United States v. Homero Quintanilla Navarro

Cincinnati, Ohio - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant charged with conspiring to distribute drugs.

In 2017, defendant pleaded guilty with the benefit of a plea agreement reached under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) to conspiring to distribute and possess with

intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, see

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and illegally reentering the United States after having been

removed subsequent to a felony conviction, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1). The district court

accepted the plea and sentenced him to 120 months of imprisonment, and he did not appeal.

In April 2020, Quintanilla filed a pro se motion referring to the COVID-19 pandemic,

which the district court construed as a request for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court appointed counsel for Quintanilla, and counsel filed a

supplemental motion on Quintanilla's behalf, asserting that he has underlying medical conditions

that put him at high risk of severe illness from COVID-19, including diabetes, obesity, and

hypertension; that his facility, FCI Oakdale, was among those hardest hit by the pandemic; and

that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release. The government responded in

opposition, arguing that defendant had not demonstrated sufficiently extraordinary and

compelling reasons and that, even if he had, his motion should be denied because he is a danger

to the community and his release would be inconsistent with the § 3553(a) factors. The district

court denied the motion in a form order, stating that it had considered the applicable § 3553(a)

factors and policy statements and conducted a "complete review” of the merits. Quintanilla

timely appealed from the district court's order.

II.

Since the district court's denial of Quintanilla's motion, we have in a trio of cases

provided more guidance on how to evaluate compassionate release motions brought by prisoners.

See United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098

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(6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Elias, — F.3d —, 2021 WL 50169 (6th Cir. 2021). Each case

warrants further discussion.

Ruffin set forth the three substantive requirements that must be met before a district court

may grant compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 978 F.3d at 1004–05. First,

"the court initially must 'find' that 'extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a

reduction.'” Id. at 1004 (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (brackets omitted)). Second, "the court next

must 'find' 'that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission.'” Id. at 1005 (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) (brackets omitted)). Third,

"[e]ven if a district court finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist and that a

sentence reduction comports with [the applicable policy statements], the court may not grant the

reduction before 'considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are

applicable.'” Id. (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A) (brackets omitted)).

Next, in Jones, we elaborated in detail on what is required to "strike the proper balance”

between "accord[ing] due deference to district judges” while still "correct[ing] their factual and

legal errors” in the context of a motion for compassionate release. 980 F.3d at 1112. In so

doing, we acknowledged that district courts are not required to "pen a 'full opinion' in every

sentencing or sentencing-modification decision.” Id. (quoting Chavez-Meza v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2018)). So, where "a matter is [ ] conceptually simple . . . and the record

makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments,” a district court is

not required to render an extensive decision. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S 338, 359 (2007)). But on the other hand, Jones also opined that "[i]n most

circumstances, '[a] district court's use of a barebones form order . . . would be

inadequate.'” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1114 (emphasis added and second alteration in original)

(quoting Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967). According to Jones, a district court's use of a form

order is reserved only for cases involving "thorough record evidence of the judge's factual

decisions.” Id.

Finally and most recently, Elias clarified that "district courts may deny compassionaterelease motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do

No. 20-5640 United States v. Quintanilla Navarro Page 4

not need to address the others.” 2021 WL 50169, at *2. But where the district court grants a

motion for compassionate release, it must of course address all three steps. Id.

III.

With the benefit of these three decisions, we turn to the issue presented by Quintanilla's

appeal: whether the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for compassionate

release. See Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1005.

A.

Two preliminary observations are in order.

First, we observe that the district court did not err by skipping right to the § 3553(a)

factors and denying defendant's motion. Elias settles that matter. 2021 WL 50169, at *2.

Second, to the extent that one might conclude Jones's broad assertions about barebones

orders favor reversal here, we disagree.

The discussion in Jones regarding the insufficiency of so-called barebones orders was not

necessary to the court's judgment and is accordingly not binding on later panels. See Jones, 980

F.3d at 1116–17 (Cook, J., concurring). The Jones decision contains an erudite discussion of the

scope of a district court's obligation to explain its weighing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, a

discussion that provides an overview of the relevant law, and provides thoughtful advice to

district judges. The Jones court held that the explanation in that case was sufficient, and also

opined regarding what would not be sufficient. The former was a basis for upholding the lower

court judgment, while the latter would be a basis for reversing some different judgment. The

former analysis is binding on later panels, but the latter is not.

