United States of America v. Antonio Alonzo Outlaw, also known as Mike

St. Louis, MO - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with conspiracy to distribute heroin and aiding, abetting the distribution of heroin and two counts of distributing heroin charges.

The prosecution's theory of the case was that Outlaw engaged in heroin

trafficking with a group of drug dealers who identified themselves as "We the Best.”

Outlaw admitted guilt on two counts of distribution that were based on controlled

transactions with a person cooperating with law enforcement. To prove the

conspiracy count, the government called numerous witnesses who testified that they

acquired heroin from Outlaw or persons associated with him between 2013 and

January 2017. The aiding and abetting charge was based on a controlled transaction

on December 10, 2014. A cooperator testified that he met with Outlaw and an

associate nicknamed "Black,” and received fifteen bags of heroin—five from Outlaw

and ten from "Black.” The associate "Black,” however, testified that while Outlaw

drove the two men to the drug transaction, only "Black” distributed heroin to the

cooperator on that occasion.

Outlaw contends on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his

convictions by the jury. On claims of insufficient evidence, we affirm a conviction

if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. United States v. El Herman, 583 F.3d 576, 579 (8th Cir. 2009); see Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

The conspiracy charge required the government to prove three elements: (1)

that there was an agreement to distribute heroin, (2) that Outlaw voluntarily and

intentionally joined the conspiracy, and (3) that Outlaw knew the purpose of the

conspiracy when he joined. United States v. Hickman, 764 F.3d 918, 924 (8th Cir.

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2014). "An agreement to join a conspiracy need not be explicit but may be inferred

from the facts and circumstances of the case.” United States v. Conway, 754 F.3d

580, 587 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted).

In the course of proving a conspiracy to distribute heroin, the government

presented overwhelming evidence that Outlaw distributed heroin during the relevant

period. Outlaw pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution, and the government

presented evidence of these controlled transactions. More than a dozen separate

witnessestestified that Outlaw distributed heroin to them on occasionstotaling in the

hundreds during the time of the charged conspiracy.

There was ample evidence to show that Outlaw knowingly and intentionally

joined a conspiracy to distribute heroin. Several witnesses testified that after they

obtained a telephone number at which to contact Outlaw to purchase heroin, they

called the number to place an order for drugs. The witnesses testified that different

persons answered their calls: sometimes it was Outlaw, and sometimes it was one of

several other persons. According to the testimony, sometimes Outlaw arranged a

transaction on the telephone, but a "runner” would deliver the drugs to the buyer.

Other times, Outlaw answered the call and delivered the drugs himself; in another

scenario, a third person would answer the phone and deliver the drugs. Some

witnesses also testified that they communicated with Outlaw's telephone by text

message to arrange heroin purchases. Return text messages from Outlaw's phone

number typically included the "We the Best” group moniker at the end.

Taking the evidence as a whole, a reasonable jury could infer that Outlaw

distributed heroin as part of a conspiracy with other persons involved with the "We

the Best” group. Outlaw attacks the credibility of several prosecution witnesses who

admitted to drug use or cooperation agreements with the government. Credibility,

however, is almost exclusively matter for the jury, and the sheer number of witnesses

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who testified to a similar pattern of activity with Outlaw gave the jury sound reason

to believe that Outlaw was a member of the charged conspiracy.

The aiding and abetting conviction arose from Outlaw's involvement in a

controlled drug transaction on December 10, 2014. The government had the burden

to prove that Outlaw "took an affirmative act to further the underlying criminal

offense, with the intent of facilitating the offense.” United States v. Borders, 829

F.3d 558, 565 (8th Cir. 2016). The intent element required proof that Outlaw had

advance knowledge of all the characteristics of the transaction that made it

illegal—"knowledge that enable[d] him to make the relevant legal (and indeed,

moral) choice” to facilitate the offense. Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 78

(2014).

The prosecution's evidence established that Outlaw drove to the site of the

drug transaction with an associate nicknamed "Black” as a passenger. The

cooperating person testified that Outlaw and "Black” transferred heroin to him.

"Black” admitted distributing heroin, but denied that Outlaw did so. Whether or not

the jury was convinced that Outlaw personally transferred heroin on this occasion, the

jury reasonably could have inferred that Outlaw knew in advance that he was driving

to a drug transaction, and did so intentionally to facilitate his associate's transfer of

heroin. In addition to the evidence about this particular transaction, the jury also

heard other testimony that Outlaw and "Black” worked together in trafficking heroin.

