Lucretia Mae Joyce v. State of Indiana

Indianapolis, IN - Criminal defense attorney represented Lucretia Joyce with appealing by alleging that her conviction is void and should be vacated because the State initiated the criminal case against her by filing a citation rather than an information or indictment.

In July 2019, a section of Pollack Avenue in Vanderburgh County was under

construction while a pipeline was being installed. The road was closed to

through traffic, allowing local traffic only. The section at issue was a two-lane

roadway, with one lane open for traffic, and was marked with signs in both

directions that warned drivers of the road closure and "Workers Ahead.”

Transcript at 10.

[4] On July 12, Gabriel Cartwright, a foreman with Miller Pipeline, and his crew

were working on the project. Cartwright was standing at the rear of a work van

when he heard a loud engine. He stepped out to the side to check on the source

of the sound and observed a pick-up truck "barreling” past at a speed exceeding

the posted thirty-five miles per hour limit. Id. at 11. Cartwright had to step

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back behind the van to avoid being hit by the truck's side mirror. He held up

his hands to indicate to the driver to slow down, but the driver, later identified

as Joyce, yelled obscenities out of her window and "sped up and went even

faster.” Id.

[5] Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Deputy Joshua Wargel was off duty but working

as security for Miller Pipeline at the work site that day, when he observed the

pick-up truck speed past. He activated his emergency lights and followed it,

keeping it in sight until he initiated a traffic stop about a quarter mile from the

construction site. As Deputy Wargel approached the truck, Joyce was

confrontational, "yelling” and asking "what she had done” and "what gave

[him] the authority to stop her.” Id. at 18. Deputy Wargel issued a citation to

her.

[6] On September 3, 2019, the State charged Joyce with reckless driving by filing an

Indiana Citation Report (the Citation) in Vanderburgh Superior Court. The

Citation indicated that the offense occurred on July 12, 2019 at 10:57 a.m. and

the charges were "Traffic - reckless Driving.” Appendix at 17, 18 (capitalization

in original). Next to that typed description was handwritten "9-21-8-52 [CM]”,

referring to the applicable Indiana Code statute. Id. In addition to filing the

Citation, the State filed, on green paper, an "Incident/Investigation Report”

and attachments, including the BMV's driver record for Joyce.

1

Id. at 4. The

1 The CCS labeled this filing as a "Probable Cause Affidavit.” Appendix at 4.

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State also filed a "Notice of Exclusion of Confidential Information” (Notice),

stating that the "Information” tendered on green paper was excluded from

public access. Id. at 16.

[7] The Incident Report included Deputy Wargel's Narrative, which outlined the

circumstances of the occurrence giving rise to the charge. Deputy Wargel

described that, on July 12 at 10:57 a.m., he was in his fully-marked SUV, facing

east in the westbound lane, when he observed the pick-up truck traveling "at an

extremely high rate of speed” eastbound on Pollack Avenue and past the

construction area. Id. at 36. Deputy Wargel reported that "[t]he vehicle never

slowed” and required one worker to quickly move out of the way. Id. Deputy

Wargel "had to accelerate rapidly” to follow it and estimated it was traveling at

over sixty miles per hour. Id.

[8] The court held an initial hearing on September 10, where the court appointed

counsel to represent Joyce. Thereafter, a review hearing was held on October

15 and a pretrial conference on December 20, with Joyce appearing in person

and with counsel at both hearings. A bench trial was held on January 28, 2020.

Cartwright, Deputy Wargel, and Joyce each testified.2

At trial, Joyce's theory

2 We note that, in beginning its examination of Deputy Wargel, the State directed, "I want to take you back

to on or about July 19th, 2019” and asked Deputy Wargel to describe how the events unfolded. Transcript at

15. Referring to that testimony, both parties cite to July 19 in their briefs as the date of the incident.

However, this date appears to be in error, as the Citation, Incident Report/Narrative, and the court's

sentencing statement, each reflect that the date of the incident was July 12, 2019.

