Joseph Meadows v. City of Walker, Michigan, et al.

Grand Rapids, Michigan civil rights lawyer represented Plaintiff who sued Defendant on a 1983 claim of excessive use of force.



Joseph Meadows claims that officers used excessive force to

detain him one night during a traffic stop. Officer Steve Dumond began pursuing Meadows after

he passed Dumond on the highway while traveling nearly ninety miles per hour. During the

subsequent traffic stop, which was captured on dash-camera footage, Dumond instructed

Meadows to keep his hands out of his vehicle and to open the door to his vehicle. Dumond and

Meadows shouted back and forth as Meadows attempted to open his door. Once Meadows

exited the vehicle, Dumond grabbed Meadows and slammed him to the ground. On the ground,

Dumond kneed Meadows to try and roll him over, and Officer Chris Wietfeldt punched

Meadows multiple times. Wietfeldt also fractured Meadows's wrist while handcuffing him.

Meadows sued the officers and the City of Walker under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers contend

that they are entitled to qualified immunity and appeal the district court's denial of summary

judgment in their favor. Their arguments reject any conclusion that the officers could see that

Meadows's actions were compliant and that he was not resisting arrest. The officers are not

entitled to summary judgment because, on interlocutory appeal, we may not review their

arguments challenging the factual disputes identified by the district court.



On August 29, 2017, Joseph Meadows passed Officer Steve Dumond on I-96 at night

while traveling nearly ninety miles per hour. Almost immediately after Meadows passed him,

Dumond changed lanes to follow Meadows. About eleven seconds later, Dumond activated his

police lights; at this point, Meadows had gained several car lengths of separation between him

and Dumond, and there was at least one other vehicle on the road in front of Meadows. Over the

next thirty seconds, Meadows drifted between lanes on the highway, and Dumond closed the

distance between him and Meadows to a few car lengths. Meadows then took the first exit off

the interstate after Dumond activated his police lights. Meadows drove to the end of the exit

ramp and pulled to the side of the road in the right-turn lane.



After leaving and returning to his vehicle once, Dumond approached Meadows's vehicle

with a flashlight in his left hand and his firearm in his right hand pointed at the ground. Dumond

yelled, "turn off your truck; put your hands out the window.” Meadows complied and placed

both of his hands out the driver-side window of his vehicle. It is not clear from the video

whether Meadows turned his vehicle off. Dumond, however, never asked Meadows to turn his

vehicle off again and does not allege that Meadows refused to comply with that command.

Dumond then told Meadows to "undo [his] door.” Meadows said "yes sir” and then pulled his

left arm back into the vehicle. Meadows later testified that he put his left hand in his vehicle "to

hit the door handle to open the door to get out of the truck.” Dumond yelled, "don't reach back

inside your f****** vehicle,” and Meadows immediately complied and put his left hand back

outside the driver-side window. While still in his vehicle, Meadows explained that Dumond had

told him to open the door, and Dumond instructed him to open the door from the outside.

Dumond then told Meadows "do what you're told cause I'm not f****** around today.”



Dumond instructed Meadows to unlock his door, and Meadows stated that the door was

unlocked. Dumond then repeatedly told Meadows to open the door; Meadows explained that he

was trying to open the door, and an audible thump on the dash-camera footage is consistent with

Meadows's pulling on the door handle outside his car. Having watched Meadows fail to open

the door, Dumond asked Meadows again if the door was locked. Meadows then asked for

Dumond to give him a second, and Dumond told Meadows to stop reaching his hand inside the

vehicle, while Dumond simultaneously raised his firearm and pointed it at Meadows for the first

time. Meadows explained to Dumond that he was not trying to reach into his vehicle, he was just

trying to unlock his door. Officer Chris Wietfeldt then approached the passenger side of the

vehicle aiming his firearm at Meadows. Meadows finally managed to unlock and open his door,

and Dumond instructed Meadows to step out of the vehicle.



As the door opened, Dumond holstered his firearm. Meadows stepped out of the vehicle

within five seconds of getting his door open and within ten seconds of Dumond's first command

to get out of the vehicle. The moment Meadows stepped out of the vehicle, Dumond

immediately grabbed Meadows and threw him to the ground. Officer Wietfeldt ran over to help

subdue Meadows. After the initial takedown, Meadows was on his right side with his right arm

between his body and the ground, and Dumond was using Meadows's left arm to keep him

pinned to the ground. Dumond then shifted his body to where he was standing over top of

Meadows and told him to roll over. Immediately after Dumond told Meadows to roll over,

Dumond kneed Meadows in his lower back. Wietfeldt then struck Meadows in either the

shoulder or the head before striking him twice more in the side. At that point, the officers had

turned Meadows so that his stomach was on the ground, and a second police vehicle arrived.

