Jennifer Blake, et al. v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. and Shiraz A. Ali

Houston, Texas plaintiff personal injury truck wreck wrongful death lawyers represented Plaintiff who sued Defendants on auto negligence theories.



Trey Salinas was driving a vehicle with Jennifer Blake and her three children on eastbound Interstate 20 ("I-20") near Odessa, Texas on December 30, 2014, during a National Weather Service Winter Storm Warning. Salinas lost control of the vehicle and it crossed the 42-foot-wide grassy median before colliding with an 18-wheeler traveling over 40 miles per hour. Ali was driving the 18-wheeler, which was owned by Werner Enterprises (the "Werner Truck").



As a result of the collision, seven-year-old Zachery Blake died, his 12-year-old sister, Brianna Blake, suffered a severe traumatic brain injury and was rendered a quadriplegic, and fourteen-year-old Nathan Blake suffered a broken shoulder blade, broken collar bone, bruised lung, and other injuries. Jennifer Blake suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, contusions, a hematoma, and other injuries.



Appellees Jennifer Blake, individually and as next friend for Nathan Blake and as heir of the estate of Zachary Blake, and Eldridge Moak, in his capacity as Guardian of the Estate of Brianna Blake (together, "the Blakes"), sued Appellants for damages stemming from the collision. The jury found both Appellants liable and assessed over $100 million in damages. The trial court signed a final judgment on July 30, 2018. Appellants timely appealed.



II. Relevant Facts



The jury heard the following:



(1) two weeks before his collision with the Blakes' vehicle, Ali received the second-lowest possible score on an evaluation from a Werner supervisor (an 8 out of 21);



(2) Ali knew he was driving in "freezing rain";



(3) freezing rain is the sole cause of black ice;



(4) even "misting" generates a sufficient amount of water to give rise to black ice if it is below freezing;



(5) black ice is almost invisible;



(6) with black ice, traction becomes almost non-existent;



(7) there was black ice at the scene of Ali's collision with the Blakes - "[i]t was like a skating rink";



(8) that area of I-20 was "covered" in ice;



(9) there was a National Weather Service Winter Storm Warning in effect at the time of the collision;



(10) a Winter Storm Warning meant "that whatever condition they're warning of is either imminent or occurring";



(11) it is critical for drivers to monitor weather updates in such an environment so that they can know when the "happening soon" changes to "happening now"; (12) if weather conditions are unsafe, drivers should "absolutely" not drive, "no debate there";



(13) Ali acknowledged that Werner taught or trained him that "we know what the consequences are if a passenger vehicle loses control on ice in front of a 30- or 40-ton 18-wheeler going highway speeds";



(14) Werner's director of safety acknowledged that "all vehicles, certainly passenger vehicles included, are more likely to lose control on icy roads" and that "[n]obody should drive on ice";



(15) Texas Department of Public Safety State Trooper Corey Vanderwilt testified he (a) observed a section of I-20 just west of Odessa that was covered in ice; (b) believed that section of I-20 was unsafe to drive on; (c) was driving at 5 to 10 miles per hour (with his emergency lights on) in these conditions; (d) saw a vehicle pass his vehicle at 20 to 30 miles per hour; (e) believed 20 to 30 miles per hour was too fast based on the road conditions; (f) watched said vehicle lose control, slide across the median, and collide with another vehicle traveling the opposite direction; (g) cited the driver of said vehicle for driving at an unsafe speed; (h) believed said driver should have known there was ice because she was driving on ice westbound and "she was in it. Everybody was. As many crashes as I'm sure she's passed along the way, she should have known that going at that rate of speed that she was going was unsafe for those roadway conditions"; and (i) to the best of his recollection, the road surface conditions at the site worsened over time;



(16) Ali drove past the collision Officer Vanderwilt was working four and a half minutes before he collided with the Blakes' vehicle;



(17) Texas Department of Public Safety Officer Christopher Weimer testified (a) he responded to a one-car accident that had occurred at 3:00 p.m.; (b) he arrived on-scene at 3:43 p.m. and observed the icy condition of the overpass where the accident occurred; (c) his crash report stated that the driver was "traveling at an unsafe speed for the icy road conditions", struck a center concrete barrier, and came to rest facing eastward in the center median; (d) he was told the car slid on the ice that was on I-20 westbound; and (e) he observed yet another one-vehicle accident that occurred about 100 feet away;



(18) Officer Weimer also (a) observed a pickup truck traveling at an unsafe speed on westbound I-20, lose control on the ice, and crash; (b) wrote in his report that the truck was "traveling at an unsafe speed for the icy road conditions"; (c) turned on his emergency lights when he arrived on the scene at 3:43 p.m.; and (d) did not turn off his emergency lights earlier than 4:30 p.m.;



(19) Ali both (a) passed the collision Officer Weimer was working at approximately 3:53 p.m. (37 minutes before his collision with the Blakes) and (b) testified he is sure he saw Officer Weimer's vehicle with its emergency lights on when he passed it;



(20) Texas Department of Public Safety Officer Chad Matlock testified that he traveled to the site of Ali's collision with the Blakes' vehicle westbound on I-20 and recalled with "hundred percent" certainty that "the roads were icy";



(21) Andrew Gambs (a certified EMT paramedic) testified he (a) was traveling eastbound on I-20 about three miles west of Ali's collision with the Blakes' vehicle when he heard about it on his radio; (b) went straight to the site (which took about 5 minutes); (c) was the first emergency responder on the scene; (d) slipped on ice on westbound I-20 when he was running to get a backboard 10-15 minutes after he arrived; (e) saw it was sleeting lightly when he arrived; and (f) perceived westbound I-20 to be very icy;



(22) Dylan Hand testified he (a) was driving a vehicle eastbound on I-20 near the site of Ali's collision with the Blakes' vehicle when it occurred; (b) believed the Werner Truck was traveling too fast for the weather conditions; (c) believed the conditions of the road were too icy for 18-wheelers; (d) stopped his vehicle to see if he could be of assistance; (e) perceived eastbound I-20 to be so icy that he could barely walk on it with tennis shoes; and (f) saw it was sleeting at the scene;



(23) Andy Irwin (Appellants' accident-reconstruction expert) testified that (a) Ali drove the Werner Truck through freezing rain somewhere before his collision with the Blakes' vehicle; (b) photographs of the Werner Truck taken after the collision show ice was caked up on the leading edges of the antennas and the mirrors and above the windshield; and (c) he believed the ice got there because the Werner Truck had been driven through freezing rain;



(24) James Wampler (a local tow truck driver) was driving between 10 and 15 miles per hour on I-20 that day due to the weather conditions;



(25) despite these conditions, Ali was driving his 18-wheeler at approximately 43 miles per hour at the time of his collision with the Blakes;



(26) Ali's supervisor (who was in the truck with him) was asleep at the time of the collision;



(27) Werner knew its supervisor could not supervise Ali if he was asleep;



(28) "the roads were so icy" people "couldn't drive very fast" or they would "go[ ] out of control";



(29) if Ali "had followed the safety rule that dictates what a driver of an 18-wheeler is supposed to do once he hit icy roads", then the Blakes would not have suffered their injuries;



(30) there were at least 10 truck stops at which Ali could have stopped between Midland and Odessa;



(31) it is "really important for the driver to monitor the outside air temperature . . . because we know once it drops below 32, that's the condition that creates freezing water and therefore, freezing rain and black ice";



(32) despite the existence of available devices to check for conditions giving rise to black ice (including OAT gauges and CB radios), Ali's supervisor prohibited him from utilizing either device;



(33) "any person driving any kind of vehicle" should know that they are driving "into an area where the National Weather Service says that we're going to have freezing rain accumulating into ice . . . and then issue an update . . . that changes it to freezing rain"; (34) Werner had 13 truck driving schools that graduated approximately 5,000 students a year (and hired approximately 2,000 of those graduates);



(35) federal regulations require states to provide pre-approved information manuals to applicants for commercial drivers' licenses;



(36) Texas created such a manual;



(37) said manual is designed to promote safety and save lives;



(38) said manual includes section 2.6.2, entitled "Matching Speed";



(39) section 2.6.2 instructs drivers to reduce their speed to a crawl when they encounter icy roads;



(40) a "crawl" in the trucking industry means between 10 and 15 miles per hour;



(41) the purpose of coming to a crawl is to stop at the first safe place;



(42) drivers have no discretion concerning the application of rule 2.6.2;



(43) Werner teaches drivers that they have the discretion whether to come to a crawl or stop in icy conditions unless "they feel that they're unsafe";



(44) Ali personally believed that 2.6.2 was "a very good recommendation" that drivers are "not required to follow";



(45) it is "ludicrous" to not follow 2.6.2 because drivers should not "have to have a wreck before [they] find out that [they] shouldn't have had a wreck";



(46) Werner taught its truck driving students that if they felt unsafe, they should stop but if they did not feel unsafe, to keep going;



(47) Werner's director of safety testified that even with low scores, Ali had "a commercial driver's license from the State of Texas, so he could drive a truck by himself without anybody in it";



(48) the head of safety's foregoing interpretation could represent "a very dangerous mistake";



(49) Werner's director of safety was "not really involved" in issues relating to drivers' uses of OAT gauges or CB radios and was unfamiliar with Werner's practice of pairing student drivers with trainers on just-in-time ("JIT") runs;



(50) drivers should use anything in their truck that helps them operate it safely;



(51) even if drivers match their speed to their road condition, they may still "need to reduce it slower";



(52) Ali was "looking for spray coming from cars in front . . . I mean, if there's spray coming from cars, it's not icy";



(53) Ali's method is the number one method utilized by Werner's drivers;



(54) Ali's method for gauging whether the road was icy was flawed because drivers "cannot look at spray coming off a tire when there has been freezing rain and there's been moisture in the air. There's going to be a small, thin layer on top of solid ice and it's even more slippery";



(55) Werner did not convey any information about the Winter Storm Warning to its drivers because "it was a localized event";



(56) the Winter Storm Warning was in effect for almost all areas of Midland and Odessa;



(57) despite these facts, Werner assigned Ali a JIT run on December 30, 2014 through parts of West Texas while that area was under a Winter Storm Warning;



(58) JIT runs have a one hundred percent on-time expectation;



(59) late delivery on a JIT run can result in discipline;



(60) four late loads can result in termination;



(61) Werner required Ali to drive the first shift from Dallas on that highway that day at that time because student drivers are not allowed to drive past midnight;



(62) Ali not only had not taken Werner's "Winter Driving Training Module", but he had to ask the Blakes' counsel what Werner's winter driving training module was even called to ensure it was not on a list of the trainings Werner provided him;



(63) Ali's truck collided with the Blakes' vehicle during a Winter Storm Warning on black ice;



(64) the parties effectively agreed Ali was driving at least 43 miles per hour at the time of impact;



(65) Ali was traveling at approximately 50 miles per hour when the Blakes' vehicle lost control and crossed the median;



(66) after impact, it looked as if the Blakes' vehicle had been "cut in half"; and



(67) the Blakes suffered catastrophic and life-altering injuries as a result of the collision.

Werner Enters. v. Blake (Tex. App. 2023)

One hundred million Plaintiffs' verdict, affirmed on appeal.