Dennis Bracale v. Harold C. Gibbs, et al.

[1] Dennis Bracale appeals from a summary judgment entered by the
Superior Court (Hancock County, Mead, J.) in favor of Harold C. and K. Elizabeth
Gibbs on Bracale's complaint for specific performance based on promissory
estoppel arising from Bracale's purchase of property in Bar Harbor. Bracale
asserts that the motion court's application of the doctrine of merger and its
interpretation of the real estate contracts do not justify entry of summary judgment.
Because Bracale failed to demonstrate that the Gibbses misled him, and because
his claims relate to property different from the property for which he might have
asserted a claim for specific performance, we affirm the judgment.

I. CASE HISTORY

[2] In 1987, the Gibbses and the National Park Service engaged in a real
estate exchange by which the Gibbses traded a 7.5-acre parcel and $12,500 to
acquire a 13-acre parcel of property from the National Park Service. All property
at issue is located in Bar Harbor. The acquisition was consummated by a quitclaim
deed to the Gibbses that referenced the Park Service's conveyance of its rights in
tract 104-06, supported by a detailed metes and bounds description of the property
conveyed. A 1990 survey for the Gibbses outlined the location of this property on
the face of the earth, tracking the metes and bounds description in the 1987 deed.
Apparently, there remained some uncertainty as to the location of a monument and
the boundary at the southwest corner of the 13-acre parcel. In this action, this
parcel is called "Parcel One."

[3] In 1988, the Gibbses began to inquire about ownership of a lot abutting
the 885-foot northern boundary of the 13-acre parcel. Ultimately they were
advised by their attorney and by officials of the United States of America,1 that the
U.S.A. held no interest in the 2.93-acre lot on their northern boundary. In this
action, this lot is called "Parcel Two."

[4] In 1991, the Gibbses signed a purchase and sale agreement to convey
the 13-acre parcel to Bracale and his then wife. The original contract for sale of
real estate indicated that the Gibbses were obligated to finalize the property line
with Acadia National Park by a set date. However, that original language was
struck and the following handwritten language substituted: "Sellers will release
any interest they have in property south-west of surveyed property line. Sellers
will initiate correspondence with Acadia National Park as to the monument
discrepancy affecting the south-west corner of the property."

[5] Bracale's statement of material facts in opposition to summary
judgment indicates that at the closing in early 1992, the Gibbses discussed their
inquiries about the 2.93-acre parcel and suggested that Bracale continue efforts to
acquire title to the property. The statement of material facts also indicates that
there was an "understanding" between Bracale and the Gibbses that the Gibbses
"would convey all additional property that was the subject of boundary disputes
between [the Gibbses] and the United States of America at the time of entering into
the contract." (Emphasis added.) Nothing in Bracale's statement of material facts
indicates that, at the time of the closing, the Gibbses believed or stated that the
U.S.A. owned the 2.93-acre parcel, or that there was any boundary dispute with the
U.S.A. regarding the proper location of their 885-foot northern boundary.

[6] The Gibbses' 1992 quitclaim deed conveyed to the Bracales "land
situate in Bar Harbor, more particularly described as Tract 104-06 as set forth in
the deed to these grantors from the United States of America dated January 27,
1987, recorded in Book 1630, page 11, to which deed reference may be had for a
more particular description . . . ." The deed also conveyed "all of grantor's right,
title and interest in and to any adjacent property now or formerly of the United
States of America located southerly and westerly of the above-described property."
This conveyed to the Bracales any rights to property at the southwestern corner or
on the southwestern boundary of the 13-acre property that would be subsequently
acquired in resolution of the disputed boundary and monument marker with the
U.S.A.

[7] Then followed an extended effort to resolve the boundary and
monument location matters with the U.S.A. During these efforts, it was
determined that the 1987 conveyance of tract 104-06 to the Gibbses should have
included both the 13-acre lot and a separate 2.93-acre lot. The 2.93-acre lot
abutted the 885-foot northern boundary of the 13-acre lot as described in the 1987
deed and as appeared in the 1990 survey. In 2001, Bracale's attorney obtained
from the U.S.A. a correction deed, revising the 1987 deed to convey to the Gibbses
the 13-acre lot, described as "Parcel One," and the separate 2.93-acre lot, described
as "Parcel Two." The metes and bounds description of Parcel One in the correction deed is identical to the metes and bounds description for the 13-acre lot
in the 1987 deed. The correction deed stated that the legal description in the 1987
deed "did not include said 2.93-acre parcel of land," and that the U.S.A. had
intended to convey Parcel Two to the Gibbses as part of the 1987 transfer of tract
104-06.

[8] Bracale's attorney sent a copy of the correction deed to the Gibbses,
along with a request that they sign over the 2.93-acre parcel to Bracale. The
Gibbses refused and obtained a separate correction deed from the U.S.A., dated
March 9, 2004.

[9] In 2004, after the Gibbses refused to transfer Parcel Two to Bracale, he
commenced this action for specific performance. His complaint asserted that
"[t]his is an action for specific performance pursuant to the general equitable
authority of this Court." The complaint indicated that the equitable claim was
based on promissory estoppel.

[10] Bracale contends that the court should order that Parcel Two be
conveyed to him by the Gibbses because: (1) the U.S.A. had intended that Parcel
Two be part of its conveyance to the Gibbses in 1987; (2) the Gibbses conveyed
the interest in the 13-acre property that they believed they then had to the Bracales
in 1991; (3) the uncertainty in the boundary descriptions referenced in the 1991
and 1992 purchase and sale documents and in his discussions with the Gibbses included Parcel Two; (4) the southwest boundary referenced in the conveyance
documents was the southwest boundary line of Parcel Two; and (5) Bracale had
incurred significant legal fees to identify and secure the transfer from the U.S.A. of
Parcel Two.

[11] The Gibbses initially responded to Bracale's action with a motion to
dismiss, which was denied. They then filed a motion for summary judgment. That
motion was granted. The court concluded, applying rules of deed construction and
contract law, that there was no merger of the deed for the 13-acre parcel with the
later deed for the 2.93-acre parcel, and that the purchase and sale agreement and
deeds executed in 1991 and 1992 could not be modified by oral contracts due to
application of the statute of frauds. Bracale then brought this appeal.

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[14] Bracale urges that the doctrine of promissory estoppel should be
applied by the court in equity to cover resolution of all disputes with the U.S.A.
over conveyance of the larger tract, and that the Gibbses induced Bracale to
pursue, at considerable expense, resolution of all boundary disputes with an
implicit promise that whatever Bracale recovered would be his. We have adopted
the definition of promissory estoppel that appears in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.

Nappi v. Nappi Distribs., 1997 ME 54, 9, 691 A.2d 1198, 1200 (citation
omitted).

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