Antionne Sellers a/k/a Antionne Jeremiah Sellers v. State of Mississippi

Jackson, MS - Criminal defense attorney represented Antionne Sellers a/k/a Antionne Jeremiah Sellers with driving under the influence (first offense) and an improper equipment violation charges.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. Around 9:00 at night, a caller notified the

Madison Police Department of a reckless driver on Interstate 55 who had "ran off the road

multiple times.” Officer William Hall of the Madison Police Department responded to the

report and began to follow Antionne Sellers, who matched the description. As Officer Hall

followed him, he observed three things which triggered his suspicion. First, Sellers was

driving twentymiles an hour below the speed limit. Second, he was swerving in his lane (but

not crossing the line). Third, his car had a tag cover that obscured the license plate's

expiration date. The officer then initiated a traffic stop for the improper display of the tag

cover.

¶3. Officer Hall later testified that during the stop he "detected the odor of intoxicating

beverage coming off [Sellers'] breath.” He also observed that the driver's pupils were

dilated. When Officer Hall asked Sellers whether he had been drinking, the driver initially

denied having consumed any alcohol, but he later admitted that he had had one beer. Officer

Hall then asked Sellers to step out of the car. As he exited the car, the officer "observed

some beer cans and a liquor bottle on the passenger's side floorboard.”

¶4. Sellers consented to three different field sobriety tests. The results of the tests

prompted Officer Hall to ask Sellers to provide a sample for a portable breath test. Sellers

agreed. Officer Hall testified that Sellers' portable breath test was positive for alcohol.

Sellers was then arrested and taken to the Madison Police Department. There, an Intoxylizer

8000 indicated that the driver's breath-alcohol content was .12%. Sellers was charged with

driving under the influence and an improper-equipment violation for the tag cover.

¶5. Sellers went before the Madison Municipal Court and was convicted of both driving

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under the influence (first offense) and an improper-equipment violation. He appealed his

convictions to the County Court of Madison County, where his case was reviewed de novo

in a bench trial. Following the close of the State's case-in-chief, Sellers filed a motion for

a directed verdict. The motion was denied, and he did not call any witnesses on his behalf.

¶6. The county court found Sellers guilty of driving under the influence but not guilty of

the improper-equipment charge. The court held there was probable cause for the stop, but

the evidence was insufficient to find Sellers guilty of the improper-equipment charge beyond

a reasonable doubt.

¶7. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the court stated, "This is a first offense, I do

believe.” Even though Sellers twice admitted to having received a prior DUI in 2010—once

in the patrol car and again at the police station—his trial counsel responded in the

affirmative, "It is, Your Honor.”

¶8. The court then imposed and suspended a sentence of 48 hours of jail time. The court

also sentenced Sellers to two years of unsupervised probation, ordered him to pay fines and

assessments in the amounts of $688 and $394, and attend MASEP classes.1

¶9. Sellers appealed his conviction for driving under the influence to the Circuit Court of

Madison County. The circuit court affirmed the countycourt's judgment. Aggrieved, Sellers

now appeals.

1 Mississippi Alcohol Safety Education Program (MASEP) is a statewide, statutorily

mandated DUI intervention program.

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DISCUSSION

¶10. Sellers asserts the following assignments of error on appeal: (1) the county court erred

by denying his motion for a directed verdict "because the officer's observations and

articulable facts were insufficient to show probable cause which would have suppressed the

evidence”; (2) the county court erred by creating additional grounds to find probable cause;

and (3) the county court erred by not suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the

traffic stop. For the sake of clarity and brevity we will address Sellers' first and third

assignments of error together.

I. The county court did not err by denying Sellers' motion for a

directed verdict.

¶11. Sellers argues that the county court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict

because the only evidence supporting his conviction for driving under the influence was

inadmissible. More specifically, he alleges that the traffic stop was illegal because Officer

Hall lacked probable cause to initiate the stop. Therefore, any evidence obtained as a result

of the stop should have been suppressed at trial.

