R.A. v. Mercy Hospitals East Communities, d/b/a Mercy Hospitals, et al.

St. Louis, Missouri personal injury medical malpractice lawyer represented the Plaintiff.



COMES NOW Plaintiff R.A., a minor, by and through his Next Friends and Natural

Parents Sarah Anyan and Blake Anyan, by and through his attorneys of record and for his Second

Amended Petition against Mercy Hospitals East Communities d/b/a Mercy Hospital St. Louis,

Mercy Clinic East Communities d/b/a Mercy Clinic Mercy OB/Gyn, and Dr. Daniel McNeive, and

states as follows:

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff is and was at all times mentioned herein a citizen and resident of the State

of Missouri.

2. Plaintiff is a minor child under the age of fourteen (14) years and brings these

claims and causes of action by and through his Natural Parents and Next Friends, Sarah Anyan

and Blake Anyan.

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Sarah Anyan is the natural mother of Plaintiff and Blake Anyan is the natural father

of Plaintiff and both are and were at all times mentioned herein citizens and residents of the State

of Missouri.

4. Sarah Anyan and Blake Anyan have previously been appointed as Next Friends to

Plaintiff for purposes of instituting and prosecuting this action.

5. Plaintiff's claim arises from medical and health care treatment that took place on

or about May 3, 2020 through May 4, 2020 at Defendant Mercy Hospitals East Communities d/b/a

Mercy Hospital St. Louis (hereinafter "Mercy Hospital”) located at 615 S. New Ballas Rd., Creve

Coeur, Missouri in the County of St. Louis, Missouri.

6. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Mercy Hospital was and is a benevolent

entity in good standing organized under the laws of the state of Missouri and can sue and be sued

in its own name.

7. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Mercy Hospital owned and operated a health

care facility located at 615 S. New Ballas Rd., Creve Coeur, Missouri 63141, known as Mercy

Hospital.

8. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Mercy Hospital employed the health care

providers who provided medical services to Mrs. Anyan and Plaintiff, including but not limited to:

Margaret Hilt-McLeland, RN, and Jessica Wagner (f/k/a Jessica Brown), RN (collectively "the

labor and delivery nurses”).

9. At all times relevant herein, the labor and delivery nurses were employees of

Defendant Mercy Hospital.

10. At all times relevant herein, the labor and delivery nurses were acting within the

scope and course of their employment with Defendant Mercy Hospital.

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11. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Mercy Hospital, through its agents and

employees, was engaged in the practice of medicine.

12. At all times relevant herein, there existed a health care provider/patient relationship

between Defendant Mercy Hospital and Mrs. Anyan and Plaintiff.

13. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Mercy Clinic East Communities d/b/a

Mercy Clinic Mercy OB/Gyn (hereinafter "Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn”) was and is a

benevolent entity in good standing organized under the laws of the state of Missouri and can sue

and be sued in its own name.

14. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn operated a health

care facility located at 621 S. New Ballas Rd. Suite 4017-B, Creve Coeur, Missouri 63141, known

as Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn.

15. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn employed a

physician who provided medical services to Mrs. Anyan and Plaintiff.

16. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn, through its agents

and employees, was engaged in the practice of medicine.

17. At all times relevant herein, there existed a doctor/patient relationship between

Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn and Mrs. Anyan and Plaintiff.

18. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Dr. Daniel McNeive (hereinafter

"Defendant Dr. McNeive”) was an agent of Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn.

19. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Dr. McNeive was acting within the scope

and course of his agency with Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn.

20. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Dr. McNeive was an employee of Defendant

Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn.

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21. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Dr. McNeive was acting within the scope

and course of his employment with Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn.

22. At all times relevant herein, there existed a doctor/patient relationship between

Defendant Dr. McNeive and Mrs. Anyan and Plaintiff.

23. At all times relevant herein, each defendant was acting as the agent and employee

of each and every other defendant.