The dash-camera footage becomes less clear at this stage because the lights from the

second police vehicle obscured what was happening between Meadows and the officers on the

ground. A third officer came from the second vehicle and grabbed Meadows's legs to secure

them while Dumond and Wietfeldt attempted to handcuff Meadows. The dash-camera footage

does not clearly depict how the officers managed to handcuff Meadows, but the footage does

show Wietfeldt holding Meadows's right arm perpendicular to Meadows's back while Meadows

was facedown on the asphalt. Meadows alleges that he felt someone with one hand on his elbow

and then one hand on his wrist before he felt a pop and sharp pain in his wrist. Meadows

subsequently discovered that his wrist was fractured during the arrest.



Meadows was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated (third offense),

resisting and obstructing police in the performance of their duties, operating a motor vehicle on a

suspended/revoked license, and having an open container in his vehicle. He pleaded guilty to

operating his vehicle while intoxicated, and the other charges were dropped.



Meadows subsequently filed suit against the City of Walker, Officer Steve Dumond, and

Officer Chris Wietfeldt. Meadows brought excessive-force claims against the officers and a

municipal-liability claim against the City of Walker. The defendants moved for summary

judgment, with the officers arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court held argument on the defendants' motion and issued an oral ruling on

the motion. Excessive force claims are analyzed under Graham v. Connor, which requires

consideration of the "severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest.” 490 U.S.

386, 396 (1989). Applying Graham, the district court first concluded that Meadows's initial

crime of speeding was a moderately severe crime. Turning to the second factor, the court

recognized that "not knowing what's inside the cab is certainly a concern,” but the court also

found that the officers had no objective evidence to believe Meadows posed any direct threat to

the officers. In reaching this conclusion about the second factor, the court noted that the footage

showed "from the very first engagement between the two of them the citizen is compliant, polite,

respectful, and it's the officer who initially escalates both verbally and with the firearm.”

The court focused most of its analysis on whether Meadows was actively resisting arrest.



Here, the court found several factual disputes that a jury could resolve in Meadows's favor.

First, the court noted that the footage of the traffic stop showed "a citizen who is trying to be

respectful, trying to comply, and is confused about how to do it because he's got his hands out,

and then he is told to open the door.” The court also recognized that it was inconsistent for

Dumond to instruct Meadows to put his hands out the window and then to open his door, and the

court even posited, "What's the citizen to do?” Next, with respect to the struggle on the ground,

the court concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that the struggle was "not because of

anything the citizen is doing.” The court stated that Meadows was explaining that he was trying

to comply and he was not resisting, and the court determined that a reasonable jury could agree

with this factual assessment. Based on these factual disputes, the court determined that "a

reasonable jury can certainly conclude that to an objective officer—an objectively reasonable

officer, the only thing [the officer is] seeing from this citizen is at most some kind of passive

resistance, and I would say barely that.” Further, the court went on to conclude that a reasonable

jury could conclude that Meadows was not resisting arrest as a matter of fact and, viewing these

facts in Meadows's favor, Meadows was not actively resisting arrest, and the officers therefore

used excessive force to slam Meadows to the ground and handcuff him.



The district court appeared to conclude that it is clearly established in the Sixth Circuit

that an officer cannot use physical force on someone who is not actively resisting arrest. Citing

Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2015), the district court relied on the "axis of passive

resistance or active resistance that the case law . . . tries to guide us through.” Rudlaff explains

that a "simple dichotomy thus emerges: When a suspect actively resists arrest, the police can use

a taser (or a knee strike) to subdue him; but when a suspect does not resist, or has stopped

resisting, they cannot.” 791 F.3d at 642. Because the district court determined that a reasonable

jury could conclude that Meadows was objectively not refusing to comply or resisting arrest, the

district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment, and the officers have brought

this interlocutory appeal.1



The officers argue on appeal that they reasonably perceived that Meadows was refusing

to comply and resisting arrest. In their view, Meadows resisted arrest in several different ways.

First, the officers assert that Meadows refused to pull over on the highway when Dumond

activated his police lights. Next, the officers contend that Meadows refused to comply with

orders to keep his hands out of his vehicle while he was supposed to be opening the door to his

vehicle. Finally, the officers assert that once they had Meadows on the ground, he failed to

comply with their orders for him to roll onto his stomach. Based on these facts, the officers

argue that they did not use excessive force to subdue and arrest Meadows.



