United States of America v. Kelvin Baez

St. Louis, MO - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute charges.

From September 2016 to May 2017, Baez distributed methamphetamine as

part of a drug-trafficking conspiracy in Minnesota. On May 5, 2017, Officer Jacob

Gruber stopped another member of the conspiracy, Rodolfo Anguiano, for expired

license plates. Officer Gruber arrested Anguiano upon seeing numerous dryer sheets

on the floor of his car as well as a fake Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA”)

badge and more than ten credit cards in his wallet. A search of the car revealed large

wads of cash and additional credit cards in different names.

Joined by two other officers, Officer Gruber proceeded to the hotel suite

where Anguiano was staying. One of the officers knocked on the door. Baez's wife,

Zyaira Gavino, opened the door and waved in the officers when they requested

permission to enter. Baez was sitting in the front room of the suite next to Chevrolet

keys and a methamphetamine pipe. The officers asked Gavino's consent to search

"the room,” which she granted, gesturing to some bags in the front room. In a

backpack between Gavino and Baez, the officersfound a Chevrolet Equinox owner's

manual. After searching the front room of the suite, the officers proceeded through

an open door to the back room and saw a locked armoire that appeared to be under

cell-phone video surveillance. The officers called for a canine unit, which alerted at

the armoire and at an Equinox in the hotel parking lot that flashed its lights when an

officer pressed the unlock and lock buttons on the Chevrolet keys. Officer Gruber

searched the rest of the back room and discovered two large bags of

methamphetamine hidden under a sink.

1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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At that point, Officer Gruber arrested Gavino and Baez. The officers obtained

a warrant to search the hotel suite and the Equinox. In the armoire, they discovered

methamphetamine and a firearm. In the Equinox, they discovered

methamphetamine, another firearm, and a safe with ammunition as well as receipts

in Baez's name. The next day, Baez made incriminating statements while in

custody.

Baez and some of his coconspirators, including Anguiano, were indicted over

the next several months. After pleading guilty, Anguiano unsuccessfully appealed

the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the

searches of the armoire and the Equinox. See United States v. Anguiano, 934 F.3d

871 (8th Cir. 2019). The district court also denied Baez's motions to suppress the

evidence found in the back room, the evidence found in the safe in the Equinox, and

the incriminating statements that he made while in custody.

Baez was the only defendant among the conspirators not to plead guilty. At

trial, he advanced an "innocent-intent” defense, claiming that he was infiltrating the

drug-trafficking conspiracy with the intention of assisting law enforcement. To

bolster this defense, Baez sought to introduce evidence regarding his mental health

and a potential informant with whom he had been acquainted when he lived in North

Carolina. In addition, Baez moved to compel the Government to disclose

information about the potential informant pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83 (1963). The district court excluded the evidence that Baez sought to introduce

and only partially granted his Brady motion. The district court declined Baez's

request to instruct the jury that it would "negate[] the specific intent required by the

charges” if Baez intended to "assist ongoing federal investigations” and believed

that "his actions were not criminal.”

The jury convicted Baez on all three counts charged in the indictment. At

sentencing, the district court concluded that Baez's criminal history was overstated

and departed downward from the guidelines, settling on a criminal-history category

of III instead of a criminal-history category of V. Because Baez's offense level was

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40, this resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 360 months' to life

imprisonment. The district court then proceeded to vary downward by more than

fifty percent, sentencing Baez to 168 months' imprisonment.

Baez appeals, challenging the denial of his suppression motions, the district

court's failure to instruct the jury on his "innocent-intent” defense, the exclusion of

the evidence related to his "innocent-intent” defense, the partial denial of his Brady

motion, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

II.

First, Baez argues that the district court erred in denying his motions to

suppress the evidence found in the back room of the hotel suite, the evidence found

in the safe in the Equinox, and the incriminating statements that he made while in

custody. When considering the denial of a Fourth Amendment suppression motion,

"we review the district court's conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings

for clear error.” United States v. Molsbarger, 551 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2009).



A.

We begin with Baez's challenges to the admission of the evidence found in

the back room and in the safe in the Equinox.

1.

With limited exceptions, evidence acquired during, or as a consequence of, a

search that violates the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S.

---, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016). The two exceptions relevant here are the

independent-source doctrine and the inevitable-discovery doctrine. Neither doctrine

applies unless the evidence would have been acquired by lawful means had the

unlawful search not occurred. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984)

(explaining that neither doctrine puts the prosecution "in a better position than it

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would have been in if no illegality had transpired”). The independent-source

doctrine applies if the evidence both would have been acquired by lawful means had

the unlawful search not occurred and in fact was acquired (or reacquired) by these

lawful means. The inevitable-discovery doctrine, on the other hand, applies if the

evidence would have been acquired by lawful means had the unlawful search not

occurred but in fact was not acquired (or reacquired) by these lawful means. See

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988) (noting that the inevitablediscovery doctrine applied in Nix because a lawful search "would have found” the

evidence "had [the search] not been aborted” when the evidence was acquired

unlawfully, but the independent-source doctrine would have applied "if the search

had continued and had in fact found” the evidence).

Although the distinction between the independent-source and inevitablediscovery doctrines is not sharp, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013,

1014 (7th Cir. 2004) (expressing uncertainty regarding "which [doctrine] rules this

case”), where exactly one draws the line between the two doctrines is unimportant.

Underlying both doctrines is the principle that, "while the government should not

profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it

would otherwise have occupied.” Murray, 487 U.S. at 542; see also Nix, 467 U.S.

at 443-44 (explaining that the point of both doctrines is to put the police "in the same

. . . position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had

occurred”). Provided that the evidence would have been acquired lawfully if the

unlawful search had not occurred, admitting the evidence puts the government in the

same position that it would have occupied if the unlawful search had not occurred.

This is true regardless whether the evidence in fact was (re)acquired lawfully—and

thus whether the appropriate exception to invoke is the independent-source doctrine

rather than the inevitable-discovery doctrine. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 541-42

(explaining that admissibility does not turn on the "metaphysical” question whether

it is possible for officers who retain evidence after seizing it unlawfully to "reseize[]”

it lawfully).

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One way for police to acquire evidence lawfully is pursuant to a valid search

warrant. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139 (1990). To determine

whether evidence within the scope of a valid warrant would have been acquired had

a prior unlawful search not occurred, we ask whether (1) law enforcement "would

have sought a warrant even if the [unlawful] search had not occurred,” and (2) "the

warrant was supported by probable cause even without information gained from the

[unlawful] search.” Anguiano, 934 F.3d at 874.

Here, the officers ultimately obtained a warrant to search the entire hotel suite

and the Equinox. Crediting Officer Gruber's testimony, the district court found that

the officers would have halted their search and sought a warrant had they thought

that they lacked valid consent from Gavino to search the entire suite. United States

v. Anguiano, No. 17-135(1) ADM/DTS, 2019 WL 2443540, at *5-6 (D. Minn. June

11, 2019). We affirmed this finding in Anguiano, 934 F.3d at 874, and we are bound

by that precedent here, see Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011)

(en banc) ("[O]ne panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.”). The district

court also found that the warrant was supported by probable cause even without the

information gained from the allegedly unlawful search of the back room. United

States v. Anguiano, No. 17-135 ADM/DTS, 2017 WL 6501840, at *10 (D. Minn.

Dec. 19, 2017). Again, we affirmed this finding in Anguiano, 934 F.3d at 875, and

we are bound by that precedent here, see Mader, 654 F.3d at 800. Even assuming

the initial search of the back room was unlawful, then, any evidence that fell within

the scope of the warrant was admissible. And both the evidence found in the back

room and the evidence found in the safe in the Equinox fell within the scope of the

warrant. See United States v. Darr, 661 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining

that a warrant to search a bedroom authorized a search of containers in the bedroom).

Therefore, both the evidence found in the back room and the evidence found in the

safe in the Equinox were admissible.

It is true that Baez is not bringing exactly the same challenge that Anguiano

brought. Anguiano appealed only the admission of the evidence found in the armoire

and the evidence found in the Equinox, which not only would have been but in fact

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were acquired lawfully, during the later search. See Anguiano, 934 F.3d at 874.

Here, Baez also challenges the evidence found under the sink. Because the officers

had already uncovered this evidence during the earlier search, it is a stretch to say

that it not only would have been but was (re)acquired lawfully. But this difference

is relevant only to which doctrine accounts for the admissibility of the respective

pieces of evidence. In Anguiano, we invoked the independent-source doctrine. See

id. at 874-75. Here, at least with respect to the evidence found under the sink, the

inevitable-discovery doctrine appears more appropriate. The bottom line is that,

whichever doctrine applies, the evidence found under the sink, the evidence found

in the armoire, and the evidence found in the Equinox (including the evidence found

in the safe) were all admissible.

