Catherine Jane Shuman v. Wesley Robinson Shuman

¶1 Wesley Robinson Shuman and Catherine Jane Shuman obtained a bifurcated decree of divorce in 2011. Several years later, in 2015, all outstanding issues related to their divorce were submitted to the trial court for resolution. Following a two-day trial, the court granted primary physical and sole legal custody

1. After hearing the arguments in this case, Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr. retired and did not participate in the consideration of the case. Judge Ryan M. Harris, having reviewed the briefs and listened to a recording of the oral arguments, substituted for Judge Voros and participated fully in this decision.

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of the parties’ three minor children to Catherine.2 The court also

resolved the parties’ disagreements regarding marital assets and

debts, child support, medical and childcare expenses, and other

matters. Wesley appeals the trial court’s rulings with respect to

custody, marital assets and debts, medical and childcare

expenses, and child support, challenging both the adequacy of

the trial court’s factual findings and the sufficiency of the

evidence underlying those findings. In addition, he claims the

trial court’s order regarding parent-time fails to conform to the

court’s factual findings. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶2 “We review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for

correctness as a question of law.” Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT

App 161, ¶ 15, 257 P.3d 478 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “We review this issue only if it was presented to

the trial court in such a way that the trial court had an

opportunity to correct any deficiencies in the adequacy of the

detail of the findings of fact.” Interstate Income Props., Inc. v. La

Jolla Loans, Inc., 2011 UT App 188, ¶ 12, 257 P.3d 1073 (citing 438

Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801).

¶3 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, we will not set aside a trial court’s factual findings

“unless clearly erroneous,” giving “due regard to the trial court’s

opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Utah R.

Civ. P. 52(a)(4). Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence

may be raised on appeal “whether or not the party requested

findings, objected to them, moved to amend them, or moved for

2. “As is our practice in cases where both parties share a last

name, we refer to the parties by their first name with no

disrespect intended by the apparent informality.” See Smith v.

Smith, 2017 UT App 40, ¶ 2 n.1, 392 P.3d 985.

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partial findings” in the trial court. Id. R. 52(a)(3); see also In re

K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶¶ 60–64, 201 P.3d 985 (explaining that, to

preserve the issue for appeal, parties must object in the trial

court “to the adequacy of the detail of” the court’s factual

findings, but no similar preservation requirement applies to

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence). A party

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “will almost certainly

fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to

marshal” the evidence in support of the challenged finding. State

v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 42, 326 P.3d 645.

ANALYSIS

I. Custody

¶4 Wesley asserts the trial court’s factual findings with

respect to custody were inadequate in detail and were not

supported by sufficient evidence. He first contends the trial

court’s “findings regarding legal custody were grossly

defective,” in that they “omitted consideration of material

evidence” he presented at trial. He also contends the trial court’s

findings “failed to consider many material factors relating to

physical custody,” and he asserts “primary custody [should be

awarded] to [him] outright.” Catherine responds that the trial

court’s findings “present substantial factual grounds supporting

[its] ultimate conclusion that Catherine should continue having

custody of the minor children.”3

3. Catherine also contends that, in the trial court, Wesley did not

contest the adequacy of the court’s factual findings with respect

to custody, but Wesley’s challenges to the adequacy of the

court’s findings were largely included in his post-trial motion.

While the presentation of those challenges could have been

clearer, we conclude that those arguments were preserved for

appellate review.

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¶5 A trial court’s factual findings “must be sufficiently

detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the

evidence upon which they are grounded.” In re S.T., 928 P.2d

393, 398 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); see also Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App

125, ¶ 22, 379 P.3d 882 (“Findings are adequate when they

contain sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure that

the district court’s discretionary determination was rationally

based.”); Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 11, 316 P.3d 455

(“Findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and

include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which

the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). This obligation

facilitates meaningful appellate review and ensures the parties

are informed of the trial court’s reasoning. See In re S.T., 928 P.2d

at 399.