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of defense was that it was not her that sped through the construction zone and

was, instead, a different green pick-up truck that was ahead of her.

[9] At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found Joyce guilty as charged

and entered judgment of conviction for Class C misdemeanor reckless driving.

The court then sentenced her to sixty days in jail, all suspended on the

condition that she complete twenty-four hours of community service. Joyce

thereafter requested and received permission to file a belated appeal.

Discussion & Decision

[10] Joyce claims that the State's failure to file an information or indictment

rendered the trial court's judgment void. While Joyce and the State frame the

issue somewhat differently from each other, they agree that, where, as here, the

facts are not in dispute, "a jurisdictional question involving the trial court's

ability to render a valid judgment is reviewed de novo.” Appellant's Brief at 7

(citing Peele v. State, 141 N.E.3d 838, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied); see

also State v. D.B., 819 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (whether a lower

court had jurisdiction is reviewed de novo when facts are not in dispute), trans.

denied.

[11] Joyce argues that Indiana requires that all prosecutions of crimes be initiated by

the filing of either an information or an indictment and that the failure to do so

here rendered her conviction void. In support, she cites to Ind. Code § 35-34-1-

1(b), which provides that "all prosecutions of crimes shall be instituted by the

filing of an information or indictment by the prosecuting attorney, in a court

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with jurisdiction over the crime charged.” She maintains that this language

reflects a clear determination by the legislature that a prosecution may be

initiated "solely with the filing of a charging information or indictment, and in

no other way.” Appellant's Brief at 5.

[12] Taking her point one step further, she argues that a trial court does not have

power to render judgment – i.e., does not have jurisdiction – in a case that has

not been properly initiated. In this regard, she refers us to Pease v. State, 74 Ind.

App. 572, 129 N.E. 337, 339 (1921), where this court stated:

In this state it has been held consistently that a criminal action

can be commenced only in the manner provided by law, and that

is the filing of the accusation in lawful form that invokes the

jurisdiction of the court in the particular cause. It is a universal

principle as old as the law that the proceedings of a court without

jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment void. There can be no

conviction or punishment for crime, except on accusation made

in the manner prescribed by law.

(Internal citations omitted). Joyce claims that, in line with Pease, the State's

failure to file an information or indictment renders her conviction void. We

disagree.

[13] More recently, and more applicable to the matter before us, our Supreme Court

has noted that "a uniform traffic ticket or citation is the functional equivalent of

an information or indictment.” Butler v. State, 658 N.E.2d 72, 75 n.8 (Ind.

1995) (citing to Watt v. State, 249 Ind. 674, 234 N.E.2d 471 (1968) (rejecting

claim that only an indictment or affidavit may initiate a criminal action)).

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Accordingly, we reject Joyce's claim that the filing of the Citation, rather than

an information or indictment, was fatal to the State's prosecution of her.

[14] Alternatively, Joyce argues that, even if we were to find that the judgment was

not void, the Citation in this case failed to comply with the statutory

requirements for an information or indictment. Joyce acknowledges that,

generally, the failure to challenge an information by motion to dismiss

constitutes waiver. She urges, however, that waiver does not apply in the

present case because "it is not that the charging information is insufficient. It is

that the charging document does not exist in the first place.” Appellant's Brief at

9. Having found that a charging document does exist, i.e., the Citation, we find

that Joyce has waived her claim that the Citation was inadequate and therefore

must show that fundamental error occurred. Grimes v. State, 84 N.E.3d 635, 640

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017) ("Failure to timely challenge an allegedly defective

charging information results in waiver unless fundamental error has

occurred.”), trans. denied. Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception

to the waiver rule, and the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that

the alleged error is so prejudicial to the defendant's rights as to make a fair trial

impossible. Id.

