Tampa., Florida - Divorce lawyer represented Appellant with appealing the final judgment dissolving her marriage.

After seven years of marriage, Former Wife petitioned to

dissolve the marriage. The parties have an eight-year-old daughter

diagnosed with autism.

A Marital Settlement Agreement resolved most of the parties'

legal issues. The trial court entered a partial final judgment and

scheduled a July 2020 final hearing to address "[t]he remaining

issues of child support, parental responsibility[,] and time-share

[sic]." Before the final hearing, the parties agreed upon child

support, shared parental responsibility, and equal time-sharing.

And so, the final hearing dealt with the outstanding issue of

the child's schooling. See D.M.J. v. A.J.T., 190 So. 3d 1129, 1132

(Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("Where the final judgment reserves jurisdiction

to determine school enrollment and the parties are unable to agree

on the minor child's school, they are required to obtain a court

order on the issue. 'In such a circumstance, the court must resolve

the impasse by determining the best interests of the child.' " (first

citing and then quoting Dickson v. Dickson, 169 So. 3d 287, 289–90

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(Fla. 5th DCA 2015))); e.g., Otto-Jones v. Jones, 69 So. 3d 986, 987

(Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing an order requiring the parties' child to

spend half the school year in private school and half in public

school because "there was no evidence that this rotating school

schedule [wa]s in the best interest of the child"); Norris v. Norris,

926 So. 2d 485, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (reversing an order

requiring placement of the parties' children in public school

because the record did not support the contention that the public

school was in the children's best interests).

Former Wife homeschooled the child since the child was four

years old. Former Wife requested that the trial court continue

home schooling for at least the next school year, after which she

proposed enrolling the child in "a private school that can

accommodate her . . . special . . . and unique needs." At the final

hearing, Former Wife observed that the new school year was

scheduled to start in a matter of weeks. Consequently, in Former

Wife's view, continued home schooling would be in the child's best

interests because it would provide the child with continuity and

stability.

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Former Husband is a commercial pilot. Former Wife has a

credentialed and extensive background in the Pinellas County

School District as an administrator, teacher, and trainer.

By all accounts, the child flourished in her homeschool

setting. The Guardian ad Litem (GAL) described the child as

"learning at or above expectations for her cognitive functioning."

Former Wife and other witnesses extolled the benefits of keeping the

child's routine unchanged. They also recommended that the child's

educational setting allow for individualized attention and minimal

distractions.2

At the conclusion of the final hearing, the trial court praised

the parties for sharing time equally with the child and participating

in her upbringing. However, the trial court recognized that the

parties had communication problems. Seemingly, Former Wife

refused to share information openly and honestly, thereby impeding

fruitful co-parenting. The trial court reasoned that Former Wife's

2

Former Wife testified that several days a week the child

attended homeschooling cooperatives with other children outside of

the home. The trial court received evidence that the typical publicschool classroom might include up to two dozen other students; the

homeschooling cooperatives have, at most, fourteen other students

per classroom.

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continued homeschooling would hamper Former Husband's ability

to participate fully in their child's education.

To "level the playing field" and allow Former Husband to share

an equal role in the child's education, the trial court ordered that

Former Husband's address be utilized for school designation

purposes.3

Specifically, the trial court stated as follows: "[F]or

school designation I will say that the school designation will be

Odessa because that's where the father is zoned for, and I have to

list a parent here, so I'm going to list the party as Mr. Hassenplug

. . . ."

3

The trial court extolled the "very good job" the GAL had done

in the case. In her testimony, the GAL described the "difficult and

strained" communication between the parties:

There are times when [Former Husband] wants to

have a discussion about something and get more

information, and [Former Wife] is very elusive or evasive

about it. . . . There is kind of a power struggle going on

here, and so if these parties are following a school

mandate, [Former Husband] knows when he can go to

the school, [Former Husband] knows how to participate

in the school, but he gets to participate independent of

[Former Wife]. . . . I just really think that the distress

would be lessened because the discord between these

parents would be substantially reduced if they were on a

level playing field instead of this power and control thing.

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The trial court also ordered the child to attend Odessa

Elementary School for the 2021-2022 school year starting in August

("I'm saying that she's going to Odessa next year."), concluding that

the public school offered the necessary special needs education

programs. Unfortunately, those programs would not be put in place

until the school completed its evaluation, at least sixty days after

the child's enrollment.

The trial court apparently disregarded or minimized testimony

from several witnesses who explained the special education needs of

an autistic child; namely, that children with autism have a

heightened need for stability and a corresponding necessity for

reduced distractions, and an abrupt transition into a populated

public school would have a negative impact on the child's

educational, emotional, and mental welfare.

