MARVIN TYRONE TARLETON v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.

Atlanta, GA - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with appealing the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, .

Marvin Tarleton was charged with one count of unarmed robbery in state

court in Duval County, Florida. The robbery occurred at a Bank of America branch

where approximately $3500 was stolen. The case proceeded to a jury trial on

February 3, 2011. The State called Elva Braho, the teller who was the victim of

the robbery, who testified that at around 10:40 a.m., the perpetrator of the robbery

approached her teller window. Before he walked up to her window, she had not

noticed him in the bank. She testified that the perpetrator was a white male, with

brown hair, brown eyes, and a clean-shaven face and was wearing a blue button-up

shirt, hat, and thin-rimmed glasses. She testified that he was approximately 5'8”

tall and that he was in his early 40s. When she spoke with law enforcement shortly

after the robbery, she estimated the perpetrator's weight at 170 pounds and

described him as "slim.” The perpetrator approached the window, placed a black

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briefcase on the counter, and said, "I want 100s, 20s, and 50s” in a soft voice. The

teller then provided the perpetrator with various currency without any tracking

devices. He then turned and left the bank through the back door, at which point the

teller triggered an alarm. The perpetrator was not wearing gloves and during the

encounter, he touched both the counter and the briefcase containing the currency.

Bank surveillance captured the encounter on video recording, which the State

showed to the jury during the teller's testimony.

Approximately two weeks after the robbery, law enforcement showed the

teller a photopack that contained photographs of six individuals, which included a

picture of Tarleton. In her testimony at trial, Ms. Braho confirmed that when law

enforcement showed her the photopack, she picked out the photo of Tarleton, and

excluded the other five individuals in the photopack. She testified it was the eyes

that gave it away more than anything else. As the surveillance video played for the

jury, Ms. Braho pointed out the man in the video who robbed her. On crossexamination, Ms. Braho confirmed that she had not been able to positively identify

for law enforcement any one of the six photos in the photopack. And when the

person showing her the photopack showed her Tarleton's photo, she confirmed

that, although she had picked out the photo because of the eyes, she told the officer

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that she could not positively identify it as the person who robbed her.1

She also

confirmed that the photo of Tarleton in the photopack was different from the

perpetrator from the nose down; his chin was heavier, wider; his whole face was

bigger. She also testified that the photo of Tarleton was heavier than the

perpetrator.

The State also called several of Tarleton's relatives. A detective contacted

Tarleton's stepmother, Joyce Tarleton, showed her two photographs, and asked her

if she recognized the person in the photographs. She identified Tarleton in one of

the photographs but said she could not identify who the person in the other

photograph was. She testified that the shirt the person in the photograph was

wearing looked like a shirt she had given Tarleton for Christmas. She described

the shirt as being blue, which matched the description by Ms. Braho of the blue

shirt worn by the perpetrator. On cross-examination, she acknowledged that she

gave the shirt to Mr. Tarleton at least four Christmases prior because she had had

little contact with Mr. Tarleton in the past four years. Afterwards, Joyce Tarleton

1 The question in cross-examination was: "And, in fact, you told the person showing you

that photo spread no to the picture of Marvin Tarleton; is that correct?” Answer: "Because he

said, Are you positive? I said, No.” Doc. 18-2, at 295, lines 9-12.

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called some relatives and non-relatives "to try to confirm what [she was]

suspecting.” At trial, she testified that she was "pretty sure” that the person in the

photograph was Tarleton and that she believed the person in the surveillance video

was also he. She testified that the briefcase that the person in the bank was

carrying looked like a briefcase Tarleton's father had. On cross-examination,

Joyce Tarleton testified that Tarleton's father passed away in 2007. She confirmed

that, shortly before his passing, she had a dispute with Tarleton and his sister and

since that time, had had little contact with Tarleton. She testified that she had told

Tarleton and his sisters not to have contact with her.

Ashley Hoffman, Joyce Tarleton's granddaughter, was also called by the

State. She testified that her grandmother called her one day and told her to look up

news coverage of the robbery. Hoffman testified that she did so and then

recognized Tarleton as the purported suspect shown in the pictures in the news

coverage. She testified at trial that she recognized the smile, the briefcase, the

trucker-style hat, and the shirt that the suspect was wearing. She also testified on

cross-examination that she had not seen Mr. Tarleton in the last four years, since

she was 16 years old.

The State called Franchesca Swierz, Tarleton's ex-wife, who testified she

had been approached by a detective, shown a photograph, and asked if she

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recognized the person depicted therein. She responded that it looked like her exhusband. She also testified that the person in bank surveillance video looked like

her ex-husband.2

Swierz and Tarleton divorced in 2001, however, and she had not

seen, nor had any contact with him since 2003 or 2004, "almost a decade” earlier.

Jacksonville Sheriff's Office Detective James Venosh, Jr. testified that upon

responding to the scene, he had patrol officers canvas the area and deployed K-9s

to search for the suspect. Law enforcement was not able to find a suspect or any

information helpful to the investigation. He released pictures from the bank

surveillance to the media in the hope of finding a suspect, and on November 22,

the detective received two crime stopper tips. One of the tips was that the suspect

was a person named Robin Zidberry, but he ruled out Zidberry after examining

photos of him, and Zidberry had green eyes, while the bank teller said the

perpetrator had brown eyes. The other anonymous crime stoppers tip was that the

suspect may have been Tarleton, and after reviewing pictures of Tarleton, the

2 The detective who investigated the robbery, James Venosh, Jr., testified about having

shown the photo and surveillance video to Swierz. "She was fairly sure when I showed her the

photograph, but she said she wasn't 100 percent positive. She asked if she could see the movie

video and she would be able to tell me 100 percent. She viewed that and, when she saw it, she

said, Absolutely, that is him.” Doc. 18-3, at 16, lines 8-12.

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detective opined that there were "strong similarities” between Tarleton and the

suspect.

He created a photopack that contained a picture of Tarleton, which he

showed to the bank teller, Ms. Braho, and two other bank employees who were

present on the day of the robbery. Only Ms. Braho had a good look at the

perpetrator. She picked out the picture of Tarleton as looking very similar to the

suspect; the facial features and eyes looked very similar. But because he looked

larger in the photo than the person she remembered, she "didn't feel it was possibly

the same person.” Overall, the detective's testimony suggests that he believed Ms.

Braho had identified Tarleton, although the differences prevented her from making

a positive identification.3

The detective testified that he then showed the photopack to the stepmother,

Joyce Tarleton. After Joyce Tarleton identified Tarleton as the person in the

3 The detective was asked at that point: "So her ID was basically on eyes and face?”

Answer: "Correct . . . Overall facial features is what she told me.” Doc. 18-2, at 346, lines 5-8.

See also Doc. 18-3, at 5, lines 13-15 (the detective was asked on cross-examination: "Yet when

you brought [Ms. Braho] the photo spread she was not able to positively identify Martin

Tarleton?” Answer: "Not positively, no.”).

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surveillance, the detective had Tarleton arrested. At the time of his arrest, Tarleton

was 40 years old, 5'8” tall, and weighed 200 pounds.

The detective testified that he showed the bank surveillance to one of

Tarleton's sisters, Angela Tarleton. Angela cried when she viewed the photo and

told him that she could not be sure, but that the person looked like Tarleton. After

viewing the photo, Angela gave the officer permission to search her home, where

Tarleton had been residing prior to his arrest. Law enforcement found no potential

evidence during that search.

A vehicle Tarleton had been driving was also later searched and no evidence

was found in it. The detective testified that he found no evidence of Tarleton

having made any extravagant purchases after the robbery occurred. The detective

showed the surveillance photo to another of Tarleton's sisters, Kimberly

McClenton, who testified that she did not recognize the person in the photo.

