Melynda Vincent v. Pamela J. Bondi

Salt Lake City, Utah civil rights lawyers represented the Plaintiff who sought to invalidate 18 U.S.C. 922(g(1).



Ms. Melynda Vincent sued the Attorney General, claiming that the

Second Amendment entitles her to possess firearms. We rejected this claim

and dismissed the action. Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197, 1200–02 (10th

Cir. 2023). But the Supreme Court vacated our dismissal and remanded for

reconsideration in light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

Vincent v. Garland, 144 S. Ct. 2708 (2024) (mem.). 1 Given this remand,

we've freshly considered the Second Amendment claim and conclude that

Rahimi doesn't undermine the panel's earlier reasoning or result.



Ms. Vincent was convicted of bank fraud, a federal felony. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1344. This conviction triggered 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits

individuals with felony convictions from possessing firearms. Ms. Vincent

claims that the Second Amendment prohibits application of § 922(g)(1) to

nonviolent offenders like herself.



3

2. Our precedent renders this prohibition constitutional.

We addressed a similar constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) in

United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009). There we held

that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment. Id. at 1047. A

precedent like McCane would generally bind us when addressing the same

issue. United States v. Salazar, 987 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir. 2021). But

an exception exists when the Supreme Court has indisputably and

pellucidly abrogated our precedent. Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134,

1147 (10th Cir. 2015).



Ms. Vincent argues that the Supreme Court abrogated McCane in

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). In a non-precedential

opinion, we rejected Ms. Vincent's reading of Rahimi. United States v.

Curry, 2024 WL 3219693, at *4 n.7 (10th Cir. June 28, 2024)

(unpublished). We do so again.

Ms. Vincent argues, however, that the Second Amendment protects

nonviolent offenders like herself. But this argument is unavailable under

McCane. There we upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) without

drawing constitutional distinctions based on the type of felony involved.

See In re: United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009)

(unpublished) (stating that McCane had “rejected the notion that Heller

mandates an individualized inquiry concerning felons pursuant to

§ 922(g)(1)”) 3; accord United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1125 (8th

Cir. 2024) (concluding “that there is no need for felony-by-felony

litigation regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)”). McCane instead

upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) for all individuals convicted of

felonies. See p. 3, above. Under McCane, the Second Amendment doesn’t

prevent application of § 922(g)(1) to nonviolent offenders like

Ms. Vincent. So we readopt our prior opinion and affirm the dismissal.