Jean Finney v. Missouri Department of Corrections

This case is about Missouri's for-cause dismissal of two jurors based on their religious beliefs. Jean Finney

sued her employer, the Missouri Department of Corrections, in state court under the Missouri Human Rights Act,

which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §213.055 (Cum. Supp. 2022). "Finney alleged that she is a lesbian who presents masculine” and that "she was improperly stereotyped and discriminated against based on sex.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 67a. At the beginning of voir dire, Finney's attorney asked all

the jurors what he characterized as "a tricky question,” namely, whether any of them "went to a conservative Christian church” where "it was taught that people [who] are homosexua[l] shouldn't have the same rights as everyone else”

because "what they did” was "a sin.” Id., at 29a–30a. Thequestion was indeed "tricky” because it conflated two separate issues: whether the prospective jurors believed that homosexual conduct is sinful and whether they believed that

gays and lesbians should not enjoy the legal rights possessed by others. In response to this question, some poten-

tial jurors raised their hands, and Finney's lawyer then questioned them individually.



During this phase of voir dire, Juror 4, a pastor's wife, stated that "homosexuality, according to the Bible, is a sin.”

Id., at 38a. But she quickly added: "So is gossiping, so is lying.” Ibid. "[N]one of us can be perfect. And so I'm here

because it's an honor to sit in here and to perhaps be a part of, you know, a civic duty.” Ibid.

Juror 13 similarly stated that he believes homosexuality is a sin because "it's in the Bible.” Id., at 33a. But he fol-

lowed by noting that "every one of us here sins. . . . It's just part of our nature. And it's something we struggle with, hopefully throughout our life.” Id., at 33a–34a. And the fact that it is a sin "has really nothing to do with—in a negative way with whatever this case is going to be about.”



Finney's counsel moved to strike these jurors for cause, arguing that "there's no way . . . somebody [who] looks at a

gay person and says . . . you are a sinner” could ever fairly consider a case involving a lesbian plaintiff. Id., at 43a. The trial judge granted that motion. She noted that both jurors said "that they could follow the law,” id., at 45a, and 3Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) Statement of ALITO , J. she did not suggest that she disbelieved them. Neverthe-

less, she concluded that she should "err on the side of caution,” and she therefore dismissed Jurors 4 and 13 because

there were "enough jurors left” without them. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissals

for two reasons. First, it reasoned that the jurors' belief "that Finney's conduct was sinful (meaning immoral and

wrong)” provided a sustainable ground for "concluding that they could not impartially and fairly decide her claim that

she was unlawfully harassed due to her homosexuality—even if those veniremembers claimed that their religious

beliefs would not prevent them from serving.” Second, the court concluded that the jurors had been dis-

missed, not on the basis of their religious status, but on the basis of their religious beliefs. And this distinction, it said, made all the difference because, in its view, while dismissals based on a juror's "status as Christians” must comport with strict scrutiny, dismissals based on a juror's "views”

need not.



Before us, the Department of Corrections argues that these for-cause dismissals were unconstitutional, and I

agree that the Court of Appeals' reasoning raises a very serious and important question that we should address in an

appropriate case. The judiciary, no less than the other branches of State and Federal Government, must respect

people's fundamental rights, and among these are the right to the free exercise of religion and the right to the equal

protection of the laws. When a court, a quintessential state actor, finds that a person is ineligible to serve on a jury because of his or her religious beliefs, that decision implicates fundamental rights.

Under the Free Exercise Clause, state actions that "single out the religious for disfavored treatment” must survive

"the 'most rigorous' scrutiny.”* Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 460, 466 (2017)

(quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993)). And that is true regardless of

whether the differential treatment is predicated on religious status or religious belief. Cf. Carson v. Makin, 596

U. S. 767, 786 (2022). Our precedents make it clear that distinctions based on "religious beliefs,” no less than ditions based on religious status, must "advance 'interests of the highest order' and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit

of those interests.” Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 532, 546 (emphasis added).

Under Missouri law, "[t]he standard for determining whether a juror should be excused for cause is whether his

or her views would 'prevent or substantially impair' the performance of duties as a juror.” State v. Ramsey, 864 S. W.

2d 320, 336 (1993) (quoting State v. McMillin, 783 S. W. 2d 82, 91 (1990)). If a court has a sound basis for concluding

that a particular juror's beliefs would "prevent or substantially impair” his or her ability to render impartial justice,dismissal for cause clears that high bar. "The Constitution guarantees both criminal and civil litigants a right to aimpartial jury.” Warger v. Shauers, 574 U. S. 40, 50 (2014).



So a court has an indisputably significant "interest in [seating] a . . . jury that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case.” Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U. S. 162, 175 (1986). Jurors are duty-bound to decide cases

based on the law and the evidence, and a juror who cannot carry out that duty may properly be excused.



Plaintiff's counsel struck three jurors who said that being homosexual was a sin.

Judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $225,000. Affirmed.