¶6 But trial courts are not required to render a global

accounting of all evidence presented or to discuss all aspects of a

case that might support a contrary ruling. Cf. id. at 398 (“A trial

court is not required to recite each indicia of reasoning that leads

to its conclusions, nor is it required to marshal the evidence in

support of them.” (brackets, citation, and internal quotation

marks omitted)). Indeed, so long as the “steps by which the

ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached” are

apparent, see Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 11 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted), a trial court may make

findings, credibility determinations, or other assessments

without detailing its justification for finding particular evidence

more credible or persuasive than other evidence supporting a

different outcome, see In re S.T., 928 P.2d at 398–99 (“[A] trial

court is also not required to explain why it found certain

witnesses less credible or why some testimony was given less

weight or considered irrelevant.”).

¶7 Here, the trial court’s findings with respect to custody

span approximately six pages and detail the “subsidiary facts,”

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credibility determinations, and analytical “steps by which the

[court’s] ultimate conclusion” on the issue of custody was

reached. See Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 11 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Without addressing the vast majority

of the court’s findings,4 Wesley selectively highlights evidence

from the trial record, asserts the evidence supported a different

outcome, and claims the court’s findings were inadequate

because they did not specifically address his highlighted

evidence. As set forth above, however, Wesley misunderstands

the nature of the trial court’s obligation, see In re S.T., 928 P.2d at

398–99, and Wesley has not demonstrated how the court’s

findings are insufficient to support its conclusion, see, e.g., Dahl v.

Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 123 (rejecting a claim of inadequate factual

findings, concluding that “the findings were based on the

evidence presented to the district court and were sufficiently

detailed to disclose the steps by which it reached the ultimate

distribution”).

¶8 In addition, to successfully challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence underlying a trial court’s factual finding, “the appellant

4. The trial court found, for example, that one child preferred “to

remain with [Catherine]” and it was a “compelling” factor to

keep all of the minor children together; that Catherine “was the

primary caregiver of the children when the parties were married,

and it would be in [the children’s] best interest to continue that

continuity of care”; that Catherine had “put the best interests of

the children first and . . . foster[ed] positive relationships

between [the] children and [Wesley]”; that Wesley had

“involved [the parties’ older] children in divorce issues and

communications against [Catherine]”; that Wesley had “made

negative statements about [Catherine] to the children”; that

Wesley had “cancelled, not shown for, been late dropping off or

picking up, or not calendared[] parent time”; and that the court

had “concern[s] about [Wesley’s] motives and credibility.”

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must overcome the healthy dose of deference owed to factual

findings by identifying and dealing with the supportive

evidence and demonstrating the legal problem in that evidence,

generally through marshaling the evidence.” Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT

App 135, ¶ 19, 379 P.3d 890 (brackets, citation, and internal

quotation marks omitted). Parties challenging factual findings

cannot persuasively carry their burden in this respect “by simply

listing or rehashing the evidence and arguments [they]

presented during trial” or “by merely pointing to evidence that

might have supported findings more favorable to [them]; rather,

[they] must identify flaws in the evidence relied on by the trial

court that rendered the trial court’s reliance on it, and the

findings resulting from it, clearly erroneous.” Id. ¶ 43. Indeed, as

noted above, a party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

in support of “a factual finding . . . will almost certainly fail to

carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal” the

evidence that supports the challenged finding. State v. Nielsen,

2014 UT 10, ¶ 42, 326 P.3d 645.

¶9 Wesley has not addressed most of the trial court’s

findings and makes no attempt to marshal the evidence in

support of them. He clearly views the evidence as compelling a

different outcome, but it is not within our purview to “engage in

a reweighing of the evidence,” Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, 2010 UT

App 261, ¶ 3, 241 P.3d 365 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted), and Wesley has not demonstrated that the evidence

underlying the trial court’s findings is insufficient, see Taft, 2016

UT App 135, ¶ 19; see also, e.g., Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 29

(rejecting the appellant’s “attempt to inject alternative findings

favorable to his preferred outcome under the guise of an

adequacy-of-the-findings or sufficiency-of-the-evidence

challenge”).

¶10 We are, of course, sensitive to the emotional

undercurrents giving rise to Wesley’s challenge on appeal. This

appears to have been “a very difficult and close case with

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meritorious arguments from both parties—both of whom love

and care for their children.” See Peck v. Polanco, 2015 UT App 236,

¶ 14, 360 P.3d 780. “But the fact that the evidence could also

have supported a determination that [Wesley] should [obtain

joint custody or] gain primary physical custody of the

children . . . does not” render the trial court’s findings

inadequate or unsupported by the evidence, nor did it require an

outright grant of custody in his favor. See id.

II. Marital Assets and Debts

¶11 With regard to the trial court’s division of marital assets

and debts, Wesley likewise contends that the trial court’s factual

findings were inadequate in detail and were not supported by

sufficient evidence. As set forth above, to preserve a challenge to

the adequacy of the detail in the trial court’s findings, the

challenge must be “presented to the trial court in such a way that

the trial court had an opportunity to correct any deficiencies in

the adequacy of the detail of the findings of fact.” Interstate

Income Props., Inc. v. La Jolla Loans, Inc., 2011 UT App 188, ¶ 12,

257 P.3d 1073.

¶12 Although Wesley raises multiple challenges to the

adequacy of the trial court’s factual findings with respect to

marital assets, he raised only one such assertion in the trial court,

and we therefore address only that contention.5 See id. Wesley’s

preserved argument is that (1) there were alleged discrepancies

5. Wesley asserts, for example, that the trial court failed to

recognize and assign to the parties a debt owed on motorized

scooters, but Wesley provides no citation to the record

demonstrating that evidence of the alleged debt was presented

to the court during trial, and it appears from our review of the

record that the issue was not properly presented for the trial

court’s consideration.

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between Catherine’s valuations of marital assets as presented at

trial and as presented by Catherine in other court documents,

(2) Wesley presented contrary and more credible evidence as to

the value of marital assets, and (3) “[t]he findings do not state

why the Court discounted [Wesley’s] evidence over

[Catherine’s].”

¶13 Here again, Wesley’s argument rests on a mistaken

premise as to the trial court’s obligation. See supra ¶¶ 5–6. Both

parties submitted lists of marital assets and proposed values for

those assets, and the trial court’s findings indicate that it credited

the list of assets and values provided by Catherine. The trial

court was not required to further explain its implicit

determination that Catherine’s evidence was more accurate or

reliable than Wesley’s. See In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 398–99 (Utah

Ct. App. 1996).

¶14 With regard to Wesley’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence underlying the trial court’s factual findings, the

findings “are clearly erroneous only if they are in conflict with

the clear weight of the evidence, or if the court has a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Taft v. Taft, 2016

UT App 135, ¶ 16, 379 P.3d 890 (brackets, citation, and internal

quotation marks omitted). The existence of discrepancies

between the values Catherine assigned to assets in different

court documents does not, standing alone, establish that the

values provided in Catherine’s trial exhibit were inherently

unreliable or otherwise insufficient to support the trial court’s

factual findings. For example, at trial, Catherine testified that

some discrepancies may have arisen because, in her trial exhibit,

she incorporated Wesley’s suggestion as to an item’s value, or

because the assets valued in the divorce proceeding were not the

same assets valued in other court documents. In addition, while

Wesley cites discrepancies in the values assigned by Catherine to

a vehicle, Wesley assigned the same $3,000 value to that asset as

Catherine did in her trial exhibit. Wesley’s alleged discrepancies

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in Catherine’s various court documents thus do not demonstrate

insufficiency of the evidence with respect to the trial court’s

factual findings regarding marital assets.6

¶15 The record does not otherwise present “significant”

discrepancies between the evidence presented at trial and the

offset awarded in Catherine’s favor, as Wesley claims. However,

the trial court plainly relied on Catherine’s evidence in

calculating the nearly $16,000 offset awarded in her favor. And

as Wesley points out, that offset would have been less if based

on the value of marital assets to which Catherine testified at trial,

after taking into account that Catherine admitted she

erroneously “included the [$600] heat blankets on her list twice.”

We therefore remand to the trial court to either make additional

findings detailing the basis for not adjusting the offset for the

double-counted heat blankets or to adjust the offset to account

for the erroneously included blankets.

¶16 With regard to marital debt, Wesley challenges the trial

court’s decision not to hold Catherine “responsible for [the]

marital debt that [Wesley] was claiming.” The trial court found

“no reason to hold [Catherine] liable for” most of the marital

debt claimed by Wesley, finding that Catherine’s bankruptcy

proceeding “benefited both parties by discharging a large

portion of the marital debt” and that Wesley was “not paying on

the marital debt.” Wesley’s briefing, however, is unclear as to the

type of challenge he is asserting—e.g., inadequacy of the court’s

6. While Wesley asserts his asset values were clearly superior to

Catherine’s, we note that Wesley’s proposed values were, like

Catherine’s, based on estimates of current value. The trial court’s

acceptance or rejection of those values turned largely on

credibility determinations, and Wesley has failed to overcome

the strong deference owed to those determinations. See Taft v.

Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 19, 379 P.3d 890.

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findings, insufficiency of the evidence underlying those findings,

or abuse of discretion in adjusting the parties’ financial interests,

see, e.g., id. ¶ 32 (“The trial court in a divorce action is permitted

considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property

interests of the parties, and . . . this court will not disturb a

court’s distribution of marital property unless it is clearly unjust

or a clear abuse of discretion.” (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted)).

¶17 As legal authority in support of his argument, Wesley

includes a citation to a single, unpublished decision from

another jurisdiction, without analysis or discussion thereof. But

“bald citation to authority,” without development and reasoned

analysis, does not constitute argument setting forth the

“contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues

presented, . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts

of the record relied on,” as required under Utah Rule of

Appellate Procedure 24. Hampton v. Professional Title Services,

2010 UT App 294, ¶ 2, 242 P.3d 796 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9);

CORA USA LLC v. Quick Change Artist LLC, 2017 UT App 66, ¶ 5,

397 P.3d 759 (“[W]hile failure to cite to pertinent authority may

not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when

the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the

burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶18 Wesley’s argument also fails to address the broader

picture of the parties’ relative circumstances to demonstrate that,

given the overall distribution of assets and debts and the parties’

relative incomes and expenses, etc., the court’s ruling with

regard to marital debt must be reversed. As noted above, the

court concluded that Catherine discharged a significant amount

of marital debt through her bankruptcy proceeding and, as

Wesley notes, the court awarded Wesley an additional $13,000

offset due to debt Catherine incurred. Thus, “[w]hile there is no

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bright line between adequate and inadequate briefing, we

conclude that [Wesley] has not developed an argument sufficient

to carry [his] burden of persuasion” on appeal as to this issue.

See CORA USA, 2017 UT App 66, ¶ 6 (first alteration in original)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶19 Wesley also asserts the trial court failed to make findings

regarding a debt allegedly owed to his sister, for a loan to the

parties for the purchase of stone engraving equipment. Wesley

asserts that “[i]n spite of [his] evidence [with respect to the loan],

. . . the findings do not classify the debt as marital, nor do they

assign the debt to either party.” Wesley is correct. Although the

trial court noted that it would not resolve whether Wesley’s

sister had a right to possession of the equipment, the court did

not otherwise address the alleged debt owed to Wesley’s sister.

¶20 A trial court’s “[f]ailure to make findings on all material

issues [regarding property distribution in a divorce proceeding]

is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear,

uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in

favor of the judgment.” Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 33, 379

P.3d 890 (first alteration in original) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Here, Wesley submitted evidence

regarding an alleged marital debt, and the court neither

addressed that evidence nor assigned the debt to either party.

We therefore “remand to give the trial court the opportunity to

enter more detailed findings as to the [alleged debt], and, if

necessary, to amend the property division.” See id. ¶ 47.

III. Medical and Childcare Expenses

¶21 Wesley contends that the trial court’s factual findings

were also insufficient to support its ruling that Wesley reimburse

Catherine over $5,000 for medical and childcare expenses. In one

respect, Catherine concedes error in the trial court’s calculation

of the reimbursement amount, due to “duplicate entries on

Catherine’s list of medical and childcare expenses,” and agrees

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Wesley is entitled to a reduction of $702.44 in “the amount

awarded to [Catherine] for medical and childcare

reimbursements.” We therefore instruct that, on remand, the

trial court alter its judgment accordingly.

¶22 But Wesley further claims the court’s findings did not

“state” or “comment” on the court’s rationale for not crediting

Wesley’s arguments or evidence as to the medical and childcare

expenses each party claimed to have incurred on behalf of their

children. Wesley largely reiterates the positions he took in the

trial court that, for example, the expenses incurred by Catherine

were submitted to him untimely and with insufficient

supporting documentation. But the trial court concluded

otherwise, stating that “[t]he parties presented conflicting

evidence regarding billing and collecting various expenses,” that

Catherine submitted “credible evidence of numerous invoices,

receipts, and emails documenting the” expenses and amounts

owed by Wesley, and that Wesley’s “justifications for not paying

these invoices [were] not sufficient to warrant non-payment.”

¶23 The court’s reimbursement order was plainly based on

the evidence Catherine submitted at trial, and Wesley has not

identified flaws in that evidence rendering the trial court’s

reliance on it, and the findings resulting from it, clearly

erroneous. See id. ¶ 43. Nor has Wesley demonstrated that the

court’s explanation was insufficiently detailed or failed to

include “enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence

upon which” the court’s findings were grounded, see In re S.T.,

928 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), with one exception. Both

at trial and on appeal, Wesley challenged the lack of findings

addressing his claim that Catherine had not reimbursed him for

medical expenses incurred on behalf of the children. We agree

with Wesley that the court’s findings do not address this claim,

nor do the findings include an implicit or explicit determination

that the evidence Wesley offered in support of his claim was not

credible.

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¶24 As noted above, a trial court’s “[f]ailure to make findings

on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the

record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only

a finding in favor of the judgment.” Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 33

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Wesley

submitted evidence in support of his claim for reimbursement of

medical expenses, and the court neither addressed that claim nor

offset the reimbursement Wesley was ordered to provide to

Catherine for medical expenses by any amount. We therefore

“remand to give the trial court the opportunity to enter more

detailed findings as to [the medical expenses alleged by Wesley],

and, if necessary, to amend” the order requiring reimbursement

of medical expenses Catherine incurred on behalf of the

children. See id. ¶ 47.7

IV. Child Support

¶25 With regard to the trial court’s calculation of Wesley’s

child support obligation, Wesley likewise asserts the court’s

findings were “insufficient.” Specifically, Wesley asserts on

appeal, as he did in the trial court, that the court’s findings failed

to address evidence that he had not received any credit against

his child support obligation for several periods of extended

parent-time, to which he allegedly was entitled. See Utah Code

Ann. § 78B-12-216(1) (LexisNexis 2015) (providing for reductions

in child support obligations due to extended parent-time).

7. Wesley includes an additional, single sentence in his appellate

briefing, stating, “The findings also gave no offset for [Wesley]

paying the full medical insurance coverage for the children.” It

may be that this sentence asserts a challenge to the court’s

findings, but given the lack of clarity as to the type of challenge

asserted, as well as the absence of any citation to or development

of legal authority or argument in support of this claim, we do

not address it further. See supra ¶¶ 16–17.

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¶26 At trial, the court noted that the “parties are at least in

agreement that [Wesley] would get a credit for those [dates] as

long as he can document [them].” The court also informally

noted that because Wesley was “asking for credit,” the court

would place on Wesley the burden of “tak[ing] . . . the steps”

needed to submit to Catherine documentation required to obtain

the credit. However, the trial court’s findings did not address

this issue, thus leaving open a material issue with respect to the

parties’ divorce and attendant child support obligations. See Taft,

2016 UT App 135, ¶ 33. Accordingly, we remand to give the trial

court the opportunity to enter findings addressing this question

and, if necessary, to amend the court’s order with respect to

Wesley’s child support obligation. See id. ¶ 47.

¶27 Wesley makes additional arguments challenging the trial

court’s calculation of child support, but it appears that at least

one of these assertions was not preserved for appellate review,8

and Wesley’s other assertion relies on an incorrect

understanding of the trial court’s obligation with respect to

factual findings and is also inadequately briefed.9 We therefore

8. For example, Wesley asserts that he “should be given two

child support credits for the children he is supporting with his

current wife.” But as with other contentions in his brief, it is

unclear whether this single sentence is asserting a challenge to

the adequacy of the court’s findings or sufficiency of the

evidence underlying them. Given that lack of clarity, the absence

of citation to legal authority or development of this claim, and

the absence of record citation showing preservation of this issue,

we do not address it further. See supra ¶¶ 2, 16–17.

9. Wesley asserts the court’s findings “did not consider” that

Wesley’s earning potential was used to calculate his child

support obligation, while Catherine’s earning potential was

allegedly understated for that same purpose. But again, Wesley’s

(continued…)

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do not address further Wesley’s remaining arguments with

respect to child support.

V. Parent-Time

¶28 Wesley’s final challenge asserts that the trial court’s order

and judgment fails to conform to the court’s findings with

respect to parent-time. Specifically, Wesley alleges the order

“add[s] restrictions” on Wesley’s parent-time and “orders the

parties to split [the children’s] fall and spring breaks [in]

alternating years,” contrary to the court’s findings, which

provide that Wesley “shall . . . be entitled to enjoy parent time

during the entire Fall and Spring school breaks.” He also briefly

asserts that both the trial court and Catherine were negligent in

relation to the preparation and filing of the proposed parenting

plan and the final order. However, under rule 24 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party seeking appellate review

must provide a “citation to the record showing that the issue

was preserved in the trial court” or “a statement of grounds for

seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.” Utah

R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), (B). Wesley has provided neither; instead,

he cites to a rule of appellate procedure that does not provide

any basis for preservation. See id. R. 30(a). This issue is therefore

inadequately briefed, see id. R. 24(a)(5)(A), (B), and we do not

address it further.

(…continued)

argument is summarily made, without development of or

citation to authority, and thus fails to carry Wesley’s burden of

demonstrating error. See supra ¶¶ 17–18. And Wesley’s

insistence that the court’s findings explicitly “consider these

facts” again misrepresents the trial court’s obligation with

respect to its findings. See supra ¶¶ 5–6.

¶29 We remand the case (1) with the instruction that the trial

court make additional findings with respect to the division of

marital assets detailing why the offset awarded is greater than if

calculated based on the evidence Catherine presented and

admitted to at trial regarding the value of marital assets, or to

adjust the offset by that approximate amount; (2) with the

instruction that the award to Catherine for medical and childcare

expenses be reduced by $702.44, consistent with the parties’

agreement on appeal; and (3) for additional findings on the

questions of (a) whether there is a marital debt owed by the

parties on stone engraving equipment and, if so, the allocation of

that debt to either or both of the parties, (b) whether Wesley is

entitled to an offset due to medical expenses he incurred on

behalf of the children, and (c) whether Wesley is entitled to a

credit against his child support obligations due to extended

parent-time; together with whatever, if any, adjustment in the

trial court’s ruling it determines is appropriate in view of the

additional findings. In all other respects, the ruling of the trial

court is affirmed.