Evidence of the larger conspiracy reinforced the inference that Outlaw was not an

unwitting driver on December 10, but that he knowingly and intentionally

participated in the charged transaction.

For these reasons, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions.

The district court properly denied Outlaw's motion for a judgment of acquittal.

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II.

Outlaw raises several claims of procedural error in the district court's

calculation of the advisory guideline range at sentencing. We review the district

court'sinterpretation of the guidelines de novo and itsfactual findingsfor clear error.

United States v. Sesay, 937 F.3d 1146, 1153 (8th Cir. 2019).

Outlaw first arguesthat the district court erred by applying a four-level increase

for an aggravating role in the offense. That adjustment applies where a defendant was

"an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants

or was otherwise extensive.” USSG § 3B1.1(a). The district court found that Outlaw

oversaw a number of runners in the heroin distribution conspiracy, and that the

criminal activity involved five or more participants.

We conclude that the district court's determinations were supported by

sufficient evidence. In deciding whether a defendant played an aggravating role, the

court should consider "the exercise of decision making authority . . . and the degree

of control and authority exercised over others.” USSG § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4).

Several witnesses testified that Outlaw exercised control over "runners” whom he

dispatched to deliver heroin. This sort of control and authority, exerted with respect

to several persons over a period of years, sufficed to establish Outlaw as an organizer

or leader. See United States v. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1997). The

record also supports the finding of five or more participants. Two associates,

nicknamed "Black” and "Little Man,” were prominent in the testimony, and witnesses

identified at least two more people who participated in the conspiracy. One witness

testified that she knew of three individuals other than Outlaw who were members of

"We the Best,” and that she herself had assisted the group on one occasion. Another

witness said that when he called the number associated with "We the Best” to order

drugs, four or five people other than Outlaw answered the phone and facilitated

transactions. There was no clear error in applying the four-level increase.

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Outlaw next disputes a two-level increase for obstruction of justice under

USSG § 3C1.1. The guideline commentary provides that "escaping or attempting to

escape from custody before trial or sentencing” is the type of conduct to which the

guideline applies. USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(E)). The district court found that

Outlaw was a co-conspirator with another inmate in an effort to escape from a county

jail while he was detained pending trial. The court concluded that Outlaw "may not

have been the brains of the outfit, but he was definitely conducting overt acts in

furtherance of the conspiracy to do a jailbreak.”

There was sufficient evidence to support the court's finding. A jail

administrator testified that he received a report from an inmate that Outlaw and

another prisoner named Valencia were planning an escape from the jail. The inmate

testified that Valencia told him of a plan for Valencia's associates to drill a hole

through the window of Outlaw's cell from the outside and hand Outlaw a saw blade

that he or Valencia could use to cut through bricks and escape. At around this time,

jailers found physical evidence that someone had applied a blowtorch and acid to the

window of Outlaw's cell. Jailers then moved Outlaw to the second floor of the jail,

but Valencia offered marijuana to an inmate on the ground floor in exchange for

allowing Outlaw to move into his cell. Outlaw also requested to move back to the

ground floor based on supposed "medical issues.” The prosecution introduced

recorded jailhouse telephone calls between Valencia and outsidepartiesin which they

discussed tools and other matters; these communications supported a reasonable

inference that Valencia was planning an escape. The government also presented

evidence that Outlaw arranged for a female associate to place money in a jail

telephone account for Valencia so that he could plan the escape. There was no clear

error in the court'sfinding that Outlaw participated in a conspiracy to escape fromthe

jail.

Outlaw's final argument is that the district court should have granted a

downward variance from the advisory guideline range of 292 to 365 months to the

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statutoryminimumtermof 240 months. He cites a difficult upbringing, during which

his parents abused drugs and engaged in criminal activity, and he suggests that his

criminal history was overstated because a number of convictions were sustained

twenty years before the sentencing in this case. The district court reasonably

concluded, however, that there was no basis for a downward variance. The court

observed that despite turmoil in Outlaw's youth, he had a good grandmother and

aunts who supported him, and he was not "out on the street.” The court found that

the aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigating factors, and that a sentence

within the recommended range was appropriate. We presume that a term within the

advisory range is reasonable, and the court did not abuse its discretion by following

the guidelines here.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.