Pythagorean, Inc. v. Grand Rapids Township

Defendant Grand Rapids Township appeals by leave granted an order of the circuit court
denying its motion for an order to block the depositions of its planning commission members.
We reverse.

In 1995, plaintiff filed an application with defendant to rezone plaintiff's property from
an R-1 (single family residential) to a C-1 (suburban neighborhood commercial) zoning
classification. Plaintiff sought the rezoning so that it could construct a combination of offices
and retail space on the property. Following a public hearing, defendant's planning commission
voted to recommend to defendant's board that the application be denied, which it did on October
24, 1995.

In 1996, plaintiff filed another application requesting that the property be rezoned to a
planned unit development classification that would allow neighborhood commercial uses.
Counsel for defendant advised that office use had been designated for the property by the master
plan since 1990 and that, therefore, defending continued zoning restrictions allowing only single
family residential use would be difficult. On its own initiative, the planning commission
scheduled a hearing on a proposal to rezone the property to a C-2 (suburban office use)
classification and, on May 27, 1997, the commission adopted that proposal. On July 1, 1997,
defendant's board adopted the planning commission's recommendation to rezone plaintiff's
property from R-1 to C-2.

Plaintiff thereafter brought suit against defendant alleging that the board had "arbitrarily,
capriciously, and without substantial or material basis" denied plaintiff's application to use the
property for commercial purposes. Plaintiff also sought compensation for inverse condemnation.

During the discovery period, plaintiff sought to take deposition testimony from the
members of both defendant's board and the planning commission in order to discover the reason
behind each member's decision regarding the subject rezoning. The trial court entered an order
prohibiting the depositions of board members but allowing depositions to be taken of planning
commission members. Defendant appeals that portion of the trial court's order allowing
deposition of its planning commission members. In doing so, defendant makes two arguments:
first, that the constitutional privilege against discovery recognized by our Court in Sheffield
Development Co v Troy, 99 Mich App 527; 298 NW2d 23 (1980) should extend beyond elected
legislators, like plaintiff's board, to others involved in the legislative process, i.e., the planning
commission members, and, second, that deposition discovery of the planning commission
members should be disallowed as irrelevant and unduly harassing.

We will not reach constitutional issues if cases may be resolved using other grounds.
Widdoes v Detroit Public Schools, 242 Mich App 403, 408 n 4; 619 NW2d 12 (2000).
Accordingly, because we conclude that defendant is correct in arguing that the deposition
discovery sought here would have been irrelevant and unduly harassing, we do not reach the
constitutional question raised.

In Sheffield, supra, our Court noted the longstanding rule that "‘[c]ourts are not
concerned with motives that actuate members of a legislative body in enacting a law, . . . .'" Id.
at 530, quoting People v Gibbs, 186 Mich 127, 134-135; 152 NW 1053 (1915). In other words,
the validity of a law has nothing to do with the motivation of the legislators who enact it; "[b]ad
motives might inspire a law which appeared on its face and proved valid and beneficial, while a
bad and invalid law might be, and sometimes is, passed with good intent and the best of
motives." Id.; see also People v Gardner, 143 Mich 104, 107; 106 NW 541 (1906) ("the legality
of the acts of legislative or corporate bodies cannot be tested by the motives of the individual
members" (internal quotations omitted)).

Thus, the motivation of legislators who actually enact or reject zoning proposals is
irrelevant to a determination of the validity of those actions. That being the case, we fail to see
how the motivation of members of a planning commission with respect to a zoning question can
have any relevance either. If anything, their motivation is even less relevant to a determination
of the validity of an approved zoning proposal; the planning commission, acting as a zoning
board, see MCL 125.331, only conducts hearings for the purposes of a recommendation to the
township board, which ultimately makes the final decision. See MCL 125.277, 125.284.

Plaintiff focuses on dicta from the Sheffield opinion that "[m]otive of the legislators may
be examined, however, when fraud, personal interest or corruption is alleged in the complaint."
Sheffield, supra at 531. Without considering whether that is a correct statement of the law,1 we note that defendant correctly points out that no such allegation of abuse of office has been made
with respect to the planning commission members at issue here. All that is alleged, which
defendant readily acknowledges, is that the planning commission acted on the advice of
township counsel in recommending that property be rezoned from an R-1 classification, to better
comply with the master plan. That certainly does not evidence any bad faith on the part of the
commission members. Neither does their action in recommending a C-2 classification for the
property, rather than the C-1 classification sought by plaintiff.

Plaintiff has simply come forward with no argument by which we could conclude that the
motivation or thought processes of the planning commission members in making their
recommendation to the board might be relevant or might reasonably be calculated to lead to the
discovery of any relevant evidence. See MCR 2.302(B)(1). Further, we note that the planning
commission members are volunteers who willingly give of their time and efforts for the good of
the community. Justice requires that they be protected from the annoyance and undue burden
and expense of deposition discovery that has no relevance to the issues involved in plaintiff's
complaint. See MCR 2.302(C).

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We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

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