The Estate of Richard Walter Meier v. May J. Burnsed

Beaufort, South Carolina civil litigation lawyers represented the parties in a life insurance proceeds dispute.



Decedent and Burnsed married on July 19, 1997. Transamerica Premier Life Insurance Company, Inc. issued a $250,000 life insurance policy (the Policy) to Decedent on June 16, 1998. Decedent named Burnsed as the primary beneficiary and his brother, Richard Walter Meier (Brother), as the contingent beneficiary. However, he retained the power to change the beneficiaries of the policy. Burnsed and Decedent divorced on November 26, 2002. The final divorce decree did not address the Policy expressly but provided that neither party had claims for spousal support, alimony, or an equitable interest in the other's assets or debts. The decree also stated that each party "waived any claim" they may have had against their former spouse.1 Decedent maintained the Policy until his sudden death on December 26, 2017, never having removed Burnsed as the primary beneficiary.



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"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature." Brooks v. Benore Logistics Sys., Inc., 442 S.C. 462, 477, 900 S.E.2d 436, 444 (2024) (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)). The statute's text is the "best evidence of the legislative intent or will." Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed. 1992)). Thus, if a "statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the Court must give effect to t hat clearly expressed legislative intent and h as no right to impose any other meaning." Brooks, 442 S.C. at 477, 900 S.E.2d at 444. Rather, the Court will give words their "plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation." Connelly v. Main St. Am. Grp., 439 S.C. 81, 89, 886 S .E.2d 196, 200 (2023) (quoting State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991)).



In ascertaining the legislature's intent, a Court should read a statute "in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose." State v. Taylor, 436 S.C. 28, 34, 870 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2022) (quoting State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010)). Thus, it "should consider the languageof the statute as a whole." Taylor, 436 S.C. at 34, 870 S.E.2d at 171 (quoting Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996)). "[T]he Court may not, in order to give effect to particular words, virtually destroy the meaning of the entire context; that is, give the particular words a significance that would be clearly repugnant to the statute, looked at as a whole, and destructive of its obvious intent." Buchanan v. S.C. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 424 S.C. 542, 549-50, 819 S.E.2d 124, 128 (2018) (quoting Crescent Mfg. v. Tax Comm'n, 129 S.C. 480, 492, 124 S.E. 761, 765 (1924)).





Section 62-2-507 sets out the revocation upon divorce provision:



Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce or annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage: (1) revokes any revocable: (i) disposition or appointment of property or beneficiary designation made by a divorced individual to the divorced individual's former spouse in a governing instrument . . . .

§ 62-2-507(c)(1)(i). The statute defines "governing instrument" as "an instrument executed by the divorced individual before the divorce . . . of the individual's marriage to the individual's former spouse including, but not limited to . . . life insurance beneficiary designations . . . ." § 62-2-507(a)(4). A "revocable" instrument is "one under which the divorced individual, at the time of the divorce . . . was alone empowered . . . to cancel the designation in favor" of their former spouse. § 62-2-507(a)(5).

The circuit court granted Burnsed's motion on March 21, 2019, finding the legislature did not intend section 62-2-507(c) to "apply retroactively in the case of a divorce entered before the effective date of the statute."



Affirmed as modified.