24. Attorneys for Plaintiff have filed their Healthcare Affidavit against Defendants with

their previously filed Petitions.

VENUE

25. Venue is proper in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 508.010.4, because Plaintiff was first injured in St. Louis County, Missouri.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

26. On or about the afternoon of May 3, 2020, Mrs. Anyan presented to Mercy Hospital

for labor and delivery of Plaintiff with Category I strips and a ruptured membrane.

27. Plaintiff was Mrs. Anyan's first pregnancy.

28. At approximately 10:42 P.M. on May 3, 2020, an epidural was started.

29. At approximately 12:27 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Mrs. Anyan's Pitocin rate of

infusion was increased to 18 mL/hour.

30. Pitocin is a high-alert medication used to stimulate and strengthen contractions,

which can result in decreased oxygenation and blood flow to the fetus.

31. At approximately 3:50 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Mrs. Anyan was documented to be

10 centimeters dilated and 100% effaced, meaning she had entered the second stage of labor.

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32. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) defines the

second stage of labor as the time when the cervix becomes fully dilated and ends with the delivery

of the neonate.

33. ACOG has also previously defined, in part, a "prolonged second stage” of labor as

more than 3 hours with an epidural in women who have not given birth before.

34. A known risk of a prolonged second stage of labor is decreased oxygenation and

blood flow to the fetus.

35. It was also noted that Plaintiff was at "zero station”, meaning he was approximately

halfway down the birth canal, which approximately measures 10 centimeters in length.

36. "Station” refers to a fetus's progress down the birth canal.

37. Mrs. Anyan then began actively pushing for the first time.

38. After approximately 90 minutes of pushing, a nurse called for a "pushing

evaluation” by a physician.

39. At approximately 5:35 A.M., Resident Obstetrician Dr. Kelsey McKillip arrived at

Mrs. Anyan's bedside and documented that Plaintiff was at "zero station” and that caput (swelling

of the head) was present.

40. Dr. McKillip also documented that Plaintiff's positioning was "ROP with rotation

to ROA with maternal pushing efforts with rotation back to ROP upon cessation of pushing effort”.

41. "OP” (occipital posterior) and "OA” (occipital anterior) refer to the positioning of

the fetus's head, with "OA” being the best fit for delivery and "OP” being indicative of

malpositioning as the fetus will have more difficulty navigating the mother's pelvis.

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42. Dr. McKillip also documented that after 20 minutes of staying at the bedside

helping Mrs. Anyan push in multiple different positions, there was still "[m]inimal descent noted

with pushing.”

43. At approximately 6:00 A.M., Dr. McKillip instructed Mrs. Anyan to rest for half

an hour and then resume pushing in a different position.

44. Between approximately 6:40 A.M. to 9:45 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Mrs. Anyan

began actively pushing again.

45. At approximately 7:00 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Nurse Greenwald passed Mrs. Anyan

to Nurses Hilt-McLeland and Wagner.

46. From 7:30 AM to 8:00 AM, Nurse Brown stayed in Mrs. Anyan's room due to

concerns regarding noncontiguous tracings on the fetal monitoring strips ("FMS”).

47. FMS are classified as Category I ("reassuring”), Category II ("indeterminate”), and

Category III ("non-reassuring”).

48. At approximately 8 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Mrs. Anyan was seen by Defendant Dr.

McNeive.

49. At 8:00 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Defendant Dr. McNeive was aware that it was

documented that Mrs. Anyan had entered the second stage of labor more than four hours prior to

his examination.

50. At 8:00 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Defendant Dr. McNeive was aware of Dr.

McKillip's note documenting minimal descent, caput, and malpositioning.

51. At 8:00 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Defendant Dr. McNeive had an opportunity to

review the FMS showing Category I and Category II tracings.

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52. At 8:00 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Defendant Dr. McNeive was aware that Mrs. Anyan

had been continuously receiving Pitocin for several hours.

