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Kenneth Peyton Bryant v. Jennifer Hart Bryant
Date: 02-07-2022
Case Number: 2020-CA-00883-COA
Judge: Latrice Westbrooks
Court:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
On appeal from The DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Plaintiff's Attorney:
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Defendant's Attorney: CHARLES E. WINFIELD
ASHLYN BROWN MATTHEWS
Description:
Jennifer and Kenneth were married from August 2, 2009, until their divorce (based
on irreconcilable differences) on March 30, 2016. Three children were born during their
marriage: the eldest child was born in 2011, and twins were born in 2014. The divorce
decree incorporated a Property, Child Support, and Child Custody Agreement (PSA) that set
forth stipulations as to all matters concerning the minor children.
¶3. The PSA provided that Jennifer and Kenneth agreed to share legal and physical
custody of the children, and there was a specific provision regarding the children's education
and where they could attend school. The PSA stipulated that if they could not agree about
major decisions concerning the children, Kenneth had final decision-making authority. There
was also a clause stating that the PSA could be submitted to the chancellor for "approval or
disapproval.â€
¶4. Kenneth and Jennifer had previously amended the terms of the PSA. On July 26,
2016, Jennifer filed a petition for contempt alleging that Kenneth had incessantly harassed
her and the family since the entry of the divorce decree and that he threatened to withhold
the minor children from her if she did not meet his demands. Kenneth responded, alleging
that Jennifer had not provided him with a copy of her drug test results as commanded in the
divorce decree. Additionally, he alleged that Jennifer denied him the right to speak with the
children when they were in her custody. On May 30, 2017, the parties entered into an
"Agreed Order Modifying Visitation†altering the parties' weekly periods of custody and
limiting their means of communications to text messages and emails. This modification did
not disturb the parties' joint legal custody or the terms of the children's private school and
child care.
¶5. In 2020, when the actions giving rise to this appeal occurred, Kenneth and his wife
Alicia, a teacher in Lake Cormorant, lived in Hernando, as did Jennifer and the children. Per
the PSA, the eldest child had been enrolled in Magnolia Heights, a private school. The twins
were to start kindergarten in the fall of 2020. A few months prior to this time, Kenneth
2
informed Jennifer that he would be enrolling all the children in the Lake Cormorant public
school system. In keeping with the PSA, Jennifer filed a motion requesting that the
chancellor order the children to attend Hernando public schools.1
¶6. Prior to the hearing on Jennifer's motion, the chancellor had read the parties'
submissions, and she came to the conclusion that Magnolia Heights was not an option for
either party. Accordingly, the only schools under consideration were Lake Cormorant and
Hernando elementary schools. Testimony was given regarding the parties' ability to pay for
Magnolia Heights, and the chancellor inferred that Jennifer could not afford half of the
tuition. Kenneth testified that he could afford his part of the tuition, but Alicia wanted to
send the children to Lake Cormorant.
¶7. At the conclusion of the hearing, the chancellor ruled that all three children should be
enrolled in the Hernando school district. At the request of Kenneth's attorney, the chancellor
also ordered that if Kenneth is able to afford private school for all three children and if both
parents decide that would be in the children's best interests, Kenneth would be solely
responsible for all costs associated with them attending private school. Kenneth filed his
notice of appeal from the July 29, 2020 order and argues that the chancellor erred in ordering
that his three minor children must attend school in the Hernando school district or, in the
alternative, that he must pay for private school.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1
Jennifer had "Collective School Rankings†admitted into evidence. Based on this
information, she testified that Hernando ranked higher than Lake Cormorant and that
students at Hernando tested above average in several subjects. Ultimately, the court did not
mention this research in its ruling.
3
¶8. This Court has a limited standard of review in domestic relations cases, and "under
the standard of review utilized to review a chancellor's findings of fact, particularly in the
areas of divorce, alimony and child support, this Court will not overturn the chancellor's
decision on appeal unless his findings were manifestly wrong.†Nelson v. Nelson, 271 So.
3d 613, 616 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). But "[w]hile a chancellor's decisions in a divorce
action are reviewed for manifest error, a property settlement agreement is a contract, and
contract interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.†McFarland v.
