United States of America v. Kylear Williams

Denver, Colorado, criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.

We must decide whether the Fourth Amendment permitted a protective
sweep of a car after the driver was arrested and handcuffed. Everyone agrees
that the police developed reasonable suspicion that the driver was armed and
dangerous. But with the arrest, any safety risks that the driver posed to the
officers ended. Still, the police conducted a protective sweep of the driver’s
area rather than let the passenger-owner leave it legally parked or drive it away.

Within seconds of beginning the sweep, officers recovered from under the
driver’s seat a loaded handgun and a magazine containing ammunition.
A federal grand jury indicted the driver for possessing ammunition after a
felony conviction. In response to the driver’s motion to suppress the firearm
and ammunition, the government argued that the protective sweep was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It contended that objectively
reasonable officers would have suspected that the passenger, too, was armed
and dangerous. To support this view, the government projected the driver’s
alarming criminal history and gang ties to the passenger. It argued that prudent
officers would reasonably suspect a passenger-girlfriend of a gang-associated
boyfriend as a threat to access a hidden weapon from inside the car and to use it
in a quixotic attempt to free him from four alert, armed officers.

The district court approved the protective sweep and denied the
suppression motion. Agreeing with the government, the court ruled that the
officers had reasonable suspicion that the girlfriend-passenger was armed and
dangerous. It relied solely on her “romantic relationship” with the boyfriend-
driver. But this amounts to a criminality-by-association test, when the
governing test instead requires that we consider the totality of circumstances.

The circumstances of this passenger include these: she produced a valid
driver’s license, current registration, and proof of insurance for her car; she
was polite, calm, and cooperative throughout the stop; and she committed no
crime and was not suspected of being involved in any.

* * *

he Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of “persons,
houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “vehicle is an ‘effect’
protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307 (quoting Byrd
v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 403 (2018)).
Courts recognize that the government has a “legitimate and weighty”
interest in officer safety. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356
(2015) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1983)).
Because traffic stops are inherently dangerous, police can order a driver and
passengers out of an automobile during a stop. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U.S. 408, 415 (1997). At the same time, courts do not ignore “the
countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional
rights fully protected.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 (2009).
Generally, warrantless searches are unreasonable, but this rule has
several exceptions. One such exception, and the one at issue here, allows
officers to perform protective sweeps of “areas in which a weapon may be
placed or hidden” if the police reasonably suspect that “a suspect poses a
danger and may gain immediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307.
Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 1213
In that instance, the police can sweep areas of the automobile from which the
returning occupant could immediately access a weapon. See Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983) (comparing a protective sweep in this circumstance
to a Terry stop because “if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any
weapons inside”).

Defendant committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of EIGHTEEN (18) MONTHS. Supervised Release of THREE (3) YEARS. Special Assessment of $100.00

We conclude that the protective search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Reversed.