Mary B. Valencia v. City of Springfield, Illinois

Plaintiffs allege the City of Springfield

(“Springfield” or “the City”) unlawfully discriminated

against three disabled individuals when it ruled they could

no longer occupy a single-family residence located within 600

feet of an existing disabled group home. Finding that plaintiffs

possessed a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits,

the district court granted them a preliminary injunction

and enjoined the City from initiating eviction proceedings

2 No. 17-2773

while this case is pending. The City appeals. For the reasons

stated below, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Like most municipalities, Springfield’s zoning code (“the

Code”) divides the city into multiple zoning districts, including

residential districts. Springfield, Ill., Code of Ordinances

§ 155.004. The primary permitted use within residential districts

is “single-family detached residences.” Id. § 155.016. The

Code defines “family” as:

One or more persons each related to one another

by blood, marriage, or adoption, or is a

group of not more than five persons not all so

related occupying a single dwelling unit which

is not a boardinghouse or lodging house as defined

in this section.

Id. § 155.001.

In addition to single-family detached residences, the Code

also allows certain residential districts to be used for “family

care residence[s].” Id. § 155.016. The Code defines a “family

care residence” as:

A single dwelling unit occupied on a relatively

permanent basis in a family-like environment

by a group of no more than six unrelated persons

with disabilities, plus paid professional

support staff provided by a sponsoring agency

either living with the residents on a 24-hour basis

or present whenever residents with disabilities

are present at the dwelling, and complies

No. 17-2773 3

with the zoning regulations for the district in

which the site is located.

Id. § 155.001. The Code imposes additional restrictions on

family care residences. In relevant part, such residences must

be “located upon a zoning lot which is more than 600 feet

from the property line of any other such facility.” Id. § 155.053.

According to the Code, this is to ensure that family care residences,

“which operate most effectively in residential environments,

do not adversely affect those environments

through over concentration.” Id.

Plaintiff Individual Advocacy Group, Inc. (“IAG”) is a

non-profit organization that provides residential services to

adults with disabilities, including assistance in dressing, food

preparation, shopping, home maintenance, and cleaning.

Such services allow disabled individuals to live in family-like

settings in typical residential communities, a configuration

commonly referred to as Community Integrated Living Arrangements

(“CILAs”). Notably, unlike other residential service

agencies, IAG does not own or operate group homes. Rather,

IAG clients (or their legal guardians) rent individual

dwellings on their own behalf, and then IAG provides inhome

support.1

In 2012, IAG contacted several property owners in

Springfield about providing housing for CILAs. In August

2013, Christine and Robyn Hovey agreed to rent a home located

at 2328 Noble Avenue (”the Noble home”) to three IAG

1 Although IAG clients (or their legal guardians) are technically the

lessees of a particular residence, IAG enters into written agreements with

landlords to pay any security deposit and, if necessary, supply a new disabled

tenant in the event a lessee departs the home.

4 No. 17-2773

clients. The Noble home is located in a residential district

that allows both single-family detached residences and family

care residences. It is a one-story ranch house that resembles

other dwelling units in the neighborhood. The district

court found there is nothing about the exterior of the Noble

home that indicates it is inhabited by disabled individuals.

Although IAG employees are present any time the home is

occupied, they do not drive marked vehicles, and there are

generally no more than two staff cars present at any time.

In March 2014, after the Hoveys completed significant

renovations,2 IAG clients J.M., J.D., and former plaintiff

A.D.3 moved into the Noble home. Each possessed a substantial

physical or mental impairment, and two were non-ambulatory.

At the time, A.D. was a sixty-two year-old male

who was confined to a wheelchair and almost completely

nonverbal.

Unbeknownst to the Hoveys, IAG, or its clients, Sparc—

another non-profit organization supporting those with developmental

disabilities—had been operating a family care

residence (“the Sparc home”) across the street from the Noble

home for approximately twelve years. Like the Noble

home, the Sparc home is indistinguishable from other homes

in the area. However, according to the City, the property

2 These renovations included, inter alia, widening doorways, enlarging

two bathrooms, and lowering kitchen counters to make the home wheelchair

accessible.

3 A.D. died on September 12, 2017. Plaintiff Mary B. Valencia, who is

A.D.’s sister and legal guardian, originally filed this suit on A.D.’s behalf.

On October 31, 2017, the district court terminated A.D. as a party and substituted

Valencia.