53. At 8:00 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Defendant Dr. McNeive chose to continue with the

original plan of care, namely a vaginal delivery instead of proceeding to C-section.

54. Between approximately 10:25 A.M. to 12:15 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Mrs. Anyan

was actively pushing.

55. At approximately 10:45 A.M. on May 4, 2020, Mrs. Anyan's chart was reviewed

during "Safety Rounds.”

56. At the Safety Rounds, 15 minutes of the FMS were reviewed with multiple

providers, including Defendant Dr. McNeive, and classified as "Category II”.

57. At the Safety Rounds, Defendant Dr. McNeive again chose to continue with the

original plan of care, namely a vaginal delivery instead of proceeding to C-section, despite Mrs.

Anyan's prolonged second stage of labor, which by this point was approaching seven hours.

58. At the Safety Rounds, Defendant Dr. McNeive also chose to continue with

administration of the continuously infusing Pitocin.

59. Per Mercy Policy on "Vaginal Birth Protocol”: "[i]f the fetal heart rate (FHR)

pattern is indeterminate (Category II) or abnormal (Category III), the following measures will be

initiated based on maternal-fetal response: [...] Discontinuation of oxytocin [Pitocin] if infusing”.

60. At approximately 12 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Nurse Hilt-McLeland and/or Nurse

Wagner charted decelerations on the fetal monitoring strip.

61. At approximately 1:35 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Mrs. Anyan began actively pushing

again, now more than nine and a half hours after first reaching the second stage of labor.

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62. At approximately 2:20 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Defendant Dr. McNeive returned to

Mrs. Anyan's bedside for the first time since his last visit at approximately 8:00 A.M.

63. At approximately 2:20 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Defendant Dr. McNeive recalled (but

did not document) that Plaintiff was now only +2 station despite Mrs. Anyan being in the second

stage of labor for over ten (10) hours.

64. At approximately 2:21 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Nurse Hilt-McLeland and/or Nurse

Wagner increased Mrs. Anyan's Pitocin to 20 mL/hour per Dr. McNeive's orders.

65. At approximately 2:44 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Nurse Hilt-McLeland and/or Nurse

Wagner increased Mrs. Anyan's Pitocin to 22 mL/hour per Dr. McNeive's orders.

66. At approximately 3:10 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Nurse Hilt-McLeland and/or Nurse

Wagner increased Mrs. Anyan's Pitocin to 24 mL/hour per Dr. McNeive's orders.

67. At approximately 3:56 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Nurse Hilt-McLeland and/or Nurse

Wagner increased Mrs. Anyan's Pitocin to 26 mL/hour per Dr. McNeive's orders.

68. At approximately 3:57 P.M. on May 4, 2020, Plaintiff's FMS showed Category III

"non-reassuring findings”.

69. At approximately 4:12 P.M. on May 4, 2020, the NICU was notified because Mrs.

Anyan had developed a fever of about 101.4 degrees Fahrenheit.

70. On or about May 4, 2020 at approximately 4:24 P.M., Plaintiff was delivered

vaginally and found to be "born floppy”, with poor tone and no cry, more than twelve hours after

Mrs. Anyan first entered the second stage of labor.

71. At approximately 6 hours of life, Plaintiff was observed to be having seizures.

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72. On or about May 5, 2020, Plaintiff underwent an EEG and was noted to have

seizure activity correlated with apneic spells and partial seizure activities originating mostly from

the right temporal area in the beginning of recording with attenuated left hemispheric amplitude.

73. On or about May 6, 2020, Plaintiff underwent a brain MRI, which revealed

abnormal findings most consistent with diffuse hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy.

74. Plaintiff remained in the NICU for 46 days due to poor feeding and irritability.

75. On or about August 17, 2020, Plaintiff underwent an EEG, which was suggestive

of cortical dysfunction and tendency of multifocal onset seizures.

76. On or about November 23, 2020, Plaintiff underwent an additional EEG, the

findings of which were consistent with an epileptic encephalopathy.

