Myles Danard Alexander-Woods v. State of Indiana

Indianapolis, IN - Criminal defense attorney represented Myles Danard Alexander-Woods' with moving to suppress the seized evidence on the bases that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to search and arrest him; and his arrest and the vehicle search were unreasonable and violated his right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

[4] On October 10, 2019, while Deputy Brent Horton ("Deputy Horton”) of the

Rush County Sheriff's Department was on routine patrol, Deputy Horton

initiated a traffic stop of a speeding vehicle with an Oklahoma license plate.

Without his canine partner, Deputy Horton approached the vehicle on the

passenger side. Deputy Horton observed the driver, later identified as

Alexander-Woods, making "abnormal[ly]” excessive, "furtive movements”

within the vehicle. Tr. Vol. III pp. 222, 223. Alexander-Woods was

accompanied by his wife, India Alexander-Woods ("India”).

1

The vehicle was

a rental car.2

[5] Deputy Horton detected a strong odor of marijuana in the vehicle and observed

one package of Swisher Sweets cigarillos in the center console and another

package on India's floorboard. In Deputy Horton's experience, cigarillos are

commonly used to smoke marijuana, with marijuana substituted for the original

1 Alexander-Woods resided in Michigan at the time of these events.

2 The vehicle was originally rented by Alexander-Woods' brother.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 4 of 18

tobacco. Deputy Horton instructed Alexander-Woods and India to exit the

vehicle and advised the couple that Deputy Horton detected the odor of raw

marijuana coming from the vehicle. India exited the vehicle promptly;

however, Alexander-Woods "took a fair amount of time to exit the vehicle

which was a red-flag to [Deputy Horton].” Id. at 225-26. Alexander-Woods

advised that the couple smoked marijuana earlier that day. Deputy Horton

called for backup and commenced a vehicle search based on his detection of the

marijuana odor.

3



[6] The vehicle search revealed a baggie containing a plant-like material in the

center console of the vehicle. Deputy Horton believed the plant-like material to

be marijuana. Visibly protruding from beneath the driver's seat, Deputy

Horton found a t-shirt that was wrapped around a crumpled napkin and a

handgun. The napkin contained a hard, brown, sand-like substance that

Deputy Horton suspected was heroin; the substance was later determined to be

fentanyl. Deputy Horton read the Miranda advisements to Alexander-Woods,

who agreed to speak with Deputy Horton. Alexander-Woods admitted that he

owned the gun and that the brown sand-like material was heroin.

[7] On October 11, 2019, the State charged Alexander-Woods with possession of a

narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony; theft of a firearm, a Level 6 felony; carrying a

3 Deputy Horton's canine partner did not participate in the vehicle search. See Tr. Vol. III p. 227 (Deputy

Horton's testimony that "I'd already detected the odor of marijuana and searched based on that. My canine

was not needed.”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 5 of 18

handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of

marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. In a separate information, the State alleged

that Alexander-Woods was an habitual offender.

[8] On January 3, 2020, Alexander-Woods filed a motion to suppress evidence,

wherein he asserted that: (1) "[t]he search and seizure was not based on

reasonable suspicion that [ ]Alexander-Woods [ ] was involved in criminal

activity”; (2) "[t]he search was not incident to arrest, because the search

preceded the arrest of [ ]Alexander-Woods[ ]”; and (3) "[c]onsidering the

totality of the circumstances, the arrest and search of [Alexander-Woods] was

unreasonable, and thus, violated Article l, Section 11 of the Indiana

Constitution . . . and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States.” See Alexander-Woods' Conf. App. p. 71. On January 9, 2020, the trial

court conducted a suppression hearing and, at the close of the evidence, found:

". . . [T]here was reasonable [ ] suspicion for the stop and [ ] the odor of

marijuana, in itself, was Probable Cause for the search of the vehicle. [ ][T]he

Motion for Suppression of Evidence should be denied.” Tr. Vol. II p. 22.

[9] The trial court conducted Alexander-Woods' jury trial on February 25 and 26,

2020.