No. 17-2773 5

lines of the Noble home and the Sparc home are separated

by only 157 feet.

In August 2016, the City notified the Hoveys that a complaint

had been filed because the Noble home was located

within 600 feet of the Sparc home, in violation of § 155.053 of

the Code. The City thus informed the Hoveys that the Noble

home residents would be evicted unless the Hoveys applied

for a Conditional Permitted Use (“CPU”). Under the Code,

“[a]ny family care residence … not in compliance with

[§ 155.053] … may seek a conditional permitted use under …

the zoning ordinance.” Id. To qualify for a CPU, a family care

residence must establish that: (1) “the proposed location and

use will not have any adverse impact upon residents of

nearby facilities when located within 600 feet of another such

facility”; and (2) “[t]he proposed location will not have any

detrimental affect [sic] upon existing privacy, light or environment

of surrounding residences.” Id. § 155.211.1.

On October 7, 2016, the Hoveys and IAG submitted a

joint CPU application. On November 10, 2016, the Springfield-

Sangamon County Regional Planning Commission

(“the County Commission”) recommended the CPU be denied

because “[t]he evidence provided in the petition [did]

not provide sufficient detail to allow staff to make a reasonable

determination whether the design and method of operation

of the proposed use [would] minimize the adverse effects

on the character of the surrounding area.”

On November 16, 2016, the Springfield Zoning and Planning

Commission (“the Springfield Commission”) held a

public hearing. At the hearing, Dr. Charlene Bennett, IAG’s

executive director, testified that when the Noble home

opened, IAG was not aware of the Sparc home across the

6 No. 17-2773

street. She further testified that, except for one instance in

early 2014 when a Sparc resident entered the Noble home

without supervision, the residents of the Noble home have

had no contact with the residents of the Sparc home.

Plaintiffs also presented testimony from Daniel Lauber, a

land use planning and zoning expert. Lauber testified that

because the Noble home was leased by IAG’s clients, not

IAG itself, the City should treat its residents as a “family”

under § 155.001 and classify the home as a single-family detached

residence rather than a family care residence. Lauber

further testified that, even if the home was deemed a family

care residence, a CPU was warranted because the home was

consistent with the City’s comprehensive plans and did not

adversely affect the surrounding community.

In response, certain residents of the 2300 block of Noble

Avenue asked that the CPU be denied because caregivers

“rac[ed] up and down their block to get to work on time,”

“listen[ed] to … loud music in their vehicles,” “park[ed] on

the wrong side of the street,” and blocked driveways and

sidewalks.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Springfield Commission

voted 4-3 to recommend denial of the CPU. The

Springfield City Council considered the recommendations of

the County Commission and the Springfield Commission on

December 20, 2016. Once again, IAG requested the City either

deem the Noble home a single-family detached residence

or grant a CPU. Following a public comment period,

the City Council voted 8-2 to affirm the Springfield Commission’s

recommendation and deny the CPU.

No. 17-2773 7

B. Procedural Background

On December 22, 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the

United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.

Plaintiffs alleged the City discriminated against the Noble

home residents on the basis of their disabilities, in violation of

the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31, Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213,

and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

In addition to monetary damages, plaintiffs sought an order

directing the City to grant their requested CPU and permanently

refrain from treating the Noble home as a non-conforming

use under the Code.

Plaintiffs’ raised multiple theories of liability. First, they

claimed the Code facially discriminates against disabled individuals

because it imposes a 600-foot spacing requirement on

unrelated disabled persons living in family care residences,

but not on unrelated non-disabled persons living in singlefamily

dwellings.4 Second, they argued that even if the 600-

foot spacing requirement is facially neutral, it has a disparate

impact on persons with disabilities. Third, they claimed that

by refusing to grant the Noble home a CPU, the City failed to

make a reasonable accommodation.

4 Plaintiffs’ theory relied upon the interaction of the terms “family”

and “family care residence” in the Code. Interpreting these two ordinance

provisions, plaintiffs contended that five or fewer unrelated, non-disabled

individuals can constitute a “family” and thus live in a single-family detached

residence (without a 600-foot spacing requirement), but five unrelated,

disabled persons must live in a family care residence.

