Laila Snead v. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania

This matter involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which
defendant, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania
("SPCA"), was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff,
Laila Snead ("Snead"). The jury awarded Snead $154,926.37, including
$100,000 in punitive damages. We affirm the judgment in part, reverse in
part, and remand for further proceedings.

2 The procedural history of this case is somewhat complicated and the
facts involving the condition of the dogs at the heart of this case are very
disturbing. Although we will repeat several times infra that under
Pennsylvania law, the animals are considered property, this court clearly
recognizes that dogs as pets hold a unique place in many people's lives as
friend, companion, and family member.

3 The facts leading to the lawsuit, to be discussed in greater detail infra
when addressing SPCA's specific claims on appeal, are generally as follows.
On January 23, 1999, Humane Society Officer Felix Anthony Beltram
("Officer Beltram") responded to a complaint regarding a dead dog inside
713 East Hilton Street, Philadelphia. (Notes of testimony, 7/6/05 at 202-
203.) When he arrived, he discovered 13 dogs, 1 dead and 12 alive. (Id. at
150.) The dogs were all pit bull terriers, with the exception of "Aramis," a
Beauceron.1 (Notes of testimony, 7/7/05 at 35.) Officer Beltram testified
that the house appeared to be abandoned and was in poor condition. (Notes
of testimony, 7/6/05 at 205.) Several of the dogs had suffered wounds and
appeared to be emaciated. (Id. at 216-220.)

4 While the animals were in the process of being removed from the
home, Snead arrived. (Id. at 148-149.) Snead told Officer Beltram that she
lived at the home and that the animals were hers. (Id. at 150, 169.)
Officer Beltram placed Snead under arrest for dog-fighting2 and informed her that her dogs would be held as evidence pending resolution of the charges.3
(Id. at 150-151; 7/7/05 at 65-67.)

5 The following day, January 24, 1999, the district attorney dropped the
dog-fighting charges; however, Snead was not aware that the charges were
dropped and that the dogs were therefore available to be reclaimed.4 On
January 27, 1999, Snead went to the shelter to check on the dogs; she
spoke with Charles Spencer ("Spencer"), the director of animal care, who
informed Snead that all of the dogs had been euthanized. (Notes of
testimony, 7/6/05 at 59; 7/7/05 at 69-70.) Snead was told that the shelter
is only required to keep animals for 48 hours; and since the charges were
dropped and the dogs were no longer needed as evidence, they were put to sleep. (Notes of testimony, 7/7/05 at 69-70, 193-194.) Snead became
hysterical and left the shelter. (Id. at 70, 192.) In fact, the dogs were not
euthanized until January 30, 1999, three days later. (Notes of testimony,
7/6/05 at 197.) Snead testified that had she been provided notice that the
dogs were available to be redeemed, she would have taken them back and
complied with any SPCA conditions. (Notes of testimony, 7/7/05 at 70-71.)
Snead also testified that several of the dogs were strays that she had taken
in with the intention of nursing them back to health. (Id. at 42-43.)

6 Snead initially filed suit in municipal court in 2001, contending that
SPCA illegally destroyed her dogs. Snead sought judgment for $8,450, the
alleged value of the dogs. The municipal court granted judgment in favor of
Snead on March 5, 2001, and SPCA appealed on March 22, 2001. The
appeal was listed for a trial de novo in the court of common pleas; and on
June 19, 2001, Snead filed a civil complaint, alleging trespass, conversion,
negligence, and violations of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The case was transferred
to compulsory arbitration; and on January 15, 2003, the arbitrators entered
their report finding in Snead's favor on all counts. SPCA filed an appeal from
the arbitrators' award on February 10, 2003.

7 The case proceeded to a jury trial on October 22, 2003, at the
conclusion of which SPCA made an oral motion for a directed verdict. The
trial court granted the motion by order entered October 30, 2003. Snead
filed post-trial motions arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by
granting SPCA's motion for directed verdict because Snead had presented
sufficient evidence to prove each count raised in her complaint. Snead's
post-trial motions were denied; and on February 3, 2004, Snead filed notice
of appeal with this court.

8 On appeal, a unanimous panel of this court held that Snead could not
sustain a Section 1983 claim for violation of her Fourth Amendment right to
privacy based on the warrantless search and seizure of the dogs. Snead v.
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania
("Snead I"), No. 402 EDA 2004, unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super. filed
February 1, 2005). It appearing from the uncontroverted evidence that the
house at 713 East Hilton Street was abandoned and that Snead was not
actually sleeping in the structure in January 1999, we found that Snead had
no legitimate expectation of privacy and her claims of trespass and the
violation of her civil rights, based on her Fourth Amendment right to privacy
in the structure, failed as a matter of law. Id. at 10-14. However, with
regard to Snead's remaining claims for negligence, conversion, and
Section 1983 claims, we remanded for a new trial. We determined that the
trial court had improperly weighed conflicting evidence to rule on SPCA's
motion for directed verdict with respect to these claims, including Snead's
testimony that she had attempted to retrieve the dogs on January 27 only to
be told they were already dead, testimony which was contradicted by Spencer. Id. at 14. The weighing of this testimony involved credibility
determinations which were for the jury. Id. at 14-15.5

9 On July 6, 2005, a second jury trial commenced, following which the
jury rendered the verdict described above. SPCA's post-trial motions were
denied. Snead's post-trial motion for delay damages in the amount of
$1,544.50 was granted; however, her post-trial motion for counsel fees was
denied. Both parties filed timely notices of appeal6 and have complied with
the trial court's order directing them to file concise statements of matters
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On February 1,
2006, the Honorable Edward E. Russell filed opinions addressing the issues
raised in both appeals.

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15 The Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, Section 8541,
42 Pa.C.S.A., provides, "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no
local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a
person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee
thereof or any other person."

The overall purpose of the Tort Claims Act, of course,
is to limit governmental exposure to tort liability for
its acts. See, e.g., Lory v. City of Philadelphia,
544 Pa. 38, 43, 674 A.2d 673, 675-76 (1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 870, 117 S.Ct. 184, 136 L.Ed.2d
123 (1996). See also Smith v. City of
Philadelphia, 512 Pa. 129, 139, 516 A.2d 306, 311
(1986) (plurality opinion) (‘preservation of the public
treasury as against the possibility of unusually large
recoveries in tort cases, is, self-evidently, an
important governmental interest').

Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 566 Pa. 541,
548, 782 A.2d 510, 515 (2001).

Our inquiry begins with an examination of the
plain language of the relevant statutory provisions.
See 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1903(a), 1921(b);
Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18, 24,
669 A.2d 883, 886 (1995) (when language of statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect in
accordance with its plain and common meaning);
Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 531 Pa. 500, 502-03,
614 A.2d 218, 220 (1992) (the object of all
interpretation and construction of statutes is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly; the best indicator of legislative intent is
the plain language of the statute). The Tort Claims
Act comprises Subchapter C of Chapter 85 of the
Judicial Code, the chapter which addresses ‘Matters
Affecting Government Units.' The definition section
of Chapter 85 defines a ‘local agency' as ‘[a]
government unit other than the Commonwealth
government.' 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. The general
definitions section of the Judicial Code, which applies
in the absence of further specific definitions, defines
a ‘government unit' as, inter alia, ‘"any government
agency . . . .' Id. § 102. A ‘government agency,' in
turn, is defined by the Judicial Code as ‘[a]ny
Commonwealth agency or any political subdivision or
municipal or other local authority, or any officer or
agency of any such political subdivision or local
authority.' Id. (emphasis supplied). See also
Guinn, 531 Pa. at 502 n.2, 614 A.2d at 220 n.2.

Although the Judicial Code does not define
‘local authority,' the Statutory Construction Act does.
It provides that the phrase ‘local authority,' ‘[w]hen
used in any statute finally enacted on or after
January 1, 1975,' means ‘a municipal authority or
any other body corporate and politic created by one
or more political subdivisions pursuant to statute.'
1 Pa.C.S. § 1991. Both the Judicial Code and the
Tort Claims Act were enacted after January 1, 1975;
hence, both are subject to this overarching
definition.

Id. at 545-546, 782 A.2d 513 (citation omitted).

16 In determining that SPCA is not a government agency, the trial court
stated:

In the instant case, [SPCA's] directors and officers
are not appointed by the Commonwealth, but rather,
elected by the corporation. The Commonwealth does
not exercise control over its operations or have an
interest in its assets. [SPCA] adopts its own by-laws
and manages its own affairs. The Commonwealth is
not its sole source of income, nor does it provide
benefits or indemnity. Under the expanded inquiry
set forth in Sphere Drake, supra, [SPCA] does not
qualify as a Commonwealth party or employee.

Trial court opinion, 2/1/06 at 7. We agree and will not disturb the trial
court's determination. See Tabaj v. Fayette Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals Inc., 53 Pa.D.&C.4th 399 (Fayette 2001), affirmed,
828 A.2d 409 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 575 Pa. 698, 836 A.2d 123
(2003) (Fayette County SPCA not entitled to local agency immunity under
the Tort Claims Act). Compare Vonstein v. SPCA, 24 Pa.D.&C.4th 474
(Lycoming 1993) (SPCA agents, while statutorily authorized to initiate
criminal proceedings, not entitled to official immunity from suit).

17 Having found that SPCA is not immune from liability, we proceed to its
remaining claims. SPCA argues that the evidence was insufficient, as a
matter of law, to sustain Snead's claims. We disagree.

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