State of Wisconsin v. Melisa Valadez

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court

for Walworth County, David M. Reddy, Judge. The circuit court

denied the motion of the defendant, Melisa Valadez, to withdraw

her guilty pleas.

¶3 Ms. Valadez's motion to withdraw her guilty pleas is

based on Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (2011-12).2 Before we examine

§ 971.08(2), we examine § 971.08(1)(c). Wisconsin Stat.

§ 971.08(1)(c) requires that before a circuit court accepts a

plea of guilty or no contest, the circuit court

"shall . . . [a]ddress the defendant personally and advise the

defendant as follows: 'If you are not a citizen of the United

States of America, you are advised that a plea of guilty or no

contest for the offense with which you are charged may result in

deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country or the

denial of naturalization, under federal law.'"

¶4 The circuit court's colloquies with Ms. Valadez did

not adhere to this statute. Judge John R. Race and Judge Robert

J. Kennedy presided over the criminal proceedings in which Ms.

Valadez entered guilty pleas. Neither of the circuit courts

For information supplied by the federal agency responsible for naturalization, see U.S. Customs & Immig. Serv., Citizenship Through Naturalization, http://www.uscis.gov/uscitizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization. For information regarding prosecutorial discretion in deportation cases, see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Immigration Action, https://www.ice.gov/immigrationAction.

2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011—12 version unless otherwise indicated.

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advised Ms. Valadez of the immigration consequences of a guilty

plea as required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).

¶5 If a circuit court fails to advise a defendant of the

immigration consequences (as required by Wis. Stat.

§ 971.08(1)(c)) and if the defendant shows that the plea is

"likely" to result in the defendant's deportation,3 exclusion

from admission to this country, or denial of naturalization, the

circuit court must ("shall") permit withdrawal of the plea and

permit the defendant to enter another plea.

¶6 Section 971.08(2) provides as follows:

(2) If a court fails to advise a defendant as required by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's deportation, exclusion from admission to this country or denial of naturalization, the court on the defendant's motion shall vacate any applicable judgment against the defendant and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea. This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest on any other grounds.

¶7 The court of appeals certified the instant case to

this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.

¶8 The appeal presents two questions:

1. Did Melisa Valadez's motion to withdraw her pleas of

guilty satisfy the "likely" statutory criterion in

Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) for mandatory vacation of the

judgments of conviction, that is, did she show that

3 Federal statutes refer to deportation as "removal." See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 n.6 (2010). We use the terms "removal" and "deportation" interchangeably.

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her guilty pleas were "likely" to result in her

exclusion from admission to this country?4

2. Is there a time limit for a defendant to file a

motion to withdraw a plea based on Wis. Stat.

§ 971.08(2)?5 The court of appeals further

inquired: "How would such a time limit fit in with

the possible need to await actual deportation

proceedings before moving to withdraw the plea?"

4 The court of appeals framed the issue as follows: "How definite or imminent must deportation be in order for it to be 'likely' such that a defendant may withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the basis that he or she was not informed of the immigration consequences at the plea colloquy?"

The circuit court and court of appeals focused predominantly on deportation, although they occasionally referred to the other two immigration consequences——exclusion from admission to this country and denial of naturalization.

We restate the issue to reflect the key arguments of the parties in this court. Both parties briefed the immigration consequence of deportation, and Ms. Valadez briefed the consequence of denial of naturalization. However, especially in oral argument, the parties focused on Ms. Valadez's likely exclusion from admission as the ground for withdrawing her pleas, not deportation or denial of naturalization. This court does not have to reach the issues of either deportation or denial of naturalization because Ms. Valadez has met the burden of proving that exclusion from admission is likely.

Deportation has been addressed by this court in State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749; State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93; and State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 717.

5 See State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶67 n.14, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668.

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¶9 In response to the first question, for the reasons set

forth, we conclude that Ms. Valadez has demonstrated that the

circuit court did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) and

that her guilty pleas are "likely" to result in her exclusion

from admission to this country. Because Ms. Valadez has shown

that her guilty pleas are "likely" to result in her exclusion

from admission to this country, we need not reach the question

of whether her pleas are also "likely" to result in deportation

or denial of naturalization. Accordingly, we reverse the order

of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court

to vacate the judgments of conviction and to permit Ms. Valadez

to withdraw her guilty pleas and enter new pleas.