8 No. 17-2773

On January 11, 2017, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction

to enjoin the City from instituting eviction proceedings

against the Noble home residents during the pendency

of the case. They limited the bases of their motion to their theories

of disparate treatment and reasonable accommodation.5

In response, the City challenged plaintiffs’ motion on only

one issue: whether plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood

of success on the merits. On August 3, 2017, the district

court granted plaintiffs’ motion, finding that plaintiffs possessed

a reasonable likelihood of success under both theories

of liability.6 This appeal followed.7

5 Plaintiffs did this because, in their view, the City’s zoning code is not

facially neutral. See Larkin v. Mich. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 290 (6th

Cir. 1996) (noting that cases involving facially discriminatory statutes present

cases of disparate treatment, not disparate impact).

6 The court further found that the Noble home residents would incur

irreparable harm because “it would be very difficult” for them “to find a

suitable residence” before eviction proceedings were complete. Additionally,

“any post-trial relief would come too late to avoid the injuries that

would result if preliminary injunctive relief [was] not granted.” Finally,

the court concluded that a preliminary injunction “would serve the public

interest.”

7 The City claims it does not appeal “because it desires to immediately

remove the Plaintiffs from the Noble home.” Rather, it believes the district

court’s interpretation of the Code “effectively renders moot any factual

determination that might be made” after a trial on the merits. According

to the City, if the district court’s interpretation stands, “it is unlikely that

any set of facts would save the ordinance from violating the FHA.”

No. 17-2773 9

II. Discussion

A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard

“An equitable, interlocutory form of relief, ‘a preliminary

injunction is an exercise of a very far-reaching power, never

to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.’” Girl

Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of United States of

Am., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Roland

Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 389 (7th Cir.

1984)); see also Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd.

of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017) (“A preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary remedy.”). “It is never awarded

as a matter of right.” Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1044. “To determine

whether a situation warrants such a remedy, a district court

engages in an analysis that proceeds in two distinct phases: a

threshold phase and a balancing phase.” Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d

at 1085–86.

“To survive the threshold phase, a party seeking a preliminary

injunction must satisfy three requirements.” Id. at 1086.

It must show that: (1) “absent a preliminary injunction, it will

suffer irreparable harm in the interim period prior to final resolution

of its claims”; (2) “traditional legal remedies would be

inadequate”; and (3) “its claim has some likelihood of succeeding

on the merits.” Id.

If the moving party satisfies each of these requirements,

the court “proceeds to the balancing phase of the analysis.”

Id. In the balancing phase, “the court weighs the irreparable

harm that the moving party would endure without the protection

of the preliminary injunction against any irreparable

harm the nonmoving party would suffer if the court were to

grant the requested relief.” Id. “In so doing, the court employs

10 No. 17-2773

a sliding scale approach: ‘[t]he more likely the plaintiff is to

win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in his

favor; the less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his

favor.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roland Mach., 749

F.2d at 387). “Where appropriate, this balancing process

should also encompass any effects that granting or denying

the preliminary injunction would have on nonparties (something

courts have termed the ‘public interest’).” Id. (quoting

Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1986)).

As stated above, the City contests only a single aspect of

the preliminary injunction inquiry: whether plaintiffs are

likely to succeed on the merits. “A party moving for preliminary

injunctive relief need not demonstrate a likelihood of absolute

success on the merits. Instead, he must only show that

his chances to succeed on his claims are ‘better than negligible.’”

Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Cooper v. Salazar, 196

F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999)). Although “[t]his is a low threshold,”

id., it “does not mean … that applicants for interim injunctive

relief with relatively weak cases will always obtain

injunctions.” Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999).

“If it is plain that the party seeking the preliminary injunction

has no case on the merits, the injunction should be refused

regardless of the balance of harms.” Green River Bottling Co. v.

Green River Corp., 997 F.2d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 1993).

In reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction,

this court “examines legal conclusions de novo, findings

of fact for clear error, and the balancing of harms for abuse of

discretion.” Coronado v. Valleyview Pub. Sch. Dist. 365-U, 537

F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1044.

In other words, “[a] district court abuses its discretion when,

in conducting its preliminary injunction analysis, it commits

No. 17-2773 11

a clear error of fact or an error of law.” Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d at

1086. “Absent such errors, we accord a district court’s decisions

during the balancing phase of the analysis great deference.”

Id.; see also Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 662

(7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e give substantial deference to the court’s

weighing of evidence and balancing of the various equitable

factors.”).