2.

Before considering Baez's objections to our analysis, we address whether our

reliance on the inevitable-discovery doctrine is consistent with circuit precedent. We

conclude that it is.

Our caselaw on the inevitable-discovery doctrine divides into two strands.

The first strand aligns with the view that the Supreme Court has endorsed since Nix.

On this view, in order for evidence acquired unlawfully and not reacquired lawfully

to be admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine, it is sufficient that the

evidence would have been acquired lawfully but for the constitutional violation. See

Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (holding that "evidence that would inevitably have been

discovered” is admissible because excluding it would "put the government in a

worse position” than "if no misconduct had taken place”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547

U.S. 586, 592 (2006) (reiterating that "a necessary . . . condition for suppression” is

"that a constitutional violation was a 'but-for' cause of obtaining [the] evidence”).

From our adoption of the inevitable-discovery doctrine in United States v. Apker,

705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 724 F.2d 633 (8th

Cir. 1983), until our decision in United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663 (8th Cir.

1997), we articulated the doctrine in a way that is consistent with this view. See,

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e.g., Apker, 705 F.2d at 306 (holding that the inevitable-discovery doctrine "allows

illegally obtained evidence to be admitted if it would have been discovered in the

course of a proper investigation”); United States v. Durant, 730 F.2d 1180, 1185 (8th

Cir. 1984) (holding that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies "when the

evidence would have been inevitably discovered absent the illegal conduct”);

Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d 463, 465-66 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (explaining that

evidence is admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine if "it inevitably would

have been discovered by lawful means” and stating that "there is no reason to

exclude . . . evidence” if "police misconduct is not even a 'but for' cause of its

discovery”); United States v. Dickson, 64 F.3d 409, 410 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Hamilton).

In Conner, however, we held that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies

only if the government shows not only (1) "that the evidence would have been

discovered by lawful means in the absence of police misconduct” but also (2) "that

the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternative line of investigation

at the time of the constitutional violation.” 127 F.3d at 667; cf. United States v.

Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 860-62 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., concurring) (pointing

out the differences between the Supreme Court's approach in Nix and our approach

in Conner).

Since Conner, our practice has been inconsistent. In some cases, we have

repeated Conner's two-condition test. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d

1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Conner); Thomas, 524 F.3d at 858 (citing Glenn);

United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 923 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Thomas). In other

cases, we have repeated the one-condition test from Nix and our earlier caselaw. See,

e.g., United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 779 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Eighth

Circuit caselaw prior to Conner); United States v. Craddock, 841 F.3d 756, 760 (8th

Cir. 2016) (citing Nix); United States v. Sallis, 920 F.3d 577, 582-83 (8th Cir. 2019)

(citing Nix). In one case, we even applied the inevitable-discovery doctrine despite

acknowledging that there was no contemporaneous alternative line of investigation.

See United States v. Chandler, 197 F.3d 1198, 1201 (8th Cir. 1999).

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The uncertainty in our caselaw regarding the inevitable-discovery doctrine

does not stand in the way of our application of that doctrine here. We already

explained in Section II.A.1 why the evidence found under the sink satisfies the test

from Nix and our earlier caselaw. Therefore, our application of the inevitablediscovery doctrine here is proper unless Conner's test is controlling. And even if

Conner's test is controlling, our application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine here

is proper if Conner's second condition is met. Because either possibility—that

Conner is not controlling or that Conner's second condition is met—would be

sufficient to support our application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine here, we

need not decide which is true. It is enough to conclude that at least one is true. And

we know that at least one is true because, prior to Conner, we applied the inevitablediscovery doctrine in a case where it was less plausible than it is here that a

contemporaneous alternative line of investigation was present.

That case is Durant, 730 F.2d 1180. In Durant, the defendant—charged with

bank robbery—challenged the admission of evidence that he drove a blue

Oldsmobile, which the police had acquired by unlawfully interrogating him while

arresting him for an unrelated offense. Id. at 1184-85. The police did not realize the

significance of the car until "[l]ater,” "when [the defendant] was linked to the bank

robbery.” Id. We held that the evidence was admissible under the inevitablediscovery doctrine because, if the police had not known already that the defendant

drove a blue Oldsmobile, then they would have found out by tracing the driver's

license and traffic citation that they had obtained from the defendant when he was

arrested. Id. at 1185.

It is more plausible that a contemporaneous alternative line of investigation

was present here than in Durant. In United States v. Hammons, we held that it was

enough to constitute "actively pursuing a substantial, alternative line of

investigation” for officers to have in mind "an alternative plan” that they would have

executed if the constitutional violation had not occurred. 152 F.3d 1025, 1030 (8th

Cir. 1998). Here, Officer Gruber conceded that it did not "occur” to him "to go and

. . . get a warrant” when he and the other officers arrived at the suite, and it was not

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until he "found the meth” under the sink that he "wanted to get the warrant.” But

Officer Gruber also testified that he "understood that [getting a warrant] was an

option” when he asked Gavino's consent to search the room, and he "would have

. . . called for a search warrant” had Gavino refused to consent. This implies that

Officer Gruber was at least disposed to execute an alternative plan if Gavino refused

to consent, even if he did not consciously have such a plan in mind. In Durant, by

contrast, the officers had no reason to suspect that the defendant had participated in

a robbery involving a blue Oldsmobile when they arrested him. Hence, there is

nothing to indicate that they were disposed to trace the driver's license and traffic

citation in search of a blue Oldsmobile if the defendant refused to answer their

questions—much less that they consciously had such a plan in mind. See Durant,

730 F.2d at 1185 ("[The defendant's] connection to the blue Oldsmobile would have

been inevitably discovered once the officers became aware of [his] alleged

participation in the bank robbery.” (emphasis added)).

The fact that it is more plausible that a contemporaneous alternative line of

investigation was present here than in Durant shows that either Conner's second

condition is met here or else Conner is not controlling. On the one hand, if a

contemporaneous alternative line of investigation was present in Durant, then a

fortiori a contemporaneous alternative line of investigation was present here, too. In

that case, our application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine here would be proper

because Conner's second condition would be met. On the other hand, if a

contemporaneous alternative line of investigation was not present in Durant, which

applied the inevitable-discovery doctrine anyway, then Conner's second condition

conflicts with prior-panel precedent. In that case, our application of the inevitablediscovery doctrine here would be proper because Conner would not be controlling.

See Mader, 654 F.3d at 800 (holding that, in the event of "conflicting panel opinions,

the earliest opinion must be followed”).

2

In sum, whether because Conner's second

2

Although Judge Colloton concluded in his Thomas concurrence that Conner

was "governing precedent” despite his concerns with it, 524 F.3d at 862, we note

that this remark was made before Mader was decided.

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condition is met or because Conner is not controlling, circuit precedent supports our

application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine here.



3.

Baez presents three additional objections to our analysis. First, he attacks the

district court's basis for denying his motion to suppress the evidence found under

the sink during the initial search of the back room. The district court held that Baez

lacked standing to challenge the legality of the search because he had no reasonable

expectation of privacy in the back room. Even assuming Baez is correct that he had

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the back room, however, the alternative basis

for denying his suppression motion that we have articulated stands. Because "we

can affirm the district court's judgment on any ground that is supported by the

record,” Taylor v. United States, 204 F.3d 828, 829 (8th Cir. 2000), we need not

reach the question whether Baez had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the back

room.

Second, Baez disputes that the warrant would have been supported by

probable cause even if the initial search of the back room had not occurred.

According to Baez, "the methamphetamine found under the sink was included in the

warrant [application] and most certainly influenced the judge's decision [to issue the

warrant].” We settled this dispute in Anguiano, where we recounted at length the

evidence that "justified issuance of a warrant.” 934 F.3d at 875. Our conclusion

there, that "probable cause [supported] issuance of the search warrant even without

information gleaned from the initial search” of the back room, id., is binding here.

See Mader, 654 F.3d at 800.

Third, Baez argues that "the search [of the safe in the Equinox] was legal as

to Anguiano but illegal as to Baez” because "the facts supporting probable cause for

the warrant had nothing to do with Baez or his property and everything to do with

Anguiano.” But the legality of a search pursuant to a valid warrant is not suspectspecific. See, e.g., Darr, 661 F.3d at 379 ("Because the . . . warrant authorized the

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search of the entire premises . . . , officers did not exceed its scope by searching [the

defendant's] bedroom, even though the warrant was issued based on information

about activities of [the defendant's father].”). Here, the warrant authorized the

search of the entire Equinox, including containers inside it. This rendered the search

of the safe legal without qualification, not merely "legal as to Anguiano.” Evidence

from the search was therefore admissible not only against Anguiano but also against

Baez.

B.

We now turn to Baez's challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to

suppress the incriminating statements that he made while in custody. With limited

exceptions, evidence acquired as a consequence of an arrest that violates the Fourth

Amendment is inadmissible. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061. Baez argues that his

incriminating statements were acquired as a consequence of his unlawful arrest and

that none of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies.

Whether Baez's warrantless arrest was lawful depends on whether the officers

had probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. See, e.g., Devenpeck

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). In Maryland v. Pringle, the Supreme Court

held that officers have probable cause to believe that everyone present in a car in

which drug trafficking was occurring was involved. 540 U.S. 366, 373-74 (2003).

As the Court pointed out, it "would be unlikely” for anyone involved in drug

trafficking "to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence

against him” into the "relatively small” confines of a car. Id. at 373. In United States

v. Romero, the Sixth Circuit extended this reasoning to hotel rooms. 452 F.3d 610,

618 (6th Cir. 2006). "Like the enclosed space of the automobile in which the

individuals were arrested in Pringle,” the court reasoned, "the relatively small and

confined space of the hotel room supports the conclusion that it was reasonable for

the officers to infer . . . that [everyone in the room] was involved in a common

illegal-drug enterprise.” Id.

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Until today, we have not had occasion to join the Sixth Circuit in extending

Pringle to hotel rooms or suites. In United States v. Cowan, however, we cited

Romero when extending Pringle to apartments. See 674 F.3d 947, 954 (8th Cir.

2012) ("As with the car in Pringle and the hotel room in Romero, the officers had

probable cause to believe [the defendant], who was present in the apartment, was

engaged in a common drug trafficking enterprise with the apartment's occupants.”).

A hotel suite is comparable to an apartment. Therefore, both Cowan's reasoning and

its citation to Romero support the proposition that officers have probable cause to

believe that everyone present in a hotel suite in which drug trafficking was occurring

was involved.

Here, Baez was present in a hotel suite in which the police had probable cause

to believe that drug trafficking was occurring. Even setting aside the evidence found

in the back room, which Baez claims was inadmissible, but see supra Section II.A,

the front room contained a methamphetamine pipe and keys to a car in which a

canine unit had indicated drugs were present. In addition, the suite was reserved

under the name of someone who had just been stopped in a car with a fake DEA

badge, dryer sheets, numerous credit cards in different names, and large wads of

cash. We conclude that the police had probable cause to believe that everyone

present in the hotel suite, including Baez, was involved in drug trafficking.

Because the officers had probable cause to believe that Baez had committed a

crime, Baez's arrest was lawful. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying

Baez's motion to suppress the incriminating statements that he made while in

custody.

III.

Next, Baez argues that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that

it would "negate[] the specific intent required by the charges” if Baez participated

in the drug-trafficking conspiracy with the intent to "assist ongoing federal

investigations” and in the good-faith, even if unreasonable, belief that "his actions

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were not criminal.” "We review jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.” United

States v. Ghant, 339 F.3d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 2003).

As the Government points out, the "innocent-intent” instruction that Baez

demanded misstates the law. An intention to assist law enforcement is not a defense

to a criminal charge. See, e.g., United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 589 (8th Cir.

1986) (affirming a jury instruction to disregard the defendants' further intentions or

"motive[s], good or bad,” "laudable or not,” if the prosecution "established beyond

a reasonable doubt the essential elements of each offense” (emphasis omitted)).

Likewise, "the usual rule [is] that ignorance of the law is no defense to a criminal

charge.” United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001). Although the

Supreme Court has "carv[ed] out an exception to [this] rule” for "highly technical

statutes that present[] the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently

innocent conduct,” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194-95 (1998), the crimes

with which Baez was charged do not fall within this exception, see McFadden v.

United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192 (2015) ("Take, for example, a defendant who

knows he is distributing heroin but does not know that heroin is listed on the

schedules. Because ignorance of the law is typically no defense to criminal

prosecution, this defendant would . . . be guilty of knowingly distributing a

controlled substance.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Therefore, even if Baez intended to assist law enforcement and believed that

"his actions were not criminal,” that would not negate his mens rea. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury otherwise. See

United States v. McQuarry, 726 F.2d 401, 402 (8th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a legally "unsupported”

jury instruction).

IV.

Next, Baez challenges the district court's exclusion of evidence related to the

"innocent-intent” theory behind his proposed jury instruction. "We review

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evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Gustafson, 528 F.3d

587, 590 (8th Cir. 2008).