¶10 The court of appeals raised the second question

because although the majority opinion in State v. Romero

Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶67 n.14, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668,

did not adopt a time limit on a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion,

it strongly suggested that (at least in certain circumstances)

there should be a time limit.6

¶11 We do not respond to the second question. Although

both parties discussed the time limit issue in their briefs,

neither party argued in this court for a time limit for plea

withdrawal under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), and both parties agreed

that even if the court were to adopt a time limit, Ms. Valadez's

motion is timely. At oral argument, the State conceded it was 6 The motion in Romero-Georgana was not a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion; it was a § 974.06 motion.

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not arguing for a time limit on motions under Wis. Stat.

§ 971.08(2), and even if the court were to adopt a time limit,

Ms. Valadez's motion was timely.7

¶12 In Romero-Georgana, the court noted that four months

before the defendant's postconviction motion under Wis. Stat.

§ 974.06 was filed, the federal government had started an

7 The following exchange between Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and the assistant attorney general representing the State is informative:

Justice Ann Walsh Bradley: I have a question . . . . As I read on page 13 of your brief going on to page 14 it says, "like many similar defendants, Valadez did not pursue additional post-conviction relief beyond the motions underlying this consolidated appeal." Next sentence. "Even if she had, however, her [Wis. Stat. §] 971.08(2) claims should not be barred later because they are not yet viable." I saw that with some dissonance to footnote 14 in our Romero-Georgana case. I mean——I don't think you're embracing the time limit suggested for a 971.08(2).

Assistant Attorney General: No, I'm not, and I don't— —I certainly don't think it's operable here. As the court pointed out earlier, the defendant in RomeroGeorgana had filed several post-conviction motions already on notice, because he had been served with a detainer from Homeland Security that he was subject to immigration proceedings. So with knowledge of a ripe claim he sat on it. And that's what I think RomeroGeorgana in that footnote speaks to and that's certainly not what's going on here.

Justice Ann Walsh Bradley: And you are not advocating that there be a time limit. Is it correct you are not advocating that there be a time limit imposed on 971.08(2) claims? Is that correct?

Assistant Attorney General: Yes.

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investigation into the defendant's deportability.8 Nevertheless,

the defendant in Romero-Georgana pressed forward with his Wis.

Stat. § 974.06 motion, without bringing a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2)

motion, and without asking the court to construe the Wis. Stat.

§ 974.06 motion as a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion.9

¶13 Under those circumstances, the Romero-Georgana court

expressed concern about judicial efficiency, stating that

"[w]hen a defendant has notice that he is likely to be deported

and subsequently brings postconviction claims unrelated to Wis.

Stat. § 971.08(2), we think it would be unwise to allow him to

bring his claim as a § 971.08(2) motion at a later time,

although he may be able to bring his claim as a Wis. Stat.

§ 974.06 motion if he has a sufficient reason for the delay."10

¶14 The circumstances that concerned the court in Romero

Georgana are not at issue here. Ms. Valadez has not brought

other postconviction motions. Ms. Valadez has not, with notice

of a ripe claim, sat on her rights. Moreover, neither Ms.

Valadez's counsel nor the State argued for a time limit on Wis.

Stat. § 971.08(2) motions, and the State conceded that Ms.

Valadez's motion would be timely even under the time limit

suggested in Romero-Georgana.

8 Romero-Georgana, 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶67 n.14.

9 Id.

10 Id.

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¶15 Because the parties agree and do not present

adversarial positions, we do not address the second question.11

I

¶16 The facts are not in dispute for purposes of this

appeal.

¶17 The defendant, Melisa Valadez, is not a citizen of the

United States. She became a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) in

2001, when she was 15 years old. Her three children were born

in the United States.

¶18 Ms. Valadez was convicted in 2004 and 2005 (when she

was 19 years old) of possession of cocaine, possession of THC,

and possession of drug paraphernalia in three separate cases on

pleas of guilty.12 To the extent it may be relevant under

federal immigration law,13 the offenses underlying the first two

cases——possession of cocaine, two counts of possession of THC,

and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia——occurred

when Ms. Valadez was 18 years old. The offense underlying the

11 See State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, ¶32 n.5, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 775 (stating that while the court of appeals' certification included several additional questions, "[t]hese questions are tangential to our inquiry . . . ."); State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 168 n.3, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983) (refusing to answer a second certified question because the case was resolved on other grounds)

12 On Ms. Valadez's motion, the court of appeals consolidated the three cases to facilitate briefing and disposition.

13 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).

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third case, possession of THC as a repeater, occurred when she

was 19 years old.

¶19 The transcripts of the plea hearings clearly show that

the circuit court failed to warn Ms. Valadez, as required by

Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c), that her pleas and subsequent

convictions may have immigration consequences.