In its denial of the motion for summary judgment, the district court identified several

genuine disputes of material fact that would allow a reasonable jury to reject the officers' factual

assertions. The district court pointed out that Dumond did not activate his siren when he

activated his lights, and that once Dumond did activate his siren, Meadows stopped his car at the

end of the interstate exit. As a result, a reasonable jury could reject the factual assertion that

Meadows refused to promptly pull over and instead conclude that no reasonable officer could

have perceived Meadows to be resisting arrest.



With regard to the traffic stop, the district court found that the dash-camera footage

showed "a citizen who is trying to be respectful, trying to comply, and is confused about how to

do it because he's got his hands out [the window], and then is told to open the door.” Further, a

reasonable jury could conclude that the physical struggle on the ground was "not because of

anything the citizen [was] doing.” The court noted that the dash-camera video did not show

Meadows punching back, and a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers knew Meadows

was not resisting their attempts to handcuff him. In sum, the court determined that a reasonable

jury could conclude that Dumond and Wietfeldt did not perceive Meadows as refusing to comply

or resisting arrest.



On interlocutory appeal, we are bound by the district court's determinations about

genuine disputes of fact, even if the panel would reach a different conclusion reviewing the facts

de novo. Under Johnson v. Jones, "a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense,

may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines

whether or not the pretrial record sets for[th] a 'genuine' dispute of fact for trial.” 515 U.S. 304,

319–20 (1995). Moreover, "a defendant may not challenge the inferences the district court

draws from those facts, as that too is a prohibited fact-based appeal.” DiLuzio v. Vill. of

Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Romo v. Largen, 723 F.3d 670, 673–74 (6th

Cir. 2013)). We are therefore bound by the district court's determination that a reasonable jury

could conclude that Dumond and Wietfeldt did not perceive Meadows as refusing to comply or

resisting arrest.



There is an exception to that rule when the district court's determinations about genuine

disputes of fact are "blatantly contradicted by the record,” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007), but the exception does not apply here. A careful review of the dash-camera footage

supports each of the district court's determinations about genuine disputes of fact. As discussed

above, the dash-camera footage shows Dumond giving Meadows inconsistent instructions both

to put his hands out the window and to open his door. In fact, the district judge even

acknowledged that his own reaction to Dumond's command would have been to "reach down

and pull [his] hand along the inside [of the car].” Sure, Meadows might have first tried to open

his door from the outside. A reasonable jury could conclude, however, that Dumond knew that

Meadows was complying or attempting to comply with Dumond's command to open the door

when he tried to open his door from the inside of his vehicle, because people typically open a car

door from the inside. Further, the dash-camera footage does not show Meadows flailing on the

ground or otherwise positioning himself so that the officers could not arrest him. To the

contrary, the footage shows Meadows's lower half lying completely still after the officers

slammed Meadows to the ground. A reasonable jury could obviously conclude that the officers

knew that Meadows was unable to roll over. The dash-camera footage therefore does not

"blatantly contradict” the factual issues identified by the district court, and we may not review

the district court's determinations about genuine disputes of fact.



To prevail on the excessive-force claim, Meadows must show that the officers' use of

physical force amounted to a violation of Meadows's clearly established constitutional rights.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The officers' argument in this regard is based

on their version of the facts, and not on the facts favorable to Meadows that the district court

held that the jury could find. The officers in other words decline to argue that even if the jury

found facts that do not amount to resistance, there was no clearly established constitutional

violation. This is reasonably clear from the briefs, and was explicitly confirmed at oral

argument:



Judge: [If] the jury could find that there was compliance, that there was apparent

compliance at all times, then you lose the appeal. Is that right?



Counsel for appellant: I think that's right. I think that's right.



Oral Argument, 6:20–6:32. It follows that once we conclude, as we do, that the district court

permissibly determined that a jury could find facts that, from the officers' perspective, showed

no active resistance (as the term has been used by the courts), then that is the end of our analysis.



In any event, our precedent clearly establishes that taking Meadows to the ground,

beating him, and fracturing his wrist when he did not actively resist arrest constitutes excessive

force. It has been clearly established for several years in the Sixth Circuit that an officer cannot

use injurious physical force to subdue a suspect that is not actively resisting arrest. See Rudlaff,

791 F.3d at 641–42. In Coffey v. Carroll, we stated flatly that "[a] suspect has a clearly

established constitutional right to be free from the use of physical force by police officers when

he is not resisting efforts to apprehend him.” 933 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation

omitted). In Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off., we summarized cases from 2004 onwards

where we have held force to be excessive from the use of a taser when "the suspects were

compliant or had stopped resisting.” 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2012). We have repeatedly

stated that "[d]rawing the line at a suspect's active resistance defines the right at a level of

particularity appropriate for a claim pursued under § 1983.” Coffey, 933 F.3d at 589 (citing

Hagans, 695 F.3d at 509). Further, we have applied this clearly established constitutional right

in the context of a traffic stop where the suspect was not actively resisting arrest. Eldridge v.

City of Warren, 533 F. App'x 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2013).



In a recent case, we rejected qualified immunity in similar circumstances where the jury

could have found that the defendant officer unnecessarily beat the plaintiff to effect an arrest,

explaining that the Fourth Amendment prohibits officers from using "gratuitous” force that is

unnecessary to effectuate the arrest of a person who has ceased resisting. Shreve

v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 453 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir. 2006). In one case, for

instance, an officer acted unreasonably when he allegedly hit an arrestee with a

baton as the arrestee approached with hands raised. Baker, 471 F.3d at 607. In

another, an officer acted unreasonably when he allegedly slammed a cooperating

arrestee against a cupboard and tossed him down a small set of stairs. Barton,

949 F.3d at 952–54; see also, e.g., Malory v. Whiting, 489 F. App'x 78, 84 (6th

Cir. 2012) (beating); Landis v. Baker, 297 F. App'x 453, 461 (6th Cir. 2008) (ten

baton strikes and four uses of taser); Pigram ex rel. Pigram v. Chaudoin, 199

F. App'x 509, 513–14 (6th Cir. 2006) (slap to face); Phelps, 286 F.3d at 297,

301–02 (beating); McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1307 (baton strike).

Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th 391, 403 (6th Cir. 2022). We further explained that the

constitutional violation was sufficiently specific to be clearly established:

[O]ur precedent had "clearly establish[ed] the right of people who pose no safety

risk to the police to be free from gratuitous violence during arrest.” Shreve, 453

F.3d at 688; see, e.g., Phelps, 286 F.3d at 301–02. Under the Supreme Court's

framework, this legal rule is identified at a sufficiently "specific” level of

generality to qualify as clearly established law in this case. Mullenix v. Luna, 577

U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (citation omitted). For one thing, "the

unlawfulness” of the Officers' alleged beating . . . would "follow immediately

from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at

590 (citation omitted).



Id. Our caselaw therefore confirms that, based on the facts that a jury could find, Dumond

violated Meadows's clearly established right to be free from the use of gratuitous force when

Meadows was not actively resisting arrest.



The officers argue in response that their conduct falls in a "gray area” because they did

not know whether Meadows was complying with their commands. The officers contend that, as

a result, they are entitled to the benefit of the doubt and should receive qualified immunity. The

argument appears to conflate ambiguity about the facts in this case for purposes of whether there

is a genuine issue of material fact, on the one hand, with ambiguity from the officers' perspective

about what the victim was up to, on the other. To be sure, when the facts confronting an officer

leave ambiguity about whether the officer's actions violate a constitutional right, the officer is

entitled to qualified immunity. Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2021) (per curiam).

But an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity when the facts are disputed, but a reasonable

jury could find a set of facts that, if proven at trial, would show that an officer's actions violated

a clearly established right. See Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 870 (6th Cir. 2020); see

also Gambrel, 25F.4th at 404. In other words, in this case, if from the officers' perspective

Meadows could be seen as possibly engaged in active resistance, then qualified immunity would

presumably be warranted, and this would be true even if the officer was not entirely sure. But if

the jury could reasonably conclude that from the officers' perspective Meadows could not be

seen as possibly engaged in active resistance, then qualified immunity would not be warranted.

The latter is clearly what the district court concluded, and that conclusion is supported by the

dash-camera footage. On such facts, as discussed above, our precedent clearly establishes that

an officer may not use injurious physical force to subdue a suspect that is not actively resisting

arrest.



Finally, our decision in Stanfield v. City of Lima, 727 F. App'x 841, 848 (6th Cir. 2018),

does not require a different result. Stanfield is an unpublished opinion that is not binding upon

us. In any event, it is distinguishable. In that case, we held that three people injured in physical

takedowns by the defendant officers did have their constitutional rights violated. Id. at 848–49.

We nonetheless held that qualified immunity was warranted because the rights were not clearly

established where the officers could perceive at least some resistance, id. at 850, or the struggle

was in progress. Id. at 851. Stanfield is distinguishable on its facts, however, because there we

concluded that Stanfield's actions "could reasonably have been perceived as resistance” by an

officer. Id. at 848. And indeed Stanfield argued that his movements while intoxicated and off-

balance "resulted in the movements the officers perceived as resistance.” Id. at 844. Here, on

the other hand, we must accept the district court's factual conclusion that a reasonable juror

could conclude that no reasonable officer would perceive Meadows as resisting arrest or refusing

to comply. Stanfield accordingly does not compel reversal in this case.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for

Officers Dumond and Wietfeldt.