B. The Statutes at Issue

The FHA, passed in 1968, “was enacted ‘to provide, within

constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the

United States.’” Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of

Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 3601). Although the original Act only prohibited discrimination

on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin,

the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988 (“FHAA”) extended

FHA protections to persons with disabilities. See Pub.

L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619. The FHA makes it unlawful

“[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make

unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because

of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).

Similarly, Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,

be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. § 12132.

Finally, under the Rehabilitation Act, “[n]o otherwise

qualified individual with a disability … shall, solely by reason

of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,

12 No. 17-2773

be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”

29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Importantly, all three statutes apply to municipal zoning

decisions. See Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465

F.3d 737, 752 n.12 (7th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Oconomowoc, 300

F.3d at 782. A plaintiff may prove a violation of the FHA,

ADA, or Rehabilitation Act by showing: (1) disparate treatment;

(2) disparate impact; or (3) a refusal to make a reasonable

accommodation. Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v.

City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2002). For each respective

theory, the same analysis generally applies under all

three statutes. See id. at 48–53.

C. Reasonable Accommodation

The district court found that plaintiffs possessed a reasonable

likelihood of success under theories of both intentional

discrimination and reasonable accommodation. We need not

address both issues here. “[W]e may affirm on any basis that

appears in the record,” see Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957,

965 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012), and plaintiffs’ reasonable accommodation

claim offers a sufficient avenue for affirming the district

court’s ruling.8

8 Although the City appealed in hopes of resolving the proper interpretation

of its Code, we believe such a ruling would be best made with

the assistance of a full record. The City’s fear that the district court’s preliminary

interpretation “renders moot any factual determination that

might be made” at trial is overstated. “[T]he granting of a preliminary injunction

is not a decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s suit.” Ayres v. City

of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997). Rather, “[i]t is merely a decision

that the suit has enough merit—which need not be great merit—to

justify an order that will freeze the situation, in the plaintiff’s favor, for

No. 17-2773 13

The FHAA requires public entities “to reasonably accommodate

a disabled person by making changes in rules, policies,

practices or services as is necessary to provide that person

with access to housing that is equal to that of those who

are not disabled.” Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of

Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2003); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 3604(f)(3)(B). “Although the plain language of the FHAA

provides little guidance concerning the reach of its accommodation

requirement, the contours of the obligation have been

given substantial elaboration by this court and other courts of

appeals.” Wis. Cmty. Servs., 465 F.3d at 749. “The basic elements

of an FHAA accommodation claim are well-settled.” Id.

“The FHAA requires accommodation if such accommodation

(1) is reasonable, and (2) necessary, (3) to afford a handicapped

person the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a

dwelling.” Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 783.9

“Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable or not

is a highly fact-specific inquiry and requires balancing the

needs of the parties.” Id. at 784. “An accommodation is reasonable

if it is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to

such time as it may take to determine whether the suit is, or is not, meritorious.”

Id. “The propriety of preliminary relief and resolution of the merits

are … ‘significantly different’ issues,” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 721 n.10 (2007) (quoting Univ. of Tex.

v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 393 (1981)), and therefore “findings made at the

preliminary injunction stage do not bind the district court as the case progresses.”

Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 782 (7th Cir.

2011).

9 As stated above, the requirements for reasonable accommodation

under the FHAA are the same as those under the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act. See Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 783; Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d

492, 497 (7th Cir. 1996).

14 No. 17-2773

implement it.” Id. On the other hand, “[a]n accommodation is

unreasonable if it imposes undue financial or administrative

burdens or requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of

the program.” Id.

Some costs related to reasonableness “may be objective

and easily ascertainable.” Wis. Cmty. Servs., 465 F.3d at 752.

For example, “some governmental costs associated with the

specific program at issue may be a matter of simply looking

at a balance sheet.” Id. Other costs “may be more subjective

and require that the court demonstrate a good deal of wisdom

in appreciating the intangible but very real human costs associated

with the disability in question.” Id. This refers to “those

intangible values of community life that are very important if

that community is to thrive and is to address the needs of its

citizenry.” Id. Of particular relevance here, “[a] zoning waiver

is unreasonable if it is so ‘at odds with the purposes behind

the rule that it would be a fundamental and unreasonable

change.’” Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 784 (quoting Dadian v. Vill.

of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2001)).

“Whether the requested accommodation is necessary requires

a ‘showing that the desired accommodation will affirmatively

enhance a disabled plaintiff’s quality of life by

ameliorating the effects of the disability.’” Dadian, 269 F.3d at

838 (quoting Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1995)).

