ANTHONY M. VEALS v. State of Indiana

Indianapolis, IN: Criminal defense attorney represented charged with residential entry.

On September 8, 2019, Luis Diaz ("Diaz”) was at his girlfriend's, Patricia

Castro's ("Patricia”), house where she lived with her two brothers, Sergio

Castro ("Sergio”)—who owned the home—and Fernando Castro

("Fernando”). Diaz was sitting in the living room, into which the front door

opens. He and Patricia were watching a movie with her dog, and Diaz paused

the movie while Patricia went to the bathroom. While the movie was paused,

the dog began to bark, and Diaz heard footsteps on the front porch. Diaz

thought the footsteps were one of Patricia's brothers coming home until the dog

started growling. Diaz then saw the front door open from the outside. Diaz

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Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-2098 | June 25, 2021 Page 3 of 7

witnessed Veals, who he did not know at the time, stick his head inside the

front door, look around for several seconds, move back out onto the porch, and

shut the front door. Diaz immediately walked out of the front door to see who

had tried to enter the house. Fernando, who had just arrived home, was on the

front porch confronting Veals. Veals appeared "stunned” or "confused.” Tr. at

30. Diaz called the police.

[4] The State charged Veals with residential entry, a Level 6 felony. Following a

jury trial, the jury found Veals guilty as charged. At Veals's October 22, 2020,

sentencing hearing, the court found aggravating factors that it determined

outweighed the mitigating factors. The court sentenced Veals to 900 days in

jail, with credit for 405 days served plus earned credit time. The trial court

noted that, after accounting for credit time, "that le[ft] about 45 days to serve.”

Id. at 63.

[5] Veals now appeals his conviction and his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[6] Veals alleges the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his

conviction.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and

reasonable inferences supporting the fact-finder's decision. Drane

v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the fact-finder's Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-2098 | June 25, 2021 Page 4 of 7

role, and not ours, to assess witness credibility and weigh the

evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a

conviction. Id. To preserve this structure, when we are

confronted with conflicting evidence, we consider it most

favorably to the fact-finder's decision. Id. We affirm a

conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It

is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is

sufficient if an inference reasonably may be drawn from it to

support the fact-finder's decision. Id. at 147.

Dowell v. State, 155 N.E.3d 1284, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Moreover, a

conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone. Sallee v. State, 51

N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016).

[7] To prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Veals committed the crime of

residential entry, the State must have provided evidence that: (1) Veals, (2)

knowingly or intentionally, (3) broke into and entered, (4) the dwelling, (5) of

another person. I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5. Veals first contends that the State did not

prove that the place into which he stuck his head was a "dwelling.” "Dwelling”

is defined as "a building, structure, or other enclosed space, permanent or

temporary, movable or fixed, that is a person's home or place of lodging.” I.C.

§ 35-31.5-2-107. The State provided evidence, through Diaz's testimony, that

the place into which Veal stuck his head was the home where Patricia and her

two brothers lived, and that Sergio owned the home. That was sufficient

evidence to prove that the place into which Veals stuck his head was a

"dwelling.”Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-2098 | June 25, 2021 Page 5 of 7

[8] Veals also briefly asserts that the State failed to prove that he "knowingly or

intentionally” stuck his head in the door of the building. A person engages in

conduct "intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious

objective to do so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). A person engages in conduct

"knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high

probability that he is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b).

[I]ntent is a mental function and without a confession, it must be

determined from a consideration of the conduct, and the natural

consequences of the conduct.” Duren v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1198,

1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Accordingly, intent

often must be proven by circumstantial evidence. Id. The trier of

fact is entitled to infer intent from the surrounding circumstances.

White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. 2002).

Laughlin v. State, 101 N.E.3d 827, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[9] The evidence established that Veals opened the front door of the Castro home

and stuck his head into the house. The jury was entitled to infer from those

facts that Veals "knowingly and intentionally” broke into and entered2

the

Castro home. Veals's argument he was not aware of what he was doing when

he entered the dwelling because he appeared "stunned and confused” when he

was confronted on the front porch by Fernando, Diaz, and police is simply a

request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

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Veals does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he "broke into and entered” the

Castro residence.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-2098 | June 25, 2021 Page 6 of 7

[10] The evidence was sufficient to support Veals's conviction.

Mootness of Sentencing Decision

[11] Veals also maintains that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the offense

and his character. However, the validity of a sentence is rendered moot after

the sentence has been served, Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ind. 2012)

(citing Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 n. 2 (Ind.2004)), and we do not "engage

in discussions of moot questions or render advisory opinions,” Irwin v. State,

744 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

3

On October 22, 2020, Veals was

sentenced to 900 days, 405 of which had already been served. With good time

credit, that left Veals with ninety days left to serve. However, the trial court

noted he would serve only about forty-five more days with credit time. Thus, at

the latest, Veals was released from jail on January 20, 2021—i.e., ninety days

from October 22, 2020. Veals's release from jail renders his sentencing

argument moot; therefore, we do not address that issue.

The State presented sufficient evidence to support Veals’s conviction of

residential entry. Veals’s sentencing challenge is moot.