Lewis James Martin v. State of Indiana

Anderson, IN - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant Lewis James Martin a/k/a Andolian Juan Ochoa-Napraja charged with f Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug, Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine, two counts of Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, and Level 4 felony dealing in a narcotic drug.

[2] In June and July of 2018, the Madison County Drug Task Force used

confidential informants to conduct a series of four controlled-buy operations

targeting Martin. On June 20, 2018, Martin agreed to deliver six grams of

heroin to a confidential informant in exchange for $600.00, and he delivered a

substance purported to be heroin to the confidential informant. On June 27,

2018, Martin agreed to deliver five grams of heroin to a confidential informant

in exchange for $500.00, and he subsequently delivered a substance to the

confidential informant. Similarly, on July 5, 2018, Martin agreed to sell five

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(c), Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(e)(3), & Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2.

2 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1.

3 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C) & Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(d)(1).

4 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C) & Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(c)(1).

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grams of heroin to a confidential informant for $400, and he delivered a

substance to the confidential informant. In each of these three controlled-buy

operations, Martin delivered fentanyl to the confidential informants rather than

heroin. On July 18, 2018, Martin sold approximately six-and-one-half grams of

methamphetamine to a confidential informant.

[3] Police arrested Martin in Detroit, Michigan, on August 3, 2018, and he was

later extradited to Indiana. The State initially charged Martin with Level 2

felony dealing in a narcotic drug and Level 3 felony dealing in

methamphetamine.

5

The State later amended the charging information to

convert the Level 2 dealing in a narcotic drug charge to a Level 2 felony

conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug charge, and the State added

two counts of Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and one count of Level 4

felony dealing in a narcotic drug. Martin moved for a reduction in his bond,

and the trial court held a hearing on Martin’s motion on May 28, 2019. At the

hearing, Martin acknowledged that he was on parole from federal charges in

Michigan when he was arrested in the instant case. He explained the federal

charges stemmed from his robbery of an armored car. He described himself as

a former “King Pin” and explained that he used the proceeds from the robbery

5 The State also filed a notice of intent to file a habitual offender sentence enhancement pursuant to Indiana

Code section 35-50-2-8, but the State later moved to dismiss the habitual offender count after determining

Martin did not qualify for the habitual offender enhancement.

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to finance his drug dealing operation. (Tr. Vol. II at 22.) The court

subsequently denied Martin’s motion for a bond reduction.

[4] The court held a change of plea hearing on November 22, 2019, but the court

refused to accept Martin’s guilty plea after he contested the factual basis given

by the State. The court held a second change of plea hearing on November 27,

2019, and the court accepted Martin’s guilty plea at that hearing. The court

held a sentencing hearing on January 14, 2020. Martin’s Pre-Sentence

Investigation report indicated multiple previous felony convictions, including

armed robbery, bank robbery, and discharging a firearm during a federal crime

of violence. Martin testified that all of these convictions stemmed from a single

incident, his robbery of the armored car, but some of the charges were brought

against him in Michigan state court and other charges were brought against him

in federal court. Martin also testified that his father was Pablo Escobar’s righthand man and that Martin receives royalties from a book he self-published in

2015. Martin described the book as a memoir depicting his drug-dealing

lifestyle, his attempt to leave that lifestyle behind, and “people pulling [him]

back into it.” (Id. at 138.)

[5] The court sentenced Martin to a term of twenty-four years in the Indiana

Department of Correction on the Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing

in a narcotic drug. The court also sentenced Martin to a term of fifteen years on

each of his Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug convictions, fifteen years

on his Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine conviction and eight years

on his Level 4 felony dealing in a narcotic drug conviction. The court ordered

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Martin to serve the sentences concurrently, for an aggregate term of twenty-four

years. In pronouncing sentence, the court noted Madison County had been

“very hard hit” by crime, overdoses, and other problems stemming from illegal

drug use in the community. (Id. at 157.) The court listed Martin’s prior

criminal history, his history of uncharged criminal activity, and his being under

court supervision at the time of the instant offenses as aggravating factors. The

court did credit Martin’s decision to accept responsibility and plead guilty as a

mitigating factor, but the court found the aggravating factors heavily

outweighed that mitigating factor.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion

[6] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we

review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d

973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “An abuse of discretion will be found where the

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances

before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn

therefrom.” Id. For example, a trial court may abuse its discretion by:

(1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a

sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating

factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a

sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly

supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement

that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law.

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Id. “In cases where the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for

resentencing only ‘if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would

have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy

support in the record.’” Bryant v. State, 959 N.E.2d 315, 322 (Ind. Ct. App.

2011) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on

reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[7] Martin argues the trial court considered an impermissible aggravating factor

when it pointed to Martin’s description of drug dealing in his book as evidence

of uncharged criminal conduct. A trial court may consider uncharged criminal

conduct by the defendant in imposing sentence. Carter v. State, 771 N.E.2d 835,

840 (Ind. 1999). While Martin’s book was not introduced into evidence,

Martin testified that the book included descriptions of past drug dealing, and he

commented about his past success as a drug dealer during the hearing on his

motion for a bond reduction. As the trial court explained during sentencing,

“The defendant has acknowledged, yeah, I was a dealer. So he didn’t just

become a dealer when he came to Anderson, this was a way of life for him that

he had known from before, that he continued here.” (Tr. Vol. II at 158.)

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Martin’s

uncharged criminal conduct as an aggravating factor in imposing sentence. See

Carter, 771 N.E.2d at 840 (holding “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

considering Carter’s attempted molestation of his sister as an aggravating

circumstance”).