¶20 As a result of these convictions, Ms. Valadez served

jail time and was placed on probation. She was ordered to pay

fines, have an AODA assessment, and get alcohol counseling. She

has fulfilled all the conditions imposed by the circuit courts

and has had no subsequent convictions in the decade since these

2004-2005 convictions.

¶21 In 2013, Ms. Valadez filed a motion under Wis. Stat.

§ 971.08(2) to withdraw her guilty pleas, arguing that as a

result of the convictions she is unable to renew her LPR card;

she is subject to deportation; she likely would be excluded from

admission to the United States if she left the country; and she

likely would be denied naturalization if she applied to become a

naturalized American citizen.

¶22 At the initial hearing on Ms. Valadez's motion to

withdraw her plea, the circuit court granted her additional time

to attempt to acquire an affidavit or some narrative of verbal

communications with a federal agent in order to meet the

requirements of this court's decision in State v. Negrete, 2012

WI 92, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749.

¶23 To supplement Ms. Valadez's initial brief, defense

counsel submitted e-mail communications between counsel and an

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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent. The e

mails were introduced apparently to confirm a telephone call

between defense counsel and the ICE Special Agent regarding

immigration law and enforcement practices. The e-mails did not

confirm or challenge defense counsel's views of immigration law.

¶24 Citing Negrete (especially footnote 8), the circuit

court denied Ms. Valadez's motion to withdraw her pleas.

Footnote 8 in Negrete states as follows:

More specifically, if a defendant chooses to establish that the crime to which the defendant pleaded is one for which the defendant would have been subject to potentially adverse immigration consequences under controlling federal law, the defendant should cite the federal law upon which reliance is placed. For example, under federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006) delineates numerous categories of aliens who are potentially deportable. Relevant to motions under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) is the federal statute providing that "[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See State v. Baeza, 174 Wis. 2d 118, 127, 496 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1993).

In addition, in such a motion, a defendant should allege that the federal government has conveyed its intent to impose one of the enumerated immigration consequences set out in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2). This required nexus between the crime to which a plea was made and adverse immigration consequences can be demonstrated by alleging facts that show that, because of his plea, the defendant has become subject to deportation proceedings, has been excluded from admission to the country, or has been denied naturalization.

Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27 n.8.

¶25 Relying on footnote 8 in Negrete, the circuit court

reasoned that Ms. Valadez had not met the statutory standard of

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"likely" to suffer the enumerated immigration consequences,

because she is not presently the object of a proceeding for

deportation, exclusion from admission, or denial of

naturalization. The circuit court concluded the hearing

stating: "Gratuitously, I will say that I think that this area

is ripe for some clarification from the appellate court."

¶26 The court of appeals certified the instant case to

this court. The court of appeals wrote that the "degree of

certainty necessary to show, for purposes of plea withdrawal

under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), that a defendant is likely to

suffer immigration consequences as a result of a guilty plea is

not clear under existing case law."

II

¶27 This case requires us to interpret and apply Wis.

Stat. § 971.08(2) to the undisputed facts. The interpretation

and application of a statute to undisputed facts are ordinarily

questions of law which this court determines independently of

the circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from

their analyses.14 We begin with the text of the statute and

examine case law interpreting and applying the statute.

III

¶28 In order to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea under

Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), the statute requires a defendant to

14 State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶15, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749; State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, ¶42, 301 Wis. 2d 531, 734 N.W.2d 81.

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allege: (1) that the circuit court "fail[ed] to advise [the]

defendant as required by [Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c)]"; and (2)

that the defendant's plea "is likely to result in the

defendant's deportation, exclusion from admission to this

country, or denial of naturalization . . . ."15

¶29 No one disputes that Ms. Valadez has met the first

requirement. Transcripts of the plea colloquies are available;

the circuit courts did not provide the immigration warning

required under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). As case law

demonstrates, it is of utmost importance that circuit courts

adhere to § 971.08(1)(c) in plea colloquies.

¶30 At issue is whether Ms. Valadez showed that her guilty

pleas are "likely" to result in one of the enumerated

immigration consequences. If Ms. Valadez makes this showing,

she may withdraw her pleas and enter new ones, irrespective of

whether she was otherwise aware of such consequences. State v.

Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶¶22-25, 42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646

N.W.2d 1.

¶31 Ms. Valadez was convicted more than 10 years ago for

violations of laws relating to controlled substances. She does

not allege she is the subject of a deportation proceeding.

