Richard Hicks and Jocelyn Hicks v. Gregory Middleton, et al.

Savannah, Georgia, personal injury lawyers represented the Plaintiff on an auto negligence claim.



This case arose from a collision that occurred on November

7, 2020 at the Port of Savannah (the "Port”) in Savannah, Georgia.

The Hickses alleged that, while Richard Hicks was working as a

longshoreman3 on the Port, fellow longshoreman Middleton

struck him with his personal vehicle as Hicks stood alongside an-

other car. The Hickses sought to hold Middleton personally liable

and Ports America vicariously liable for Richard's injuries and other

monetary damages.



Ports America is one of three stevedoring companies that

employs longshoremen to perform cargo operations. The Port

where Hicks and Middleton worked is owned, operated, and con-

trolled by the Georgia Ports Authority ("GPA”). However, private

companies like Ports America perform cargo operations at the

Port.



Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, International

Longshoreman's Association Local 1414 ("ILA 1414”) provides

workers to Ports America and the other stevedoring companies.

Each working day, members of ILA 1414 hold meetings at a union

hall located off-site from the Port, during which longshoremen are

hired to work for the stevedoring companies like Ports America.

The meetings are held exactly one hour before the time set for

cargo operations to begin.



After being selected for employment, longshoremen then

drive from the union hall to the Port, which takes approximately

fifteen minutes. Upon arriving at the Port, longshoremen must

present credentials at the security gate showing that they have been

dispatched to work that day before they will be allowed on the

Port's premises. An agreement between ILA 1414 and the steve-

doring companies expressly prohibits anyone who has not been dis-

patched to work that day from coming upon the Port's premises,

and anyone found on Port premises "who is not employed by” one

of the stevedoring companies is subject to a fifteen-day suspension.

Once within the Port, longshoremen must complete several

tasks (the "pre-ship duties”) before they are permitted to begin

working on a ship. Among other pre-ship duties that must be com-

pleted before cargo operations commence, longshoremen are re-

quired to obtain documents called "game plans,” which show the

manner and order in which cargo will be unloaded and loaded on

the assigned ship. Ports America creates the game plans "in ad-

vance so the work can be done more efficiently,” and

longshoremen usually retrieve the game plans from the "dock

house” located nearest to the "cargo berth” ("CB”) where the as-

signed ship is docked. There are four or five dock houses at the

Port, and the CBs are designated in numerical order from CB1 to

CB9 along the edge of the Port closest to the water. Because GPA

does not allow individuals to walk on Port premises, those who

work at the Port generally must drive their personal vehicles while

inside.



According to Ports America's corporate representative, re-

trieving the game plans is part of the "whole job” of being a long-

shoreman. Nevertheless, longshoremen are not paid for the time

it takes them to retrieve the game plans. Indeed, the pay period for

longshoremen does not start until the commencement of cargo op-

erations, at which point they must have completed all their pre-

ship duties.



On the day that Hicks was injured, Middleton drove to the

Port and arrived approximately twenty-three minutes before cargo

operations were set to begin. While driving through the Port to

obtain his game plans, Middleton crossed the center line of the

roadway, entered the wrong lane of travel, and struck Hicks. The

incident occurred behind the dock house located nearest to CB8,

but Middleton had actually been assigned to work on a ship docked

at CB4.



When asked why he had driven past the dock house nearest

to his assigned ship, Middletoen stated that he thought he had been

assigned to a ship docked "somewhere between” CB7 and CB9. He

testified that he had been driving to the dock house "[f]or the pur-

pose of picking up” his game plans when the accident occurred, and

he also planned to heat up his lunch while at the dock house. Tests

conducted after the incident revealed that Middleton had been

driving while impaired by fentanyl and other drugs.



Because Middleton never reported to his assigned ship, Ports

America did not pay him for any work performed that day. Mid-

dleton testified, however, that he had "already been hired” by Ports

America when the incident occurred and confirmed that work was

the only reason he was at the Port that day. Ports America's cor-

porate representative likewise confirmed that when Middleton

"was hired in the [union] hall, he was hired to work for Ports America.”



* * *



In evaluating an employer's liability where an employee

commits a tort while driving, Georgia courts adhere to "a

longstanding general rule that an employee is engaged in a purely

personal matter while commuting to . . . work,” thus precluding li-

ability against the employer for torts arising during the employee's

commute. Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Naville-Saeger, 834 S.E.2d 875,

878–79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). An employer likewise cannot be held

liable under Georgia law where an employee deviates from a "nor-

mal route” and completely departs from the scope of employment

to engage in a purely personal pursuit like driving to a restaurant

on a lunch break. See Elliot v. Leavitt, 178 S.E.2d 268,

274 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970) (explaining that an employee's complete

departure from the scope of employment will exonerate an em-

ployer from liability as a matter of law). However,

[w]here the evidence shows that the employee was

not taking the shortest or most direct route for the

performance of the duties of his employ-

ment, . . . whether the deviation was so substantial as

to constitute a departure from the employment, or

whether he was nevertheless acting within the scope

of his employment, is generally a question of fact for

the jury.



Davis Gas Co. v. Powell, 232 S.E.2d 258, 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976);

see also Prodigies Child Care Mgmt., 893 S.E.2d at 653 (Peterson, P.J.,

concurring) ("[T]he question of when mid-commute work-related

activity rises to the level of scope and furtherance will almost al-

ways be for a jury to decide.”).

Defendant motion for summary judgment granted.



Reversed