Ozgur Can Leonard v. Rachel Joy Lentz and Steven Troy Lentz

In this matter brought under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of

International Child Abduction (Hague Convention),1 Ozgur Leonard, a dual citizen

of Turkey and the United States, appeals from the order of the district court2 granting

judgment in favor of his estranged wife, Rachel Lentz, a United States citizen.

Leonard claimed that Lentz had wrongfully removed the couple’s three minor

children, I.Y.L., E.M.L., and S.M.L, to the United States, and he sought the return of

the children to the Republic of Turkey. Lentz denied having taken any wrongful

action. As an affirmative defense, she asserted, inter alia, that E.M.L., who had been

born with End Stage Renal Disease and needed a kidney transplant, required a much

more advanced treatment facility and medical team than Turkey could provide; and

that returning the children to Turkey would create a grave risk that they would suffer

some physical or psychological harm, or place them in an intolerable situation.

The district court concluded that Leonard had established a prima facie case for

wrongful removal. See Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 917 (8th Cir. 2010)

(explaining that court considering ICARA petition must determine child’s habitual

residence immediately prior to removal, whether removal violated petitioner’s

custody rights under law of habitual residence, and whether petitioner was exercising

those rights at time of removal). The district court further determined, however, that

Lentz had established the grave risk exception to removal, finding, as relevant, that

the evidence, particularly testimony provided by E.M.L.’s doctors at the University

of Iowa Health Care (UIHC), showed that ordering E.M.L. to be returned at that time

would pose a grave risk to her physical health, and that E.M.L. would need to remain

in close proximity to UIHC for the duration of her post-transplant recovery. See 22

1Pub. L. 100-300 Sec. 2(a)(4), codified as the International Child Abduction

Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4).

2The Honorable C. J. Williams, then Chief United States Magistrate Judge, and

now United States District Judge, for the Northern District of Iowa, presiding

pursuant to the consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A) (respondent opposing child’s return has burden to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that exception set forth in article 13b of Hague

Convention applies); Hague Convention, art. 13b (judicial authority is not bound to

order child’s return if person opposing return establishes there is a grave risk that

child’s return would expose child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise

place child in intolerable situation). Accordingly, the court denied Leonard’s request

to return the children to Turkey. Just weeks after E.M.L. received a kidney transplant

from Lentz, Leonard asked the court to reconsider its decision and, as relevant, to

“order the return of the [c]hildren contingent on a future medical ‘release’ by

[E.M.L’s nephrologist] stating [she was] satisfied that E.M.L’s further care [could]

be provided in Turkey.” The district court found that the issue of whether E.M.L.

could be returned to Turkey post-transplant was not ripe for consideration.

On appeal, Leonard argues, as relevant, that the district court improperly

denied his request to return the children to Turkey because the transplant had already

occurred and because there was no evidence before the district court demonstrating

that Turkish medical facilities were unable to provide adequate post-transplant care.3

We agree that the issue is not ripe for consideration, as the record contains

neither evidence that E.M.L. had reached the point in her recovery where her medical

team was prepared to release her nor evidence establishing the point at which posttransplant

return to Turkey would be safe for E.M.L. See Parrish v. Dayton, 761 F.3d

873, 875 (8th Cir. 2014) (ripeness is reviewed de novo; “[a] claim is not ripe for

adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).



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Leonard’s ot 3 her appeal arguments are either moot or without merit.

4Lentz’s motion to supplement the record is granted.

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The judgment is affirmed.