Joseph Ebu v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, et al.

Lexington, Kentucky immigration lawyer represented the Plaintiff on a naturalization law issue.



Plaintiff Joseph Ebu, a lawful permanent resident, was subject to concurrent

naturalization and removal proceedings. Believing that the pending removal proceedings took

priority over his naturalization application, defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration

Services (USCIS) delayed considering Ebu's naturalization application until his removal

proceedings concluded. But when that delay exceeded 120 days following his naturalization

examination, Ebu asked the district court to "determine” his naturalization application and

declare him prima facie eligible for naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Relying on

our unpublished opinion in Rahman v. Napolitano, 385 F. App'x 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2010), the

district court dismissed Ebu's complaint under a separate provision that prohibits the

determination of a naturalization application while removal proceedings are pending, see

8 U.S.C. § 1429. Because Rahman is sound, we affirm the district court's dismissal and hold

that § 1429 precludes district courts from considering naturalization applications under § 1447(b)

while removal proceedings are simultaneously pending against the applicant.



In 2017, Ebu pleaded guilty in Kentucky state court to facilitating theft by deception and

fraudulent use of a credit card. The government asserts that these crimes involve "moral

turpitude” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and thus commenced removal proceedings against

Ebu.



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No. 24-5431 Ebu v. USCIS, et al. Page 4

"statutory language has meaning only in context.” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir.

2022) (brackets and citation omitted); see also Keen v. Helson, 930 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 2019)

(explaining that statutory interpretation is a "holistic endeavor,” in which context, structure, and

wording can all "help clarify the meaning of an isolated term” (citation omitted)). So "we must

take care not to interpret the language of a statute in a vacuum; instead, we must look to the

structure, history, and purpose of the statutory scheme.” Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d

429, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2019) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). And we must

interpret different sections of the immigration code as a harmonious whole, "making every effort

not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute

inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” Keeley v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 878, 884 (6th Cir.

2018) (citation omitted).

1.

We begin with the text of § 1429 and its surrounding provisions. "By its terms, § 1429

limits only the authority of 'the Attorney General' to act on applications for naturalization when

removal proceedings are pending against [the applicant].” Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 239

(2d Cir. 2008). But a neighboring provision, § 1447(b), speaks to the district court's role in

deciding naturalization applications: it affords district courts the power to determine these

applications when USCIS fails to do so within 120 days following an applicant's naturalization

examination. In other words, when USCIS (or "the Attorney General”) delays too long in

determining a naturalization application, § 1447(b) vests the district court with the power to

make that determination instead. Under a "harmonious reading” of those two provisions, where

either USCIS or the district court determines a naturalization application, § 1429's prioritization

of removal proceedings over naturalization proceedings applies to either decisionmaker. Cf.

Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 2010) ("A harmonious reading of § 1421(c) and

§ 1429 leads to the conclusion that [a noncitizen] has a statutory right to review of his

naturalization application, unless he is in removal proceedings.”); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Home

Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) ("[T]he words of a statute must be read in

their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” (citation omitted)).

Affirmed