertinent part, the 1852 enactment provided



[t]hat whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued,) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.



Md. Code (1879), Art. 67 § 1; 1852 Md. Laws, ch. 299.



The Wrongful Death Act remained "virtually unchanged" from its enactment until 1974. Mummert, 435 Md. at 215. In 1974, as part of Maryland's code revision,[5] the General Assembly repealed Article 67 and reenacted the Wrongful Death Act as Title 3, Subtitle 9 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. CJ § 3-902(a) provides that "[a]n action may be maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death of another." "The 197[4] changes to the statute were made for style and organization purposes, not to alter the meaning of the statute, as is the usual goal of [c]ode revision." Mummert, 435 Md. at 216 (citations omitted).

Wadsworth v. Sharma (Md. 2022)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Mr. Wadsworth pleaded a loss of chance case, which is not recognized in Maryland. Consistent with the plain language and legislative history of CJ § 3-902(a), principles of stare decisis, and our decisions in Weimer and Fennell, we hold that the plaintiff in a wrongful death claim bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's negligence proximately caused the decedent's death. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals regarding Mr. Wadsworth's wrongful death claim.