United States of America v. Cesar Aguayo-Montes

Salt Lake City, Utah, criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with drug possession.

Before Cesar Aguayo-Montes (Aguayo) pleaded guilty to a drug charge, he
asked his attorney about the impact it would have on his immigration status. had lived in Colorado for as long as he could remember, so he was concerned about a
line in the plea agreement warning that he “may” be removed. Counsel said he
couldn’t tell Aguayo what would happen but that Aguayo didn’t need to worry about
it until he got to prison. Acting on that advice, Aguayo agreed to plead guilty to
possessing heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), a
controlled-substance offense that made his deportation practically inevitable.

After learning that his plea had all but sealed his immigration fate, Aguayo
filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. He alleged that his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his
attorney’s advice on the immigration consequences of his plea fell below the standard set in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The district court denied the motion, explaining that Aguayo couldn’t succeed on his challenge because he knew all he was entitled to know—that his plea exposed him to a risk of deportation. Aguayo appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas motion.

The Defendant pled guilty.

The Sixth Amendment required counsel to advise Aguayo that his plea made
him subject to automatic, presumptively mandatory, or practically inevitable
deportation. The equivocal and misleading advice counsel provided Aguayo—that he
“may” be deported but he “shouldn’t worry about it until after his plea”—fell below
the objective standard of reasonableness outlined in Padilla. We therefore reverse the district court’s determination that Aguayo failed to show deficient performance and remand for further proceedings.