[1] Tyrone Burns (“Burns”) appealed his conviction after a jury trial of receiving

stolen auto parts as a Level 6 felony, raising the issue of whether the State

presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. In a memorandum

decision, we affirmed his conviction. Burns v. State, No. 19A-CR-2943, 2020

WL 3526008 (Ind. Ct. App. June 30, 2020). Burns has petitioned for rehearing

requesting that this court reconsider its decision because we inadvertently erred

in reciting the applicable statute when affirming his conviction. We grant

rehearing for the limited purpose of correcting this mistake and reaffirm our

previous decision in all other respects.

[2] Burns was convicted of receiving stolen auto parts pursuant to Indiana Code

section 35-43-4-2.5. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 12. That statute set out that a

“person who knowingly or intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of a motor

vehicle or any part of a motor vehicle of another person that has been the

subject of theft commits receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony.” Ind.

Code § 35-43-4-2.5(c) (2017). On appeal, Burns argued that the State had failed

to present “substantial evidence of probative value” that he knew he was

driving a stolen car. Appellant’s Br. at 4. In affirming his conviction in our

memorandum decision, we found that the evidence presented at trial was

sufficient to prove his knowledge that the car was stolen and to support his

conviction. Burns, 2020 WL 3526008 at *3. However, in making this

determination, we inadvertently set out the incorrect statutory language for the

charged crime and mistakenly stated that the crime with which Burns was

charged required proof of a prior conviction:

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In order to convict Burns of Level 6 felony receiving stolen auto

parts as charged, the State was required to prove that Burns

knowingly or intentionally received the vehicle with the intent to

permanently deprive the owner of any part of its value or use,

that the vehicle was worth at least $750 and less than $50,000,

and that Burns had prior unrelated convictions of theft,

conversion, or receiving stolen property. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-

2.5(c).

Burns, 2020 WL 3526008 at *2. Although the citation to the quoted language is

the correct citation to the Indiana Code for Burns’s charged crime, the statutory

language came from Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2(a)(1) rather than from

Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2.5(c). See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1) (setting

out the elements necessary to support a conviction for Level 6 felony theft).

[3] Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2.5(c) was repealed and replaced with Indiana

Code section 35-43-4-2(a)(1) on July 1, 2018. Pub. L. No. 176-2018 § 7 (2018)

(repealing I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5). Because Burns committed his offense on

December 17, 2017, he was properly charged, and convicted, of receiving stolen

auto parts under Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2.5(c), which does not require

the State to provide proof of a prior conviction to support a Level 6 felony.

Therefore, it is clear from a review of the record that this court mistakenly set

out the statutory elements for Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2(a)(1) rather than

the statute at issue. We, therefore, correct our opinion to reflect that the correct

statutory language for the crime of which Burns was charged and convicted

provides that a “person who knowingly or intentionally receives, retains, or

disposes of a motor vehicle or any part of a motor vehicle of another person

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that has been the subject of theft commits receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6

felony.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.5(c) (2017).

[4] This mistake did not change our analysis of whether the State presented

sufficient evidence to prove that Burns knew he was driving a stolen car and to

sustain his conviction for receiving stolen auto parts as a Level 6 felony.

Contrary to Burns’s assertion, this error did not change the “law of the case,”

and he is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction on this basis. Appellant’s Pet.

For Reh’g at 6-7. The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that an appellate court’s

determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the court on appeal

in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and substantially the same

facts. Dutchmen Mfg., Inc. v. Reynolds, 891 N.E.2d 1074, 1082 (Ind. Ct. App.

2008) (citing Pinnacle Media, L.L.C. v. Metro. Dev. Comm’n of Marion Cty., 868

N.E.2d 894, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. The purpose

of the doctrine is to minimize unnecessary relitigation of legal issues once they

have been resolved by an appellate court. Id. Accordingly, all issues decided

directly or by implication in a prior decision are binding in all further portions

of the same case. Id. To invoke the law-of-the-case doctrine, the matters

decided in the earlier appeal must clearly appear to be the only possible

construction of an opinion. Id. at 1082-83. Therefore, questions not

conclusively decided in the earlier appeal do not become the law of the case. Id.

(citing Hanson v. Valma M. Hanson Revocable Trust, 855 N.E.2d 655, 662 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2006)). Moreover, statements that are not necessary in the determination

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of the issues presented are dicta, are not binding, and do not become the law of

the case. Id.

[5] Here, although the incorrect statutory language was set out, there was no

“determination of a legal issue” regarding whether Burns had a prior conviction

for theft, conversion, or receiving stolen property because he was not charged as

such. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 12. That issue was not presented to the jury and

was not presented on appeal. The only issue before this court on appeal was

whether the State had presented sufficient evidence to prove that Burns knew

the vehicle was stolen, and we concluded that the evidence presented a trial

established that he knew the vehicle was stolen and that the State had met its

burden. Burns, 2020 WL 3526008 at *2-*3. The fact that we inadvertently set

out the incorrect statutory elements did not constitute the determination of a

legal issue and did not change the “law of the case.” We, therefore, reject

Burns’s argument that his conviction should be reversed and reaffirm his

conviction.

Affirmed on rehearing.