Taken in isolation, Jones's statements about the propriety of barebones orders are in

tension with the Supreme Court's own observations about their use in Chavez-Meza. There, the

Court explained that a "judge need not provide a lengthy explanation” for reducing a defendant's

sentence "if the 'context and the record' make clear that the judge had 'a reasoned basis' for

reducing the defendant's sentence.” 138 S. Ct. at 1966 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, 359). It

then condoned the district court's use of a barebones form order to resolve a sentencing-

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modification motion brought under § 3582(c)(2) because it was satisfied that the district court

had met that standard. Id. at 1967–68. In particular, the Court looked through to the original

sentencing proceeding and observed that the district court rejected the defendant's request for a

downward variance by emphasizing that the defendant had distributed a "significant quantity” of

methamphetamine and that methamphetamine had particularly deleterious effects on that specific

community. Id. at 1967. Therefore, when the district court later granted defendant's motion for

a sentence reduction in a form order, but did not impose the exact sentence the defendant had

requested, the Supreme Court concluded that the record as a whole had convinced it "that the

judge considered the parties' arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal

decisionmaking authority.” Id. (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). That is

a far cry from Jones's unduly restrictive view that barebones orders are to be "reserved for the

simplest of cases” with "thorough record evidence of the [district court]'s factual decisions.”

980 F.3d at 1113–14.

B.

We therefore follow the guidance of Chavez-Meza and consider whether Quintanilla's

request for compassionate release and the district court's denial thereof reflects a "conceptually

simple” matter suitable to resolution via a form order. We conclude that it was, and that the

district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying Quintanilla's motion.

The district court had before it the record of the original proceedings, including a

presentence report it adopted in full, the sentencing hearing transcript, and the judgment. It is

apparent from the original sentencing records that the district court was concerned that the

defendant had been deported from the United States "numerous times”—the presentence report

establishes that defendant had voluntarily departed the United States (as opposed to being

deported) ten times between 2004 and 2008, and had been deported from the United States six

additional times since then. In addition, defendant's convictions for possession with intent to

distribute cocaine—for which the presentence report attributed to defendant more than ten

kilograms of cocaine—led the district court to remark that the offense conduct was "very

serious.” Those concerns led the district court to impose a mandatory-minimum ten-year

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sentence as outlined in Quintanilla's plea agreement, especially because Quintanilla "doesn't

seem to learn his lesson very well.”

A little more than two years later, Quintanilla filed his motion for compassionate release

and requested that the district court reduce his sentence to time served, excusing him from the

remaining seven or so years of his mandatory-minimum sentence. Notably, Quintanilla's motion

focused exclusively on establishing that the COVID-19 virus established extraordinary and

compelling circumstances under § 3582(c)(1)(A). He did not argue that his personal

circumstances—beyond the COVID-19 outbreak—had changed so that the district court should

weigh the § 3553(a) factors differently than it had at the original sentencing.

Accordingly, for largely the same reasons cited by the Chavez-Meza Court, we are

"satisfie[d] . . . that the judge considered the parties' arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for

exercising [her] own legal decisionmaking authority.” 138 S. Ct. at 1967 (second alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Based on the district court's

observations at the original sentencing proceeding that Quintanilla had committed a serious drugtrafficking offense and had not learned his lesson from prior run-ins with law enforcement, "[t]he

record as a whole strongly suggests” that the district court's view of the § 3553 factors had not

changed by the time of Quintanilla's motion for compassionate release. Id. And so, while a

more detailed order fleshing out the district court's weighing of the § 3553(a) factors may be

desirable as a general matter, and "under different facts and a different record, the district court's

use of a barebones form order in response to a motion like [defendant's] would be inadequate,”

id., we conclude that "given the simplicity of this case . . . the judge's explanation (minimal as it

was) fell within the scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the

sentencing judge.” Id. at 1968.

This conclusion aligns with United States v. McGuire, where, on nearly identical facts,

we affirmed a district court's denial of compassionate release. 822 F. App'x 479 (6th Cir. 2020).

There, we found no abuse of discretion where the district court used precisely the same language

to deny McGuire's motion, stating that it had "considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and

policy statements” and conducted a "complete review” of the merits. Id. at 480–81. We were

unconcerned that the district court "did not specifically cite which factors guided its decision,”

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because the circumstances—including the defendant's history of violent crimes and behavior—

were such that it "did not need to.” Id. In other words, "[b]ecause it [was] clear that the judge

relied on the record when declining to modify McGuire's sentence,” we concluded that "even a

'barebones form order' could have sufficed.” Id. (quoting Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1968).

The same can be said for Quintanilla, who like the defendant in McGuire, has an extensive

criminal history—in addition to his repeated illegal reentries, he has been convicted of reckless

driving and driving under the influence several times and arrested for aggravated burglary and

assault. Id. at 480. And just as in McGuire, these facts—among others—made the district

court's denial of Quintanilla's motion, and our review thereof, "conceptually simple.” Rita, 551

U.S. at 359.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying Quintanilla’s motion for compassionate release