Eberaia D. Fields v. State of Indian

Indianapolis, IN - Criminal Defense lawyer represented defendant with a operating a vehicle while intoxicated charge.

In February 2018, the State commenced Cause Number 09D01-1802-F6-64

("F6-64”). It charged Fields with operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a

Level 6 felony, operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as a

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A-CR-2469 | May 6, 2022 Page 3 of 10

Level 6 felony, and resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor.

Fields also received an HVSO enhancement. Then, in April 2021, the State

initiated Cause Number 09D01-2104-F6-79 ("F6-79”), charging Fields with

operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction within seven years

as a Level 6 felony and resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony. Also, the

State alleged that Fields was an HVSO. For the purposes of disposition, the

trial court combined these two cases.

[4] At the combined plea and sentencing hearing, the court dismissed the operating

a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person charge from F6-64. Then, in

both F6-64 and F6-79, Fields pleaded guilty to the remaining charges. For F6-

64, the trial court sentenced Fields to two years for operating a vehicle while

intoxicated and one year for the resisting law enforcement conviction. It

enhanced the convictions by six years due to Fields's HVSO status.

[5] Then, as to F6-79, the trial court sentenced Fields to two years for operating a

vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction within seven years and two

years for resisting law enforcement, which were also enhanced by six years due

to Fields being an HVSO. It also ordered the total sentence for F6-79 to run

concurrently to the total sentence for F6-64 so that the total period of

incarceration would be ten years. Fields now appeals.

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Discussion and Decision

I. Kosciusko County Sentence

[6] Fields first argues the trial court erred by not "offsetting” his concurrent HVSO

enhancements in F6-64 and F6-79 against his earlier HVSO sentence in a

Kosciusko Superior Court case under Cause Number 43D03-1510-F6-642 ("F6-

642”). Although the record here is not clear as to what the Kosciusko Superior

Court ordered in F6-642, it appears it may have directed that Fields's HVSO

enhancement there must be served consecutively to his sentence in F6-64 once

that later sentence was imposed. Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 35–36; Tr. Vol. 2 at

36–40. But since F6-64 had not yet progressed to disposition, the Kosciusko

Superior Court could not order the sentences to run consecutively. See Reaves v.

State, 586 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind. 1992) (stating that a trial court may not

withhold judgment, indefinitely postpone sentencing, or impose sentences that

begin in futuro). Regardless, that alleged error from an earlier, separate

sentencing is not before us in the appeal of this case.

1

Instead, Fields's remedy

lies in the Kosciusko Superior Court.

1 The trial court lacked the authority to review the Kosciusko Superior Court's alleged error. See State v.

Downey, 14 N.E.3d 812, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) ("The rule is quite well settled, that one court cannot

control the execution of the orders or process of any other court of equal jurisdiction.” (quotation marks

omitted)), trans. denied. Therefore, under Indiana Appellate Rules 5(A) and 9(A)(1), the issue is not before us

for our review.

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II. Abuse of Discretion2

[7] Trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing a

sentence for a felony offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.

2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The statement must

include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court's reasons for imposing

a particular sentence. Id. If the recitation includes a finding of aggravating or

mitigating factors, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating

and aggravating factors and explain why each factor has been determined to be

mitigating or aggravating. Id. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound

discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of

discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is "clearly against

the logic and effect of the facts and [factors] before the court, or the reasonable,

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

[8] A trial court may abuse its discretion by entering a sentencing statement which

omits mitigating factors that are clearly supported by the record and advanced

for consideration. Id. at 490–91. Because the trial court no longer has any

2 We note that Fields seems to conflate two separate sentencing standards: whether the trial court abused its

discretion in identifying mitigating and aggravating factors and whether his sentence is inappropriate

pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7. "As our Supreme Court has made clear, inappropriate sentence and

abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App.

2008). Accordingly, "an inappropriate sentence analysis does not involve an argument that the trial court

abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant.” Id. While Fields uses some language typical of an

inappropriate sentence claim, he has failed to develop his argument or provide citations to authorities. See

Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). As such, he has waived this claim for our review. See Shepherd v. Truex, 819

N.E.2d 457, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding appellant waived claim by failing to present cogent

argument).

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obligation to "weigh” aggravating and mitigating factors against each other

when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its

discretion in failing to "properly weigh such factors.” Id. at 491. Once the trial

court has entered a sentencing statement, which may or may not include the

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, it may then "impose any sentence

that is . . . authorized by statute; and . . . permissible under the Constitution of

the State of Indiana.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d).