McFarland, 105 So. 3d 1111, 1118 (¶21) (Miss. 2013) (citing Harris v. Harris, 988 So. 2d
376, 378 (¶8) (Miss. 2008)).
DISCUSSION
¶9. Kenneth maintains that the chancellor erred in ordering that the children attend a
public school in Hernando. Kenneth also argues the chancellor erred in ordering that if he
wanted the children to attend private school, he was responsible for the payment of all
tuition. These two issues are inextricably intertwined, therefore we will discuss them
simultaneously.
¶10. Our Supreme Court has stated that when parties have complied with the
irreconcilable-differences divorce statute, their agreement concerning "custody, support,
alimony and property settlement agreement becomes a part of the final decree for all legal
intents and purposes.†Switzer v. Switzer, 460 So. 2d 843, 845 (Miss. 1984). Furthermore,
"for purposes ofsubsequent modification proceedings, alimony and child support provisions
found in an agreement made incident to an irreconcilable differences divorce are treated the
4
same as though the chancellor had made the award after a contested divorce trial.†Id. at 846.
The Supreme Court further clarified:
A divorce agreement is "no different from any other contract, and the mere
fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a
divorce decree, does not change its character.†East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927,
931-32 (Miss. 1986). Similarly, in Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841, 844 (Miss.
1990), we held that when parties in a divorce proceeding have reached an
agreement that a chancery court has approved, we will enforce it, absent fraud
or overreaching, and we take a dim view of efforts to modify it just as we do
when persons seek relief from improvident contracts.
Ivison v. Ivison, 762 So. 2d 329, 334 (¶14) (Miss. 2000).
¶11. "Property settlement agreements are contractual obligations.†In re Est. of Hodges,
807 So. 2d 438, 445 (¶26) (Miss. 2002). "Property settlement agreements [between parties
to a divorce] are contracts, and like all contracts, there are sometimes disputes regarding the
meaning of their terms.†Mosher v. Mosher, 192 So. 3d 1118, 1121-22 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016). This is the situation currently before us. Relevant excerpts of the agreement
provided:
11. CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION. The parties shall share
joint legal and physical custody of the children. For the benefit of the parties,
in all matters where "full joint legal†custody applies, as here expressed or as
defined by the 1983 Mississippi Legislature in Ch. 513, Section 1 and 2
(Section 93-5-24), "joint legal custody†here shall mean that the parents . . .
shall share the decision-making rights, the responsibilities, and the authority
relating to the . . . education . . . of the children . . . [i]n the event that the
parties are unable to agree upon major life decisions affecting the
child/children, the Father shall have the final decision making authority.
. . . .
17. PRIVATE SCHOOL/CHILD CARE. Both the Mother and
Father agree that the [eldest] minor child . . . is currently enrolled at Magnolia
Heights School. Each party shall be responsible for one-half (1/2) of the costs
5
of tuition and extra curricular costs for said minor child. Further, each party
shall be responsible for uniforms and school lunches for the minor child while
in their care.
Both parties agree that when it is time for the twins to attend 5 year old
kindergarten, if either party is financially unable to afford tuition for the said
minor children, the Court will reevaluate this matter upon Motion of either
party.
Further, each party shall be responsible for the costs of child care for
the minor children while in their care.
(Emphasis added). The parties also specifically agreed that the PSA was subject to the
court's approval or disapproval. As stated in the PSA:
27. REPRESENTATION. . . .
It is further agreed and understood by and between the parties that this
is a full and complete contract and same may be submitted to the Court of
proper venue and jurisdiction for approval or disapproval by decree or
otherwise.
¶12. Kenneth argues that the chancellor's ruling to send all three children to Hernando
elementary school contradicts the language in the PSA that gave him the final decisionmaking authority should he and Jennifer disagree on any major life decisions affecting the
children. But even when parties agree, they cannot deprive a court of its authority to review
provisions for support and custody. A court may alter or modify the parties' agreement with
respect to these matters even if the parties intended to be bound by the agreement regardless
of court approval. Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 23.09[1][b] at 798 (3d
ed. 2020).
¶13. The Mississippi SupremeCourt has held that chancerycourts are not bound by parties'
property settlement agreement, particularly when the parties agree that their agreement
clearly gives the court the authority to decide any matters differently than provided by the
6
property settlement agreement. See Gerty v. Gerty, 296 So.3d 704, 706 (¶7) (Miss. 2020).
