Tam Thanh Nguyen v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Jared Bromberg

A claim that a search was unconstitutional accrues when the

officer conducts the search, not when a court later declares it

unconstitutional. So the statute of limitations runs from the

time of the search, not the time of the court decision.

Here, Tam Thanh Nguyen sued Pennsylvania State Trooper

Jared Bromberg for a 2012 search and arrest, but only after a

2015 Pennsylvania court decision held that search unconstitutional.

Nguyen’s suit thus arrives more than a year late and is

time-barred, so we will affirm.

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I. FACTS

In January 2012, Nguyen caught a ride home from a New

Year’s party with his friend, David Kung. Around 3:15 a.m.,

Trooper Bromberg and his partner clocked the car driving 18

miles per hour over the speed limit. After tailing the car for a

bit, they pulled it over.

Bromberg checked Kung’s license and registration as well

as Nguyen’s ID. Bromberg asked Kung to step out of the car,

talked with him briefly, gave him a warning, and said he was

free to go. Both started to return to their cars. But the trooper

had second thoughts because Kung was nervous and because

his check of Nguyen’s ID revealed his history of drug arrests.

So Bromberg turned around and began to question Kung again.

Bromberg asked for permission to search the car, and Kung

consented. Bromberg then asked Nguyen to step out of the car

and asked him to consent to a pat-down. Nguyen consented.

The pat-down revealed a cellphone, a large bundle of cash, and

small baggies of pills. Nguyen admitted that the pills were OxyContin.

So Bromberg arrested Nguyen. A search incident to

arrest turned up bags of powder cocaine and jars of crack cocaine.

Pennsylvania prosecuted him, and Nguyen moved to suppress

the drugs. Commonwealth v. Nguyen, 116 A.3d 657, 662

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). The trial court denied the motion, but the

appeals court reversed, holding that the search violated the

Fourth Amendment. Id. at 669. The court reasoned that, by

reengaging Kung, Bromberg had seized him anew, and that this

second seizure required its own justification (beyond the initial

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speeding violation). Id. It found no reasonable suspicion for the

second seizure, so it held the seizure and resulting search of

Nguyen unconstitutional. Id. Pennsylvania then dismissed the

charges.

A few months later, in September 2015, Nguyen sued Bromberg

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserted that, by stopping the

car, searching him, and arresting him, Bromberg had (1) conducted

an unreasonable search and seizure, and (2) made a

false arrest, both in violation of Nguyen's Fourth Amendment

rights.

The District Court granted Bromberg’s motion for summary

judgment. Ngyuen v. Pennsylvania, No. 15-5082, 2017 WL

5113229, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2017). It reasoned that Bromberg’s

search and arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment;

that even if it did not, qualified immunity applied; and

that the statute of limitations barred Nguyen’s claims. Id. at *4.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Thomas

v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).

II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM THE TIME

OF THE SEARCH

We need not address Nguyen’s Fourth Amendment or qualified

immunity claims because his suit is untimely.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, but

borrows the statute of limitations from state personal-injury

torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). So Pennsylvania’s

two-year limitations period for personal injuries governs.

Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 Pa.

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Cons. Stat. § 5524(2). Nguyen thus had two years to file this

suit.

Up to this point, the parties agree. But Nguyen argues that

the limitations period began to run when the Pennsylvania

court held the search unconstitutional, not when the search

happened. We disagree.

Federal law, not state law, determines when a limitations period

begins to run. Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Under federal law,

the statute of limitations runs from the moment that a claim

accrues. Id. And a claim accrues when the last act needed to

complete the tort occurs. Id. For a search, that is the moment

of the search. For a false arrest, that is the moment when legal

process justifies the detention or, absent legal process, the moment

of release. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390-91.

Here, the last act was Bromberg’s search of Nguyen, not the

Pennsylvania court decision invalidating the search. And Nguyen

was charged and held over for legal process that same day.

So the causes of action accrued, and the limitations period began

to run, in January 2012. Two years from then is January

2014. So Nguyen’s suit, filed in September 2015, came a year

and a half too late.

Finally, Nguyen has not sought to toll the limitations period.

So his claim is time-barred. We will affirm.