77. Plaintiff has been diagnosed with moderate hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy and

seizures.

78. Plaintiff's treating neurologist, Dr. Judith Weisenberg, has documented that

Plaintiff is at high risk for neurodevelopmental disability including cerebral palsy and has global

developmental delay including concern for cortical visual impairment and microcephaly.

COUNT I

(Medical Negligence v. Mercy Hospitals East Communities d/b/a Mercy Hospital St. Louis)

79. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if fully set

forth herein.

80. During Plaintiff's care and treatment by Defendant Mercy Hospital, Defendant

owed a duty to Plaintiff to use that degree of skill and learning ordinarily used by skillful, careful

and prudent members of the medical profession in providing medical services.

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81. Defendant, by and through its employees, agents and/or representatives, including

the labor and delivery nurses, breached this duty owed to Plaintiff in one or more of the following

respects:

a. Failed to administer appropriate doses of medications, including Pitocin, during

Mrs. Anyan's second stage of labor;

b. Failed to sufficiently monitor Mrs. Anyan during her second stage of labor;

c. Failed to appreciate Mrs. Anyan's failure to progress during her second stage

of labor;

d. Failed to communicate with a physician regarding Mrs. Anyan's failure to

progress during her second stage of labor;

e. Failed to appreciate the non-reassuring fetal heart rate patterns during Mrs.

Anyan's second stage of labor;

f. Failed to communicate with a physician regarding the non-reassuring fetal heart

rate patterns during Mrs. Anyan's second stage of labor;

g. Failed to appreciate the signs of fetal deterioration during Mrs. Anyan's second

stage of labor;

h. Failed to communicate with a physician regarding the signs of fetal

deterioration during Mrs. Anyan's second stage of labor;

i. Failed to appreciate Mrs. Anyan's prolonged second stage of labor;

j. Failed to communicate with a physician regarding Mrs. Anyan's prolonged

second stage of labor;

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k. Failed to timely, adequately and properly evaluate the size, shape, and

progression of Plaintiff so as to determine whether Plaintiff could be safely

delivered vaginally;

l. Failed communicate with a physician regarding the need for a C-section

delivery; and

m. Such further and other breaches of the standard of care as discovery and the

evidence reveal.

82. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid occurrences and the carelessness

and negligence of Defendant, by and through its employees, as aforesaid, Plaintiff suffered an HIE

that has caused permanent injuries, including neurodevelopmental delays and physical injuries.

83. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has sustained and

will sustain both economic and non-economic losses, including but not limited to past and future

medical expenses and loss of earning capacity.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, by and through his Next Friends and Natural Parents Sarah

Anyan and Blake Anyan, pray for judgment against Defendant Mercy Hospitals East Communities

d/b/a Mercy Hospital St. Louis, jointly and severally, in an amount in excess of Twenty-Five

Thousand Dollars ($25,000) which is fair, just and reasonable together with his costs herein

expended and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just under the circumstances.

COUNT II

(Medical Negligence v. Mercy Clinic East Communities d/b/a Mercy Clinic Mercy OB/Gyn)

84. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if fully set

forth herein.

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85. During Plaintiff's care and treatment by Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn,

Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to use that degree of skill and learning ordinarily used by

skillful, careful and prudent members of the medical profession in providing medical services.

86. Defendant, by and through its employees, agents and/or representatives, including

but not limited to Defendant Dr. McNeive, breached this duty owed to Plaintiff in one or more of

the following respects:

a. Failed to sufficiently monitor Mrs. Anyan during her labor;

b. Failed to appreciate and/or act upon non-reassuring fetal heart rate patterns;

c. Failed to perform the appropriate procedure indicated by Plaintiff's weight,

gestational age and delay in descent and delivery;

d. Failed to timely, adequately and properly evaluate the size, shape, and

progression of Plaintiff so as to determine whether Plaintiff could be safely

delivered vaginally;

e. Failed to timely perform the subject delivery;

f. Failed to schedule Mrs. Anyan for a cesarean section delivery;

g. Failed to perform a C-section delivery;

h. Failed to order and/or administer appropriate medications and/or appropriate

doses of medications;

i. Failed to appropriately assess, monitor and/or resuscitate Plaintiff after he was

born; and

j. Such further and other breaches of the standard of care as discovery and the

evidence reveal.