The detective showed the surveillance photo to another niece of Tarleton's

by marriage, April Hoffman. The detective stated at trial that April said she

recognized the person in the photo as her uncle but that she did not wish to be

involved in the investigation.

A DNA sample from Tarleton was compared to DNA samples collected

from the bank counter, and Tarleton was excluded as a contributor of any of the

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DNA samples obtained from the counter. Tarleton's fingerprints were compared

to latent prints recovered from the bank entry/exit door and Tarleton was excluded

as a match to any of the latent prints.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the detective if he also showed

the photo to Tarleton's brother, James. He testified that James could not

"positively identify” Tarleton as the suspect. On redirect examination, however,

the detective testified that James told him that the suspect in the photo looked like

his brother, but he could not be sure that it was. The detective testified on redirect

that he also showed James's wife the surveillance photo and she said that the

person in the photo could be Tarleton.

Angela Tarleton later testified as a defense witness and stated that she did

not recognize the person in the surveillance photo as her brother. She testified that

she cried when she was shown the photo by the detective because she feared that

she would be evicted from her public housing.

In closing arguments, the State relied on the detective's testimony about the

three non-testifying family members. The State argued: "April Hoffman said that

she recognized the suspect in the surveillance photograph as Ty Tarleton. She did

not want to sign it because she did not want to get involved with the investigation.

That is still an identity. That is still her identifying Ty Tarleton as the person in

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those photographs, the same person that robbed the bank on December 16, 2009.”

It later told the jury to remember what those non-testifying family members said

"when the defense gets up here and says and argues to you that the only people that

are identifying Marvin Tyrone Tarleton are people that have something to gain.”

During deliberations, the jury asked two questions:

1) When was photo (mugshot) JPICS ID 1148849 taken?

2) Can we get sequential order of when all photos were taken?

The court replied, "the only answer I can give you, is that you will have to rely on

your individual and collective memories of the evidence that you saw and heard

and make your decision based on that.”

Tarleton filed pro se motions for mistrial/new trial and for judgment of

acquittal. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Tarleton argued the issue of

having been denied an opportunity to cross-examine the various witnesses who did

not testify but whose out-of-court statements were admitted. The state circuit court

informed Tarleton that it had ruled on the matters, that it was now up to the

appellate court to address the issues, and it denied the motions. On March 10,

2011, the court sentenced Tarleton to 30 years' imprisonment. Tarleton appealed

to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, which issued a per curiam

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affirmance on August 13, 2012. Tarleton v. State, 94 So. 3d 589 (Fla. 1st DCA

2012).

On November 26, 2012, Tarleton filed in the First District Court of Appeal a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. The court denied that petition without discussion. Tarleton v. State, 103

So. 3d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). On January 29, 2013, Tarleton filed in the state

circuit court a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.850. He later filed an amended motion with leave of the

court. The motion raised six total claims, which included, for purposes of this

appeal:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to

inadmissible hearsay from non-testifying witness April Hoffman;

(2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to

inadmissible hearsay from the crime stopper tipster;

(3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to

inadmissible hearsay from Tarleton's brother;

(4) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to

inadmissible hearsay from Tarleton's sister-in-law; and

(6) ineffective assistance of counsel based on the cumulative effect of

the errors and omissions of counsel presented in grounds one, two and

three.

The court denied relief on all grounds.

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The court did make a finding that "the record does not reflect that Defendant had a

prior opportunity to cross-examine April Hoffman.” While addressing ground one,

the state circuit court specifically found

[o]ne of the witnesses who identified the robber was the victim, the

Bank of America teller. The victim testified at trial that she had

identified Defendant from a photo spread approximately two weeks

after the robbery. (Ex. E at 166, 168-76.) During trial, the victim also

identified Defendant as the individual who robbed her, from the photo

spread, and the jury was shown the photograph that the victim selected.

(Ex. E at 176-79.) Further, Defendant's stepmother, niece, and ex-wife

identified Defendant as the individual who had robbed the Bank of

America on November 16, 2009, at trial. (Ex. E at 188-89, 191-96, 206-

21.)

The court further observed that the jury viewed the bank surveillance video and

still photos and Tarleton's booking photograph from his arrest. Although the court

found that April Hoffman's testimony was hearsay, it held that

Ms. Hoffman's statements are inconsequential and far from damaging

when considering the testimony presented at trial in its entirety. The

testimony of the four witnesses at trial who identified Defendant as the

robber - including that of the victim - provided much more in the way

of near overwhelming evidence that Defendant was the robber, than the

few references to Ms. Hoffman's statements made during the course of

the Defendant's trial.

Similarly, the state court found, and the State conceded, that the detective's

testimony about the crime stopper tip was inadmissible hearsay. Relying on the

same evidence it relied on in denying relief on the April Hoffman ineffective

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counsel issue, the court found that prejudice was not established from the

admission of the out-of-court statements of the crime stopper tipster, the brother,

and the sister-in-law. Finally, the state court denied the cumulative error issue,

reasoning that "[b]ecause all of Defendant's grounds for relief have been denied,

Defendant's claim of cumulative error must be similarly rejected.” Tarleton

appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, who again issued a per curiam

affirmance on October 3, 2014. Tarleton v. State, 151 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA

2014).

On June 19, 2015, Tarleton filed in the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The motion raised as grounds relevant to this

appeal:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to inadmissible

hearsay from non-testifying witness April Hoffman; (2) ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to object to inadmissible hearsay from

non-testifying witnesses James and Nynce Tarleton; (3) ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to object to inadmissible hearsay from

non-testifying crime stoppers' witness; (4) ineffective assistance of

counsel based on the cumulative effect of the errors and omissions of

counsel presented in grounds one, two and three; . . . and (6) a Sixth

Amendment Confrontation Clause claim based on Detective John

Venosh's testimony that non-testifying witness April Hoffman

identified Petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime after Ms. Hoffman

viewed photographs taken during the robbery.

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The district court addressed the first three claims together. First, the district court

noted that the state court had properly referenced the Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), standard, and noted that its standard for

prejudice in this context asked if there was a reasonable probability that a different

jury verdict would have resulted. Specifically, in the hearsay context, the state

court had asked the proper question of whether the introduction of the hearsay

evidence as corroborative evidence "'was profoundly damaging'” and the nonhearsay evidence was "'far from overwhelming.'” The district court noted that the

state court found all three to be inadmissible hearsay but that Tarleton had not

established prejudice. This conclusion, the district court stated, was based on the

state court's reliance on the "substantial impact” of the four witnesses who actually

testified at trial and who identified Tarleton as the perpetrator in the bank's

surveillance videotape and still shots. The district court acknowledged that the

trial court "liberally construed the testimony of Elva Braho” when it stated that she

identified the robber but stated that there was "certainly” strong testimony from

Braho describing the robber and verifying that she selected Tarleton from the

photospread. The district court also noted that the trial court relied on the three

witnesses who identified Tarleton from the photos and on the jury's own viewing

of the video and stills as well as Tarleton's photo taken during the booking process.

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Given this evidence, the trial court found no prejudice and the district court held

that this decision was not inconsistent with Strickland. Further, because there was

a qualifying decision by the state court, the district court held that deference must

be given.

Ground Four was the cumulative error claim and the district court rejected it

because the none of the grounds for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel

provided a basis for relief, so the cumulative effect did not provide the foundation

for granting habeas relief. It cited the state court for a similar holding and held that

decision entitled to deference. Ground Six was the Crawford4 claim based on the

detective's statement about April Hoffman's identification of Tarleton. First, the

court held that Tarleton had not procedurally defaulted the claim because he

included two sentences about it in his direct appeal, and the reference to Crawford

put the state appellate court on notice that the Confrontation Clause was involved.

Because the First District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam, the district court

presumed that it adjudicated the claim on the merits because there was no

indication that procedural grounds existed. The petitioner, the district court held,

4 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).

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failed to demonstrate that there was no reasonable ground for the presumed

rejection of the claim. The court returned to the prejudice analysis and determined

the error was harmless.

This Court granted a Certificate of Appealability on three issues:

Whether Mr. Tarleton is entitled to habeas relief on his claims that

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to

object, on Confrontation Clause and state law grounds, to the

admission and use of hearsay statements from three non-testifying

witnesses—April Hoffman, James Tarleton, and Nynce Tarleton—and

an anonymous tipster;

Whether Mr. Tarleton is entitled to habeas relief on his claim that the

trial court erroneously admitted April Hoffman's out-of-court

statements in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause;

Whether Mr. Tarleton is entitled to habeas relief on his claim that the

errors listed in grounds (1) and (2) cumulatively denied him the right

to a fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel–Admission of Hearsay Statements

Tarleton argues that the district court erred when it accepted the state court's

conclusion of no prejudice when his attorney failed to object to the introduction of

hearsay statements from three declarants. He argues that the court based this

conclusion on the state court's unreasonable fact finding that the bank teller

identified Tarleton as the perpetrator and reliance on three witnesses who viewed

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the surveillance video and stated the person was Tarleton despite not having seen

him for several years. Tarleton also points to physical evidence such as DNA and

fingerprints that excluded him. The evidence, when properly construed, he argues,

was not overwhelming.

Under well-established law, a person in custody pursuant to a state court

judgment cannot be granted habeas relief in federal court on a claim that was

"adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state court

decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”

§ 2254(d)(1), or unless the state court decision "resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2). The primary focus of Tarleton's

attempt to avoid the preemptive force of § 2254 with respect to his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim relies on § 2254(d)(2) and his argument that the Rule

3.850 judge's rejection of his claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts

because that judge unreasonably found that the bank teller, Ms. Braho, identified

Tarleton as the perpetrator. Tarleton also argues that the Rule 3.850 judge made an

unreasonable application of the clearly established Strickland law. His argument

in that regard relies primarily on his view that the Rule 3.850 judge unreasonably

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found that Ms. Braho had identified him, but he also argues that the several

hearsay errors were prejudicial and contributed to making the state court decision

an unreasonable application of Strickland's prejudice prong.

A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application” of Supreme

Court precedent if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle

but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable

manner. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1439 (2005). In

such a case, the decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous—it must be

"objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S. Ct. 1166,

1174 (2003). Thus, to prevail the petitioner must show that the state court's ruling

"was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 135 S. Ct. 770, 786-87

(2011).

In applying § 2254(d)(2)—a decision based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the state court proceedings—

the Supreme Court "requires that we accord the state trial court substantial

deference.” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015).

"If '[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in

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question, on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's . . .

determination.'” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849 (2010)).

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a habeas

petitioner must show both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that

counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

S. Ct. at 2064. To prove prejudice under Strickland, a petitioner "must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

A "reasonable probability” does not mean that counsel's performance "more likely

than not altered the outcome.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175, 106 S. Ct.

988, 998 (1986). Rather, a "reasonable probability” is a "probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. Further, the burden is heavier still when a federal court is reviewing a state

court:

As difficult as it is to prevail on an ineffective assistance prejudice issue

in the first court to decide it, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 makes it even harder to succeed on that issue in a

federal habeas proceeding after a state court has ruled that the petitioner

failed to show prejudice. To obtain habeas relief, the petitioner must

show that the state court's ruling "resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

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established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). That is a highly deferential

standard that is intentionally difficult to meet. . . .

To overcome AEDPA deference under § 2254(d)(1), the petitioner

must "show that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended

in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”

[Virginia v. LeBlanc, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017)] "[I]f

some fairminded jurists could agree with the state court's decision,

although others might disagree, federal habeas relief must be denied.”

Holsey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1257 (11th

Cir. 2012).

Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1348-49 (11th Cir.