"When the subject of the [contractual] agreement is the custody of minor children, . . . other
considerations override the basic rule. The welfare of the children and their best interest is
the primary objective of the law, and the courts must not [allow] contractual arrangements
. . . to turn the inquiry away from that goal.†McManus v. Howard, 569 So. 2d 1213, 1215
(Miss. 1990) (citations omitted). "The ultimate determination of the best interest of the child
is a determination to be made by the court.†Torrence v. Moore, 455 So. 2d 778, 780 (Miss.
1984).
¶14. In keeping with the language of the PSA, the chancellor reevaluated a decision that
was submitted to her "for approval or disapproval.†After hearing testimony presented by
each side, the chancellor held that all three children should be enrolled in the Hernando
school district. The chancellor reasoned that it was in the children's best interest to do so.
The chancellor also took into account Jennifer's willingness to transport the children as long
as Kenneth worked out-of-town. Additionally, the costs of private school tuition (should the
parties agree to private school), was assessed to Kenneth at the urging of his own counsel.
The chancellor awarded Kenneth exactly what he requested.
¶15. In McManus, the Supreme Court addressed an agreement similar to the PSA here.
The parents of two minors executed a property settlement agreement and attached it as a part
of the final judgment. McManus, 569 So. 2d at 1214. Our Supreme Court gave a "thumbnail
sketch†of the parties' position:
At the time of the divorce the parties agreed that Columbus would be the home
of the children and that their primary custody would be with the mother. They
7
agreed that if the mother moved away from Columbus without the consent of
the father, the custody would automatically be divested from her and placed
in the father. The mother now says that that agreement should not be enforced
as being contrary to public policy and the law. When she filed the complaint
she contemplated remarriage and has since remarried and that it is in the best
interest of the children that they be allowed to reside in another county in the
state and that a change of residence is not a change of circumstance that would
justify a modification of the divorce decree.
The husband, on the other hand, says that the Agreement was made by the
parties freely and voluntarily and was approved by the court and should be
enforced.
Id. at 1214-15. The chancellor found that "both father and mother are fit and proper parents
to have custody of the children[;]. . . [h]owever, because of their Agreement, being the
principal custodian placed her not in a preferenced position.†Id. at 1215. The chancellor
held that it was beyond his authority to consider or intervene in the matter. Id. The
Mississippi Supreme Court noted the chancellor's position "that the [a]greement was made
by the parties and should be enforced in the absence of a finding of a material change of
circumstance adversely affecting the children†and held theLowndesCountyChanceryCourt
in error. Id. (emphasis added). The Court opined that "the [chancery] court simply cannot
surrender or subordinate its jurisdiction and authority as to . . . circumstances . . . [that would]
cause a change in custody†and held the "agreement to be void and contrary to public policy.â€
Id. at 1216.
¶16. If we were to accept Kenneth's interpretation—that the chancellor's ruling is against
the law and public policy—that would go against an established line of caselaw. In the case
before us, we find that the chancellor's findings were not manifestly wrong. The language
of the PSA gave the chancellor the authority to reevaluate the matter upon the motion of
8
either party. Unlike McManus, custody of the children did not change (and was not at issue)
and neither did the location or residence of the children with the entry of the order on July
29, 2020.
¶17. The PSA clearly gave the chancellor the authority to weigh in on all matters covered
therein—specifically where the children attended school. A property settlement agreement
cannot deprive the court of its authority to modify support and educational needs of a child.
The decision-making power afforded Kenneth in this instance cannot and does not usurp that
of the chancellor.
Jackson, MS - Divorce lawyer represented defendant with appealing an order of his divorce.
Jennifer and Kenneth were married from August 2, 2009, until their divorce (based
on irreconcilable differences) on March 30, 2016. Three children were born during their
marriage: the eldest child was born in 2011, and twins were born in 2014. The divorce
decree incorporated a Property, Child Support, and Child Custody Agreement (PSA) that set
forth stipulations as to all matters concerning the minor children.
