A.A.R.P., et al. v. Donald J. Trump, President of the Untied States, et al.

The President has invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), Rev. Stat. §4067, 50 U. S. C. §21, to remove Venezuelan nationals who are members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. See Presidential Proclamation No. 10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033 (2025). Applicants are two detainees identified as members of TdA and a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas. All of the alleged TdA members in the putative class are currently being held in U. S. detention facilities. In the application before the Court, the detainees seek injunctive relief against summary removal under the AEA.



I



On April 17, 2025, the District Court denied the detainees' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against

summary removal under the AEA. No. 25−cv−59, ECF Doc. 27. The detainees allege that, hours later, putative class

members were served notices of AEA removal and told that they would be removed "tonight or tomorrow.” ECF Doc.

30, p. 1. On April 18 at 12:34 a.m. central time, the detainees moved for an emergency TRO. See ibid. At 12:48 p.m.,

the detainees moved for a ruling on that motion or a status conference by 1:30 p.m. ECF Doc. 34. At 3:02 p.m., they

appealed "the constructive denia[l]” of the emergency TRO to the Fifth Circuit. ECF Doc. 36, p. 1. The detainees also

applied to this Court for a temporary injunction. We understood the Government to assert the right to remove the detainees as soon as midnight central time on April 19. The Government addressed the detainees' allegations on April 18 only at an evening hearing before the District Court for the District of Columbia, where the detainees

had separately sought relief. The Government guaranteed that no putative class members would be removed that day.

Tr. of Proceedings in J. G. G. v. Trump, No. 25−cv−766, ECF Doc. 93, p. 9. But it further represented that, in its

view, removal of putative class members as soon as the next day "would be consistent with” its due process obligations,

and it "reserve[d] the right” to take such action. Id., at 26; see id., at 16 (explanation by the court that "tomorrow . . . starts at 12:01 a.m.”). Evidence now in the record (although not all before us on April 18) suggests that the Government had in fact taken steps on the afternoon of April 18 toward removing detainees under the AEA—including transport- ing them from their detention facility to an airport and later returning them to the facility. See Supp. App. to Reply 1a−5a. Had the detainees been removed from the United States to the custody of a foreign sovereign on April 19, the Government may have argued, as it has previously argued, that no U. S. court had jurisdiction to order relief. See Ap- plication To Vacate Injunction in Noem v. Abrego Garcia, No. 24A949 (Apr. 7, 2025), pp. 11−20.



At 12:52 a.m. eastern time (11:52 p.m. central time), we ordered the Government—in light of all these circum-

stances—"not to remove any member of the putative class of detainees” in order to preserve our jurisdiction to con-

sider the application. 604 U. S. ___ (2025). We invited the Government to respond to that application after the Fifth

Circuit ruled. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for

injunction pending appeal as premature, on the ground that the detainees "gave the [district] court only 42 minutes to

act.” No. 25−10534, ECF Doc. 14, p. 2. We now construe the application as a petition for writ of certiorari from the

decision of the Fifth Circuit. See Reply 15. We grant the petition as well as the application for injunction pending

further proceedings, vacate the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, and remand for further proceedings.



II



The Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellate courts have jurisdic-

tion to review interlocutory orders that have "the practical effect of refusing an injunction.” Carson v. American

Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 84 (1981). A district court's inaction in the face of extreme urgency and a high risk of "serious, perhaps irreparable,” consequences may have the effect of refusing an injunction. 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3924.1, pp. 174, 180−181 (3d ed. 2012) (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc.

v. Bodinger, 348 U. S. 176, 181 (1955)). Here the District Court's inaction—not for 42 minutes but for 14 hours and

28 minutes—had the practical effect of refusing an injunction to detainees facing an imminent threat of severe, irrep-

arable harm. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals.



"[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.” Trump v.

J. G. G., 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Procedural due process rules are meant to protect” against "the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 259 (1978). We have long held that "no person shall be” removed from the United States "without opportunity, at some time, to be heard.” The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101 (1903). Due process re-

quires notice that is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties” and that "af-

ford[s] a reasonable time . . . to make [an] appearance.”



Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950). Accordingly, in J. G. G., this Court ex-

plained—with all nine Justices agreeing—that "AEA detainees must receive notice . . . that they are subject to re-

moval under the Act . . . within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas

relief ” before removal. 604 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 3). In order to "actually seek habeas relief,” a detainee must have sufficient time and information to reasonably be able to contact counsel, file a petition, and pursue appropriate relief.



The Government does not contest before this Court the applicants' description of the notice afforded to AEA detain-

ees in the Northern District of Texas, nor the assertion that the Government was poised to carry out removals immi-

nently. The Government has represented elsewhere that it is unable to provide for the return of an individual deported

in error to a prison in El Salvador, see Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 25−cv−951 (D Md.), ECF Docs. 74, 77, where it

is alleged that detainees face indefinite detention, see Application for Injunction 11. The detainees' interests at

stake are accordingly particularly weighty. Under these circumstances, notice roughly 24 hours before removal, de-

void of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that removal, surely does not pass muster. But

it is not optimal for this Court, far removed from the circumstances on the ground, to determine in the first in-

stance the precise process necessary to satisfy the Constitution in this case. We remand the case to the Fifth Circuit

for that purpose.



To be clear, we decide today only that the detainees are entitled to more notice than was given on April 18, and we

grant temporary injunctive relief to preserve our jurisdiction while the question of what notice is du

e is adjudicated.