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87. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid occurrences and the carelessness

and negligence of Defendant as aforesaid, Plaintiff suffered an HIE that has caused permanent

injuries, including neurodevelopmental delays and physical injuries.

88. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has sustained and

will sustain both economic and non-economic losses, including but not limited to past and future

medical expenses and loss of earning capacity.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, by and through his Next Friends and Natural Parents Sarah

Anyan and Blake Anyan, pray for judgment against Defendant Mercy Clinic OB/Gyn, jointly and

severally, in an amount in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000) which is fair, just

and reasonable together with his costs herein expended and for such other and further relief as the

Court deems just under the circumstances.

COUNT III

(Medical Negligence v. Dr. Daniel McNeive)

89. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if fully set

forth herein.

90. During Plaintiff's care and treatment by Defendant Dr. McNeive, Defendant owed

a duty to Plaintiff to use that degree of skill and learning ordinarily used by skillful, careful and

prudent members of the medical profession in providing medical services.

91. Defendant breached this duty owed to Plaintiff in one or more of the following

respects:

a. Failed to sufficiently monitor Mrs. Anyan during her labor;

b. Failed to appreciate and/or act upon non-reassuring fetal heart rate patterns;

c. Failed to perform the appropriate procedure indicated by Plaintiff's weight,

gestational age and delay in descent and delivery;

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d. Failed to timely, adequately and properly evaluate the size, shape, and

progression of Plaintiff so as to determine whether Plaintiff could be safely

delivered vaginally;

e. Failed to timely perform the subject delivery;

f. Failed to schedule Mrs. Anyan for a cesarean section delivery;

g. Failed to perform a C-section delivery;

h. Failed to order and/or administer appropriate medications and/or appropriate

doses of medications;

i. Failed to appropriately assess, monitor and/or resuscitate Plaintiff after he was

born; and

j. Such further and other breaches of the standard of care as discovery and the

evidence reveal.

92. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid occurrences and the carelessness

and negligence of Defendant as aforesaid, Plaintiff suffered an HIEs that has caused permanent

injuries, including neurodevelopmental delays and physical injuries.

93. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has sustained and

will sustain both economic and non-economic losses, including but not limited to past and future

medical expenses and loss of earning capacity.

94. The conduct of Defendant Dr. McNeive as described above demonstrates that he

intentionally caused damage to Plaintiff or demonstrated malicious misconduct that caused

damage to Plaintiff, thereby justifying an award of punitive damages in such sum, which will serve

to punish Defendant and to deter Defendant and others from like conduct in the future.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, by and through his Next Friends and Natural Parents Sarah

Anyan and Blake Anyan, pray for judgment against Defendant Dr. Daniel McNeive, jointly and

severally, in an amount in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000) which is fair, just

and reasonable together with his costs herein expended and for such other and further relief as the

Court deems just under the circumstances.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

95. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained

in this Petition as though fully set forth herein.

96. House Bill 393 and numerous particular provisions therein, which became effective

on August 28, 2005, and which purport to apply to this case, violate the Missouri Constitution and

are therefore invalid and without legal effect, as more fully discussed herein.

97. House Bill 393 violates the requirements in Article III, Section 23 of the Missouri

Constitution that a bill have only a single subject and that the subject be clearly expressed in its

title. The title of HB393 purports to repeal various statutes and enact in lieu thereof twenty-three

new sections relating to claims for damages and the payment thereof. This title is

unconstitutionally under-inclusive because the bill addresses multiple subject and because some

of the provisions enacted under the bill relate to claims other than claims for damages.