¶3. The PSA provided that Jennifer and Kenneth agreed to share legal and physical
custody of the children, and there was a specific provision regarding the children's education
and where they could attend school. The PSA stipulated that if they could not agree about
major decisions concerning the children, Kenneth had final decision-making authority. There
was also a clause stating that the PSA could be submitted to the chancellor for "approval or
disapproval.â€
¶4. Kenneth and Jennifer had previously amended the terms of the PSA. On July 26,
2016, Jennifer filed a petition for contempt alleging that Kenneth had incessantly harassed
her and the family since the entry of the divorce decree and that he threatened to withhold
the minor children from her if she did not meet his demands. Kenneth responded, alleging
that Jennifer had not provided him with a copy of her drug test results as commanded in the
divorce decree. Additionally, he alleged that Jennifer denied him the right to speak with the
children when they were in her custody. On May 30, 2017, the parties entered into an
"Agreed Order Modifying Visitation†altering the parties' weekly periods of custody and
limiting their means of communications to text messages and emails. This modification did
not disturb the parties' joint legal custody or the terms of the children's private school and
child care.
¶5. In 2020, when the actions giving rise to this appeal occurred, Kenneth and his wife
Alicia, a teacher in Lake Cormorant, lived in Hernando, as did Jennifer and the children. Per
the PSA, the eldest child had been enrolled in Magnolia Heights, a private school. The twins
were to start kindergarten in the fall of 2020. A few months prior to this time, Kenneth
2
informed Jennifer that he would be enrolling all the children in the Lake Cormorant public
school system. In keeping with the PSA, Jennifer filed a motion requesting that the
chancellor order the children to attend Hernando public schools.1
¶6. Prior to the hearing on Jennifer's motion, the chancellor had read the parties'
submissions, and she came to the conclusion that Magnolia Heights was not an option for
either party. Accordingly, the only schools under consideration were Lake Cormorant and
Hernando elementary schools. Testimony was given regarding the parties' ability to pay for
Magnolia Heights, and the chancellor inferred that Jennifer could not afford half of the
tuition. Kenneth testified that he could afford his part of the tuition, but Alicia wanted to
send the children to Lake Cormorant.
¶7. At the conclusion of the hearing, the chancellor ruled that all three children should be
enrolled in the Hernando school district. At the request of Kenneth's attorney, the chancellor
also ordered that if Kenneth is able to afford private school for all three children and if both
parents decide that would be in the children's best interests, Kenneth would be solely
responsible for all costs associated with them attending private school. Kenneth filed his
notice of appeal from the July 29, 2020 order and argues that the chancellor erred in ordering
that his three minor children must attend school in the Hernando school district or, in the
alternative, that he must pay for private school.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1
Jennifer had "Collective School Rankings†admitted into evidence. Based on this
information, she testified that Hernando ranked higher than Lake Cormorant and that
students at Hernando tested above average in several subjects. Ultimately, the court did not
mention this research in its ruling.
3
¶8. This Court has a limited standard of review in domestic relations cases, and "under
the standard of review utilized to review a chancellor's findings of fact, particularly in the
areas of divorce, alimony and child support, this Court will not overturn the chancellor's
decision on appeal unless his findings were manifestly wrong.†Nelson v. Nelson, 271 So.
3d 613, 616 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). But "[w]hile a chancellor's decisions in a divorce
action are reviewed for manifest error, a property settlement agreement is a contract, and
contract interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.†McFarland v.
McFarland, 105 So. 3d 1111, 1118 (¶21) (Miss. 2013) (citing Harris v. Harris, 988 So. 2d
376, 378 (¶8) (Miss. 2008)).
DISCUSSION
¶9. Kenneth maintains that the chancellor erred in ordering that the children attend a
public school in Hernando. Kenneth also argues the chancellor erred in ordering that if he
wanted the children to attend private school, he was responsible for the payment of all
tuition. These two issues are inextricably intertwined, therefore we will discuss them
simultaneously.
¶10. Our Supreme Court has stated that when parties have complied with the
irreconcilable-differences divorce statute, their agreement concerning "custody, support,
alimony and property settlement agreement becomes a part of the final decree for all legal
intents and purposes.†Switzer v. Switzer, 460 So. 2d 843, 845 (Miss. 1984). Furthermore,
"for purposes ofsubsequent modification proceedings, alimony and child support provisions
found in an agreement made incident to an irreconcilable differences divorce are treated the
4
same as though the chancellor had made the award after a contested divorce trial.†Id. at 846.
