State of Utah v. Apuhia Manatal

¶1 In this appeal, we address whether the trial court erred by

denying defendant Afuhia Manatau's motion to dismiss the charges

against him on double jeopardy grounds. We specifically address

whether the double jeopardy clause of the Utah Constitution barred

Mr. Manatau's retrial when a trial judge declared a mistrial without

establishing legal necessity to do so. We conclude that the burden to

create a record for and sufficiently justify the mistrial fell on the trial

court and the State, not the defendant. We further conclude that

legal necessity was not established on the record and hold that

Utah's constitutional protections against double jeopardy prohibited

Mr. Manatau's retrial.

State v. Manatau

Opinion of the Court

BACKGROUND

¶2 On May 24, 2009, Mr. Manatau beat his wife in their

apartment and pursued her as she fled to two different apartments

in their neighborhood. At the third apartment, Mr. Manatau threw

a baby gate through a window into the residence, spraying shattered

glass on the apartment's occupants, and persisted in pounding on

the front door until shortly before the police arrived.

¶3 The State charged Mr. Manatau with various crimes,

including aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, burglary,

criminal mischief, and reckless endangerment. Mr. Manatau's case

went to trial on March 2, 2010. Prior to jury selection, bailiffs

discovered a pocket knife in the pocket of a suit jacket

Mr. Manatau's wife had brought for him to wear in court.

Mrs. Manatau claimed she borrowed the suit jacket from her brother

and was unaware that he had left a pocket knife he used for Boy

Scout activities in the pocket. Because of security concerns caused by

this incident, the trial judge excluded Mrs. Manatau from the

courtroom for the remainder of the trial.1 Thereafter the jury was

selected, empaneled, and sworn, and the trial proceeded.

¶4 On the second day of trial, after several witnesses had

testified and the trial judge had ruled on several objections,

Mrs. Manatau's attorney asked the court to allow her to reenter the

courtroom to observe the proceedings against her husband.

Mrs. Manatau's attorney argued that courtroom security could be

maintained if Mrs. Manatau were subjected to a search before

entering the courtroom and if a bailiff sat next to her. The State

opposed the request, arguing that Mrs. Manatau had attempted to

smuggle a knife to her violent husband, was wearing an ankle

monitor for unspecified charges against her, and had attempted to

intimidate witnesses against her husband. After hearing argument,

the judge ruled that Mrs. Manatau could reenter the courtroom if

additional security measures were followed. The judge then took a

recess.

¶5 Following the recess, the trial judge announced sua sponte

that she was recusing herself and declaring a mistrial. The judge

explained that during the recess she had had an opportunity to

reflect on the knife incident, and had concluded that it was affecting

her more than she had previously thought. The judge announced

1 Shortly after the knife incident, but before the jury was sworn,

Mrs. Manatau formally invoked her privilege not to testify against

her husband.

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that her prior rulings in the case were not biased, but stated that in

anticipation of future rulings, she had decided to recuse herself:

[I]n an abundance of caution and to avoid any question

of either impropriety or biased decision-making on my

part, I am actually going to call a mistrial and recuse

myself from the case. As you can probably tell, I'm

feeling quite emotional about this, and I think just for

the benefit . . . of the state, and all of the witnesses in

this case, I think it's best that I recuse myself from this

case. So I am going to call a mistrial and we'll have the

case assigned to a different judge.

¶6 Both defense counsel and the prosecutor objected to the

mistrial. Defense counsel objected on double jeopardy grounds. The

judge overruled these objections, stating that in a mistrial case,

"jeopardy doesn't attach and so we can go forward with a new jury.”

¶7 The case was reassigned for retrial under a new judge. At

the retrial, Mr. Manatau moved to dismiss the charges against him

on the grounds of double jeopardy. Mr. Manatau argued that

because jeopardy had attached when the first jury was empaneled,

the mistrial acted as an acquittal. The trial court denied this motion,

ruling that the mistrial did not act as an acquittal because the

mistrial was legally necessary. At the conclusion of the second trial,

Mr. Manatau was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated

assault, burglary, criminal mischief, and four counts of reckless

endangerment. Mr. Manatau appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 In this case, we review the rulings of two separate trial

courts. First, we review the second trial court's (Judge Reese's)

ruling that Mr. Manatau's retrial was not barred on double jeopardy

grounds. We afford no deference to the trial court's double jeopardy

ruling because the trial judge was in "no better position than this

court to determine the necessity of a mistrial.” State v. Harris, 2004

UT 103, ¶ 21, 104 P.3d 1250. Second, we review the initial trial

court's (Judge Christiansen's) sua sponte order declaring a mistrial

to determine whether the mistrial was legally necessary. If a court

articulates on the record a factual basis for its determination that a

new trial is legally necessary, we review that court's determination

for abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 29. Absent record findings, however, we

independently assess whether the mistrial was legally necessary. Id.

¶ 30.

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State v. Manatau

Opinion of the Court

ANALYSIS

I. UTAH'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

¶9 In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury has been sworn

and empaneled. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979).

