Richard Eugene Glossip v. Oklahoma

In 1997, Justin Sneed beat Barry Van Treese to death with a baseball bat at an Oklahoma hotel owned by Van Treese and managed by peti-tioner Richard Glossip. Glossip initially made inconsistent statements to the police about Sneed's role in the murder, but he ultimately told police that Sneed admitted to killing Van Treese. Sneed later claimed Glossip had asked him to murder Van Treese because, among other things, Glossip had wanted to steal Van Treese's money. Glossip main-tained his innocence and refused a plea deal that would have had him avoid the death penalty in return for testifying against Sneed. Sneed then testified against Glossip at trial in exchange for avoiding the death penalty, and Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence con-necting Glossip to the murder. The jury convicted Glossip and sen-tenced him to death. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned that conviction because the defense had been inef-fective in challenging Sneed's testimony and the remainder of the evi-dence only weakly corroborated Sneed's account. At the retrial, Sneed provided inconsistent testimony on potential motives for Glossip's murder. Sneed also denied that he had been prescribed lithium or seen a psychiatrist. After the defense established (through the State's med-ical examiner) that Van Treese had been attacked with a knife as well as a bat, Sneed testified that he had repeatedly tried to stab Van Treese in the chest with a pocket knife. But Sneed had previously de-nied stabbing Van Treese both when questioned by the police as well as at Glossip's first trial. Glossip moved for a mistrial based on the prosecution's failure to notify the defense about Sneed's change in tes-timony, which the trial court denied after the prosecution disclaimed any knowledge about the change. Glossip was again convicted and sentenced to death, and a closely divided OCCA affirmed, holding that circumstantial evidence suggesting Glossip had mismanaged the hotel, combined with Glossip's concession that he had been dishonest in his initial statements after the murder, sufficiently corroborated Sneed's testimony that he killed Van Treese at Glossip's direction.



Glossip subsequently filed several unsuccessful habeas petitions. Concerns over the integrity of his conviction led a bipartisan group of Oklahoma legislators to commission an independent investigation by a law firm, Reed Smith. In June 2022, Reed Smith reported "grave doubt” about Glossip's conviction, citing factors such as the prosecu-tion's deliberate destruction of key evidence and the false portrayal of Justin Sneed as a non-violent "puppet.” The State then disclosed seven boxes of previously withheld documents, including letters suggesting Sneed had considered recanting and a note from prosecutor Connie Smothermon to Sneed's lawyer noting they should "get to” Sneed to discuss his problematic testimony about a knife found in Van Treese's room. Glossip filed for post-conviction relief based on this evidence and evidence revealed by Reed Smith. Glossip also argued that, during his second trial, Smothermon had interfered with Sneed's testimony about the knife in violation of the rule of sequestration, which prohibits wit-nesses from hearing each other's testimony. Oklahoma waived any procedural defenses to Glossip's claims, and asked the OCCA to deny the claims on their merits. The OCCA denied Glossip's claims as pro-cedurally barred and meritless.



The State then discovered additional documents revealing that Sneed had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lith-ium, contradicting his trial testimony. The attorney general deter-mined that Smothermon had knowingly elicited false testimony from Sneed and failed to correct it, violating Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, which held that prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to correct false testimony. Glossip filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, which the attorney general supported, conceding multiple errors that warranted a new trial. The OCCA denied the unopposed petition without a hearing, holding that Glossip's claims were procedurally barred under Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedures Act (PCPA), and further that the State's concession was not "based in law or fact” be-cause it did not create a Napue error. This Court stayed Glossip's ex-ecution and granted certiorari.

1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment. The independent and adequate state ground doctrine precludes the Court from considering a federal question if the state court’s decision rests on an independent and adequate state law ground. OCCA’s applica-tion of the PCPA was not such a ground, because the OCCA’s decision to apply the PCPA depended on its antecedent rejection of the attorney tion to correct false testimony. The attorney general ac-cordingly asked the court to grant Glossip a new trial. The OCCA declined to grant relief because, it held, the State’s concession was not “based in law or fact.” 2023 OK CR 5, ¶25, 529 P. 3d 218, 226. Because the prosecution violated its obligations under Napue, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for a new trial.