The Supreme Court further clarified:
A divorce agreement is "no different from any other contract, and the mere
fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a
divorce decree, does not change its character.†East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927,
931-32 (Miss. 1986). Similarly, in Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841, 844 (Miss.
1990), we held that when parties in a divorce proceeding have reached an
agreement that a chancery court has approved, we will enforce it, absent fraud
or overreaching, and we take a dim view of efforts to modify it just as we do
when persons seek relief from improvident contracts.
Ivison v. Ivison, 762 So. 2d 329, 334 (¶14) (Miss. 2000).
¶11. "Property settlement agreements are contractual obligations.†In re Est. of Hodges,
807 So. 2d 438, 445 (¶26) (Miss. 2002). "Property settlement agreements [between parties
to a divorce] are contracts, and like all contracts, there are sometimes disputes regarding the
meaning of their terms.†Mosher v. Mosher, 192 So. 3d 1118, 1121-22 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016). This is the situation currently before us. Relevant excerpts of the agreement
provided:
11. CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION. The parties shall share
joint legal and physical custody of the children. For the benefit of the parties,
in all matters where "full joint legal†custody applies, as here expressed or as
defined by the 1983 Mississippi Legislature in Ch. 513, Section 1 and 2
(Section 93-5-24), "joint legal custody†here shall mean that the parents . . .
shall share the decision-making rights, the responsibilities, and the authority
relating to the . . . education . . . of the children . . . [i]n the event that the
parties are unable to agree upon major life decisions affecting the
child/children, the Father shall have the final decision making authority.
. . . .
17. PRIVATE SCHOOL/CHILD CARE. Both the Mother and
Father agree that the [eldest] minor child . . . is currently enrolled at Magnolia
Heights School. Each party shall be responsible for one-half (1/2) of the costs
5
of tuition and extra curricular costs for said minor child. Further, each party
shall be responsible for uniforms and school lunches for the minor child while
in their care.
Both parties agree that when it is time for the twins to attend 5 year old
kindergarten, if either party is financially unable to afford tuition for the said
minor children, the Court will reevaluate this matter upon Motion of either
party.
Further, each party shall be responsible for the costs of child care for
the minor children while in their care.
(Emphasis added). The parties also specifically agreed that the PSA was subject to the
court's approval or disapproval. As stated in the PSA:
27. REPRESENTATION. . . .
It is further agreed and understood by and between the parties that this
is a full and complete contract and same may be submitted to the Court of
proper venue and jurisdiction for approval or disapproval by decree or
otherwise.
¶12. Kenneth argues that the chancellor's ruling to send all three children to Hernando
elementary school contradicts the language in the PSA that gave him the final decisionmaking authority should he and Jennifer disagree on any major life decisions affecting the
children. But even when parties agree, they cannot deprive a court of its authority to review
provisions for support and custody. A court may alter or modify the parties' agreement with
respect to these matters even if the parties intended to be bound by the agreement regardless
of court approval. Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 23.09[1][b] at 798 (3d
ed. 2020).
¶13. The Mississippi SupremeCourt has held that chancerycourts are not bound by parties'
property settlement agreement, particularly when the parties agree that their agreement
clearly gives the court the authority to decide any matters differently than provided by the
6
property settlement agreement. See Gerty v. Gerty, 296 So.3d 704, 706 (¶7) (Miss. 2020).
"When the subject of the [contractual] agreement is the custody of minor children, . . . other
considerations override the basic rule. The welfare of the children and their best interest is
the primary objective of the law, and the courts must not [allow] contractual arrangements
. . . to turn the inquiry away from that goal.†McManus v. Howard, 569 So. 2d 1213, 1215
(Miss. 1990) (citations omitted). "The ultimate determination of the best interest of the child
is a determination to be made by the court.†Torrence v. Moore, 455 So. 2d 778, 780 (Miss.
1984).
