United States of America v. JONATHAN DUJAN GARDIN

Richmond, VA - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting; brandishing a firearm during and in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting, and discharging a firearm during and in furtherance of a crime of violence charges.

Citing United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (holding that § 924(c)'s

residual clause is unconstitutional), Gardin challenges his brandishing conviction because

he contends that he did not use force or violence during the commission of the offense.

However, the predicate crime of violence for the brandishing conviction was Hobbs Act

robbery, which qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s force clause. See United

States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019). We therefore find no error in Gardin's

conviction for brandishing a firearm during the commission of Hobbs Act robbery.

We review Gardin's sentence for reasonableness, applying "a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first ensure that

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the court "committed no significant procedural error,” such as improperly calculating the

Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or

inadequately explaining the sentence. United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 170 (4th Cir.

2014). If we find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we also review its substantive

reasonableness under "the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The

sentence imposed must be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals

of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). "Any sentence that is within or below a properly

calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Such a presumption can only be

rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted).

Our review of the record convinces us that Gardin's sentence is both procedurally

and substantively reasonable. The district court imposed the statutorily-mandated

minimum sentences for the firearms offenses.* With respect to the sentence imposed for

the Hobbs Act robbery convictions, the district court properly calculated the applicable 33-

to 41- month advisory Guidelines range, considered the parties' sentencing arguments, and

adequately explained its reasons for the downward variant, 16-month sentence imposed.

* Gardin's consecutive 7- and 10-year sentences for the firearms offenses do not

violate the anti-stacking amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), because that amendment

concerns only the enhanced 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for subsequent § 924(c)

convictions.

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Gardin fails to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his below

Guidelines sentence. Id.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.



This court requires that counsel inform Gardin, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Gardin requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Gardin. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.



AFFIRMED