Declaring a mistrial after jeopardy has attached automatically

invokes the double jeopardy clauses of the United States

Constitution and the Utah Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor

shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 ("nor shall any

person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense”). The

declaration of a mistrial before a verdict is entered, as a general rule,

operates as an acquittal. State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 24, 104 P.3d

1250; State v. Whitman, 74 P.2d 696, 697–98 (Utah 1937).

¶10 Once a mistrial has been declared, a retrial may proceed

without offending Utah's constitutional double jeopardy provision

only if one of two exceptions applies: (1) the defendant consents to

the mistrial or (2) there is "legal necessity” for the mistrial.2 Harris,

2004 UT 103, ¶ 24. If, as in this case, the defendant has not consented

to the mistrial legal necessity is established only if a mistrial is the

"only reasonable alternative to insure justice under the

circumstances.” Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358. In order to show that a

mistrial is the only reasonable alternative, two elements must be

met.

¶11 First, the trial judge has a duty to carefully evaluate the

circumstances of the particular case and determine that legal

necessity requires the discharge of the jury. Harris, 2004 UT 103,

¶ 27; Whitman, 74 P.2d at 697–98. As part of that inquiry, the judge

must "afford the parties adequate opportunity to object to the

declaration of a mistrial.” Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 27. The judge also

must consider possible alternatives to terminating the proceeding

and determine that none of the proposed alternatives are reasonable.

Id.

¶12 While the trial judge must ultimately bear the burden of

making the determination that none of the alternatives are

reasonable, "the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying

2 Mr. Manatau references the double jeopardy provisions of both

the federal Constitution and Utah's Constitution in his appellate

briefing, but principally relies on case law interpreting the Utah

Constitution. Because we find Utah's Double Jeopardy Clause to be

dispositive, we confine our analysis to the Utah Constitution.

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the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar.” Ambrose, 598

P.2d at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant,

however, does not bear a burden to show a mistrial is legally

necessary if the defendant objects to the mistrial. As we noted in

Ambrose, a defendant may often have many "valid personal reasons

to prefer going ahead with the trial”; the burden is placed on the trial

judge to "avoid depriving the defendant of his constitutionally

protected freedom of choice in the name of a paternalistic concern

for his welfare.” Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶13 Second, the trial court must establish a record of the factual

basis for its conclusion that a mistrial is necessary, as well as the

reasons why there is no reasonable alternative under the

circumstances. Id. If a trial court makes these findings on the record,

we afford substantial deference to its determination that legal

necessity warrants a mistrial. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 29. In the

absence of an adequate record, however, the mistrial will operate as

an acquittal if we are unable to find a readily apparent factual basis

for the mistrial on the face of the record. Id. ¶ 30. Additionally, if the

trial court fails to articulate why no reasonable alternatives existed,

"the mistrial will operate as an acquittal if we find, based on our

own independent assessment, that one or more of the proposed

alternatives presented to the trial judge was reasonable under the

circumstances.” Id. Absent an adequate record, we resolve

uncertainties as to the existence of legal necessity in favor of the

defendant. W. Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149, ¶¶ 13, 15, 981

P.2d 420.

¶14 There are sound reasons for strongly encouraging trial

judges to consider all of the alternatives before subjecting a

defendant to a second trial. The Supreme Court in United States v.

Perez stated that a judge should dismiss a jury only "under urgent

circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.” 22 U.S. 579,

580 (1824). As we discussed in Ambrose, double jeopardy protections

are robust rather than "ephemeral” because they protect a defendant

not only from being punished twice for the same offense, but also

from having to endure another trial. 598 P.2d at 357, 360. There is

"strain, embarrassment, anxiety and expense” involved in a criminal

trial, and these are concerns that cannot be vindicated once a retrial

has commenced and proceeded. Id. at 357.

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State v. Manatau

Opinion of the Court

II. MR. MANATAU'S RETRIAL VIOLATED UTAH'S

DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

A. The Trial Court Did Not Consider Alternatives to a Mistrial

¶15 In the present proceeding, there is no question that at the

time the trial judge declared a mistrial, jeopardy had attached. The

jury had been sworn and empaneled the previous day. Further, the

record is clear that Mr. Manatau did not consent to the retrial; both

Mr. Manatau and the State objected to the mistrial. Therefore, only

legal necessity could preclude the mistrial from operating as an

acquittal.

¶16 Trial judges must fulfill two distinct requirements in order

to establish the legal necessity of a mistrial; the court must

(1) consider alternatives to a mistrial and determine no reasonable

alternative exists and (2) create a record disclosing the factual basis

for the court's determinations that a mistrial is legally necessary and

that no reasonable alternative exists. State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103,

¶¶ 27–28, 104 P.3d 1250. The record here demonstrates that the trial

court did not satisfy its first obligation. The trial court did not

consider any alternatives to a mistrial, nor did it determine that none

existed because the judge mistakenly believed that jeopardy had not

attached. As noted above, when defense counsel objected to the

mistrial on double jeopardy grounds, the trial judge erroneously

stated that "in mistrial case[s], jeopardy doesn't attach and so we can

go forward with a new jury.” Thus the judge did not apprehend the

necessity of considering alternatives to a mistrial.

¶17 In this situation, the State—not the defendant—bore the

burden of alerting the trial court to the need for a determination that

no reasonable alternatives existed in order to establish the legal

necessity of a mistrial. It was in the State's interest to do so because

absent such a determination, a mistrial acts as an acquittal. Harris,

2004 UT 103, ¶ 27. Defense counsel is not required to assist the State

in rendering the case eligible for retrial by either offering alternatives

to be considered or, as especially pertinent in this case, alerting the

trial judge to a mistake of law. We do not require defense counsel to

help pave the way for their clients to be subjected to jeopardy for a

second time.

¶18 We therefore conclude that the trial court failed to meet the

first requirement to establish that a mistrial was the "only reasonable

alternative.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the trial

court mistakenly believed that jeopardy had not attached, the court

failed to "carefully evaluate all of the circumstances and conclude

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Opinion of the Court

that legal necessity mandate[d] the discharge of the jury.” Id. Absent

such an analysis, a mistrial acts as an acquittal.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Create a Record of a

Legal Necessity Determination

¶19 The mistrial also acted as an acquittal in this case because

the trial court did not satisfy its second obligation to create a record

to support a finding that there was no reasonable alternative to a

mistrial. And we cannot say that a mistrial was legally necessary

from our independent review of the record.

¶20 Because the trial court mistakenly believed that jeopardy

had not attached, it did not make findings supporting a conclusion

that a mistrial was legally necessary. The absence of a record,

however, does not always require an acquittal. If the trial court does

not make explicit findings regarding legal necessity, we

independently determine whether "the factual basis for the mistrial

is readily apparent from the record” and whether "based on our own

independent assessment, . . . one or more of the proposed

alternatives presented to the trial judge was reasonable under the

circumstances.”3 Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 30.

¶21 In this case, the trial judge articulated a factual basis for

declaring the mistrial. The judge stated that events on the first day

of trial had affected her (presumably emotionally) to the point of

causing her to question her impartiality going forward, especially in

light of the need to rule on future objections. The judge further

clarified that the basis for the mistrial was "the security issues that

[had] been raised.”

¶22 The trial judge, however, did not consider any alternatives

to a mistrial on the record, nor did either party offer any. Thus,

unlike Harris, where we considered whether alternatives proposed

3 We emphasize that requiring a trial court to record specific

findings regarding mistrial "is not intended to make trial courts

unduly apprehensive of declaring a mistrial.” Harris, 2004 UT 103,

¶ 29. On the contrary, compliance with this requirement requires

appellate courts to afford substantial deference to a trial court's legal

necessity determination. Id. A decision to call a mistrial is a factintensive,

circumstance-dependent inquiry, and the trial court has

the "superior position to determine whether any proposed

alternatives to a mistrial are reasonable in a given situation or

whether legal necessity mandates the termination of the

proceeding.” Id.

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State v. Manatau

Opinion of the Court

by the defendant were reasonable, we have no record alternatives to

a mistrial to consider here. See id. ¶¶ 33–38. We therefore must

independently determine whether the trial court had any reasonable

option to a mistrial, resolving all uncertainties caused by gaps in the

record in favor of the defendant. See W. Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT

App 149, ¶ 15, 981 P.2d 420 ("Because the record lacks support for

the declaration of the mistrial, we resolve this uncertainty in favor

of defendant.”).

¶23 We hold that a reasonable alternative did exist. In this case,

no prejudicial or improper statements were made by either party in

the presence of the jury. See Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 356–58. The only

potential prejudice at issue was that of the trial judge. And it was a

prospective concern only; the judge determined that the court's

rulings prior to declaring a mistrial were not tainted by prejudice,

and the State does not allege any of the court's rulings were suspect.

In these circumstances, it may have been reasonable for the case to

have been reassigned to another judge. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 29(a)

("If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before

whom a trial has begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other

judge of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of

the Judicial Council, upon certifying that the judge is familiar with

the record of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed

with and finish the trial . . . .”). Although we acknowledge that in

some situations this alternative may be unreasonable—for example,

where no other judge is available to continue the trial within a

reasonable amount of time—there is no evidence of any

circumstances that would make reassignment of the case to another

judge unreasonable here. Absent findings that reassignment was not

feasible, we must resolve any uncertainty caused by this gap in the

record in favor of the defendant. Thus, the insufficiency of the record

in this case precludes this court from making an independent

determination that the mistrial was legally necessary.



* * *



4 At trial, Mr. Manatau did not dispute the essential facts of the

case. He only argued that the State had overcharged him.

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Opinion of the Court

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¶24 In making this determination, we acknowledge the

reprehensible nature of the defendant’s conduct.4 However, because

of the insufficiency of the record we are unable to conclude the

mistrial was legally necessary, and constitutional requirements

preclude a second trial under such circumstances. We therefore find

that the denial of Mr. Manatau’s motion to dismiss on double

jeopardy grounds was erroneous, and reverse his convictions.