See post, at 13 (A5Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) Per Curiam 19—and do not now—address the underlying merits of the

parties' claims regarding the legality of removals under the AEA. We recognize the significance of the Government's

national security interests as well as the necessity that such interests be pursued in a manner consistent with the

Constitution. In light of the foregoing, lower courts should address AEA cases expeditiously.



III



The dissent disputes both the Court's jurisdiction and the availability of classwide relief. We do not find its reasoning persuasive.



First, we reject the dissent's characterization of the events that transpired on April 18, which lead it to question

our jurisdiction. District courts should approach requests for preliminary relief with care and consideration, see post,

at 3−4 (ALITO , J., dissenting), but exigent circumstances may impose practical constraints. Preliminary relief is

"customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial

on the merits.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)



(slip op., at 6) (quoting University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 395 (1981)). The purpose of such relief is "merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties” pending further proceedings. Lackey, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Camenisch, 451 U. S., at 395).



In this case, the record before the District Court, although limited, indicated that removals of putative class

members were likely imminent. Contra, post, at 4−6 (ALITO , J., dissenting). The detainees attached four decla-

rations to their emergency motion for a TRO. In one, for example, an attorney relayed a detainee's report that immi-

gration officers "had informed them that they will be deported either today or tomorrow.” ECF Doc. 30−1. In a sec-

ond, a nonprofit6 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP Per Curiam family members of detainees and linked to a video of detain-

ees holding notices of removal as evidence that detainees "were being removed.” ECF Doc. 30−2.



Importantly, the relevant question for purposes of our jurisdiction is whether, at the time this Court was called upon

to intervene, the District Court's inaction had the effect of refusing an injunction. In their application to this Court, the detainees represented that "[m]any individuals [had] already been loaded on to buses, presumably headed to the airport.” Application for Injunction 1. Shortly thereafter, the Government represented on the record in federal court that it reserved the right to remove detainees after midnight. We had the power to issue injunctive relief to pre-

vent irreparable harm to the applicants and to preserve our jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). Now that

the Fifth Circuit has ruled, our certiorari jurisdiction also supports review in the ordinary course.



Finally, this Court may properly issue temporary injunctive relief to the putative class in order to preserve our ju-

risdiction pending appeal.* Named applicants A. A. R. P. and W. M. M. assert that they are at imminent risk of being

classified as alien enemies and removed from the United

——————

*We note that the District Court recently denied class certification as

to the detainees' underlying habeas claims challenging the validity of re-

moval under the AEA. See ECF Doc. 67. By its own terms, the District

Court's order is "automatically vacated” by our order granting a writ of

certiorari. Id., at 2. And in any event, the District Court's order primar-

ily addressed the detainees' ability to challenge the validity of AEA re-

moval on a classwide basis. The application before this Court seeks only

to vindicate notice rights on a classwide basis. To the extent the District

Court's order addressed due process, see post, at 12 (ALITO, J., dissent-

ing) (citing ECF Doc. 67, pp. 29−31, 33, 38−39), the District Court's con-

cerns as to the propriety of classwide relief focused on considerations

downstream of the initial notice necessary for detainees to raise any sub-

stantive claims against AEA removal, see ECF Doc. 67, pp. 29−31, 33,

387Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)



States, but the record does not indicate that they have received any formal notice of removal under the AEA. See

ECF Doc. 38, pp. 5−6. The named applicants, along with putative class members, are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice prior to any removal, in order to pursue appropriate relief. Although the putative class members may ultimately take different steps to protect their own interests in response to such notice, the notice to which they are entitled is the same. And because courts may issue temporary relief to a putative class, see 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions §4:30 (6th ed. 2022 and Supp. 2024), we need not decide whether a class should be certified as to the detainees' due process claims in order to temporarily enjoin the Government from removing putative class members while the question of what notice is due is adjudicated.



We recognize that the Government "has agreed to forgo removing the named petitioners pursuant to the AEA while

their habeas proceedings are pending.” Opposition to Emergency Application 11. But we reject the proposition

that a class-action defendant may defeat class treatment, if it is otherwise proper, by promising as a matter of grace to treat named plaintiffs differently. Cf. FBI v. Fikre, 601 U. S. 234, 241 (2024) (explaining that voluntary cessation

of challenged conduct does not moot a claim). And we are skeptical of the self-defeating notion that the right to the

notice necessary to "actually seek habeas relief,” J. G. G., 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3), must itself be vindicated through individual habeas petitions, somehow by plaintiffs who have not received notice.



* * *



The application for an injunction pending further proceedings is granted. The motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix under seal is also granted. Additionally, applicants suggested this Court treat the application as a8 A. A. R. P. v. TRUMP petition for a writ of certiorari; doing so, the petition is granted. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Fifth Circuit. In resolving the detainees' appeal, the Fifth Circuit should address (1) all the normal preliminary injunction factors, including likeli- hood of success on the merits, as to the named plaintiffs' underlying habeas claims that the AEA does not authorize their removal_ pursuant to the President's March 14, 2025, Proclamation, and (2) the issue of what notice is due, as to the putative class's due process claims against summary removal. The Government is enjoined from removing the named plaintiffs or putative class members in this action under the AEA pending order by the Fifth Circuit and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

The Government may remove the named plaintiffs or putative class members under other lawful authorities. It is so ordered.



See: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a1007_g2bh.pdf