According to the record, the federal government has not taken

any steps to deport her and has not manifested any intent to

deport her. 15 Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (emphasis added). See also State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶23, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749.

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¶32 Ms. Valadez's case was not presented in this court,

however, as solely a deportation case. Ms. Valadez argues that

unlike many who seek to vacate guilty pleas by merely claiming

they are "likely" to be deportable, she is claiming that she is

"likely" to be excluded from admission.

¶33 Ms. Valadez claims that even though she is a Lawful

Permanent Resident, if she were to leave the United States and

seek to return, she would be excluded from admission as a result

of her convictions. She cites 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) to

support her claim.16

16 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012), providing:

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

. . . .

(2) Criminal and related grounds

(A) Conviction of certain crimes

(i) In general

Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

. . . .

(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign (continued)

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¶34 The State argues that Ms. Valadez's reliance on the

federal statutes that render her excluded from admission is

misplaced. According to the State, what would happen if Ms.

Valadez left the country and was excluded from admission does

not prove that she is likely to be excluded from admission.

¶35 Quoting extensively from the Negrete decision, the

State contends that Ms. Valadez has not met the burden set forth

in Negrete: She has failed, according to the State, to allege

facts showing that she is "likely" to be excluded from

admission.

¶36 Because Negrete interpreted Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), we

examine Negrete. Negrete is distinguishable and does not govern

the instant case. The Negrete case governs a non-citizen's

motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2)

based on "likely" deportation. Although Negrete refers to the

other immigration consequences enumerated in Wis. Stat.

§ 971.08(2)——"likely" exclusion from admission to this country

or "likely" denial of naturalization17——Negrete was a deportation

country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21),

is inadmissible.

17 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5 n.5.

In two other cases, the court has addressed deportation. The cases address ineffective assistance of counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel is not involved in the instant case.

(continued)

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case, and the standard it sets forth governs deportation; it

does not govern "likely" exclusion from admission.

¶37 In Negrete, the defendant pleaded guilty in 1992 to

one count of second-degree sexual assault of a person under the

age of 16, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (1991-92).18

No transcript of the plea colloquy was available.19

¶38 Negrete sought to withdraw his guilty plea in 2010,

citing Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2). Negrete alleged in his motion to

In State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, ¶¶59-61, 364 Wis. 2d 83, 868 N.W.2d 93, a case involving deportation and ineffective assistance of counsel, this court noted that although a person convicted of a violation of laws relating to controlled substances is deportable, "such a conviction will not necessarily result in deportation." The court concluded that defense counsel did not render defective performance in advising the defendant that his plea carried a strong chance of deportation. Shata, 364 Wis. 2d 83, ¶79.

In State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 717, a case involving deportation and ineffective assistance of counsel, Ortiz-Mondragon pleaded no contest to felony battery. He failed to show that defense counsel rendered deficient service when defense counsel conveyed the information regarding immigration consequences contained in the plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form.

18 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5.

19 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶1. In Negrete, because no transcript was available, the court turned to State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996), and concluded that Negrete failed to sufficiently allege that the plea-accepting court did not tell him of the potential immigration consequences of his plea. In the present case, the transcripts of the plea colloquies are available and clearly show the circuit court failed to give the required warnings. As a result, the "Bentley-type" analysis conducted in Negrete is unnecessary here. Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33.

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withdraw his plea that the circuit court did not inform him of

the potential immigration consequences of his plea. In

contrast, Negrete's affidavit stated that he "'d[id] not recall'

whether he received the necessary warning."20

¶39 Based on the equivocal assertions in the defendant's

motion and affidavit, the Negrete court concluded that Negrete

had not sufficiently alleged that the circuit court failed to

advise him of the potential immigration consequences of his

plea.21 Despite this ground for denying Negrete's motion, the

Negrete court moved on to discuss the "likely" prong of Wis.

Stat. § 971.08(2).

¶40 Negrete's motion alleged that he was "now the subject

of deportation proceedings."22 Negrete's affidavit alleged that

he was "now subject to deportation proceedings."23 The Negrete

court concluded that Negrete's "[b]are allegations of possible

deportation" were insufficient to show his plea was "likely" to

result in deportation.24

¶41 In deportation proceedings, immigration officials seek

out those who are deportable. Given the role of immigration

officials in seeking out those who are deportable, the Negrete

20 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶35.

21 Id., ¶25.

22 Id., ¶¶15, 36 (emphasis added).

23 Id., ¶2 (emphasis added).

24 Id., ¶¶26, 36.

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court held that Negrete's equivocal assertion that he was

"subject to" or "subject of" deportation was not sufficient to

show he was actually "likely" to be deported or that deportation

would be the result of the criminal offense.25 Negrete had to

allege facts demonstrating a causal nexus between the entry of

the guilty plea and the federal government's likely institution

of deportation proceedings.26 Bare allegations were not

sufficient.

¶42 In contrast to deportation, a non-citizen would have

to take affirmative steps in order to induce the federal

government to exclude the non-citizen from admission to the

United States. The federal government does not seek out

individuals who may be excluded from admission or otherwise

inform non-citizens that they may be excluded from admission to

this country based on convictions for violating laws relating to

controlled substances.

¶43 Instead, the federal government, through the statutes

governing admission to this country, excludes only non-citizens

with convictions for violating laws relating to controlled

substances who affirmatively seek admission to the country.

25 Compare Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶5, 36 (quoting Negrete's motion, which stated that he was "now 'the subject of deportation proceedings'") (emphasis added), with Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶2 (stating that "Negrete's affidavit also states that he is now subject to deportation proceedings.") (emphasis added).

26 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶26.

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Short of Ms. Valadez taking the affirmative step of leaving the

United States and actually being excluded from admission, Ms.

Valadez has no way aside from the immigration and naturalization

statutes to demonstrate that she is "likely" to be excluded from

admission.

¶44 Ms. Valadez's convictions are, as stated previously,

explicitly listed in federal statutes as grounds for exclusion

from admission. Based on the federal statutes, if Ms. Valadez

leaves the United States and attempts to gain readmission to

this country, the federal government will "likely" exclude her

from admission because of her convictions.

¶45 The circuit court mistakenly required Ms. Valadez to

show that the federal government has taken steps to exclude her

from admission. Section 971.08(2) does not require such a

showing. The statute requires only that a defendant show that

such a consequence is "likely." Here the text of the federal

statute and the necessity that a defendant take affirmative

steps to leave the country in order to actually be excluded from

admission satisfy the "likely" test. In other words, the

immigration and naturalization statutes demonstrate the

likelihood that Ms. Valadez will be excluded from admission.

¶46 Requiring Ms. Valadez to leave the country and seek

readmission to demonstrate that she is "likely" to be excluded

from admission is the equivalent of asking her to demonstrate

exclusion from admission to 100% certainty. Wisconsin Stat.

§ 971.08(2) requires an immigration consequence be "likely," not

"certain."

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¶47 When questioned at oral argument about exclusion from

admission, the State conceded that "given her convictions, [Ms.

Valadez] is inadmissible," but attempted to distinguish between

her being inadmissible under the law and her actually being

excluded from admission.

¶48 We are not persuaded by this distinction. Ms. Valadez

has demonstrated that she will, as a matter of federal law, be

excluded from admission should she take the affirmative step of

leaving the country. She has thus shown she is likely to be

excluded from admission.

¶49 The Wisconsin legislature afforded relief to a

defendant "likely" to be excluded from admission. Wisconsin

Stat. § 978.02 does not require a defendant to show that he or

she actually has been excluded from admission or that the

federal government has manifested its intent to exclude the

defendant from admission other than through the federal law

providing for exclusion from admission.

¶50 To hold that Ms. Valadez cannot withdraw her guilty

pleas because the federal government has not excluded her from

admission is, as a matter of practicality, unworkable and

effectively expunges an enumerated consequence——exclusion from

admission——from Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).27

27 "[S]tatutes are interpreted to avoid surplusage, giving effect to each word." State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶13, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811.

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¶51 We are convinced that if Ms. Valadez left the United

States she would, as a matter of law, be excluded from

admission. As a result, we are persuaded that it is "likely"

that her guilty pleas will "result in [her] . . . exclusion from

admission." To deny Ms. Valadez the opportunity to withdraw her

pleas would render relief under the statutes illusory.

¶52 Because Ms. Valadez has met her burden of showing her

guilty pleas are "likely" to result in her exclusion from

admission to this country, we need not reach the question of

whether her pleas are also "likely" to result in deportation or

denial of naturalization.

¶53 In sum, Ms. Valadez has fulfilled the statutory

requirements for withdrawing her pleas. The circuit court

failed to give the warning required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c)

and Ms. Valadez's guilty pleas are "likely" to result in her

exclusion from admission.

Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court

denying Ms. Valadez's motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. We

remand the matter to the circuit court with directions to vacate

the judgments of conviction and permit Ms. Valadez to withdraw

her guilty pleas and enter other pleas.