“In other words, the plaintiffs must show that without the required

accommodation they will be denied the equal opportunity

to live in a residential neighborhood.” Oconomowoc, 300

F.3d at 784. “This has been described by courts essentially as

a causation inquiry.” Wis. Cmty. Servs., 465 F.3d at 749.

No. 17-2773 15

Finally, “[t]he ‘equal opportunity’ element limits the accommodation

duty so that not every rule that creates a general

inconvenience or expense to the disabled needs to be

modified.” Id.

Instead, the statute requires only accommodations

necessary to ameliorate the effect of the

plaintiff’s disability so that she may compete

equally with the non-disabled in the housing

market. We have enforced this limitation by

asking whether the rule in question, if left unmodified,

hurts “handicapped people by reason

of their handicap, rather than … by virtue of what

they have in common with other people, such as

a limited amount of money to spend on housing.”

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hemisphere Bldg. Co., Inc.

v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1999)). In the

context of a zoning waiver, “‘equal opportunity’ means the

opportunity to choose to live in a residential neighborhood.”

Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 784.

“The burden is on the plaintiffs to show that the accommodation

it seeks is reasonable on its face.” Id. at 783. “Once

the plaintiffs have made this prima facie showing, the defendant

must come forward to demonstrate unreasonableness or

undue hardship in the particular circumstances.” Id.

This burden-shifting analysis applies to the

“necessary” and “equal opportunity” elements

of the requirement as well, as “a plaintiff is in

the best position to show what is necessary to

16 No. 17-2773

afford its clients (i.e., the handicapped population

that it wishes to serve) an equal opportunity

to use and enjoy housing, [while] a defendant

municipality is in the best position to

provide evidence concerning what is reasonable

or unreasonable within the context of the zoning

scheme.”

Id. at 783 n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting Lapid-Laurel,

L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 458 (3d Cir.

2002)).

Here, the CPU sought by plaintiffs would afford the Noble

Home residents an equal opportunity to establish a residential

home. See Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 784. “Often, a community-

based residential facility provides the only means by

which disabled persons can live in a residential neighborhood,

either because they need more supportive services, for

financial reasons, or both.” Id. Thus, “[w]hen a zoning authority

refuses to reasonably accommodate these small group living

facilities, it denies disabled persons an equal opportunity

to live in the community of their choice.” Id.

The City counters that plaintiffs are not seeking an equal

opportunity to enjoy a dwelling. Interpreting the definition of

“family” found in § 155.001 of the Code, the City claims “there

is no provision under [the City’s] zoning code for three unrelated

non-disabled adults to live in a single family home.”10

10 According to the City, the phrase “a group of not more than five

persons not all so related” in the Code’s definition of “family” only means

that “a group of some related and some unrelated persons not exceeding

five” may occupy a single dwelling unit. That is, the definition means

“that not all [persons] need be related, but some of them are.” Thus, under

the City’s interpretation, “[f]ive unrelated persons cannot be considered a

No. 17-2773 17

By extension, according to the City, plaintiffs “are seeking an

opportunity which would not be afforded to similarly situated

non-disabled persons under any circumstances.” We

agree with the district court that this theory is dubious. The

present record does not provide any evidence that the City

“has ever taken any measure to enforce [a] prohibition against

three unrelated non-disabled adults residing in a single family

home.” Practically speaking, therefore, plaintiffs seek the

same opportunity as unrelated non-disabled individuals.

On the questions of reasonableness and necessity, our decision

in Oconomowoc is instructive. There, Milwaukee denied

an occupancy permit for a disabled adult residential facility

because two other group homes were operating within 2,500

feet of the proposed home (one of which was located within

358 feet). Id. at 778–79.

The facility appealed to Milwaukee’s Board of Zoning Appeals,

arguing that a variance was necessary as a reasonable

accommodation under the FHAA. Id. The facility presented

evidence of the scarcity of disabled housing, as well as detailed

information about the needs of two individual plaintiffs

suffering from traumatic brain injuries. Id. At the same time,

prospective neighbors of the group home expressed concerns

that the disabled residents “might become violent” and

“threaten the safety of residents of the community.” Id. at 779–

80. Other neighbors “raised concerns about the amount of

traffic,” “parking restrictions that could constitute a hazard

for the group homes residents,” and the “lack of sidewalks.”

Id. at 780.

family under the ordinance” and therefore “could not legally occupy a

single family home.”

