United States of America v. Christian Lovies

Chicago, IL- Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with a violating the terms of his parole.

Henry Wood served time in Indiana state prison for meth‐

amphetamine‐related offenses. In 2018, he was released on

parole under enumerated conditions. Any violation subjected

him to "being taken into immediate custody.”

Wood's parole release agreement required him to "report

to [his] assigned supervising officer” as instructed. Wood also

affirmed the following:

I understand that I am legally in the custody of

the Department of Correction and that my per‐

son and residence or property under my control

may be subject to reasonable search by my su‐

pervising officer or authorized official of the De‐

partment of Correction if the officer or official

has reasonable cause to believe that the parolee

is violating oris in imminent danger of violating

a condition to remaining on parole.

About three months after being released, Wood violated

his parole by failing to report to his supervising officer. The

Indiana Parole Board issued an arrest warrant, and parole

agents arrested Wood at his home in North Judson. One of the

agents, Agent Gentry, secured Wood with wristrestraints and

conducted a frisk search. During the frisk, Gentry noticed

Wood repeatedly turning toward his cellphone, which was

lying on a "junk pile.” Gentry picked up the cellphone and

handed it to Agent Rains. This upset Wood. He demanded

that his cellphone be turned off and he began to physically

resist Gentry. With the help of another agent, Gentry

No. 20‐2974 3

restrained Wood against a nearby wall, and Wood "calmed

down immediately.”

Meanwhile, Rains felt something "lumpy” on the back of

Wood's cellphone, so he removed the back cover and found a

packet of a substance which Rains believed to be metham‐

phetamine. Wood eventually admitted the substance was, in

fact, methamphetamine. A later search of the home revealed

syringes and other drug paraphernalia. Based on these find‐

ings, Wood was arrested for possession of methamphetamine

and parole agents seized his cellphone as evidence.

Seven days after Wood's arrest, an investigator for the In‐

diana Department of Correction performed a warrantless

search of Wood's cellphone by extracting its stored data. This

search revealed child pornography. The investigator

forwarded this information to a special agent of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, who obtained a search‐and‐seizure

warrant for Wood's cellphone and its contents.

A federal grand jury indicted Wood for both receiving and

possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B). Before the district court, Wood moved

to suppress the data extracted from his cellphone. He argued

principally that the state investigator's warrantless search of

his cellphone violated Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).

The district court disagreed, holding that the search of

Wood's cellphone complied with the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Wood, 426 F. Supp. 3d 560, 575 (N.D. Ind. 2019).

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Wood en‐

tered a conditional guilty plea. See FED.R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). He

pleaded guilty to the receiving charge in Count 1 of the indict‐

ment—Count 2 was dismissed—and he reserved the right to

4 No. 20‐2974

appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.

This appeal followed.

II

"When reviewing a district court's decision denying a mo‐

tion to suppress evidence, we review the court's legal conclu‐

sions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United

States v. McGill, 8 F.4th 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2021).

The district court rejected Wood's argument that Riley v.

California required law enforcement to obtain a search war‐

rant before searching his cellphone. Instead, the court used

the totality of the circumstances approach articulated in

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), and Samson v. Cal‐

ifornia, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), to conclude that the search of

Wood's cellphone was reasonable under the Fourth Amend‐

ment. We affirm in both respects.

A

Wood asks us to apply Riley v. California to parolees. The

primary problem with this request is that Riley dealt with

searches incident to a lawful arrest. The Supreme Court care‐

fully tailored its analysis to that context and expressly recog‐

nized that "other case‐specific exceptions may still justify a

warrantless search of a particular phone.” Riley, 573 U.S. at

401–02. Under the Fourth Amendment, "what is reasonable

depends on the context within which a search takes place.”

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).

Given the context‐specific nature of the Fourth Amend‐

ment, Riley is not readily transferable to scenarios other than

the one it addressed. Indeed, we have declined to apply Riley

in two other contexts: consent searches and border searches.

See United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 483–85 (7th Cir.

No. 20‐2974 5

2019) (border search); United States v. Thurman, 889 F.3d 356,

366 n.9 (7th Cir. 2018) (consent search).

To be sure, "the Supreme Court has recently granted

heightened protection to cell phone data.” See Wanjiku, 919 F.

3d at 484. But neither our research nor the parties' briefs re‐

veal any circuit court decision extending a Riley‐like rule to

parolees—quite the opposite. See United States v. Pacheco, 884

F.3d 1031, 1043–44 & n.10 (10th Cir. 2018) (discussing Riley's

inapplicability in the parole context); United States v. Johnson,

875 F.3d 1265, 1273–76 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that Riley did

not require parole agents to obtain a warrant before searching

a parolee's cellphone); United States v. Jackson, 866 F.3d 982,

985–86 (8th Cir. 2017) (same). Nevertheless, we take a fresh

look.

The Supreme Court's "general Fourth Amendment ap‐

proach” is to "examine the totality of the circumstances to de‐

termine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 848 (cleaned up).

Whether a search is reasonable is determined "by assessing,

on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an in‐

dividual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is

needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental inter‐

ests.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).

This balancing of interests sometimes generates categori‐

cal rules, like the search‐incident‐to‐arrest exception

addressed in Riley. Under that doctrine, law enforcement gen‐

erally may conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee's per‐

son without "additional justification.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 384

(quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).

Two governmental interests support this rule: officer safety

and evidence preservation. Id. On balance, these interests

6 No. 20‐2974

outweigh an arrestee's diminished expectation of privacy, jus‐

tifying an exception to the rule that "reasonableness generally

requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” See id. at 382–84

(quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653

(1995)).

But the "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

'reasonableness,'” Riley, 573 U.S. at 381 (internal quotation

marks omitted), so technological advancements may alter the

contours of Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Kyllo v.

United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001). Riley is illustrative.

There, the Supreme Court held that cellphones fall outside the

search‐incident‐to‐arrest exception because the government's

interests in officer safety and evidence preservation did not

outweigh an arrestee's particular privacy interest in his

cellphone. Both sides of the balancing test were affected by a

cellphone's ability to store "vast quantities of personal infor‐

mation.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.

Riley first noted that the expectation of privacy, though

lowered by custodial arrest, was not eliminated. Id. at 392.

Cellphones differed greatly, the Court observed, from physi‐

cal items, like a "cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse” because

of their "immense storage capacity” which may contain "a re‐

vealing montage of the user's life.” Id. at 393, 396. Therefore,

an arrestee's privacy interest in his cellphone garnered more

protection than, say, the cigarette pack found on the arrestee

in United States v. Robinson. 414 U.S. at 236.

Regarding the government's twin interests of officer

safety and evidence preservation, the Court noted that "[d]ig‐

ital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a

weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the ar‐

restee's escape.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 387. Officers retained the

No. 20‐2974 7

ability to "examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure

that it will not be used as a weapon.” Id. And though potential

destruction of evidence presented a stronger justification for

warrantless cellphone searches, the Courtreasoned that phys‐

ical possession of the phone, ability to turn off the device (or

remove the battery), and the existence of signal‐blocking de‐

vices provided the government with reasonable alternatives

to a warrantless search. Id. at 388–91. Riley's net result, then,

was a carveout for cellphones to the search‐incident‐to‐arrest

exception, essentially reinstating the warrant requirement for

searches targeting cellphone data.

B

The Supreme Court's close attention to balancing interests

means that Riley cannot be casually applied to other contexts.

Instead, we must consider the privacy and governmental in‐

terests in the factual circumstances before us: a warrantless

search of a parolee's cellphone conducted under the terms of

the parole agreement. We take into account, of course, the Su‐

preme Court's general emphasis on cellphone privacy in the

modern era—and for that purpose Riley is instructive—but

we do not attempt a full‐scale doctrinal transplant.

For searches of parolees and probationers, two Supreme

Court decisions set the stage. In United States v. Knights, the

Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's home

based on reasonable suspicion satisfied the Fourth Amend‐

ment. 534 U.S. at 122. But Knights reserved the question of

whether a suspicionless search would also satisfy the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 120 n.6. In Samson v. California, the Court

answered a variation of that question in the affirmative, hold‐

ing that a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee was

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 547 U.S. at 857.

8 No. 20‐2974

Under Knights and Samson, courts balance a parolee's privacy

expectations, as shaped by state law, against the state's inter‐

ests in reducing recidivism and promoting reintegration.

United States v. White, 781 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th Cir. 2015).

For example, we recently applied Knights and Samson to

Wisconsin's equivalent of parole, extended supervision, in

United States v. Caya, 956 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2020). Pursuant to

state law, police officers searched the home of Caya, who was

serving an extended supervision term. Id. at 500–01. Looking

to Samson, this court concluded that an "offender on extended

supervision has no greater expectation of privacy than a pa‐

rolee. And Wisconsin's interest in rigorously monitoring of‐

fenders on extended supervision is just as compelling as the

government's parole‐supervision interests in Samson.” Id. at

503. So we held that the search was constitutional. Id. Though

Caya involved a home in Wisconsin and this case concerns a

cellphone in Indiana, we apply the same framework. Here, In‐

diana, rather than Wisconsin, law informs the analysis. See

White, 781 at 861.

Parolee status diminishes one's privacy expectations,

Samson, 547 U.S. at 852, and Indiana courts have affirmed this

principle, State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 779 (Ind. 2015).

Wood's parole agreement, authorized by IND. CODE § 11‐13‐

3‐4, reminded him that he was "legally in the custody of the

Department of Correction” and explained that his "person

and residence or property under [his] control may be subject

to reasonable search[es].” Nothing in this provision indicates

that a cellphone does not qualify as "property under[Wood's]

control,” and Wood does not make such an argument. Wood

was unambiguously informed of his parole conditions, which

permitted searches based on less than probable cause. So, any

No. 20‐2974 9

privacy interest Wood retained in his cellphone was greatly

diminished. See Samson 547 U.S. at 852.

Turning to the state's interests, we recognize that Indiana

has an "overwhelming interest in supervising parolees.” Id. at

853 (internal quotation marks omitted). Its goals of "reducing

recidivism” and "promoting reintegration ... warrant privacy

intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the

Fourth Amendment.” Id. The district court noted Indiana's

34% recidivism rate for parolees within three years of release.

Wood, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 574. It also highlighted the public

safety concerns that accompany a high recidivism rate. Id. at

575 (discussing parole division operations discovering illegal

firearms and large quantities of drugs). Indiana has a strong

interest in supervising parolees, as did California in Samson.

Despite cellphones' ability to hold "vast quantities of per‐

sonal information,” Riley, 573 U.S. at 386, they do not, as a cat‐

egorical matter, receive heightened protection under Knights

and Samson. Unlike the governmental interests discussed in

Riley (officer safety and evidence preservation), Indiana's

governmental interests (reducing recidivism and promoting

reintegration) apply equally to cellphone searches. As stated

above, the interests in reducing recidivism and promoting re‐

integration are "overwhelming.” And "the Fourth Amend‐

ment does not render the States powerless to address these

concerns effectively.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 854 (emphasis in orig‐

inal). First, parolees are "more likely to engage in criminal

conduct than an ordinary member of the community.”

Knights, 534 U.S. at 121. The government's interest in discov‐

ering criminal activity applies no less when the evidence is

data in a cellphone. By contrast, the government's interests in

Riley—officer safety and evidence preservation—were less

10 No. 20‐2974

compelling when the target of the search was cellphone data.

Not so here. Reducing recidivism is an independent goal of

the parole system, exclusive from those discussed in Riley,

and it would be frustrated by imposing a warrant require‐

ment because it would incentivize concealment of criminal ac‐

tivity. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120–22.

Second, the government has an interest in "promoting re‐

integration and positive citizenship among probationers and

parolees.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 853. A supervisor must be able

to obtain information about the supervisee. Transparency is

key because "most parolees are ill prepared to handle the

pressures of reintegration[,] [t]hus, most parolees require in‐

tense supervision.” Id. at 854. Requiring a warrant for a search

of a parolee's cellphone would hinder the state's efforts to

rehabilitate offenders and reintroduce them to society. Iden‐

tifying recalcitrance earlier rather than later is central to the

parole system. This is why Knights and Samson permit war‐

rantless searches with less than probable cause for probation‐

ers and parolees alike; it makes "eminent sense.” Id.

Given Wood's diminished expectation of privacy and In‐

diana's strong governmental interests, the search of Wood's

cellphone was reasonable. In reaching this decision, we align

our law with that of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See

Pacheco, 884 F.3d at 1044; Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1273; Jackson, 866

F.3d at 985.

Resisting this conclusion, Wood relies on two other cases,

United States v. Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009 (6th Cir. 2020), and

United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2016). Both are

distinguishable. Fletcher and Lara involved probationers, not

parolees. This matters because "on the continuum of state‐im‐

posed punishments[,] ... parolees have fewer expectations of

No. 20‐2974 11

privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to im‐

prisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” Samson, 547

U.S. at 850 (internal quotation marks omitted). As an example,

the Ninth Circuit declined to extend its holding in Lara to pa‐

rolees, explaining "[the defendant's] parole status alone dis‐

tinguishes our case from Lara and Riley.” Johnson, 875 F.3d at

1275. In addition to parolees differing from probationers,1

Fletcher and Lara do not control for other reasons.

First, both Fletcher and Lara held that the operative proba‐

tion agreements did not clearly or unambiguously include

cellphones as searchable items. Fletcher, 978 F.3d at 1019; Lara,

815 F.3d at 610. In Fletcher, the probation agreement's search

provision included the probationer's "person, [his] motor ve‐

hicle or [his] place of residence.” Fletcher, 978 F.3d at 1019. In

Lara, the probationer agreed to "submit [his] person and

property, including any residence, premises, container or ve‐

hicle under [his] control to search and seizure.” Lara, 815 F.3d

at 610. Certainly, Samson described as "salient” that parole

conditions be "clearly expressed” to the parolee. 547 U.S. at

852. But clear expression does not require an exhaustive list.

Probation agreements need not express, in granular detail,

every item subject to a search. In this case, Wood's parole

agreement provided that his "person and residence or prop‐

erty under [his] control” could be searched with "reasonable

cause” because he remained in the "custody of the

1 Indiana applies Samson's holding to probationers, in effect lowering

a probationer's privacy expectation to that of a parolee. Vanderkolk, 32

N.E.3d at 779. To the extent Indiana treats probationers and parolees the

same, that determination does not render Lara applicable to parolees.

12 No. 20‐2974

Department of Correction.” Only a strained and unreasonable

reading of these provisions would exclude a parolee's cell‐

phone.

Second, Fletcher held that a state's interest in supervising a

probationer terminates abruptly once the phone is secured.

Fletcher, 978 F.3d at 1019. This reasoning, imported from Riley,

does not find support in Knights and Samson. The state's inter‐

ests are different here and justify a post‐arrest, post‐seizure

search of a parolee's cellphone. Fletcher relied on Riley's expla‐

nation that "once law enforcement officers have secured a cell

phone, there is no longer any risk that the arrestee himself will

be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.” Id.

(quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 388). Fletcher also observed that a

seized cellphone does not pose a safety risk. Id. But the twin

interests of preventing evidence destruction and protecting

officers are not the interests underpinning Knights and

Samson. Rather, Knights and Samson support the state's ongo‐

ing supervisory role over parolees. If such supervision ab‐

ruptly terminated once a parolee was arrested—whether for

a failure‐to‐appear violation or a serious crime—the continu‐

ity of a state's parole system would be severely impeded. The

Fourth Amendment does not dictate this unreasonable result.

C

Several issues remain, each of which resolve in the gov‐

ernment's favor.

Waiver. In his opening brief, Wood argued that two other

searches were unlawful: the search of his phone's exterior

(which revealed methamphetamine) and the subsequent

search of his home. The government asserted Wood waived

both arguments.

No. 20‐2974 13

We begin with the arguments made in Wood's motion to

suppress. A defendant who moves to suppress evidence must

"identify the grounds upon which he believes suppression is

warranted.” United States v. Kirkland, 567 F.3d 316, 321 (7th

Cir. 2009). When defense counsel fails to develop a suppres‐

sion argument, he deprives the government of "a meaningful

opportunity to rebut [the defendant's] claims” and does not

"notify the district court that it needs to address them.” Id.

Wood's motion to suppress challenged only the state investi‐

gator's data extraction—not the cellphone‐cover search, and

not the home search. Thus, to start, he bypassed an oppor‐

tunity to challenge both searches, which, without good cause,

would result in forfeiture. See id.

While omissions may result in forfeiture, counsel may go

one step further and expressly waive arguments. United States

v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). "[W]aiver is the 'intentional

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,'” Olano,

507 U.S. at 733, and it "precludes appellate review,” Flores, 929

F.3d at 447. Whether a right must be waived by the defendant

or may be waived by counsel depends on the right at issue.

Id. at 447–48 (citing New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000)).

"[D]ecisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what

arguments to pursue[.] ... Absent a demonstration of ineffec‐

tiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last.” Hill, 528

U.S. at 115 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Scott, 900

F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2018) ("[T]he district court must be able

to rely on the representations given by counsel.”).

Assuming Wood could have preserved his two additional

arguments at the suppression hearing, see Kirkland, 567 F.3d

at 321, his trial counsel failed to do so. To the contrary, counsel

14 No. 20‐2974

waived Wood's right to challenge the cellphone‐cover search

and home search. When asked, "[I]s the motion to suppress

strictly targeting whether this was a reasonable search of his

cell phone?”, Wood's trial counsel responded, "It depends on

which search you're talking about.” The colloquy continued:

[Trial Counsel]: We're not going to argue with

them taking apart the back of the phone and

finding the packet of methamphetamine. We're

not arguing – we're not arguing about that be‐

cause that doesnʹt matter in this Court or on this

issue.

The Court: What about the search of the home?

[Trial Counsel]: No issue with that, as

well. ... And they take the back off the phone

and they find the methamphetamine. No, issue

with that, as well.

Wood contends his trial counsel later retracted this

waiver, but the record does not show a change of position. In

fact, trial counsel reiterated that Wood was not challenging

the search of his phone's exterior or the search of his home.

The district court accepted trial counsel's representations and

analyzed only the state investigator's search of Wood's cell‐

phone data. Wood's appeal is thus limited to that search. See

Scott, 900 F.3d at 975 (finding that defense counsel affirma‐

tively waived argument at revocation hearing).

Investigatory versus regulatory searches. Wood emphasizes

the investigatory, rather than regulatory, purpose for the state

investigator's data extraction. But the government does not

defend the search based on the special‐needs exception, see

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), where a distinction

No. 20‐2974 15

between investigatory and regulatory searches is germane.

Under Knights and Samson, it is of no moment that a parole

agent's purpose in conducting a search is investigatory. Caya,

956 F.3d at 501–03 (discussing Griffin, Knights, and Samson).

So the investigatory‐versus‐regulatory distinction is not rele‐

vant here.

Status. Because context matters under the Fourth Amend‐

ment, one's status in the eyes of the government matters.

Along these lines, Wood maintains his arrestrendered Samson

inapplicable and instead triggered Riley. On its face, this

seems plausible—Wood was arrested, making him an ar‐

restee, and Riley is about arrestees. But a parolee is on the

"'continuum' of state‐imposed punishments,” one step

removed from incarceration. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850. A

custodial arrest would not increase a parolee's privacy expec‐

tations by placing him outside Samson's reach. Upon arrest,

Wood's status was not transformed from parolee to arrestee,

but from parolee to parolee‐arrestee, so Samson continued to

apply. Cf. United States v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 687 (7th Cir.

1998) ("[The State's] interests in preventing harm to the pro‐

bationer and to society are fully cognizable even when the

probationer is in the State's custody.”).

Terms of the parole agreement. Finally, Wood argues the

search of his cellphone violated the precise terms of his parole

agreement, which authorized "reasonable searche[s]” only

when an "official has reasonable cause to believe that the pa‐

rolee is violating or is in imminent danger of violating a con‐

dition to remaining on parole.” According to Wood, once he

was arrested, he could no longer be "violating” or in "immi‐

nent danger of violating” a parole condition, eliminating the

16 No. 20‐2974

possibility of "reasonable cause.” There are a few problems

with this argument.

To begin, Indiana courts have not interpreted this provi‐

sion in the manner Wood suggests. For example, in State v.

Harper, a parolee was arrested for violations of parole condi‐

tions. State v. Harper, 135 N.E.3d 962, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019),

transfer denied, 143 N.E.3d 950 (Ind. 2020). Thereafter, parole

officers searched both his home and storage unit, with the lat‐

ter search revealing evidence of additional crimes. Id. The

Court of Appeals of Indiana held that the warrantless search

of the parolee's storage unit did not violate the Fourth

Amendment because the search "was predicated on the pa‐

role conditions and reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 972.

Indeed, Wood's reading, which requires an "ongoing pa‐

role violation”, would lead to absurd results. Taken to its log‐

ical end, the "ongoing parole violation” requirement would

prevent parole agents from conducting a reasonable search

even if they had reasonable cause to believe a parolee com‐

mitted a robbery the day before. Unless the robbery was "on‐

going,” parole agents would be unable to exercise authority

under the parole agreement to conduct a reasonable search

for evidence. This understanding of the parole agreementren‐

ders its search provision virtually meaningless, a result "no

reasonable person could approve.” See ANTONIN SCALIA &

BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

LEGAL TEXTS 234 (2012).

Finally, even if parole agents violated the parole agree‐

ment's precise terms, such a violation would not, on its own,

transgress the Fourth Amendment. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.

164, 178 (2008) (noting "it is not the province of the Fourth

Amendment to enforce state law”). The terms of the parole

No. 20‐2974 17

agreement are "neither dispositive nor inconsequential in the

constitutional analysis. Rather, [they are] one factor in consid‐

ering the totality of the circumstances.” United States v.

Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2009). Under the Supreme

Court's guidance, the parole agreement's terms do not

directly shape the contours of Fourth Amendment reasona‐

bleness. They merely elucidate the nature of the parolee's pri‐

vacy expectations.

This case is controlled by Knights and Samson, not Riley.

On balance, Indiana’s interests outweigh Wood’s privacy ex‐

pectation as a parolee whose person, residence, and property

were subject to search. So the warrantless search of Wood’s

cellphone was reasonable. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the

district court’s denial of Wood’s motion to suppress