4

During the State's case-in-chief, Deputy Horton testified that: (1) he was

previously trained regarding "street level narcotics training [and]

4 To be precise, the underlying trial was Alexander-Woods' second jury trial. The first jury trial, held from

January 14 to January 15, 2020, ended in a mistrial. On February 5, 2020, the State dismissed the theft of a

firearm count before the State retried Alexander-Woods on the remaining charges.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 6 of 18

identification[,]” tr. vol. III p. 220; and (2) he identified the odor of marijuana5

in the vehicle based on his training and experience. The defense objected to

Deputy Horton's testimony "based on [the] prior Motion to Suppress” and

"ask[ed] the Court to note [the defense's] continuing objection to any testimony

from the Deputy regarding the search of the vehicle.” Id. at 225. The trial

court overruled the objection. Thereafter, as the State introduced into evidence

the marijuana, handgun, fentanyl, and other items seized from the vehicle,

Alexander-Woods renewed his objection.

[10] On cross-examination of Deputy Horton, defense counsel challenged: (1) the

State's ability to prove that Alexander-Woods knowingly possessed the fentanyl

and the handgun found in the vehicle; (2) the propriety of Deputy Horton's

continued search after the discovery of the marijuana; (3) the particular

circumstances under which each item of contraband or evidence was discovered

during the search; (4) the nature, extent, and import of Deputy Horton's

remarks to Alexander-Woods and India; and (5) the rationale for various steps

taken by Deputy Horton during his investigation.

6

The defense did not probe

into Deputy Horton's qualifications to identify controlled substances and/or his

5 At trial, Deputy Horton did not specify that the detected odor was that of raw marijuana.

6 The defense elicited India's and/or Alexander-Woods' testimony that: (1) the vehicle involved in the

incident was a rental car; (2) India and Alexander-Woods lacked knowledge of the presence of the gun or the

fentanyl in the vehicle; (3) India had a Michigan-issued license to carry a handgun and would have had

lawful possession of any handgun in the couple's possession; (4) Alexander-Woods only claimed ownership

of the handgun after Deputy Horton "threatened to lock [India] up” as well, tr. vol. IV p. 86; and (5)

Alexander-Woods did not identify the brown sand-like substance as heroin.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 7 of 18

ability to distinguish one controlled substance from another. See Tr. Vol. III pp.

246-47, Tr. Vol. IV p. 3 (Deputy Horton's testimony and defense counsel's

references, on cross-examination, regarding Deputy Horton's detection of the

odor of marijuana).

[11] On February 26, 2020, the jury found Alexander-Woods guilty on all counts;

Alexander-Woods subsequently admitted he was an habitual offender. On

June 4, 2020, the trial court sentenced Alexander-Woods as follows and

ordered the counts to be served concurrently: (1) for possessing a narcotic drug,

ten years in the Department of Correction ("DOC”), plus a six-year habitual

offender enhancement; (2) for carrying a handgun without a license, one year;

and (3) for possession of marijuana, sixty days. Alexander-Woods, thus,

received a sixteen-year aggregate sentence from which he now appeals.

Analysis

[12] Alexander-Woods alleges the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

fentanyl and the handgun evidence; he maintains that the admission of these

items violated his Fourth Amendment rights as well as his rights under Article

1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We review challenges to the

admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Fansler v.

State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018). In those instances, we will reverse only

where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and

circumstances. Id. "[W]hen an appellant's challenge to such a ruling is

predicated on an argument that impugns the constitutionality of the search or

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 8 of 18

seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, and we consider

that question de novo.” Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013).

