Julian Rodriguez v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

Julian Rodriguez, who suffers from various medical conditions, applied for

social-security-disability benefits. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) concluded

that Rodriguez was disabled, but only as of May 1, 2015, not the earlier date that he

had listed on his application. The magistrate judge1 affirmed, and so do we.



On May 1, 2015, Rodriguez visited the emergency room and complained of

stroke-like symptoms, including facial drooping, numbness, and a headache. After

undergoing medical tests, he was diagnosed with Bell’s palsy and diabetes. The ALJ

determined that, as of this date, he was disabled in light of his “significantly

deteriorated” condition. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)–(v), (g),

416.920(a)(4)(iv)–(v), (g). But before this date, according to the ALJ, Rodriguez

could still work. Rodriguez challenges the latter finding.



For at least two reasons, we conclude that there is “substantial evidence [in] the

record” to support the May 1, 2015, onset date. Vance v. Berryhill, 860 F.3d 1114,

1117 (8th Cir. 2017). First, when Rodriguez underwent medical testing between 2012

and 2014, which measured such things as his strength, balance, reflexes, and

pulmonary function, the results were largely normal. Second, Rodriguez reported on

his application that, during this same period, he could perform a variety of daily

activities, including cooking, shopping, and mowing. See Ponder v. Colvin, 770 F.3d

1190, 1195–96 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (upholding the denial of disability

benefits, in part, because the claimant could perform a variety of daily activities, from

“wash[ing] dishes” to “shop[ping] for groceries”). Even if, as the ALJ noted,

Rodriguez “suffered from multiple severe impairments prior to May 1, 2015,” the

record supports the conclusion that those impairments did not prevent him from

working. See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that “we

will not reverse the [ALJ’s] decision merely because substantial evidence would have

also supported a contrary outcome”).



Rodriguez claims, however, that the ALJ made a procedural error by failing to

consult a medical advisor before identifying the onset date. He relies on Social



1The Honorable Noelle C. Collins, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri, to whom this case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).



-2-



Security Ruling 83-20,2 which stresses that it is “essential that the onset date be

correctly established and supported by the evidence.” 1983 WL 31249, at *1 (Jan. 1,

1983); see also Grebenick v. Chater, 121 F.3d 1193, 1200–01 (8th Cir. 1997)

(discussing Ruling 83-20). It goes on to say that, if adequate medical records are

unavailable and the “onset [date] must be inferred,” the ALJ “should call on the

services of a medical advisor.” Social Security Ruling 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *3

(emphasis added); see also id. at *3–4 (providing the example of a hypothetical

claimant who alleges a disability dating back to 1979 but whose medical records only

go back to 1980).



The parties disagree about whether the word “should” in Ruling 83-20 requires

an ALJ to consult a medical advisor every time an inference is required to determine

the onset date for a disability. Under any plausible reading, however, the ALJ did not

have to consult a medical advisor in this case, because identifying the date when

Rodriguez’s disability began did not require the ALJ to make the types of inferences

contemplated by Ruling 83-20. See Grebenick, 121 F.3d at 1201 (interpreting Ruling

83-20 to require medical consultation when the evidence is ambiguous, there is “no

contemporaneous medical documentation,” and a “retroactive inference is necessary”).



Rather, the ALJ simply relied on the “contemporaneous medical documentation” in

the record, including from before May 1, 2015, to conclude that Rodriguez did not

become disabled until he visited the emergency room and first complained of stroke like

symptoms. See id.; cf. Social Security Ruling 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *2

(calling “medical evidence . . . the primary element in the onset determination”).



* * *

______________________________

2The Social Security Administration has since replaced Social Security Ruling

83-20 with Social Security Ruling 18-01P. 2018 WL 4945639 (Oct. 2, 2018). The

latter requires “us[e] [of] the rules that were in effect at the time” of the ALJ’s

decision, including Ruling 83-20. Id. at *7.

-3-

The judgment is accordingly affirmed.