[15] We have recognized that "'[t]he purpose of the charging information is to

provide a defendant with notice of the crime of which he is charged so that he is

able to prepare a defense.'” Gilliland v. State, 979 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2012) (quoting State v. Laker, 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),

trans. denied). I.C. § 35-34-1-2(a), addressing contents of an information or

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indictment, provides in pertinent part that a charging information must be in

writing and allege the commission of an offense by:

(2) stating the name of the offense in the words of the statute or

any other words conveying the same meaning;

(3) citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated,

except that any failure to include such a citation or any error in

such a citation does not constitute grounds for reversal of a

conviction where the defendant was not otherwise misled as to

the nature of the charges against the defendant;

(4) setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged in

plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition;

(5) stating the date of the offense with sufficient particularity to

show that the offense was committed within the period of

limitations applicable to that offense;

(6) stating the time of the offense as definitely as can be done if

time is of the essence of the offense; [and]

(7) stating the place of the offense with sufficient particularity to

show that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of

the court where the charge is to be filed[.]

"The State is not required to include detailed factual allegations in a charging

information.” Laney v. State, 868 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.

denied. "[W]here a charging instrument may lack appropriate factual detail,

additional materials such as the probable cause affidavit supporting the

charging instrument may be taken into account in assessing whether a

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defendant has been apprised of the charges against him.” Grimes, 84 N.E.3d at

640 (quoting Laker, 939 N.E.2d at 1113).

[16] Joyce argues that the Citation "contains no written description whatsoever of

the nature the offense” and "failed almost completely to apprise [her] of the

allegations against her.” Appellant's Brief at 8, 12. Given the record in its

entirety, we cannot agree. The Citation identified the date, time, and location

of the incident, stated that the offense was reckless driving, and identified the

citation of the corresponding statute. Joyce observes that Ind. Code § 9-21-8-52

lists a number of ways in which a person may commit reckless driving,

including driving at an unreasonably high rate of speed or an unreasonably slow

rate of speed,

3 and she suggests that she did not know in what way she was

being alleged to have committed reckless driving.

3 More fully, I.C. § 9-21-8-52(a) provides that a person commits Class C misdemeanor reckless driving if he

or she recklessly:

(1) drives at such an unreasonably high rate of speed or at such an unreasonably low rate

of speed under the circumstances as to: (A) endanger the safety or the property of others;

or (B) block the proper flow of traffic;

(2) passes another vehicle from the rear while on a slope or on a curve where vision is

obstructed for a distance of less than five hundred (500) feet ahead;

(3) drives in and out of a line of traffic, except as otherwise permitted; or

(4) speeds up or refuses to give one-half ( ½ ) of the roadway to a driver overtaking and

desiring to pass[.]

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[17] We are unpersuaded, however, because contemporaneously with the filing of

the Citation, the State filed the Incident Report and it included Deputy

Wargel's narrative of the incident. Deputy Wargel described that he was

working as security and seated in his Sherriff's Department SUV at the

construction site, when he observed the pick-up drive by at what he estimated to

be sixty miles per hour, requiring Cartwright to quickly step out of the way.

The Citation and Incident Report thus provided Joyce with notice of the nature

and facts of the accusation. Indeed, the record reflects that she understood the

nature of the charge against her and presented a defense to it, namely that the

speeding pick-up that Deputy Wargel saw was not hers and, instead, was a

vehicle that was ahead of her on Pollack Avenue.

[18] Joyce also notes that I.C. § 35-34-1-2(c) requires that "[a]n information shall be

signed by the prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney's deputy[,]” and

that, here, the Citation was not so signed. The purpose of the signing

requirement is to ensure the prosecution has been investigated and approved by

the prosecutor's office. Clark v. State, 561 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).

Here, the State filed, along with the Citation, a Notice, advising that the

"Prosecuting Attorney has filed confidential information[,]” and then identified

the "confidential information” as being the "Information[.]” Appendix at 16.

That Notice was signed by the prosecutor. Considering the full record, we are

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confident that the prosecuting attorney had approved of the filing of the reckless

driving charge.

For all these reasons, we conclude that the judgment of conviction for reckless

driving was not void and no fundamental error occurred.



Judgment affirmed.