A. Mitigating Factors

[9] Fields argues the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him because

it failed to consider his efforts to rehabilitate, acceptance of responsibility and

remorse, and strong support system as mitigating factors.

[10] The finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory and rests within the trial

court's discretion. Storey v. State, 875 N.E.2d 243, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),

trans. denied. "The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's

arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor.” Id. Additionally, the

trial court is not required to attribute the same weight to proffered mitigating

factors as the defendant does. Id. Nonetheless, the trial court may not ignore

factors in the record that would mitigate an offense. Id. To fail to find

mitigating factors which are clearly supported by the record may imply the trial

court did not consider those factors. Id. To prevail upon appeal, the defendant

must establish a mitigating factor is both significant and clearly supported by

the record. Id.

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[11] Fields, in one sentence, asserts that the trial court did not consider three

mitigating factors—his efforts to rehabilitate, acceptance of responsibility and

remorse, and strong support system. While he summarily states these factors

are supported by the record, he offers no further argument as to how they are

significant in light of the sentence the trial court imposed. Therefore, this

argument is waived under Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), which requires

that contentions in an appellant's brief be supported by developed reasoning

and citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record on

appeal. See Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)

(concluding appellant waived claim by failing to present cogent argument).

[12] Regardless, Fields's argument fails. First, the record demonstrates that Fields's

family and social support were assessed as moderate—not high or strong. Tr. at

50; Appellant's Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 77. Next, it is not enough that Fields's

efforts to rehabilitate and his acceptance of responsibility and remorse were

supported by the record at sentencing. Tr. 12, 38, 75–76. Instead, to prevail

upon appeal, the defendant must also establish that the mitigating evidence is

significant. Storey, 875 N.E.2d at 252. Fields has not done so here.

B. Aggravating Factors

[13] Fields also argues the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him

because the aggravating factors the trial court identified—Fields's prior

convictions—were "inherently . . . included in the charges [pleaded] by [Fields]

and . . . should not have been levied against [him] as aggravating factors.”

Appellant's Br. at 14. In raising this argument, Fields emphasizes that he

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admitted to operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction within

seven years and being an HVSO. But he does not cite to any authority or offer

any detailed explanation to support this argument. Consequently, as with his

argument regarding mitigating factors, he has waived this argument under

Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). See Shepherd, 819 N.E.2d at 483 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2004).

[14] Waiver notwithstanding, we do not find Fields's argument persuasive. "The

significance of criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number

of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Maffett v. State, 113 N.E.3d

278, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). At sentencing, the trial court emphasized that

Fields has an extensive criminal history. Specifically, Fields has thirty-seven

misdemeanor convictions and six felony convictions—many of which are

alcohol-related or driving violations. Also, to the extent that Fields complains

his criminal history was used both to enhance the convictions at issue and as an

aggravating factor, that is not improper. In Pedraza v. State, 887 N.E.2d 77, 80–

81 (Ind. 2008), our Supreme Court concluded that because trial courts no

longer "enhance” sentences under the advisory statutory scheme, using a

material element of a crime as an aggravating factor—here, a prior operating a

vehicle while intoxicated conviction—is "no longer an inappropriate double

enhancement.” Id. at 80.

[15] Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused

its discretion in considering Fields's criminal history as an aggravating factor.

Moreover, we note that we do not find Fields's brief argument that the trial

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court "unreasonabl[y]” balanced the mitigators and aggravators persuasive.

Appellant's Br. at 14. Because a trial court is no longer required to identify and

weigh mitigators and aggravators upon rendering a sentence and may, instead,

impose any sentence authorized by law after it enters its sentencing statement,

"the relative weight ascribed by the trial court to any” mitigators or aggravators

"is no longer subject to our review.” Salhab v. State, 153 N.E.3d 298, 304 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2020).

[16] In sum, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing

Fields.

III. Sentencing Order

[17] As the State acknowledges, remand is necessary for a different reason.

Appellee's Br. at 17. "[I]t is well-settled that a habitual offender finding does

not constitute a separate crime nor result in a separate sentence, but rather

results in a sentence enhancement imposed upon the conviction of a subsequent

felony.” Weekly v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1133, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)

(quotations marks omitted and alterations adopted), trans. denied. Here, the trial

court's sentencing order mistakenly treats Fields's HVSO enhancements in F6-

64 and F6-79 as separate sentences. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 110, 133;

Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 71, 93. We therefore reverse the portions of the

sentencing orders directing that Fields's HVSO enhancements run as separate,

consecutive sentences to his underlying felony convictions and remand with

instructions to correct the order consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions