Hadley Christensen v. Juab School District

¶1 Hadley Christensen claims reimbursement pursuant to Utah

Code section 52-6-201, from his former employer, Juab School

District, for attorney fees and costs incurred in a successful defense

against charges of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The two issues

before us are (1) whether the right to reimbursement attaches based

on the allegations within the information, or under a more factspecific

inquiry, and (2) where reimbursement is appropriate,

whether it applies to all costs incurred in defending against the

information. The district court found no genuine dispute of material

fact and granted partial summary judgment to Christensen. The

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court explained that Juab School District’s arguments reflect a

position expressly rejected by this court in Acor v. Salt Lake City

School District, 2011 UT 8, ¶ 20, 247 P.3d 404. We agree and affirm the

district court’s grant of partial summary judgment. The district court

awarded judgment pursuant to a stipulation entered by the parties.

Therefore, the second issue is moot and we decline to address it. See

Poulton v. Cox, 2016 UT 9, ¶ 5, 368 P.3d 844.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2012, Hadley D. Christensen, then a fifth-grade

teacher for Juab School District, allowed a former student to attend a

sleepover with his daughter at his residence. The sleepover was not

sanctioned by Juab School District and occurred during Christmas

break. The student’s presence at the sleepover was not related to

Christensen’s status as a teacher, but rather because of her friendship

with Christensen’s daughter. Christensen was subsequently accused

of sexually assaulting the student during the sleepover.

¶3 On January 2, 2013, the Utah County Attorney’s Office filed

a criminal information against Christensen. The information

included one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, pursuant

to Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(4). The charge was based on three

aggravating elements: (1) “the accused caused bodily injury or

severe psychological injury,” (2) “the offense was committed by a

person who occupied a position of special trust in relation to the

victim,” and (3) “the accused caused . . . penetration, however

slight.” Id. 76-5-404.1(4)(b), (h), (j). The criminal information relied on

Christensen’s former teacher-student relationship with the victim as

the basis for the “position of special trust” enhancement.

¶4 During criminal trial proceedings, Christensen moved for a

directed verdict as to the aggravating elements of “position of special

trust” and causing “bodily injury or severe psychological injury.”

The district court granted the directed verdict, citing both the State’s

failure to present evidence that Christensen had used his position of

special trust to exercise influence over the victim and lack of

evidence of any injury. The court allowed the charge of aggravated

sexual assault of a child based on the third aggravating factor to go

to the jury, which found Christensen not guilty.

¶5 In January 2015, Christensen filed suit in district court

pursuant to Utah Code section 52-6-201(1) (the Reimbursement

Statute) in district court for reasonable attorney fees and costs that

Juab School District refused to pay. The Reimbursement Statute

provides that public employees “shall” be reimbursed for

“reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in the

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3

[successful] defense of [an] indictment” that is “in connection with or

arising out of” their employment if it is inter alia “under color of the

. . . employee’s authority.” Id. The district court granted

Christensen’s motion for summary judgment and ordered

reasonable attorney fees and costs and ultimately entered judgment

in an amount based on a prior stipulation by the parties. The

defendant, Juab School District, appeals this decision on grounds of

incorrect application of the Reimbursement Statute. This court has

jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code section 78A-3-

102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 Summary judgment requires a showing “that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(a). “In

reviewing a [district] court’s grant of summary judgment, we give

the [district] court’s legal decisions no deference, reviewing for

correctness.” Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ¶ 21,

54 P.3d 1054. “In matters of . . . statutory interpretation, an appellate

court reviews a [district] court’s ruling for correctness and gives no

deference to its legal conclusions.” Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc.,

935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997).

ANALYSIS

¶7 Plaintiff, Christensen, sought a motion for partial summary

judgment, claiming that allegations in the information regarding

Christensen’s former teacher-student relationship with the victim

were sufficient to attach a right of reimbursement under the color-ofauthority

prong of the Reimbursement Statute. Juab School District

sought a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the

statute required an inquiry into the employment-relatedness of the

actual events themselves, rather than relying on the allegations

within the information. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a

“show[ing] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact”

for summary judgment. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(a). The facts in this case

are undisputed. The only issue in dispute is the proper application of

the Reimbursement Statute, which is a question of law. Therefore,

the court was correct in issuing summary judgment. We affirm the

court’s holding that “the allegation and related enhancement

attached [Christensen’s] right to reimbursement pursuant to the

Reimbursement statute” and its grant of Christensen’s motion for

partial summary judgment.

¶8 We first address the Reimbursement Statute and our

reasoning for rejecting any application that analyzes actual events,

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rather than allegations in an employment-relatedness inquiry. Next,

we apply statutory interpretation principles to the Reimbursement

Statute. Finally, we examine how the only prong of the

Reimbursement Statute that is at issue in this case—“under color of

authority”—has been previously defined by this court and apply it

to the facts of this case. We hold that Christensen is entitled to

reasonable attorney fees and costs.

I. THE REIMBURSEMENT STATUTE PROVIDES

REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE

AGAINST “AN INFORMATION FILED . . . IN CONNECTION

WITH OR ARISING OUT OF” THE ACTS OF A PUBLIC

OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE

¶9 The Reimbursement Statute is “aimed at protecting public

employees from the costs of successfully defending against criminal

charges that arise out of public employment.” Acor v. Salt Lake City

Sch. Dist., 2011 UT 8, ¶ 17, 247 P.3d 404. Generally, it provides

reimbursement for any public employee’s successful defense against

employment-related charges. Id. ¶ 20. The statute includes three

separate prongs under which criminal charges arise in employmentrelated

circumstances: (1) “performance of the employee’s duties,”

(2) “the scope of employment, or” (3) “under the color of authority.”

Acor, 2011 UT 8, ¶ 22. The three prongs of the Reimbursement

Statute are disjunctive. Therefore, an individual need only prove one

prong to recover litigation costs.

¶10 This court’s precedent in Acor holds that the job-relatedness

of an employee’s conduct “be evaluated at a high level of generality,

without regard to the actual guilt or innocence of the charged party.”

2011 UT 8, ¶ 19. Further, it distinguishes “color of authority,” the

prong on which the plaintiff’s claim to reimbursement in this case is

based, as distinct from the first two prongs of the Reimbursement

Statute. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.

¶11 It is not guilt or innocence that matters under the color-ofauthority

prong, but rather the allegations within the criminal

information. Juab School District mistakenly argues that a specific

inquiry into the employment-relatedness of the district attorney’s

charges against Christensen is inconsistent with this court’s decision

in Acor. In that decision, this court reversed the lower court’s ruling

and granted reasonable attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff, who

was acquitted of criminal charges related to the alleged sexual abuse

of a former student. Id. ¶ 2. The school district in that case attempted

to show actual guilt by including evidence of an admission of an

inappropriate relationship, and a journal account of the relationship,

which was excluded at trial based on Fourth Amendment violations.

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Id. ¶ 12. We rejected an argument that evidence excluded at trial,

which if admitted would have established actual guilt, should

preclude the plaintiff from recovering attorney fees and costs when

acquitted. Id. ¶ 19. Actual guilt or innocence was irrelevant; the

employee only needed to show that the charges were related to her

employment and that she was acquitted.

¶12 Also irrelevant in Acor was consideration of whether the

criminal acts “advance[d] the employer’s interests or [were] the kind

of activity the employee was asked to perform”; such reasoning

“would eviscerate the terms and conditions of The Reimbursement

Statute, since criminal conduct would rarely if ever be in the

employer’s interest or at its behest.” Id. ¶ 22. Rather, the statute

“implies a general inquiry into the causal relationship between the

employee’s conduct and the underlying criminal charges.” Id.

¶13 This court held in Acor that the plaintiff was entitled to

reimbursement under both the first and the second prongs of the

Reimbursement Statute, because the plaintiff’s “performance of her

responsibility of interacting with [the victim] . . . gave rise to the

criminal charges against her.” Id. ¶ 24. We declined to “permit[] a

reexamination of an employee’s guilt of the underlying criminal

conduct under the guise of an inquiry into employmentrelatedness.”

Id. ¶ 23. Instead, we concluded that “[i]f the acts . . .

giving rise to such charges occur at a time and place of authorized

employment, acquittal of those charges generally will suffice to

entitle the employee to reimbursement.” Id.

¶14 The Acor opinion clarifies the interpretation of the three

prongs of The Reimbursement Statue under which employees are

entitled to reimbursement. While the first two prongs require an

inquiry into the “time, place, and nature of the acts giving rise to the

criminal charges,” id. ¶ 23, the third prong—under color of

authority—suggests a much broader scope, “requir[ing] only action

under color of authority.” Id. ¶ 28. State v. Watkins clarifies what

constitutes “color of authority by defining someone in a “position of

special trust” in terms of a person who occupies “a position of

authority, who, by reason of that position is able to exercise undue

influence over the victim.” 2013 UT 28, 309 P.3d 209, superseded by

statute, UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(4).

¶15 Here, Juab School District has engaged in a similarly faulty

line of reasoning as pursued by the school district in Acor. In this

case, however, rather than asserting evidence of guilt as proof that

the acts were outside the performance or scope of employment (the

first two prongs), Juab School District has relied on Christensen’s

innocence, the district’s lack of knowledge or approval of the

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sleepover, and the actual circumstances to attempt to preclude him

from recovering reasonable attorney fees and costs. It claims that

because the sleepover was not actually related to the “time, place,

[or] nature” of his employment, Christensen could not have been

acting under color of authority. Acor, 2011 UT 8, ¶ 23. This, however,

is inconsistent with Acor and would mean that the more baseless the

allegations against public employees are, the less likely it would be

that the employee would be able to recover attorney fees and costs

for a defense. Such an outcome would not only run contrary to the

purpose of the statute, which is to compensate employees for costs

incurred in defending against criminal charges from which they are

ultimately acquitted, but also run counter to the plain language of

the statute.

¶16 We reject Juab School District’s argument that the

Reimbursement Statute requires an inquiry into whether the actions

of the employee must be actually tied to his or her employment,

rather than merely alleged to be so. Rather, we reaffirm our holding

in Acor that the Reimbursement Statute only requires that the

allegations or charges in the criminal information “aris[e] out of” or

are “connect[ed]” with the defendant’s employment. UTAH CODE

§ 52-6-201(1).

II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE REIMBURSEMENT

STATUTE SHOWS THAT CHRISTENSEN IS ENTITLED TO

REIMBURSEMENT

¶17 Whether Christensen is entitled to reimbursement is a

matter of statutory interpretation. We have many “modes of

statutory construction” that we can use when a statute is

ambiguous. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15,

267 P.3d 863. We use these tools only when a statute is “susceptible

to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a

plain language analysis.” Id. Here, Juab School District argues that

the legislature could have spoken more clearly if it intended to

attach a right to reimbursement based on allegations in a criminal

information. However, “it will always be the case that the legislature

could have spoken more clearly if it had anticipated the precise

question before the court.” In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38,

¶ 75, 266 P.3d 702 (Lee, J., concurring). Such an argument “adds

nothing analytically” to our inquiry. Id. A plain reading of the

Reimbursement Statute requires an analysis of the allegations in the

criminal information, rather than an analysis of the actual events

leading up to the charges. Therefore, the issue of the right to

reimbursement in this case can be resolved by the plain meaning of

the statute. Although the petitioner invokes an examination of

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potentially bad public policy of having reimbursement arise out of

the charges made by a prosecutor rather than the actual acts of the

individual petitioning for reimbursement, we decline to address

these policy arguments because the language of the Reimbursement

Statute is plain and unambiguous.

¶18 The Reimbursement Statute first requires that an

“information is filed against[] an officer or employee.” UTAH CODE

§ 52-6-201(1). Both parties agree that Christensen, at all relevant

times, was a Juab School District employee. Juab School District is a

governmental entity, and therefore he is a public employee for

purposes of the Reimbursement Statute. The State of Utah filed a

criminal information against Christensen on December 31, 2012,

fulfilling the preliminary requirements of the Reimbursement

Statute.

¶19 We next consider whether Christensen is exempt from

reimbursement based on any exception within the Reimbursement

Statute. The Reimbursement Statute cuts off reimbursement for an

“officer or employee” who “is found guilty of substantially the same

misconduct that formed the basis for the indictment or information.”

Id. The trial court in the underlying criminal proceedings granted

motions for a directed verdict on both the position of special trust

prong and the severe injury prong. Thereafter, the jury found

Christensen not guilty, and therefore this exception to recovery does

not apply.

¶20 The Reimbursement Statute requires that the “indictment or

information [be] quashed or dismissed or result[] in a judgment of

acquittal” for a public employee to recover attorney fees and costs.

Id. It also cuts off reimbursement when the criminal information is

“quashed or dismissed upon application or motion of the

prosecuting attorney.” Id. However, because the underlying criminal

proceedings ultimately resulted in Christensen’s acquittal by jury

verdict, Christensen fulfills this requirement and the exception for

the quashing or dismissal “upon application or motion of the

prosecuting attorney” does not apply. Id.

¶21 Finally, we consider whether the information was filed “in

connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that officer

or employee during” (1) “the performance of the officer or

employee’s duties,” (2) “within the scope of the officer or

employee’s employment,” or (3) “under color of the officer or

employee’s authority.” Id. This is the requirement that is at issue in

this case, and we find that the information against Christensen was

filed “under color of the . . . employee’s authority,” id., as discussed

in the next section.

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¶22 The Reimbursement Statute provides that, if the foregoing

requirements are met, then “that . . . employee shall be entitled to

recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred

in the defense of that indictment or information” and “reasonable

attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred . . . in recovering the

attorney fees and costs allowed under this section,” including those

“incurred on appeal.” Id. § 52-6-201(1), (3).

III. CHRISTENSEN WAS CHARGED UNDER COLOR OF

AUTHORITY AS A PERSON IN A POSITION OF SPECIAL TRUST

¶23 In this case, the parties have agreed that only the third

prong, under color of authority, is at issue. Juab’s analysis of the

“time, place, and nature” of the alleged criminal conduct incorrectly

conflates the three prongs of the statute and misapplies our

precedent set forth in Acor v. Salt Lake City School District, 2011 UT 8,

247 P.3d 404. In Acor, “the time, place, and nature of the acts giving

rise to the criminal charges” were held to apply only to the first two

prongs of the Reimbursement Statute, 2011 UT 8, ¶ 23. Therefore,

any analysis of the “time, place, and nature” of Christensen’s acts, or

whether “his interaction with the child on the night of the alleged

crime was . . . related in any way to his capacity as a teacher” is

irrelevant. The third prong of the Reimbursement Statute, “under

color of authority,” only requires a showing that the “criminal

charges . . . directly arose out of acts alleged to have been committed

under color of . . . authority.”1 Acor, 2011 UT 8, ¶ 26.

¶24 A “position of special trust” was used as an aggravating

factor under Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(4)(h) (aggravated sexual

assault) when Christensen was initially charged in the criminal

information.2 The “position of special trust” as an aggravating factor

1 According to State v. Robertson, our analysis of the third prong

in Acor is an alternative basis for the decision, not dicta, and

therefore is controlling on our decision today. State v. Robertson, 2017

UT 27, ¶ 25, ___ P.3d___. We held that “[f]or a decision to become

precedent and trigger stare decisis, ‘it must be (1) [a] deliberate or

solemn decision of a court or judge [2] made after argument of a

question of law fairly arising in a case, and [3] necessary to its

determination.” Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)

(citation omitted). However, “necessary” does “not mean that the

holding must be the singular basis for our ultimate decision.” Id.

¶ 26.

2 In 2014, the Utah Legislature made changes to Utah Code

section 76-5-404.1 that established by definition those who occupy

(continued . . .)

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is related to the “under color of authority” prong in the

Reimbursement Statute. Occupying a position of special trust means

that an individual not only occupies “a position of authority,” but

also “by reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence

over the victim.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(4)(h) (2012). Therefore, the

court’s definition of a “position of special trust” in Watkins is

relevant to our decision today. See State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 17,

309 P.3d 209, superseded by statute, UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(4).

¶25 In Watkins, we held that there was insufficient evidence to

support a conviction of aggravated sexual abuse of a child where the

statute requires proof that “the perpetrator occupied both a ‘position

of authority’ and was ‘able to exercise undue influence’ in relation to

the victim.” Id. ¶ 38. The charge of aggravated sexual abuse of a

child in Watkins arose out of allegations that the defendant, while a

guest at the home of the victim’s father, engaged in inappropriate

sexual touching of the victim. Id. ¶ 5. The district court concluded

that “the position of trust was simply indicated by a mature adult

and a 10-year-old child who had lived in the same home,” and the

jury convicted the defendant as charged. Id. ¶ 9. The court of appeals

upheld his conviction based on an interpretation that a “position of

special trust may be established . . . ‘either by occupying a position

specifically listed by statute or by fitting the definition of a position

of special trust.’” Id. ¶ 11 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). We

rejected this interpretation, clarifying that to “establish aggravated

sexual abuse of a child” by a person who occupied a position of

special trust in relation to the victim, the State “must prove both that

the defendant occupied a ‘position of authority’ over the victim and

that the position gave the defendant the ability to ‘exercise undue



(continued . . .)

positions of trust relating to a “child” that already met the Watkins

elements. Thus, the state now only needs to prove the two elements

discussed in Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 38, that “the perpetrator

occupied both a ‘position of authority’ and was ‘able to exercise

undue influence’ in relation to the victim” for defendants to succeed

under the last catch-all definition of “any person in a position of

authority, other than those persons listed [above], which enables the

person to exercise undue influence over the child,” UTAH CODE § 76-

5-404.1(1)(c)(xxii). In this case, however, the analysis needed to

establish that Christensen was in a “position of special trust” came

under the 2012 version of the aggravated sexual abuse statute that

relied on our definition of those who occupy a position of special

trust as defined in Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 38.

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influence’ over the victim.” Id. ¶ 39 (quoting UTAH CODE § 76-5-

404.1(4)(h)).

¶26 Because the color-of-authority prong in the Reimbursement

Statute arises from the aggravating factor of being in “a position of

special trust,” we determine whether Christensen allegedly occupied

“a position of special trust” to determine whether Christensen was

acting “under color of authority.” This is consistent with our analysis

of “color of authority” in Acor, which explained that “criminal

charges . . . arose out of alleged acts committed under color of . . .

authority” where the defendant was “accused of . . . turning her

responsibility of interacting with [the victim] . . . into an opportunity

to sexually abuse,” Acor, 2011 UT 8, ¶ 26, or, in other words, where

she occupied “a position of special trust”—a “‘position of authority’

over the victim . . . that . . . gave the defendant the ability to ‘exercise

undue influence’ over the victim,” Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 39. The

probable cause statement in the information filed against

Christensen stated that “the defendant was also the victim’s 5th

grade teacher last year.” This implied that not only was he in a

position of authority as a teacher at her school, but that he was able

to exercise undue influence because of the previous student-teacher

relationship, thereby enhancing the allegations against Christensen

based on “a position of special trust” with the victim. Therefore, the

criminal information against him alleging aggravated sexual assault

satisfies the third prong in the Reimbursement Statute of being

charged “under color of authority.”

¶27 The criminal charges against Christensen arose out of

alleged acts “under color of authority.” See id. The charges against

him were aggravated based on a “position of special trust,” or

Christensen’s prior teacher-student relationship with the victim.

UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1(c). An allegation of aggravation based on a

“position of special trust,” as held in Watkins, means that a defendant

both “occupie[s] a ‘position of authority’ over the victim and that the

position gave the defendant the ability to ‘exercise undue influence’

over the victim.” Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 39 (citation omitted). While

the sleepover was not sanctioned by Juab School District, and while

the directed verdict indicates that Christensen did not use his

position of authority to abuse the victim, the right to reimbursement

does not attach upon analysis of actual events, but rather the alleged

events contained within the criminal information. See Acor, 2011 UT

8, ¶ 23 (rejecting a reexamination of the employee’s actual guilt or

innocence). The probable cause statement in the information pointed

to Christensen’s teacher-student relationship with the victim as

grounds for an aggravated charge. Further, such criminal

information did arise out of allegations of acts made under “color of

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authority” because, as in Watkins, they alleged that Christensen used

a position of trust to “‘exercise undue influence’ over the victim.”

Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 39 (citation omitted). Therefore, the

allegations fulfilled this requirement of the Reimbursement Statute,

in that they alleged an act under color of Christensen’s authority as a

teacher.

¶28 Christensen, as a public employee who was charged and

successfully defended against a criminal information “filed . . . in

connection with or arising out of [an] act or omission . . . under color

of the . . . employee’s authority” seeks reimbursement for his

expenses under the Reimbursement Statute. UTAH CODE § 52-6-

201(1). The Reimbursement Statute outlines clear requirements to

attach a right for reimbursement. Christensen meets those

requirements, and therefore is entitled to reimbursement.

¶29 A criminal information was filed against Christensen, a

public employee, and he was not found guilty of substantially the

same misconduct. Further, the information resulted in an acquittal,

and was not quashed or dismissed upon motion of the prosecuting

attorney. Finally, the criminal information arose out of alleged acts

under color of Christensen’s authority as the victim’s former teacher.

Therefore, Christensen is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and

costs incurred in the underlying criminal proceedings both in the

civil suit seeking reimbursement and on this appeal.3

¶30 We affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary

judgment to Christensen. As the stipulation to the amount of

attorney fees included costs for bringing an appeal, we do not need

to remand to the district court for a determination of reasonable

costs for the appeal. The parties’ stipulation stands.

3 Although entitled to actual attorney fees and costs, Christensen

has expressly waived a determination of those costs by stipulating to

a specified amount with the school district. Redevelopment Agency of

Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1299–1301 (Utah 1987)

(holding that a party could not challenge a stipulated issue unless

they could show that the stipulation was invalid).