2019) (footnote omitted) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

We agree with the district court that the conclusion of the Rule 3.850 state

court that Tarleton could not show prejudice under the Strickland standard was

neither an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent nor an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Undertaking the § 2254(d)(2) inquiry

first, and applying that deferential standard of review, we cannot conclude that the

Rule 3.850 court's statement that Ms. Braho identified Tarleton as the perpetrator

was an unreasonable determination of fact in light of the evidence presented in

state court. She testified that the perpetrator was 5'8”, clean-shaven, wore glasses,

and that she got a good look at his eyes. She testified that she picked Tarleton's

photo out of the photospread two weeks after the robbery because "[i]t was the

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eyes that gave it away more than anything else,” while conceding that enough time

had passed that she was not sure that she could recognize the person who robbed

her. At trial, she again selected the photo of Tarleton as "the photograph that

depicts the individual that had the eyes that you were talking about.” She then

watched the video and narrated, with the questions from the prosecutor, what

happened. On cross-examination, she conceded that she had described the

perpetrator as "slim” to the detectives and as weighing about 170. She also

conceded that she had told the detective that she was not positive in her

identification of Tarleton. She thought the photo had the same eyes, but looked

heavier, and the face and chin in the photo looked heavier and wider from the nose

down. While certainly this is not an unequivocal identification of Tarleton as the

perpetrator, her confidence about the eyes came through in the testimony. And she

picked out Tarleton's picture from the photopack while excluding the other five.

Although she admitted on cross-examination that she could not be positive about

her identification, and although she noted some differences, we cannot conclude

that a reasonable jurist might not deem her testimony an identification. Even if

"reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in

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question, on habeas review, that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's . . .

determination.” Brumfield, 576 U.S. at 314, 135 S. Ct. at 2277 (cleaned up).5

Second, we undertake the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry—whether the state court

decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. We have examined the

evidence—the trial witnesses (i.e., the testimony of Ms. Braho, the stepmother

Joyce Tarleton, Ashley Hoffman, and the ex-wife Swierz), as well as the video and

still photos which the jury itself viewed—and we have compared that evidence to

the weak, cumulative hearsay that Tarleton challenges. We cannot conclude that

the Rule 3.850 court's decision—that there was not a reasonable probability that

the result would have been different if the hearsay evidence had been challenged

and excluded—was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

We discussed above the testimony of the victim-teller Ms. Braho. The three

5 We follow the Supreme Court in Wood, 558 U.S. at 301, 130 S. Ct. at 849, and assume

arguendo but decline to decide, that "the factual determination at issue should be reviewed . . .

only under § 2254(d)(2) and not under § 2254(e)(1).” Because the Rule 3.850 judge's

determination of the factual issue challenged by Tarleton "was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings[,] [w]e

therefore do not need to decide whether that determination should be reviewed under the

arguably more deferential standard set out in § 2254(e)(1).” Id.

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relatives who testified at the trial—Joyce Tarleton, Ashley Hoffman, and

Franchesca Swierz—provided strong evidence that Tarleton was the man in the

surveillance video and still photos derived therefrom. Joyce Tarleton, his

stepmother, had known Tarleton since childhood, and was "pretty sure” that

Tarleton was the man in the surveillance video and stills. She recognized the

briefcase he carried and the blue shirt he wore. Ashley Hoffman testified that she

recognized Tarleton as the perpetrator in the news coverage of the robbery. She

testified that she recognized Tarleton in the surveillance video, and she recognized

his smile, the briefcase, the trucker-style hat, and his shirt. Tarleton's ex-wife,

Swierz, identified Tarleton as the perpetrator, testifying that the person in the

surveillance video looked like Tarleton, and told the detective that "it absolutely

was him.”