¶12. "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3[,] [S]ection

23 of the Mississippi Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and

seizures.” Cameron v. State, 175 So. 3d 574, 577 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015); U.S. Const.

amend. IV; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23. This "prohibition against unreasonable searches and

seizures applies to the seizures of the person, including the brief investigatory stops such as

the stop of a vehicle.” Howard v. State, 987 So. 2d 506, 509 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

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"And the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine makes inadmissible tangible evidence obtained

incident to an unlawful search or seizure.” Cameron, 175 So. 3d at 577 (¶8). Therefore, if

Sellers' traffic stop was unreasonable, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop would be

subject to this exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we will first review whether there was

probable cause for the stop.

A. There was probable cause for the traffic stop.

¶13. Sellers argues that the traffic stop was illegal because Officer Hall did not have

probable cause for the stop. "For assignments of error challenging a trial court's judgment

on reasonable suspicion and probable cause we employ de novo review.” Adams v. City of

Booneville, 910 So. 2d 720, 722 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). On appeal, "this Court may look

to the entire record to determine whether the trial [court's] findings are supported by

substantial evidence.” Wallace v. State, No. 2017-KA-01072-COA, 2019 WL 1771908, at

*1 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019), cert. denied, 279 So. 3d 1086 (Miss. 2019). "But

our review of the trial court's findings on these issues are more deferential and restricted to

the historical facts reviewed under the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous standards.”

Id. Therefore, "while we review the lower court's legal conclusions on probable cause and

reasonable suspicion de novo, we must accept the fact findings that led the lower court to that

legal conclusion unless there is clear error in those fact findings.” Adams, 910 So. 2d at 722

(¶7).

¶14. "As a general rule, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police

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have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Henderson v. State, 878

So. 2d 246, 247 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

810 (1996)). "The test for probable cause in Mississippi is the totality of the circumstances.”

Adams, 910 So. 2d at 722 (¶8) (quoting Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1138 (¶18)

(Miss. 2001)). Probable cause "arises when the facts and circumstances with an officer's

knowledge, or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in

themselves to justify a man of average caution in the belief that a crime has been committed

and that a particular individual committed it.” Id.

¶15. Sellers argues there was no probable cause for the traffic stop, so as a result all of the

evidence obtained as a result of the stop should have been suppressed, relying on Trejo v.

State, 76 So. 3d 702 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). In Trejo we held that "[t]here must be an

objective basis for the stop . . . and if it is clear that what the police observed did not

constitute a violation of the cited traffic law, there is no 'objective basis' for the stop and the

stop, is illegal.” Id. at 707 (¶9). We reversed the defendant's conviction because the only

evidence in support thereof was obtained as a result of an illegal stop. Id. at 708-09 (¶¶13-

14).

¶16. In that case, the record did not demonstrate that the officer ever suspected the

defendant of any traffic violation. Id. at (¶11). The defendant "was not weaving or driving

erratically . . . and the state concede[d] that [the officer] repeatedly testified that [the

defendant] committed no traffic violation.” Id. Rather, the officer "merely testified that he

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had a 'concern' that [the defendant] may have been tired or intoxicated.” Id. Also, there was

no evidence that the defendant was traveling "at less than the normal speed of traffic at the

time and place he was stopped.” Id. at 708 (¶13).

¶17. The facts of Trejo are very different from this case. Here, Officer Hall had no less

than five grounds for probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. First, the officer received a

report of a car matching Sellers' description driving recklessly. Second, he independently

corroborated the report with his own personal observations. Third, contrary to the defendant

in Trejo, the officer did see Sellers swerving his car. Fourth, again unlike Trejo, Sellers was

driving twenty miles an hour below the speed limit on the interstate. Officer Hall testified

that Sellers was "traveling 50 miles an hour in a 70, which he wasn't keeping up with

traffic.”2 Finally, Sellers was pulled over because Officer Hall believed he was committing

an improper-equipment violation by obscuring the expiration date on his license plate with

a car tag. The officer testified that the car tag was "obstructing the view” and that he could

not "see the total numbers of the license plate.”

¶18. A traffic stop must have an objective basis. Martin v. State, 240 So. 3d 1047, 1051

2 Sellers points out that it is not a ticketable offense to drive fifty miles an hour in a

seventy mile an hour zone. See Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-509(2) (Rev. 2013) ("In the event

a speed limit of seventy miles per hour is established on any portion of the Interstate

Highway System . . . a minimum speed of forty miles per hour shall be established[.]”).