[13] As noted above, Alexander-Woods argued below that:

3. The search and seizure was without lawful authority because:

a. The search and seizure was not based on reasonable

suspicion that the citizen (Alexander-Woods) was

involved in criminal activity.

b. The search was not incident to arrest, because the search

preceded the arrest of the citizen (Alexander-Woods).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the arrest

and search of the Defendant was unreasonable, and thus,

violated Article l, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995) and the Fourth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Alexander-Woods' Conf. App. p. 71. On appeal, however, Alexander-Woods

challenges the vehicle search on a different basis. Alexander-Woods now

contends that Deputy Horton lacked probable cause to search because: (1) "the

smell of marijuana is no longer a sufficient basis to establish probable cause

because the smell is virtually indistinguishable from the smell of a legal plant

like hemp”; (2) "[w]ithout evidence that a police officer has been formally

trained and has experience in distinguishing the odor of legal hemp from the

odor of illegal marijuana, the incriminating nature of the source of an odor that

has commonly been associated with marijuana is no longer immediately

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 9 of 18

apparent to a police officer”; and (3) "Deputy Horton . . . did not testify that he

had the training and experience necessary to discern between legal hemp and

illegal marijuana.” Alexander-Woods' Br. pp. 16-17.

[14] Alexander-Woods cannot now raise an argument that he did not raise to the

trial court. Accordingly, this issue is waived. See Washington v. State, 808

N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004) (concluding that failure to raise an argument in the

trial court constituted waiver on appeal because "'a trial court cannot be found

to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to

consider'”).

[15] As the State points out, Alexander-Woods may circumvent waiver by

establishing fundamental error. See Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind.

2010) ("Failure to object at trial waives the issue for review unless fundamental

error occurred.”). "The 'fundamental error' exception is extremely narrow and

applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles,

the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the

defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587

(Ind. 2006). "The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or

constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due

process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (internal quotation

omitted). Thus, we will consider whether the admission of the evidence at issue

constituted fundamental error under the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 10 of 18

A. Fourth Amendment

[16] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens

against unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting them without a

warrant supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The

fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens

possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings.” Taylor v. State, 842

N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). This protection has been "extended to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999

(Ind. 2016). "As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this

rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of the

unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception.” Clark v.

State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013).

[17] Probable cause is "not a high bar,” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S.

320, 338, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014), and is cleared when the totality

of the circumstances establishes "a fair probability”—not proof or

a prima facie showing—of criminal activity, contraband, or

evidence of a crime, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238, 243

n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). See McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d

522, 528 (Ind. 2018).

Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 581-82 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted).

"Probable cause to search exists where the facts and circumstances within the

knowledge of the officer making the search, based on reasonably trustworthy

information, are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the

belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Shorter v. State, 144

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 11 of 18

N.E.3d 829, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. "[T]he determination is to

be based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life upon which

reasonable and prudent persons act.” Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2002). The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that the

"presence of odors” can establish probable cause to issue a search warrant,

provided that the following conditions are met: (1) the issuing judicial officer

"finds the affiant qualified to know the odor”; and (2) the odor "is one

sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance.” Johnson v. United

States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948).

[18] In Hawkins, this Court held that, when a trained and experienced police officer

detects the distinctive odor of a drug—such as raw or burnt marijuana—coming

from a vehicle, the officer has probable cause to search the vehicle. See Marcum

v. State, 843 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d

at 752); see also Shorter, 144 N.E.3d at 838-39 (finding that detection of burnt

synthetic drugs supplied probable cause for a search). Notably, however, in

each of those decisions, the defendant either failed to challenge law

enforcement's qualifications to detect the odor, Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d at 752, or

the officer's qualifications were sufficiently established, Marcum, 843 N.E.2d at

548; Shorter, 144 N.E.3d at 839.

[19] Hawkins is especially instructive. In Hawkins, a police officer lawfully stopped

Hawkins' vehicle, detected the odor of burnt marijuana, and conducted a

warrantless search of the vehicle, which yielded a gun. Hawkins was charged

with a related offense and moved to suppress the gun for lack of probable cause.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 12 of 18

At the ensuing suppression hearing, Hawkins stipulated to the facts as provided

in the probable cause affidavit. The trial court subsequently granted Hawkins'

motion to suppress. In reversing on appeal, this Court held: "[W]hen a trained

and experienced police officer detects the strong and distinctive odor of burnt

marijuana coming from a vehicle, the officer has probable cause to search the

vehicle . . . . under both the Fourth Amendment of our federal constitution and

under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d

at 752 (emphasis added).