By contrast, the detective's report of the hearsay declarants was equivocal

and not likely to have had a significant impact on the jury. Tarleton's brother

James merely told the detective that the photo looked like Tarleton but he was not

sure. The report with respect to James' wife was similar. Although April Hoffman

told the detective she recognized Tarleton, she said she did not want to be involved

and she provided no details or reasons that might make her testimony influential

with the jury. Unlike trial witnesses Joyce Tarleton and Ashley Hoffman, she

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mentioned recognizing no details like the briefcase, the blue shirt, or the smile that

would tend to make her testimony persuasive to the jury. With respect to the

crimestopper's tip, the jury likely surmised that came from one of the trial

witnesses, and it would not have had much impact on the jury. By contrast, strong

evidence was properly before the jury in the form of the three trial witnesses who

identified persuasive reasons why their recognition of Tarleton was sound and

whose association with Tarleton was extensive and intimate (at least with respect

to his stepmother, Joyce Tarleton, and ex-wife, Swierz). Significantly, there was

also the strong evidence of the surveillance video itself, as well as the still photos,

which the jury viewed. The jury could make its own identification, comparing the

photos and video to Tarleton. From the jury questions about the photos after

deliberations began, it is clear that the photos were viewed as significant evidence

by the jury.

In short, the hearsay testimony challenged by Tarleton was brief and

cumulative, and weak in comparison to the evidence properly submitted to the jury

from the trial witnesses and the surveillance video and stills. Especially in light of

our narrow standard of review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1), we cannot conclude that

the state court decision—that Tarleton has not shown there was a reasonable

probability of a different result if the hearsay evidence had been challenged and

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excluded—was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The

Rule 3.850 judge correctly identified the governing legal principle—Strickland v.

Washington—and her application of Strickland to the facts was not "so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at

103, 135 S. Ct. at 786-87.

B. Confrontation Clause

Tarleton argues that the detective's hearsay testimony relating what April

Hoffman said violated the Confrontation Clause because the declarant's statements

were testimonial statements made in anticipation of litigation because they were

made to law enforcement during an investigation.6

Further, the State did not

establish that the declarant was unavailable for testimony. Tarleton argues that the

district court erred as a matter of law in finding that the state courts' denial of the

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Crawford.

6 We granted a certificate of appealability with respect to only one Confrontation Clause

claim—detective Venosh's testimony that April Hoffman told him that the bank's surveillance

photo looked like Tarleton but that she did not want to get involved.

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The State replies that this issue was not exhausted and thus is procedurally

barred. We agree with the district court that Tarleton exhausted this claim. In

Taylor v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 760 F.3d 1284, 1295

(2014), we deemed a claim fairly presented when the petitioner stated he was

entitled to introduce testimony under the Sixth Amendment and twice cited to

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973). Here, Tarleton

argued, in his initial brief on direct appeal from the state court's judgment, that

admission of the detective's testimony about April Hoffman violated the

Confrontation Clause, with a reference to Crawford. This is sufficient, under

Taylor, to have raised the claim with respect to April Hoffman's statement.

However, the First District Court of Appeal rejected Tarleton's direct appeal per

curiam (i.e., without opinion).

There is no indication that any state court addressed this issue and stated

reasons for rejecting it. "When a federal claim has been presented to a state court

and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court

adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law

procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99, 131 S. Ct. at 784-

85. Only if there is reason to believe another explanation for the state court's

decision is more likely can this presumption be overcome. Id. at 99-100, 131 S.

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Ct. at 785. Tarleton argues the instruction in the recent Supreme Court case

Wilson v. Sellers, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018)—that we "look through” to

the last related case that provided a relevant rationale—means that because there is

no such relevant case, we cannot defer to a presumed state court decision.

However, the Court expressly rejected that argument in Wilson, distinguishing

Richter because in that case, "there was no lower court opinion to look to.” __

U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1195. As in Richter, in this case too, there was no lower

court decision to look to because there was no contemporaneous objection and thus

no ruling by the trial judge. Accordingly, we follow the instruction in Richter and

assume an on-the-merits ruling by the First District Court of Appeal. 7



Tarleton thus finds himself in the following situation. His Confrontation

Clause claim was rejected on the merits by the First District Court of Appeal, and

there has been no statement of reasons by any state court for rejecting the claim.

