Mir Mousavi v. shahla Vakili

This 19th day of December 2003, upon consideration of the parties' briefs, it
appears to this Court that:

1. Appellant Mir Mousavi and Appellee Shahla Vakili married on
August 12, 1974. They separated in June 1996 and the Family Court entered a
final decree of divorce on May 24, 2000. Both parties are physicians and have
accumulated a multi-million dollar estate during their marriage. Before filing for
divorce, Mousavi transferred $2,055,000 worth of investments to the couple's two
children. Following an ancillary hearing on May 31, 2001, the parties provided the
court with a post-trial stipulation that included the values of the parties' retirement
funds and investments as of the date of the separation (June 1996), the date of the

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divorce (May 24, 2000) and the date of the ancillary hearing (May 31, 2001).

In a
January 13, 2003 property division decision, the trial judge chose to value the
marital property as of the date of the divorce. The trial judge found that Mousavi's
$2,055,000 transfer to his children was an effort to place those assets beyond the
reach of both his wife and the court and credited his part of the marital estate with
the amount of the transfer. The trial judge also ordered Mousavi to pay Vakili $1.8
million in order to equitably divide the marital estate 55% to Vakili and 45% to
Mousavi. Mousavi filed a Motion for Reargument/Clarification. He asked the trial
judge to revalue the assets to reflect market prices current as of the date of the
property division order. The trial judge declined to grant Mousavi any relief in a
March 12, 2003 decision. Mousavi appealed. We review the Family Court
Judge's decision for abuse of discretion.

2. The date of divorce controls for the purpose of determining the
identity of a marital asset, however, equitable factors may exist which call for
valuing the property on a date after the divorce.1 Whether to reopen a hearing is a
purely discretionary matter that requires the trial judge to weigh the facts and
circumstances of each case.2

3. Mousavi argues that the trial judge erred by not revaluing his assets
based on a 30% decrease in their value as of the date of the property division order

1 Walter W. B. v. Elizabeth P. B., 462 A.2d 414 (Del. 1983).

2 Bachtle v. Bachtle, 494 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Del. 1985).

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resulting from the time lapse between the divorce date and the ancillary property
division decision date. He relies on Schlerf v. Schlerf, where the court granted an
adjustment based on a $7,000 increase in the value of stock between the day of a
stipulation to value and 3 days before the ancillary decision.3 There, the trial
judge's stated reasons included the substantial disparity in value of the assets and
the husband's prompt action in raising the issue.4 Mousavi similarly relies on Wife
F. v. Husband F. for relief. There, a party owned a liquor store with a declared
value of $26,722, but entered into a contract to sell the store for $110,000 before a
Superior Court judge's final order.5 On appeal, we held that the trial judge should
have reopened the case to consider evidence of the sale based on, among other
reasons, the substantial difference in the previous valuation and the selling price.6

4. In the matter sub judice, the trial judge weighed the facts and
circumstances and properly denied Mousavi's request for a revaluation of assets.

This case is distinguished from Schlerf and Wife F. because Mousavi's claim of a
30% decrease in the value of his assets is pure speculation. Mousavi failed to
produce any evidence of a change in valuation. Further, Mousavi does not argue
nor does equity demand consideration of a later valuation date. Reopening this
case for the sole purpose of revaluing marital assets where the trial judge rationally

3 Schlerf v. Schlerf, File No. 08499-85 (Fam. Ct., July 31, 1986).

4 Id.

5 Wife F. v. Husband F., 358 A.2d 714 (Del. 1976).

6 Id.

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selected a reasonable valuation date only causes further delay in resolving this
marital dispute. The record demonstrates that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion when he denied Mousavi's motion.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court be, and hereby is AFFIRMED.

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