William J. Hawkins v. State of Delaware

(1) The appellant, William J. Hawkins, has appealed from the Superior
Court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61. The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of
Hawkins' opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
1Hawkins v. State, 2002 WL 384436 (Del. Supr.).
2See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988).

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(2) In March 2000, a Superior Court jury found Hawkins guilty of
Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, Assault in the Second Degree
and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.
Hawkins was declared a habitual criminal and was sentenced to a total of thirty
years imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Hawkins' conviction
and sentence.1

(3) In October 2002, Hawkins filed a motion for postconviction relief,
a memorandum of law pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, and an
amendment to the motion. Hawkins alleged that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to (i) request a self-defense jury instruction, (ii) object to inadmissible
documents and hearsay testimony, (iii) interview three witnesses, (iv) subpoena
a police officer, and (v) request a Getz analysis of an eyewitness' testimony.2
Moreover, Hawkins alleged that his grand jury indictment was defective.

(4) The Superior Court referred Hawkins' Rule 61 motion,
memorandum, and amended motion, to a Superior Court Commissioner who
issued a report finding that Hawkins' claims were either procedurally barred or
were without merit. By order dated July 16, 2003, the Superior Court adopted

3The trial transcript reflects this exchange:

THE COURT: Mr. Hawkins, what your attorney has just stated to me indicates that
it's your decision, your conscious voluntary decision that you do not wish to testify. Was
everything your lawyer stated on the record correct?
MR. HAWKINS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. You understand that you have a right to testify or not to testify,
and that decision is solely within your discretion as your [de]termination, the constitution
of the United States, as well as the constitution of the State of Delaware, does give you that
right. If it is your decision not to testify, the court will give an appropriate instruction to the
jury in that regard.

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the Commissioner's findings and recommendations and denied Hawkins'
motion for postconviction relief. This appeal followed.

(5) In his opening brief on appeal, Hawkins raises the same claims that
he raised in his postconviction motion, as amended, as well as the following
two new claims. First, Hawkins argues that his attorney coerced him into not
testifying. Second, Hawkins argues that the Superior Court should have
conducted an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.

(6) We have considered Hawkins' claim that his counsel coerced him
not to testify and find that the claim is unsubstantiated by the record. There is
no indication in the transcript or record that Hawkins' decision not to testify
was coerced by his counsel. To the contrary, the record indicates that Hawkins'
decision not to testify was "conscious" and "voluntary."3
I will instruct the jury, namely, that your decision not to testify should not be
construed in any way as indicating any conscious statement on your part that any, that the
jury should not draw any inference against you in that regard. I'm, basically, paraphrasing
what the court is going to do, but there will be an instruction in that regard.

MR. HAWKINS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So it's your decision that you do not wish to testify; is that
right?

MR. HAWKINS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay.

Trial Tr., Mar. 29, 2000, at 131, 132.

4Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (1996).

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(7) Hawkins' claim is that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
It is well-settled that the Superior Court is not required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing upon a Rule 61 motion if, on the face of the motion, it
appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.4 In this case, the Court finds
that the Superior Court properly exercised its discretion in disposing of
Hawkins' Rule 61 motion without requiring an evidentiary hearing.

(8) Having carefully considered Hawkins' remaining claims, we find
it manifest on the face of the opening brief that the judgment of the Superior
Court should be affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court's decision dated
July 16, 2003, that adopted the Commissioner's well-reasoned report and
recommendation. The Superior Court properly denied Hawkins postconviction
claims as either procedurally barred or as being without merit. We also agree
with the Superior Court's determination that Hawkins' claims do not warrant
reconsideration in the "interest of justice"5 or application of the jurisdictional
or "miscarriage of justice" exception6 to the procedural bar.