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[8] Martin also contends the trial court impermissibly took an element of the

dealing offense itself and used it as an aggravating factor. An advisory sentence

represents the legislature’s assessment of the appropriate punishment for the

typical version of an offense, Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494, and drug dealing is

inherently an offense against society. See Illegal Drug, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019) (“A drug whose toxicity or side-effects outweigh its therapeutic

usefulness (if any), making it necessary to protect the public health and welfare

by outlawing its manufacture, export, import, distribution, possession, or

use.”).

[9] However, we disagree with Martin’s assertion that the trial court considered the

societal harms caused by drugs as an aggravating factor in imposing sentence.

The trial court did comment on the societal harms that drugs cause, but the trial

court did so in an effort to illustrate why “the Legislature treats this kind of

conduct so seriously.” (Tr. Vol. II at 156.) The court did not specifically

identify the societal harms caused by drugs as an aggravating factor in its oral

sentencing statement, nor did the trial court list them among the aggravating

factors in its sentencing order. (App. Vol. II at 19) (“Court finds aggravation: 1)

Prior criminal history; 2) Uncharged criminal conduct; 3) Violated court

supervision.”). Further, even if the trial court relied on an improper

aggravating factor, that “does not invalidate the sentence if other valid

aggravators exist and the invalid aggravator did not play a significant role in the

trial court’s decision.” Hart v. State, 829 N.E.2d 541, 543-544 (Ind. Ct. App.

2005). In the case at bar, the three aggravating factors listed in the trial court’s

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sentencing order support an aggravated sentence. See Scott v. State, 840 N.E.2d

376, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming defendant’s sentence and explaining

“we can state with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same

sentence if it considered the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances”),

trans. denied.

[10] At his sentencing hearing, Martin stated, “I apologize for my actions” (Tr. Vol.

II at 132), and he argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by

not addressing this expression of remorse in its sentencing statement. The trial

court is not required to accept the defendant’s arguments regarding what

constitutes a mitigating factor or assign proposed mitigating factors the same

weight as the defendant. Flickner v. State, 908 N.E.2d 270, 273 (Ind. Ct. App.

2009). “The trial court is not obligated to explain why it did not find a factor to

be significantly mitigating.” Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ind. 2001).

We have previously observed that a “trial court’s determination of a

defendant’s remorse is similar to its determination of credibility: without

evidence of some impermissible consideration by the trial court, we accept its

decision.” Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.

denied. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not

addressing Martin’s apology because it was not required to do so, and there is

no evidence the trial court relied on some impermissible consideration to

discount Martin’s expression of remorse. See id. (holding trial court did not

abuse its discretion by failing to consider defendant’s alleged remorse as a

mitigating factor).

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II. Inappropriateness of Sentence

[11] We evaluate inappropriate sentence claims using a well-settled standard of

review.

We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due

consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we find] the sentence

is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the

character of the offender.” Ind. App. R. 7(B). Our role in

reviewing a sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B) “should be

to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding

principles for the trial courts and those charged with

improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a

perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895

N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “The defendant bears the burden

of persuading this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.”

Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

“Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage

done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in

a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2014).

Belcher v. State, 138 N.E.3d 318, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[12] When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory

sentence for the crime. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. A Level 2 felony is

punishable by imprisonment for a term between ten years and thirty years, with

the advisory sentence being seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-

4.5. A Level 3 felony carries a penalty of between three years and sixteen years

in prison, with the advisory sentence being nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.

The court may sentence a person convicted of a Level 4 felony to a term of

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imprisonment between two and twelve years, with the advisory sentence being

six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5.

[13] Martin argues his crimes were not “remarkable or particularly egregious.”

(Appellant’s Br. at 14.) However, we disagree. Martin did not commit himself

to rehabilitation following his incarceration in Michigan. Instead, he

committed the instant offenses. Martin sold drugs to confidential informants

multiple times throughout the course of the investigation. He also sold larger

quantities of illegal drugs than necessary to satisfy the elements of the charged

offenses. For example, Martin sold 6.53 grams of methamphetamine when

Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1 requires the defendant sell only five grams of

methamphetamine to be found guilty of Level 3 felony dealing in

methamphetamine.

[14] Regarding Martin’s character, we look at his criminal history. Johnson v. State,

986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The significance of criminal

history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in

relation to the current offense.” Id. Martin had been convicted of multiple

crimes before committing the instant offenses. He served over a decade in the

Michigan prison system for armed robbery, and he was convicted in federal

court of bank robbery and discharging a firearm during a federal crime of

violence. In fact, Martin was on parole for those crimes when he committed

the instant offenses. Martin had also been charged in Michigan with several

offenses, including assault on a prison employee and escape, with the charges

later being dismissed. See Harlan v. State, 971 N.E.2d 163, 170 (Ind. Ct. App.

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2012) (“Allegations of prior criminal activity need not be reduced to conviction

before they may be properly considered as aggravating circumstances by a

sentencing court.”). Therefore, we hold Martin’s sentence is not inappropriate

given the nature of his offenses and his character. See Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d

1099, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding sentence not inappropriate given

defendant’s lengthy criminal history and nature of his crimes).

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering uncharged criminal

conduct Martin described in his book as an aggravating factor in imposing

sentence. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by failing to credit

Martin’s expression of remorse as a mitigating factor. Martin’s violent criminal

history, commission of the instant offenses while under court supervision, and

continued drug dealing demonstrate his sentence is not inappropriate.

Therefore, we affirm the trial court.