However, we review for whether there was probable cause for a stop by looking at the

totality of the circumstances. Martin, 240 So. 3d at 1051 (¶13). Even if Sellers' speed at

the time of the traffic stop was within the statutory guidelines, there were other grounds for

the stop.

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(¶14) (Miss. 2017). Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we find that Officer Hall had

probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.

¶19. Sellers also contends that one of the bases of probable cause was eliminated because

his improper-equipment conviction was not upheld by the county court. However, there is

no requirement that a defendant be convicted for the predicate traffic violation to have a valid

stop. "The issue is not whether the defendant is ultimately found guilty of the traffic

violation; rather, the issue is whether or not the officer reasonably, and objectively believed

that a traffic violation had occurred.” Adams, 910 So. 2d at 724 (¶14). Therefore, Sellers'

acquittal on the improper-equipment charge does not mean the officer lacked probable cause

for the traffic stop. This issue is without merit.

B. The exclusionary rule does not apply.

¶20. Sellers claims that because there was no probable cause for the stop, the evidence

obtained as a result of the stop was inadmissible.

¶21. Sellers failed to preserve this issue for appeal, making it procedurally barred. As

noted by the circuit court and confirmed by our review of the record, Sellers failed to object

to the introduction of evidence at trial. The "failure to contemporaneously object to the

admission of evidence at trial . . . effectively waives the issue on appeal.” Butler v. State, 16

So. 3d 751, 755 (¶¶14, 19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

¶22. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this issue is still without merit. "If, in the process of

making [a] legitimate search and seizure, an officer uncovered evidence of another crime,

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as he did here, he is not required to ignore such evidence nor does the Fourth Amendment

require its suppression.” Howard, 987 So. 2d at 510 (¶12). Here, the officer had probable

cause to initiate the traffic stop. Therefore, the exclusionary rule does not apply.

C. The county court did not err by denying Sellers'

motion for a directed verdict.

¶23. Finally, we address Sellers' claim that the county court erred by denying his motion

for directed verdict. "Motions for directed verdict challenge the legal sufficiency of the

evidence[.]” Starkey v. State, 941 So. 2d 899, 902 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). "This Court

follows our supreme court's standard in reviewing denials ofmotions for directed verdict and

will reverse only when the evidence is such that 'reasonable and fair-minded jurors could

only find the accused not guilty.'” Id. (quoting McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss.

1993)).

¶24. Officer Hall was first notified by dispatch that another driver had reported that Sellers

had been driving recklessly and even "ran off the road multiple times.” Once the officer

responded to the report and began to follow Sellers, he observed the driver swerving in his

lane and driving twenty miles an hour below the speed limit on the interstate.

¶25. Officer Hall testified that when he initiated the traffic stop, he noticed that Sellers'

pupils were dilated, and he "detected the odor of intoxicating beverage coming off [Sellers']

breath.” Additionally, when Sellers exited the car, he "observed some beer cans and a liquor

bottle on the passenger's side floorboard.” The officer conducted field sobriety tests, which

indicated impairment, and a portable breath test, which was positive for alcohol. At the

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police station, the Intoxylizer 8000 indicated that Sellers' breath-alcohol content was

.12%—well above the legal limit.

¶26. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that

the evidence was sufficient to find Sellers guilty of driving under the influence. This issue

is without merit. The circuit court did not err in affirming the county court's decision.

II. The county court properly viewed the evidence before it.

¶27. Sellers claims that the county court "created” additional grounds to find probable

cause because "the judge is not a law enforcement officer observing an alleged violation” and

was limited to the officer's testimony. He argues that the court improperly found probable

cause from the video evidence instead of the observations made by Officer Hall.

¶28. "But we note again that the probable cause inquiry looks to the totality of the

circumstances.” Adams, 910 So. 2d at 725 (¶19). Therefore, it was not error for the judge

to consider all of the relevant factors present, including the video evidence, in order to gain

a clearer picture of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time. This

argument lacks merit.

Sellers’ conviction of driving under the influence is AFFIRMED.