¶14. In keeping with the language of the PSA, the chancellor reevaluated a decision that
was submitted to her "for approval or disapproval.†After hearing testimony presented by
each side, the chancellor held that all three children should be enrolled in the Hernando
school district. The chancellor reasoned that it was in the children's best interest to do so.
The chancellor also took into account Jennifer's willingness to transport the children as long
as Kenneth worked out-of-town. Additionally, the costs of private school tuition (should the
parties agree to private school), was assessed to Kenneth at the urging of his own counsel.
The chancellor awarded Kenneth exactly what he requested.
¶15. In McManus, the Supreme Court addressed an agreement similar to the PSA here.
The parents of two minors executed a property settlement agreement and attached it as a part
of the final judgment. McManus, 569 So. 2d at 1214. Our Supreme Court gave a "thumbnail
sketch†of the parties' position:
At the time of the divorce the parties agreed that Columbus would be the home
of the children and that their primary custody would be with the mother. They
7
agreed that if the mother moved away from Columbus without the consent of
the father, the custody would automatically be divested from her and placed
in the father. The mother now says that that agreement should not be enforced
as being contrary to public policy and the law. When she filed the complaint
she contemplated remarriage and has since remarried and that it is in the best
interest of the children that they be allowed to reside in another county in the
state and that a change of residence is not a change of circumstance that would
justify a modification of the divorce decree.
The husband, on the other hand, says that the Agreement was made by the
parties freely and voluntarily and was approved by the court and should be
enforced.
Id. at 1214-15. The chancellor found that "both father and mother are fit and proper parents
to have custody of the children[;]. . . [h]owever, because of their Agreement, being the
principal custodian placed her not in a preferenced position.†Id. at 1215. The chancellor
held that it was beyond his authority to consider or intervene in the matter. Id. The
Mississippi Supreme Court noted the chancellor's position "that the [a]greement was made
by the parties and should be enforced in the absence of a finding of a material change of
circumstance adversely affecting the children†and held theLowndesCountyChanceryCourt
in error. Id. (emphasis added). The Court opined that "the [chancery] court simply cannot
surrender or subordinate its jurisdiction and authority as to . . . circumstances . . . [that would]
cause a change in custody†and held the "agreement to be void and contrary to public policy.â€
Id. at 1216.
¶16. If we were to accept Kenneth's interpretation—that the chancellor's ruling is against
the law and public policy—that would go against an established line of caselaw. In the case
before us, we find that the chancellor's findings were not manifestly wrong. The language
of the PSA gave the chancellor the authority to reevaluate the matter upon the motion of
8
either party. Unlike McManus, custody of the children did not change (and was not at issue)
and neither did the location or residence of the children with the entry of the order on July
29, 2020.
¶17. The PSA clearly gave the chancellor the authority to weigh in on all matters covered
therein—specifically where the children attended school. A property settlement agreement
cannot deprive the court of its authority to modify support and educational needs of a child.
The decision-making power afforded Kenneth in this instance cannot and does not usurp that
of the chancellor.
Outcome:
Finding that the chancellor did not err, we affirm.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:
About This Case
What was the outcome of Kenneth Peyton Bryant v. Jennifer Hart Bryant?
The outcome was: Finding that the chancellor did not err, we affirm.
Which court heard Kenneth Peyton Bryant v. Jennifer Hart Bryant?
This case was heard in <center><h4><b>IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI </b> <br><br> <font color="green"><i>On appeal from The DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT </i></font></center></h4>, MS. The presiding judge was Latrice Westbrooks.
Who were the attorneys in Kenneth Peyton Bryant v. Jennifer Hart Bryant?
Plaintiff's attorney: Jackson, MS - Best Divorce Lawyer Directory Tell MoreLaw About Your Litigation Successes and MoreLaw Will Tell the World. Re: MoreLaw National Jury Verdict and Settlement Counselor: MoreLaw collects and publishes civil and criminal litigation information from the state and federal courts nationwide. Publication is free and access to the information is free to the public. MoreLaw will publish litigation reports submitted by you free of charge Info@MoreLaw.com - 855-853-4800. Defendant's attorney: CHARLES E. WINFIELD ASHLYN BROWN MATTHEWS.
When was Kenneth Peyton Bryant v. Jennifer Hart Bryant decided?
This case was decided on February 7, 2022.