Analysis

"A trial court's decision regarding school designation is

reviewed for abuse of discretion." Johnson v. Johnson, 313 So. 3d

651, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citing Bruce v. Bruce, 243 So. 3d

461, 464 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)). This standard of review affords the

trial court considerable leeway, because

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[i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the

action taken by the trial court, then the action is not

unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of

discretion. The discretionary ruling of the trial [court]

should be disturbed only when [its] decision fails to

satisfy this test of reasonableness.

Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980).

This deferential standard of review still requires that a trial

court's decision be guided by what is in the child's best interests.

See § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2020) ("The court shall determine all

matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child

of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the

child . . . ."); (3) ("For purposes of establishing . . . parental

responsibility and creating . . . a parenting plan, . . . the best

interest of the child shall be the primary consideration."); e.g.,

Scaringe v. Herrick, 711 So. 2d 204, 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (Blue,

J., specially concurring) (emphasizing the importance of the trial

court's "fact-finding and decisional responsibilities" in determining

the best interests of the child); cf. Bainbridge v. Pratt, 68 So. 3d

310, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ("Although there is no statutory

requirement that a trial court engage in a discussion as to each of

the [section 61.13(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2010),] factors, a

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discussion of the relevant factors can be helpful in determining

whether the trial court's judgment is supported by competent,

substantial evidence.").

Indeed, the child's best interests are the polestar guiding the

trial court's decisions in these matters. Snyder v. Snyder, 685 So.

2d 1320, 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (citing Burgess v. Burgess, 347

So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)); e.g., Andrews v. Andrews,

624 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) ("Decisions affecting child

custody require a careful consideration of the best interests of the

child." (citing § 61.13, Fla. Stat. (1991))). And so, section

61.13(2)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2020), requiring that a parenting

plan contain a designation of residence for school registration,

"must [also] be made based on 'the best interests of the child.' "

Bruce, 243 So. 3d at 464 (quoting Schwieterman v. Schwieterman,

114 So. 3d 984, 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)).

The trial court's examination of the best interests of the child

requires consideration of a nonexhaustive list of factors affecting

the child's welfare and interests. § 61.13(3). Although the trial

court need not address each factor independently, at a minimum, it

must find that its school designation is in the best interests of the

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child. This finding must be stated on the record or contained in the

final judgment. Clark v. Clark, 825 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2002). Although the final judgment recites such a finding, our

scouring of the record finds nary any support. We cannot discern

whether and why public schooling is in the child's best interests.

The child appears to be flourishing in her current

environment. However, the trial court's school designation seems

premised on diminishing the parties' discord which, the trial court

reasoned, would allow Former Husband to participate more fully in

the child's education. We are certain that the trial court sought to

tamp down the parties' apparent power struggle. This is a

praiseworthy goal. Yet, we search, without success, for how this

goal advances this young child's best interests.4

See § 61.13(3)

("Determination of the best interests of the child shall be made by

evaluating all of the factors affecting the welfare and interests of the

particular minor child and the circumstances of that family . . . .").

4

Nothing in our record indicates that Former Wife's behavior

toward Former Husband harmed the child or impeded the child's

developmental or educational progress.

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The trial court's effort to broker peace and foster

communication between the parties does not inform us as to the

polestar consideration-the child's best interests. And the trial court

may not shirk its responsibility to the child in making this

determination. Cf. Lane v. Lane, 599 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 4th DCA

1992) ("It is undisputed, and should be indisputable, that a trial

court's responsibility to the child cannot be abdicated to any

parent, any expert. That heavy responsibility mandates that a

court is not bound by any agreement between parents, nor by the

opinions of any expert or group of experts."). On this record, we are

not convinced that the trial court adequately considered the child's

best interests in making its school designation decision.

Unfortunately, conflict between the parties is all too customary

in dissolution cases. The trial court, a stranger to the family, is

placed in the unenviable position of making potentially lifechanging decisions affecting the child. In the discharge of our duty,

however, we must ensure that the record reflects the trial court's

paramount decisional consideration, the child's best interests. See,

e.g., Bazan v. Gambone, 924 So. 2d 952, 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)

("[O]ther than the tense relationship which exists between the

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parents, there is nothing in the record, by allegation or evidence,

that would tend to establish that the child's best interests justify

changing custody. Paramount in this consideration are the best

interests of the child, rather than the best interests of any

particular parent or relative." (citations omitted)). The trial court's

ruling lacks the necessary evidentiary support sufficient to satisfy

our concerns that such a change is in the child's best interests.

We reverse the portions of the final judgment concerning the

child's schooling and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. Again, we do not opine upon what educational

setting meets the child's best interests. In all other respects, we

affirm.