United States of America v. Gregory Brown, et al.

Minneapolis, Minnesota criminal defense laweyrs represented the Defendants charged with federal felonies.



Defendants move for the disclosure of information pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). (Dkt. Nos. 1288,1291, 1314, 1320, 1331.)



The Court has already ordered the United States to disclose all exculpatory evidence-that is, evidence that favors a defendant or casts doubt on the United States' case, as required by Brady and its progeny. (Third Amended Pretrial Scheduling and Litigation Management Order at 9, Dkt. No. 666.) In addition, Brady is a constitutional obligation-the United States must disclose exculpatory information even in the absence of a court order. Given this legal landscape, the Court will deny the Brady and Giglio motions as moot.



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Several Defendants have moved to discover information pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. The Court has already ordered the United States to make all disclosures required by Rule 16(a) (Third Amended Pretrial Scheduling and Litigation Management Order at 9), but even if it had not, no court order is needed to obligate the United States to comply with its Rule 16 obligations so long as the defendant has requested disclosures under that rule. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1) ("Upon a defendant's request” the United States must disclose six specific types of evidence: defendant's prior oral statements, defendant's prior written or recorded statements, defendant's prior criminal record, certain types of documents and objects, certain test results, and expert reports). Motions for Rule 16 discovery are accordingly denied as moot.



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Mr. Walker moves for an order compelling the United States to disclose the identity of informants. (Dkt. No. 1301.) The government has a limited privilege to withhold the identity of its confidential informants. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the need for disclosure. United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1991). "[I]n order to override the government's privilege of nondisclosure, defendants must establish beyond mere speculation that the informant's testimony will be material to the determination of the case.” Id. Put differently, "[t]here must be some showing that the disclosure is vital to a fair trial.” United States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1992). When deciding whether the confidential informant's identity must be disclosed, courts must balance the defendant's needs against the public's strong interest in preserving the confidences of individuals who report crimes. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-62 (1956). Courts consider factors such as the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. Carpenter v. Lock, 257 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61); see also United States v. Lapsley, 263 F.3d 839, 841 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.”). "Where the witness is an active participant or witness to the offense charged, disclosure will almost always be material to the accused's defense.” Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201, 206 (8th Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Foster, 815 F.2d 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The disclosure of an informant who was an active participant in the crime the accused is charged with is generally required.”). By contrast, in cases involving "a 'tipster,' i.e., a person who merely conveys information but does not witness or participate in the offense,” disclosure is not vital to a fair trial and so is usually not required. United States v. Bourbon, 819 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 1987).

Motions denied.