Leon County, Florida v. Bradfordville Phipps Limited Partnership

Leon County challenges a summary final judgment which was entered upon the
appellee's complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. In this order the court ruled that Leon County is estopped from applying certain ordinances to the appellee's
property, and that the appellee may develop the property in accordance with prior
zoning ordinances, and that Leon County shall review and grant or deny development
permit applications without reference to the new ordinances (and a sector plan) with
the County being enjoined from applying these provisions to the appellee's property.
Because the appellee did not demonstrate the complete absence of any dispute as to
all issues of material fact, and the appellee did not conclusively establish such
undisputed equities as to compel an estoppel, the court should not have entered the
summary judgment.

The appellee purchased property within the Bradfordville Study Area in Leon
County, with the property being zoned for commercial use. Pursuant to the existing
Land Use Goals and policies for this area, the county thereafter adopted interim
standards addressing stormwater loading levels. The County also became involved
in a road project which led to the exercise of eminent domain powers for the
acquisition of a right of way and land for a stormwater management facility. During
this time the appellee obtained additional property and ultimately settled the eminent
domain proceeding by a stipulated judgment with Leon County whereby the appellee
would be allowed to collect and transmit certain amounts of surplus waters into the
stormwater management facility. Leon County subsequently rezoned a portion of the area with mixed-use districts allowing commercial use, and several homeowners
associations initiated a legal proceeding challenging this action. A moratorium order
was issued in that proceeding, precluding the County from permitting new
development in the area until further regulations were adopted in accordance with a
stormwater study pursuant to the applicable Land Use Goal. The County thereafter
entered into an interim settlement with the homeowners associations and the appellee
then initiated a legal action against the County, claiming that this settlement effected a
taking of the appellee's property. The court eventually entered a judgment for Leon
County in that case, ruling that the challenged regulatory action did not effect such a
taking. Noting that the County's comprehensive plan and the Land Use Goals were
already in effect when the appellee purchased the property, the court found that the
appellee was aware of the resistance to intensive commercial development in the area
and could have reasonably expected that further regulatory standards would be
imposed and might impact the appellee's development plans.

During this time Leon County adopted Interim Development Ordinance (IDO)
99-31, providing for a temporary moratorium on development permits until a
stormwater management plan and further regulations could be adopted. After
completing the stormwater study the County adopted IDO 00-30 and 00-31, imposing
new stormwater and commercial development standards. These ordinances amended the zoning map, and required specified methods of stormwater treatment with options
for off-line or on-line retention, and the imposition of groundwater standards, etc.
Certain commercial activities were also prohibited within a specified area. The appellee
thereafter initiated the legal action which has led to the present appeal, filing a
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Describing numerous activities which
were alleged to have been undertaken in furtherance of the pre-development process,
the appellee asserted that it would be unjust for the County to impose the new
standards in connection with the appellee's plans for development. Affidavits were
filed with regard to the activities and efforts of various individuals working on the
appellee's behalf. However, Leon County denied many of the appellee's averments,
and maintained that the appellee had not changed its position with any good faith
reliance on the County's conduct. The County further asserted that the appellee
acquired the property and pursued development with the knowledge that there were
ongoing studies and regulatory revisions being anticipated to ensure that any
development would comport with the requirements of the comprehensive plan. Leon
County also filed affidavits, but the court subsequently granted the appellee's motion
for summary judgment and entered the appealed order estopping the County from
applying the challenged ordinances to the appellee's property, declaring that the
appellee would be entitled to develop the property in accordance with the prior zoning ordinances and that the County was enjoined from applying the new regulations or the
sector plan for the area and would have to consider permit applications without
reference to the new criteria.

As Leon County properly notes, the existence of disputed issues of material fact
preclude entry of summary judgment, and the appellee was required to conclusively
establish the nonexistence of such an issue beyond even the slightest possibility or
doubt. See e.g. Cox v. CSX Intermodal, 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. lst DCA 1999).
Furthermore, the courts should be extremely cautious in applying the estoppel which
the appellee sought against the County, as this doctrine pertains against a governmental
entity only under exceptional circumstances. See Dolphin Outdoor Advertising v.
Department of Transportation, 582 So. 2d 709 (Fla. lst DCA 1991). Hollywood
Beach Hotel v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976), nevertheless indicates
that the government may sometimes be estopped from unjustly repudiating a zoning
action upon which a property owner has reasonably and detrimentally relied. This
principle has been applied in situations where the repudiated zoning designation was
negotiated by the property owner or made at the property owner's request with the
government being aware that the owner was being led to a substantial and detrimental
change in position by relying on the agreed zoning. See Board of County
Commissioners Metropolitan Dade County v. Lutz, 314 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes, 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2 DCA 1975): see also
Franklin County v. Leisure Properties, 430 So. 2d 475 (Fla. lst DCA 1983). But the
present case has not been unequivocally shown to involve such circumstances, and
may instead be within the general rule announced in cases such as Ft. Pierce v. Davis,
400 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), which emphasize that a property owner
ordinarily may not obtain such an estoppel based on a particular zoning designation.
The affidavits which the appellee filed in this case fail to conclusively
demonstrate the necessary criteria for a zoning estoppel under the cited cases, as they
do not clearly establish that the earlier zoning was initiated by or made on behalf of the
appellee, or that the County could be fairly charged with knowledge that the appellee
would rely on such zoning when further studies and standards were being considered
for the area, or that the appellee reasonably incurred any detrimental reliance on the
earlier zoning designations. Indeed, under cases such as Cummins v. Allstate
Indemnity, 732 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1999), the question as to the reasonableness
of any reliance by the appellee may itself preclude entry of summary judgment.

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full
text of the Court's opinion.

Because the appellee did not conclusively show that there was no disputed issue
as to any material fact, or that there was such clear inequity as to require an estoppel,
the trial court should not have entered the summary judgment. The appealed order is
therefore reversed, and the case is remanded.

Unavailable

Unavailable

None