Raminder Kaur v. Warden, Maryland Correctional Institution for Women

Baltimore, Maryland criminal defense lawyers represented the Defendant seeking a writ of habeas corpus.



It would be "intolerable” to require a criminal defendant to surrender "one

constitutional right . . . in order to assert another.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,

394 (1968). Yet that is what Raminder Kaur asserts occurred here. After her first criminal

trial in Maryland state court was marred by ineffective assistance of counsel, Kaur moved

successfully to set aside the verdict. During the proceedings on her motion for a new trial,

the trial court ordered Kaur to turn over a significant amount of material to the State. That

material included attorney work product and attorney-client privileged communications

which revealed the existence of evidence previously unknown to the State. Kaur also

testified in support of her motion and was subjected to a lengthy cross-examination.

The trial court declined to issue a protective order barring the State from relying

upon the privileged material Kaur was ordered to produce during the motion for a new trial.

The trial court also permitted the State to use the same prosecution team that opposed

Kaur's motion for a new trial in her second trial. The trial court also left open the possibility

that the State could use Kaur's testimony from the proceedings on her motion for a new

trial to cross-examine her if she took the stand in her own defense. The second jury

convicted Kaur once again.



On direct appeal from that conviction, the Maryland appellate court assumed that

the trial court had erred by allowing the State to use the same prosecution team and to use

knowledge it had gained during the motion for a new trial against Kaur in her second trial.

Rather than order a third trial, however, the appellate court determined that Kaur suffered

no prejudice either from the State's use of the new evidence or from the threat that the State4

might be able to use Kaur's testimony in the motion proceedings against her if she took the

stand. Both conclusions were objectively unreasonable.



The State relied heavily on the new, privileged evidence it obtained during the

proceedings on Kaur's motion for a new trial in prosecuting Kaur a second time, and that

new evidence harmed Kaur's defense. In addition, the possibility that the State might use

Kaur's motion testimony to impeach her if she took the stand in her second trial also clearly

harmed Kaur's defense. It effectively prevented her from testifying, including about

significant exculpatory evidence.



Though we conclude that the Maryland appellate court's determination was

objectively unreasonable, we cannot grant Kaur's habeas petition at this point. Because the

Maryland appellate court merely assumed (but did not conclude) that a constitutional right

was violated, we vacate and remand to the district court to determine in the first instance

whether a constitutional violation occurred.

The District Court denied relief.



Vacated and remanded.