7 Following Richter, the district court presumed that the First District Court of Appeal

rejected Tarleton's Confrontation Clause claim on the merits, holding that there was "an absence

of any indication or state law procedural principles to the contrary.” D.C. opinion, Docket 21, at

25-26. Tarleton does not challenge the district court's holding that the state appellate court ruled

on the merits and not on the basis of a procedural default, and thus has waived any such

challenge. Of course, Tarleton would have no incentive to prefer procedural default to a ruling

on the merits because Tarleton could not satisfy the cause and prejudice requirement to

overcome the procedural bar which would have faced him in federal habeas court.

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Under Richter, Tarleton's burden is to demonstrate that there was no reasonable

basis for the decision of the First District Court of Appeal to deny his claim. See

Richter, 562 U.S. at 98, 131 S. Ct. at 784 ("Where a state court's decision is

unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met

by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”).

Tarleton cannot satisfy this burden because the First District Court of Appeal

could reasonably have concluded that the admission of the detective's hearsay

testimony of what April Hoffman told him was harmless error. In evaluating

whether there was a reasonable basis for the state court decision, we apply the

standard enunciated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S. Ct. 1710,

1722 (1993), which held that error is harmless unless it "had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.”8

"Under this

standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional

8 See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007) ("We hold that in

§ 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a statecourt criminal trial under the 'substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in Brecht, supra,

whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness

under the 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman[ v. California],

386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 [(1967].”); Raheem v. GDCP Warden, 995 F.3d 895, 937 (11th Cir.

2021).

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claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can

establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice.'” Id. This Tarleton cannot do.

As discussed above, the hearsay attributed by the detective to April Hoffman

was not only cumulative to, but was also much weaker than, the strong evidence

provided by the three trial witnesses and the photos and surveillance video that the

jurors themselves could compare to the defendant Tarleton sitting before them.

April's brief comment not only expressed lack of interest, but also was

accompanied by no reasons or details that might have made her opinion influential

with the jury. By contrast, the testimony of the three trial witnesses was

accompanied by numerous details that would have made their identification of

Tarleton persuasive to the jury. Also, there is no indication that April Hoffman

had an extensive association with Tarleton as had his stepmother, Joyce Tarleton,

or an intimate association as had the ex-wife, Swierz. And it is hard to imagine

that April's brief comment had much impact on the jury which had the surveillance

video and still photos to compare to Tarleton himself. It is not only probable that

the video and photos were the most powerful evidence before the jury, we actually

know from the jury's questions that they were foremost in the minds of the jurors.

We cannot conclude that no "fair-minded jurists” sitting in the shoes of the

First District Court of Appeal on Tarleton's direct appeal could have concluded

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that the Confrontation Clause claim was harmless. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101, 131

S. Ct. at 786. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Tarleton has met his burden

under Richter to show that "there was no reasonable basis for the state court to

deny relief.” Id. at 98, 131 S. Ct. at 784.

C. Cumulative Error

Tarleton argues that the cumulative effect of these incidents of ineffective

assistance of counsel and violation of the Confrontation Clause prejudiced him and

warrant vacating his conviction. The State argues that cumulative error is not a

cognizable claim in federal habeas petitions because the Supreme Court has not

held that distinct constitutional claims can be aggregated.

In this case, we need not reach the issue of whether cumulative error is

cognizable in habeas proceedings. We can assume arguendo, although we

expressly do not decide, that the prejudicial effect of Tarleton's alleged errors can

be aggregated. Tarleton presented three hearsay ineffective assistance of counsel

incidents together with one Confrontation Clause argument that all had very weak

prejudicial effect on the jury. However, as discussed more fully above, we cannot

conclude that Tarleton can satisfy his burden of avoiding the preemptive effect of

the state court decisions and of establishing prejudice.

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For the foregoing reasons, we reject Tarleton’s § 2254 petition. The

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED