West Valley City v. Benjamin Parkinson

¶1 West Valley City (the City) appeals the district court's

decision granting Defendant Benjamin Parkinson's motion to

dismiss based on the single criminal episode statute (the Single

Criminal Episode Statute or the Statute), Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-

West Valley City v. Parkinson

2. The facts described are derived from the hearing on Parkinson's

motion to dismiss where counsel presented arguments, proffered

facts, and read portions from the preliminary hearing testimony of

the officer.

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401 to -403 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013). We reverse and

remand.

¶2 On September 19, 2010, officers responded to a call alleging

domestic violence committed by Parkinson. When police arrived on

the scene and began their investigation, Parkinson was no longer

there. While an officer was interviewing the victim outside the

home, Parkinson drove by. Someone identified Parkinson, and the

officer tried to stop the vehicle with hand motions and shouting.

Parkinson did not stop, so the officer got into his vehicle and

pursued Parkinson. After a short car chase, a foot chase, and a brief

altercation, the officer ultimately apprehended and arrested

Parkinson. 2 There was apparently a fear expressed that Parkinson

had a child in the car with him as he was fleeing from the officer.

That fear proved to be groundless.

¶3 On October 4, 2010, Parkinson was charged in the West

Valley City Justice Court with four class B misdemeanors relating

to the domestic violence. These included assault, unlawful

detention, and two counts of commission of domestic violence in

the presence of a child. On October 20, 2010, Parkinson pleaded

guilty to the assault charge and the remaining charges were

dismissed.

¶4 On October 26, 2010, the City filed an information in Third

District Court charging Parkinson for actions stemming from the

police chase. These charges included driving under the influence,

failure to stop at the command of an officer, violation of

requirements for alcohol restricted drivers, driving on a suspended

or revoked license, and interference with an arresting officer.

Parkinson filed a motion to dismiss based on his assertion that

West Valley City v. Parkinson

20111122-CA 3 2014 UT App 140

these new charges and the prior charges in the justice court were

part of a single criminal episode and were required to have been

tried together. After a hearing, the district court granted

Parkinson's motion.

¶5 The City now appeals, arguing that the district court

incorrectly interpreted and applied the Single Criminal Episode

Statute. "The 'trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a

question of law' and thus is reviewed for correctness and accorded

no particular deference.” State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah Ct.

App. 1995) (quoting Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah

1990)). Similarly, "'[a] trial court's decision to grant or deny a

motion to dismiss presents a question of law, which we review for

correctness.'” State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ¶ 14, 294 P.3d 617

(quoting State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ¶ 10, 17 P.3d 1145).

¶6 The Statute generally requires that charges arising out of a

single criminal episode be tried together. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-

1-402(2) (LexisNexis 2012); id. § 76-1-403 (Supp. 2013) ("If a

defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out

of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same

or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is

barred . . . .”). The Statute was enacted "(1) to protect a defendant

from the governmental harassment of being subjected to successive

trials for offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; and

(2) to ensure finality without unduly burdening the judicial process

by repetitious litigation.” Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ¶ 22 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). A single criminal episode is

defined as including "all conduct which is closely related in time

and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single

criminal objective.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (LexisNexis 2012).

Although there could be an argument made as to whether the

conduct here was closely related in time, the City limits its claim of

error to the district court's determination that all of the conduct

leading to the charges in both courts was part of a single criminal

episode because there was a single criminal objective. Because the

West Valley City v. Parkinson

3. This officer was not the first officer to arrive at the scene and

commence the domestic violence investigation, but arrived later

and was questioning the victim outside when Parkinson drove by.

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statutory definition is written in the conjunctive, we likewise

address only this element.

¶7 We agree with the City that Parkinson's conduct leading to

the domestic violence charges filed with the justice court and the

conduct for which charges were filed in the district court did not

share a common criminal objective. "[W]here a defendant is

arguing that a subsequent prosecution is barred by a prior

conviction, 'it is appropriate to take a narrow, rather than an

expansive, view of what [a single criminal episode] entails.'” Selzer,

2013 UT App 3, ¶ 26 (second alteration in original) (quoting Strader,

902 P.2d at 642). It appears that the district court gave great weight

to the facts that the officer investigating the domestic violence was

the same officer who gave chase to Parkinson3 and that the officer

did so because he believed, albeit incorrectly, that there was a child

in the car with Parkinson, thus providing a link between the

domestic violence and the car chase and making them part of

the same criminal episode. But the involvement of a single

officer or his perception of the situation is not determinative of

whether charges arose from a single criminal episode. Instead, the

question focuses more on a defendant's actions, that is, whether the

two sets of charges arose out of actions that were "incident to an

attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.” Utah

Code Ann. § 76-1-401. ”Whether [specific charges are] incident to

the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as [other

charges] depends on the specific facts of the case viewed under . . .

the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, the totality of facts

and circumstances is viewed objectively to determine whether

there exists a common criminal objective.” Strader, 902 P.2d at

642–43 (footnote omitted).

West Valley City v. Parkinson

20111122-CA 5 2014 UT App 140

¶8 This distinction was applied in State v. Strader, where a

police officer saw the defendant enter a construction site at night,

leave with an object that he put in his car, and drive away. 902 P.2d

at 639. The officer stopped the vehicle and asked the driver for

identification. Id. Identification was provided for the defendant that

was clearly fake. Id. The officer arrested the defendant because of

the false identification and subsequently found drugs in the car. Id.

The defendant was charged in a justice court for providing false

identification and pleaded guilty. Id. at 640. He was later charged

in district court for drug possession, theft, and providing false

identification. Id. He moved to dismiss the district court charges,

citing the Single Criminal Episode Statute. Id. The district court

dismissed the false identification charge because of the prior justice

court prosecution, but declined to dismiss the other two charges.

Id. The district court's decision denying the motion was reviewed

by this court. Id. at 640–44. We affirmed, holding that there was not

a common criminal objective because the only common agent was

"an intent to avoid arrest.” Id. at 643–44.

¶9 Considering the facts and circumstances in this objective

manner and applying a narrow view of the term "single criminal

episode,” we determine that Parkinson's attempt to flee from the

officer was not incident to his acts of domestic violence. Parkinson

had left the scene where the domestic violence took place, and his

attempt to flee police was not incident to the accomplishment of his

domestic violence objectives. Cf. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ¶¶ 25–27

(affirming a determination that there was no shared criminal

objective between a sexual assault of a victim and the physical

abuse of that victim that occurred about three hours later, after the

sexual assault was completed and the victim and the defendant

went to a gas station and the defendant started to hit the victim).

Parkinson's domestic violence acts were directed at the victim and

allegedly with the purpose of harming or frightening her. The car

chase and following events were motivated by Parkinson's

objective of eluding police. Furthermore, the fact that the officer

who was questioning the victim about the domestic violence was

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20111122-CA 6 2014 UT App 140

the same officer who pursued Parkinson after he drove by is not

determinative of whether there was a single criminal objective. See

Strader, 902 P.2d at 643. Thus, we determine that the two sets of

charges were not part of a single criminal objective and thus could

be pursued in separate actions in the two courts.

¶10 We therefore reverse and remand.