United States of America v. Everette Jamel Taylor

Atlanta, GA- Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine charges. He now appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a reduction in sentence

In 1995, a jury found Taylor guilty of one count of

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of

cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

and 846. Neither the indictment nor the verdict form specified

the amount of drugs that Taylor was found to have possessed or

distributed.

Taylor's presentence investigation report ("PSI”) indicated

that he was responsible for 5,979.36 grams of crack cocaine.

Because Taylor had two prior felony drug convictions for delivery

of cocaine and possession of cocaine, he was subject to a

1 The First Step Act, enacted in 2018, "permits district courts to apply

retroactively the reduced statutory penalties for crack-cocaine offenses in the

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to movants sentenced before those penalties

became effective.” United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir.

2020); see also First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat.

5194, 5222.

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"mandatory term of life imprisonment without release.” See 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1994) (providing that where the offense

involves 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance of cocaine

base, and the defendant has "two or more prior convictions for a

felony drug offense . . . , such person shall be sentenced to a

mandatory term of life imprisonment without release . . . .”).

Taylor objected to the amount of crack cocaine

attributable to him. Relatedly, he argued that the amount of

drugs which could be fairly attributable to him was not sufficient

to trigger § 841(b)(1)(A), and, therefore, the statutory life term

should not apply to him.

At sentencing, the district court overruled Taylor's

objections to the PSI, finding, in relevant part, that the amount of

drugs was "amply supported by the testimony” at trial. The

district court sentenced Taylor to life imprisonment, explaining

that the sentence was "based on the present statutory

requirement, the mandate, based upon [Taylor's] prior criminal

history and record.” The court's Statement of Reasons indicated

that it "adopt[ed] the factual findings” in the PSI.

In 2019, Taylor filed a pro se 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion

to reduce his sentence, arguing that he was eligible for a reduction

in sentence under the First Step Act because, under the reduced

penalties of the Fair Sentencing Act, the maximum sentence he

would have faced was 25 years' imprisonment rather than life.

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Applying our decision in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d

1290 (11th Cir. 2020), the district court denied Taylor's

§ 3582(c)(2) motion, finding that Taylor was not eligible for relief

because the Fair Sentencing Act would not have benefitted him as

he would have faced the same sentence under the Act. This

appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Taylor argues that the district court abused its discretion

when it concluded that he did not qualify for a reduction under

the First Step Act. He maintains that neither the indictment, the

verdict, nor the judgment mentioned any drug quantity, and the

sentencing court did not make a specific finding that it relied on

the 5,979.36 grams of crack cocaine when determining the

applicable statutory penalty. Rather, he argues that we must

presume that the sentencing court found him responsible for only

50 grams of crack cocaine because that was the minimum

necessary to trigger the relevant statutory penalty.

We review a district court's authority to modify a sentence

de novo. Jones, 962 F.3d at 1296. We review the district court's

denial of a movant's request for a reduced sentence under the

First Step Act for an abuse of discretion. Id. "A district court

abuses its discretion when it 'applies an incorrect legal standard.'”

Id. at 1304 (quoting Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262

(11th Cir. 2015)).

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Generally, district courts lack the inherent authority to

modify a term of imprisonment but may do so to the extent that a

statute expressly permits. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). The First

Step Act expressly "permits a district court that imposed a

sentence for a covered offense to impose a reduced sentence as if

sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the

time the covered offense was committed.” Jones, 962 F.3d at 1297

(quotation omitted). However, a district court is precluded from

reducing a sentence "[i]f the movant's sentence would have

necessarily remained the same had the Fair Sentencing Act been

in effect.” Id. at 1303. Further, in determining what a movant's

statutory penalty would have been under the Fair Sentencing Act,

the district court is bound by a previous drug-quantity finding

that was used to determine the movant's statutory penalty at the

time of sentencing, including "judge-found facts that triggered

statutory penalties that the Fair Sentencing Act later modified.”

Id. at 1303.

As relevant here, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 amended

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1) and 960(b) to reduce the sentencing

disparity between crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenses.

See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat.

2372. Specifically, § 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act increased the

quantity thresholds of crack cocaine necessary to trigger a 10-year

mandatory-minimum term of imprisonment under

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) from 50 to 280 grams of crack cocaine. Fair

Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)-(2); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).

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Notably, the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the

mandatory term of life for § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) offenders with two

prior felony drug offenses, but the more recent First Step Act

reduced this mandatory minimum from life to 25 years'

imprisonment. See Fair Sentencing Act § 2; First Step Act, Pub.

L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2)(ii), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220. However, this

portion of the First Step Act is not retroactively applicable to

offenders like Taylor who were sentenced prior to the enactment

of the First Step Act. See First Step Act § 401(c), 132 Stat. at 5221.

Although Taylor was sentenced for a covered offense

under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), he is not eligible for a reduction because

his sentence would have necessarily been the same even under

the Fair Sentencing Act. Jones, 962 F.3d at 1303. Specifically, the

sentencing court attributed 5,979.36 grams of crack cocaine to

Taylor (more than the necessary 280 grams under the Fair

Sentencing Act),2 which when combined with Taylor's two prior

felony drug offenses still triggered a mandatory life term of

imprisonment under the Fair Sentencing Act. See 21 U.S.C.

2 Taylor's argument that the sentencing court never made a formal drug

quantity finding is undermined by the record. Taylor objected to the drug

quantity attributed to him in the PSI, and the court overruled his objection at

sentencing, concluding that the drug quantity was "amply supported” by the

record. And the sentencing court adopted the factual findings contained in

the PSI as its own. Accordingly, the sentencing court made a drug quantity

finding at Taylor's 1995 sentencing, which the district court was bound by

when ruling on Taylor's 2019 motion for a sentence reduction. Jones, 962

F.3d at 1303–04.

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§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).

Accordingly, Taylor would not have benefitted

from the Fair Sentencing Act, and we affirm.



AFFIRMED.