[20] Further, the panel noted: "Hawkins complains [ ] the record is silent concerning

the training and experience of the police officer. We certainly agree that an

accused may challenge the qualifications of the officer to determine the nature

of the detected odor. That opportunity was, however, foregone in this case.”

Id. Because Hawkins stipulated to the probable cause affidavit's recitation of

the facts, which provided that, the officer identified the odor of burnt marijuana

based on the officer's training and experience, the panel found "no issue was

raised [below] concerning the training and experience of the police officer, and

none can be raised now.” Id.

[21] Here, the record reveals that Alexander-Woods simply failed to seize his

opportunity below to challenge Deputy Horton's training and experience

regarding the identification of controlled substances, including Deputy Horton's

ability to distinguish between the odors of marijuana and hemp. Deputy

Hawkins testified that he was previously trained regarding "street level

narcotics training [and] identification[,]” tr. vol. III p. 220, and that he

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 13 of 18

identified the odor of marijuana in the vehicle based on his training and

experience. Alexander-Woods' ensuing objection was based generally on the

motion to suppress, but failed to press Deputy Horton regarding the nature and

extent of his qualifications. As in Hawkins, Alexander-Woods seeks, on appeal,

to litigate issues that were not raised or properly preserved before the trial court.

See State's Br. p. 14 (arguing that "[h]emp was never mentioned in the trial

court, and the trial court was never presented with any facts or argument about

the similarities or differences between the odors of hemp and marijuana”). This

is improper.

[22] "Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the

most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been

procedurally barred, not to provide a second bite at the apple for defense

counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error.”

Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014). Alexander-Woods' failure to raise

the "hemp argument” below is fatal to his claim that the trial court

fundamentally erred in finding probable cause for the vehicle search under the

Fourth Amendment.

[23] Moreover, we find that facts and circumstances within Deputy Horton's

knowledge support the trial court's finding of probable cause for the vehicle

search. The record includes Deputy Horton's testimony that, before the vehicle

search, Deputy Horton detected an odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle;

observed in plain view cigarillos commonly used for smoking marijuana; and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 14 of 18

learned directly from Alexander-Woods that the couple smoked marijuana

earlier that day. See Tr. Vol. III p. 226.

[24] For the foregoing reasons, Alexander-Woods has not established that the trial

court, by its admission of evidence, committed an egregious and blatant error

that rendered a fair trial impossible or violated due process under the Fourth

Amendment. Thus, Alexander-Woods' claim fails.

B. Indiana Constitution

[25] Next, we address whether the admission of the evidence at issue here

constituted fundamental error under the Indiana Constitution. Article 1,

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall

not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or

thing to be seized.

[26] Although Article 1, Section 11 contains language nearly identical to the Fourth

Amendment, Indiana courts interpret Article 1, Section 11

independently. Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 942 (Ind. 2020). In cases

involving Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the State must show

that the challenged police action was reasonable based on the totality of the

circumstances. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 2014); see Austin v.

State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 15 of 18

10, 17 (Ind. 2010)) ("'[W]e focus on the actions of the police officer,' and

employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the

officer's actions.”). "The totality of the circumstances requires consideration of

both the degree of intrusion into the subject's ordinary activities and the basis

upon which the officer selected the subject of the search or seizure.” Litchfield v.

State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 360 (Ind. 2005). In Litchfield, our Indiana Supreme

Court summarized this evaluation as follows:

In sum, although we recognize there may well be other relevant

considerations under the circumstances, we have explained

reasonableness of a search or seizure as turning on a balance of:

1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation

has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search

or seizure imposes on the citizens' ordinary activities, and 3) the

extent of law enforcement needs.

Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.

[27] We begin our analysis by examining the law-enforcement

officers' "degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a

violation has occurred.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. In

evaluating the officers' degree of suspicion, we consider all "the

information available to them at the time” of the search or

seizure. Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 18.

Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943. The record reveals that Deputy Horton: (1) lawfully

stopped Alexander-Woods' speeding vehicle; (2) observed Alexander-Woods'

furtive movements inside the vehicle; (3) detected the odor of marijuana from

the vehicle; (4) saw potentially-incriminating cigarillos in plain view; and (5)

noted Alexander-Woods' delay in exiting the vehicle as instructed. Deputy

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 16 of 18

Horton, thus, had a firm suspicion that there was illegal activity occurring in

Alexander-Woods' vehicle as well as concern that Alexander-Woods was

operating the vehicle under the influence of drugs.

[28] Next, our consideration of the second factor, "the degree of intrusion the

method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizens' ordinary activities”, is

guided by various principles. We first consider the degree of intrusion from the

defendant's point of view; thus, a defendant's consent to the search or seizure is

relevant to determining the degree of intrusion. Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944.

Second, we consider the intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements

and the citizen's privacy. Id. In traffic stop cases, we focus on the degree of

intrusion into the defendant's physical movements. Id. at 944-45. Third, we

consider the manner in which the officers conducted a search or seizure. See id.

at 945. Specifically, we continue to consider the totality of the circumstances

and look at "all of the attendant circumstances”—not a single aspect of the

search or seizure in isolation. Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196,

1202 (Ind. 2016)). Here, Alexander-Woods did not grant consent to the vehicle

search. Alexander-Woods does not suggest, and there is nothing in the record

to support a finding, that the actual vehicle search was conducted in an

extraordinary manner. We acknowledge, however, that Deputy Horton's order

that Alexander-Woods and India should exit the vehicle as well as the interior

search of the vehicle imposed a moderate degree of intrusion into AlexanderWoods' ordinary activities.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 17 of 18

[29] Regarding the third Litchfield factor, "the extent of law enforcement needs, our

Supreme Court has stated the following:

These law-enforcement needs exist not only when officers

conduct investigations of wrongdoing but also when they provide

emergency assistance or act to prevent some imminent harm.

In reviewing the extent of law-enforcement needs, we look to the

needs of the officers to act in a general way.

But we also look to the needs of the officers to act in the

particular way and at the particular time they did. In considering

the needs of law-enforcement officers in this more specific way,

however, we take a practical approach and do not require officers

to undertake duplicative tasks.

Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946-47 (internal citations omitted).

[30] Here, we find that the law enforcement need was elevated and, overall,

moderate. Deputy Horton was assigned to patrol the public highway and to

look out for public safety. After the lawful traffic stop, Alexander-Woods'

movements within the vehicle, his delay in exiting the vehicle, and his ability to

drive the vehicle away implicated officer safety and necessitated that officers

search the vehicle. Additionally, in the interest of ensuring the safety of

motorists, we find that conducting the search without a warrant was not

unreasonable. See Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind.

2019) (recognizing the "need to enforce traffic-safety laws”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 18 of 18

[31] Based on our consideration and balancing of the Litchfield factors, we conclude

that the vehicle search was reasonable under the totality of the

circumstances. See Meek v. State, 950 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding,

under substantially similar facts, that the warrantless search of a lawfullystopped vehicle was "reasonable under [the] totality of the circumstances[,]”

based upon police detection of the odor of raw marijuana), trans. denied; see also

Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d at 752 ("[W]hen a trained and experienced police officer

detects the strong and distinctive odor of [ ] marijuana coming from a vehicle,

the officer has probable cause to search the vehicle . . . . under Article 1, Section

11 of the Indiana Constitution.”).

[32] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the vehicle search did not run afoul of

Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Alexander-Woods has,

therefore, not established that the trial court, by its admission of evidence,

committed an egregious and blatant error that rendered a fair trial impossible or

violated principles of due process under the Indiana Constitution. AlexanderWoods' claim fails.

The trial court did not fundamentally err in admitting the evidence found

during the search of Alexander-Woods’ vehicle. We affirm.