98. Section 490.715 R.S.Mo., which purports to transfer from the jury to the court the

authority to determine the value of medical treatment rendered to plaintiff, violates the Plaintiff's

right to trial by jury as guaranteed by Article I, Section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution, because

the right to trial by jury as provided for in the Constitution includes the right to have a jury

determine all of Plaintiff's damages without interference by the legislature.

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99. Section 537.067 R.S.Mo., which purports to eliminate joint and several liability of

tortfeasors who are found to bear less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the fault for Plaintiff's

injuries, and to prohibit any party from disclosing the impact of this provision to the jury, violates:

a. Plaintiff's right to due process of law, guaranteed by the Article 1, Section 10 of

the Missouri Constitution, because it may unreasonably deprive Plaintiff of full

compensation for her injuries; and

b. Plaintiff's right to a certain remedy for every injury, guaranteed by Article I,

Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution, because the statute fails to provide a

reasonable substitute for the damages denied to Plaintiff under the statute.

100. Furthermore, application of 537.067 R.S.Mo., which purports to eliminate joint and

several liability of tortfeasors who are found to bear less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the fault

for Plaintiff's injuries, and to prohibit any party from disclosing the impact of this provision to the

jury, would violate the proscription against retroactive laws found in Article I, Section 13.

101. Section 538.210, R.S.Mo., as amended on August 28, 2017, which purports to

abolish the common law cause of action for medical malpractice and to replace said cause of action

with a legislatively created cause of action, which among other things attempts to limit Plaintiff's

recovery for noneconomic damages against a health care provider in an action for damages for

personal injury or death arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render health care services,

is unconstitutional as declared by the Missouri Supreme Court in Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical

Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. banc 2012). Further, it violates:

a. Plaintiff's right to equal protection of the law, guaranteed by Article I, Section 2 of

the Missouri Constitution;

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b. Plaintiff's right to due process of law, guaranteed by Article, Section 10 of the

Missouri Constitution;

c. Plaintiff's right to a certain remedy for every injury, guaranteed by Article I,

Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution;

d. Plaintiff's right to trial by jury, guaranteed by Article I, Section 22(a) of the

Missouri Constitution;

e. The separation of powers, established by Article II, Section I of the Missouri

Constitution; and

f. The prohibition against special laws granting to any corporation, association or

individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity, established by

Article II, Section 40(28) of the Missouri Constitution.

102. Section 538.300, R.S.Mo., which purports to exempt tort claims against health care

providers from the statutory requirements for payment of post-judgment interest set forth in

Section 408.040, R.S.Mo., violated Plaintiff's rights to equal protection of the law, guaranteed by

Article I, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution and the prohibition against special laws granting

to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity,

established by Article III, Section 40(28) of the Missouri Constitution.

103. Senate Bill 591 and numerous particular provisions therein, which became effective

on August 28, 2020, and which purport to apply to this case, violate the Missouri Constitution and

are therefore invalid and without legal effect, as more fully discussed herein.

104. Section 510.261, R.S.Mo., which purports to prohibit Plaintiff from making a claim

for punitive damages in an initial pleading, violates the separation of powers of Article V, Section

5, of the Missouri Constitution, which provides that Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri "may

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be annulled or amended in whole or in part by a law limited to the purpose.” Section 510.261,

R.S.Mo., purports to annul or amend at least Rule 55.19, which, in actions where punitive damages

are recoverable, "the petition shall state separately the amount of such damages” or "the prayer

shall be for such damages that are fair and reasonable.”

105. The remaining provisions of Senate Bill 591 are essential to and inseparably

connected with Section 510.261, R.S.Mo., and any remaining valid provisions of Senate Bill 591

are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent of Senate

Bill 591. Accordingly, Section 510.261, R.S.Mo., is not severable from Senate Bill 591, and the

remaining provisions of Senate Bill 591 also violate the Missouri Constitution.

Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.