18 No. 17-2773

The Board of Zoning Appeals denied the request for a variance,

stating that the proposed home would constitute a “flagrant

violation of the state’s distance requirement.” Id. The

Board also cited the neighbors’ safety concerns, and concluded

that the proposed facility could impose “undue costs,

expenses, and other burdens on the City.” Id.

After the facility sued for violations of the FHAA, the district

court granted partial summary judgment in its favor,

finding that Milwaukee failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.

Id. at 781. We affirmed. In our opinion, we first

stated that Milwaukee’s zoning code and variance procedure

were “not in and of [themselves] an accommodation.” Id. at

785. We further held that the facility “sufficiently established

that the [variance] was reasonable and necessary to provide

[the disabled residents] with an equal opportunity to enjoy

housing in a residential community in Milwaukee.” Id. at 787.

Specifically, we stressed that the individual plaintiffs “require[

d] a living arrangement where supportive services

[were] available twenty-four hours a day” and was “wheelchair

accessible,” and noted that neither plaintiff could afford

to purchase their own home. Id.

In contrast, we held that Milwaukee failed to prove “either

that the accommodation was unreasonable or that it created

an undue hardship.” Id. We stated that the prospective neighbors’

public safety concerns could not “be based on blanket

stereotypes about disabled persons rather than particularized

concerns about individual residents.” Id. at 786. Moreover,

“[Milwaukee’s] own engineer testified that the proposed

group home would not have a significant adverse impact on

traffic and therefore [would] not, in this fashion, impose any

financial or administrative burdens on the City.” Id. Similarly,

No. 17-2773 19

Milwaukee did not demonstrate that the group home at issue

was “any more likely to generate calls to the police than other

area residents.” Id.

This case is akin to Oconomowoc. As the district court

found, the Noble home is necessary to fulfill “IAG’s mission

to provide residential services to disabled adults in a community-

based setting.” This necessity is further highlighted by

the district court’s finding that “group homes are in short supply.”

In fact, “[i]t took several months for IAG to find a home

that would accommodate the needs of its clients.”

In addition, at this stage in the proceedings, the record

shows that IAG’s CPU request is reasonable. It would plainly

effectuate plaintiffs’ goal of establishing a CILA for Noble

home residents, and would further advance the integration of

disabled individuals into the Springfield community. Moreover,

these benefits likely outweigh the potential costs of implementation.

The financial and administrative burden on the

City is negligible. According to the evidence before the Court,

neither police nor emergency services have been called to the

Noble home in the three years since it opened. To the contrary,

at the City Council hearing on plaintiffs’ CPU request,

an alderman acknowledged that there have been “no issues”

with the home. Further, the district court found that, because

IAG made no requests for City services (such as street signs

or traffic signals), “[i]t would cost the City no money to allow

A.D. and the other residents to remain in the Noble home.”

Nor is there sufficient evidence of intangible costs to the

neighborhood. Although neighbors of the Noble home raise

various traffic concerns, the City’s own Traffic Engineer did

not object to plaintiffs’ CPU request. Moreover, while the City

also argues that the requested accommodation will have a

20 No. 17-2773

negative effect on the residents of the Sparc home, we agree

with the district court’s conclusion that “any potential ‘adverse

impact’ to the residents of the Sparc house due to the

close proximity of the Noble home is entirely speculative.”

According to the record, there has been virtually no interaction

between the residents of the two homes since the Noble

home was occupied. As a result, “[t]here is simply no basis to

conclude that the continued existence of the Noble home will

have any effect on the ability of the Sparc residents to integrate

into the community.”

Regardless, it is not clear that greater interface between the

residents of the Noble and Sparc homes would be problematic.

Sure, a report cited by the City from the Illinois Planning

Council on Developmental Disabilities recognizes “that it is

important for group homes to locate in a ‘normal’ residential

neighborhood” in order to encourage integration between

disabled and non-disabled residents. But there is no evidence

that this would not occur if both the Noble and Sparc homes

remain in place. Indeed, the report only states that “clusters

of four or five group homes on a single block could … undermine

the ability of neighboring group homes to function

properly” (emphasis added). This is a far cry from the two

homes at issue here.

In sum, plaintiffs have shown a “better than negligible”

likelihood of success on the merits of their reasonable accommodation

theory. See Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1046. Therefore, the

district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction was proper.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.