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is admissible only if it is

relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if and only if "(a) it has any

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R.

Evid. 401. Even if evidence is relevant, the trial court "may exclude [it] if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of,” inter alia, "confusing

the issues” or "misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Here, the evidence that Baez sought to admit was inadmissible under Rule 402

because it was irrelevant. The evidence falls into two categories: (1) evidence

regarding an individual who asked Baez to translate at a meeting with a federal agent

where the individual proposed serving as an informant on drug activities in North

Carolina; and (2) evidence regarding Baez's mental health. Baez claims that both

sets of evidence are relevant insofar as they support his "innocent-intent” defense:

(1) the evidence regarding the potential informant because it tends to show that Baez

intended to assist in a federal investigation; and (2) the evidence regarding Baez's

mental health because it explains how he could believe in good faith that his actions

were assisting law enforcement and were not criminal. As explained above,

however, Baez's alleged further intentions and ignorance of the law are of no

consequence in determining his guilt. See supra Part III. Therefore, neither set of

evidence is relevant under Rule 401, which means that neither is admissible under

Rule 402.

Furthermore, even if the evidence had been relevant, the district court was

within its discretion to exclude it under Rule 403 because the risk that it would

confuse issues or mislead the jury substantially outweighed whatever slight

probative value it may have had. Testimony regarding a potential informant's

activities in North Carolina would have distracted from the events in Minnesota for

which the Government was prosecuting Baez, and evidence of Baez's mental health

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may have caused the jury to confuse Baez's "innocent-intent” defense with an

insanity defense. Therefore, even if the evidence had been admissible under

Rule 402, the court was within its discretion to exclude it under Rule 403. See

United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming the

exclusion of evidence related to the defendant's mental state under Fed. R. Evid. 403

on the ground that it "could have improperly brought the insanity issue in through

the back door”).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

evidence regarding the potential informant in North Carolina and Baez's mental

health.

V.

Next, Baez challenges the district court's partial denial of his motion to

compel the Government to disclose putative Brady material regarding the potential

informant in North Carolina after in camera review. We review the denial of a

motion to compel disclosure of Brady material after in camera review for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Pendleton, 832 F.3d 934, 941-42 (8th Cir. 2016).

Under Brady, "[t]he government has an obligation to disclose evidence that is

favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment.” United States

v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009). Evidence favorable to the defendant

includes not only exculpatory evidence but also evidence that tends to impeach

government witnesses. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Evidence

is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed

to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). "The question is not whether the defendant

would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,” but

whether "its absence . . . undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at

434.

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Here, the district court ordered the disclosure of what little of the evidence

was arguably favorable to Baez. Having reviewed the remainder of the evidence,

we agree with the district court that Brady did not require its disclosure. It was not

exculpatory, and it did not tend to impeach a Government witness. Therefore, it was

not even favorable to Baez, let alone material in the sense that its nondisclosure

undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.



We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in partially

denying Baez's motion to compel disclosure of evidence regarding the potential

informant in North Carolina.

VI.

Finally, Baez argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentence is

substantively unreasonable. "We review the substantive reasonableness of a

sentence under [a] deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.

Lazarski, 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2009). Where a sentencing court varied

downward from the guidelines, "it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its

discretion in not varying downward still further.” Id.

Here, the district court varied downward from the guidelines by more than

fifty percent. Baez claims that the sentence was nonetheless substantively

unreasonable because it was higher than the sentences imposed on Baez's

coconspirators. See United States v. Fry, 792 F.3d 884, 892-93 (8th Cir. 2015)

(treating objections to sentencing disparities among coconspirators as substantivereasonableness challenges). But "the statutory direction to avoid unwarranted

sentence disparities, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), refers to national disparities, not

differences among co-conspirators.” Id. at 892. By itself, the fact that "a similarly

situated co-conspirator was sentenced differently” provides "no principled basis for

an appellate court to say which defendant received the 'appropriate' sentence.” Id.

at 893. Moreover, Baez was not similarly situated to his coconspirators; for

example, he was the only one not to plead guilty. Consequently, the disparity

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between his sentence and theirs was not unreasonable. See id. (explaining that

"disparate sentences among dissimilar defendants,” such as those who "pleaded

guilty and accepted responsibility” and those who did not, "are not unwarranted”).

This is not the "nearly inconceivable” case in which a district court that varied

downward from the guidelines nonetheless "abused its discretion in not varying

downward still further.” See Lazarski, 560 F.3d at 733.3

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm