Sara Sampra v. United States Department of Transportation

Sara Sampra sued her employer,

the United States Department of Transportation, alleging that

it interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical

Leave Act by reassigning her to a different position after she

returned from childbirth leave. The district court granted

summary judgment for the defendant on the merits, finding

that Sampra was offered essentially the same position upon

2 No. 17‐2621

her return from leave. Sampra has appealed. We affirm,

though on the different ground that Sampra’s lawsuit is timebarred.

We do not reach the merits. Sampra failed to file her

complaint within the applicable two‐year statute of limitations.

The more forgiving three‐year statute of limitations

does not apply because Sampra failed to provide evidence

that the department willfully violated her FMLA rights.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

From October 2009 to April 2014, Sampra was an electrical

engineer with the Federal Aviation Administration, an agency

within the Department of Transportation. Electrical engineers

who are assigned to the field in the FAA’s Central Service Area

typically do not work out of an office; they are assigned to

field positions at airports across the central portion of the

United States. The parties refer to these employees as “field

engineers.”

Initially, Sampra was assigned to a field position at Midway

Airport in Chicago. Her supervisor eventually assigned

her to oversee technical support services contract work releases

for the Chicago office. Overseeing these work releases

involved submitting project requirements to an outside contractor,

which in turn would report back to Sampra with its

understanding of the project, cost estimates, and a timeframe

for completion. Sampra would then review and authorize the

project proposal. Managing the work releases required little

to no field work, so in that role Sampra spent nearly all of her

time in the office. She retained the same job title, though, and

her job description continued to require up to 100% travel and

field work.

No. 17‐2621 3

Sampra’s FMLA leave began on January 6, 2014 and lasted

until she was ready to return to work on March 10. While she

was on leave, the supervisor who had given her the desk assignment

was transferred and a new supervisor, Matthew Sibert,

took over. While Sampra was still on leave, Sibert assigned

to himself the task of overseeing the work releases that

Sampra had overseen. Sibert testified that he could perform

in one hour per week the work that Sampra had been doing

full‐time, that he believed that overseeing the work releases

was not appropriate work for a full‐time field engineer, and

that he had never assigned a field engineer working under

him to manage those work releases.

On March 21, 2014, shortly after Sampra’s return, Sibert

initially assigned her to a field project at Chicago’s O’Hare

Airport. That project would have required Sampra to work on

an aviation runway overnight, from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. But

Sampra never actually worked the overnight assignment at

O’Hare. For the first three weeks of the assignment, Sibert allowed

Sampra to work regular daytime hours so that she

could secure necessary childcare. Before she would have had

to start the overnight assignment at O’Hare, Sampra requested

reassignment to the position of drafting coordinator.

On April 11, Sibert notified Sampra that effective April 20 she

would be transferred to the position of drafting coordinator.

The drafting coordinator position is in a lower pay band than

electrical engineer, but Sampra retained her electrical engineer

salary.

Sampra filed this lawsuit under the FMLA on April 18,

2016, a little over two years after her assignment to work at

O’Hare. In support of her claim, Sampra highlighted two key

differences between her positions before and after her FMLA

4 No. 17‐2621

leave. First, the location of her work changed from an office to

an aviation runway that lacked access to a toilet, let alone a

lactation room. Second, her shift changed from regular daytime

hours to overnight hours. Claiming that her former supervisor

had “set a precedent” by assigning her to oversee the

work releases from the office, Sampra argued that she was entitled

to reinstatement to an equivalent assignment upon return

from FMLA leave. The district court granted summary

judgment for the department on the merits.

II. Analysis

We do not reach the merits of Sampra’s FMLA interference

claim because the undisputed facts show that her claim is

barred by the statute of limitations. A plaintiff must bring an

FMLA claim “not later than 2 years after the date of the last

event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is

brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1); Barrett v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections,

803 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming summary

judgment for employer based on FMLA statute of limitations).

If the employer acted willfully, however, the statute of limitations

is extended to three years. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2). This

unusual statute of limitations follows the model of the Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).

The FMLA statute of limitations clock begins to run from

the “last event constituting the alleged violation.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 2617(c)(1). The FMLA makes it unlawful for an employer to

“interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt

to exercise, any right provided” under the statute.

§ 2615(a)(1). An employee who takes FMLA leave is entitled,

upon return, to be restored to the position she previously held

No. 17‐2621 5

or to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits,

pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.

§ 2614(a)(1)(A), (B).

Sampra’s lawsuit is untimely because she filed her complaint

on April 18, 2016, more than two years after the statute

of limitations clock began running. The clock started on

March 21, 2014 when Sampra’s supervisor assigned her to

work in the field at O’Hare—the assignment that Sampra

claims violated her FMLA rights. That assignment is analogous

to the denial of FMLA leave that started the clock in Barrett.

803 F.3d at 897 (identifying denial of leave request as “the

last event constituting the claim”); see also Crugher v. Prelesnik,

761 F.3d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 2014) (clock started running

on FMLA retaliation claim on date of employee’s termination);

Reed v. Lear Corp., 556 F.3d 674, 682 (8th Cir. 2009) (clock

started running on FMLA interference claim when employer

gave employee second letter denying FMLA leave rather than

later date of termination); Rutherford v. Peoria Public Schools

Dist. 150, 228 F. Supp. 3d 843, 852–53, 853 n.10 (C.D. Ill. 2017)

(clock started running on FMLA interference claim when employer

notified employee that employee had abandoned his

job and employer did not intend to reinstate him), citing and

distinguishing Barrett, 803 F.3d at 897; Deka v. Countryside

Ass’n for People With Disabilities, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 698, 705

(N.D. Ill. 2015) (clock started running on FMLA interference

and retaliation claims on date of employee’s termination);

Ryan v. Pace Suburban Bus Div. of Regional Transp. Auth., 837 F.

Supp. 2d 834, 837 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same). Sampra does not contest

the department’s contention that the statute of limitations

6 No. 17‐2621

began running on March 21, 2014 (as opposed to, say, the effective

date of the most onerous aspects of the new assignment

to the overnight schedule).1

The more generous three‐year statute of limitations in 29

U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2) does not apply because Sampra has not offered

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the department

willfully violated her FMLA rights. The FMLA does not

define the term “willful,” see § 2611, and the Supreme Court

has not yet defined the term under § 2617(c)(2). But in

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), the Supreme

Court explained the meaning of “willful” under the

analogous statute of limitations in the Fair Labor Standards

Act. McLaughlin held that to apply the three‐year limitations

period for “willful” violations of the FLSA, the employer

must have known that, or shown reckless disregard for

whether, its conduct was prohibited by the statute. Id. at 133,

135. Distinguishing “merely negligent” from “willful,”

McLaughlin observed that in common usage, “willful” is con‐

1 The department briefed the statute of limitations in its summary

judgment motion in the district court. In response, Sampra presented no

evidence or argument supporting her allegations of willfulness. Sampra

addressed the statute of limitations issue for the first time in her appellate

reply brief. Because the district court did not rely on the statute of limitations

defense, Sampra did not need to address it in her opening appellate

brief. But the department raised the issue properly in the district court,

and that was sufficient to require Sampra to offer any evidence she could

to avoid the defense. On appeal, the department is entitled to defend the

district court’s judgment on this alternative ground, see Luna v. United

States, 454 F.3d 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2006), and Sampra was entitled to address

the issue in her reply brief. We address the statute of limitations issue on

the evidentiary record the parties built in the district court.

No. 17‐2621 7

sidered synonymous with words such as “voluntary,” “deliberate,”

and “intentional.” Id. at 133. McLaughlin expressly rejected

the Fifth Circuit’s test that had required the employer

to know only that the FLSA “was in the picture” for the violation

to be considered “willful.” 486 U.S. at 132–33, 134 (“the

Jiffy June standard of willfulness—a standard that merely requires

that an employer knew that the FLSA ‘was in the picture’—

virtually obliterates any distinction between willful

and nonwillful violations”).

Other circuits have held that the McLaughlin willfulness

standard for FLSA claims applies as well to FMLA claims. See,

e.g., Bass v. Potter, 522 F.3d 1098, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2008); Hoffman

v. Professional Med Team, 394 F.3d 414, 417–18 (6th Cir.

2005); Porter v. New York University School of Law, 392 F.3d 530,

531–32 (2d Cir. 2004); Hanger v. Lake County, 390 F.3d 579, 583

(8th Cir. 2004); Hillstrom v. Best Western TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27,

33 (1st Cir. 2003). We agree that the McLaughlin definition of

“willful” under the FLSA applies to the FMLA’s use of “willful”

in § 2617(c)(2). To benefit from the three‐year statute of

limitations in § 2617(c)(2), a plaintiff must show that her employer

either knew the FMLA prohibited its conduct or

showed reckless disregard for whether it did. McLaughlin, 486

U.S. at 133.

Applying the McLaughlin standard here, Sampra has not

offered evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to

find that Sibert either knew his conduct would violate the

FMLA or showed reckless disregard. While Sibert concedes

that he knew the FMLA was in the picture, McLaughlin shows

that simple awareness that the FMLA “was in the picture” is

not sufficient to show willfulness. Id. The undisputed evidence

shows that Sibert believed he was complying with the

8 No. 17‐2621

FMLA by restoring Sampra to the same job title she had held

before her FMLA leave, and at the same pay. At worst, Sibert

might have acted negligently when he failed to consult the

FMLA regulations; there is no evidence that, as required by

the McLaughlin standard, he showed reckless disregard for

whether his conduct was prohibited by the FMLA. See, e.g.,

Deka, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 705 (finding plausible allegation of

willfulness where employee with serious illness was terminated

before going on FMLA leave and after employer repeatedly

scoffed at its FMLA duties). We also cannot ignore the

fact that a United States District Judge agreed with Sibert that

restoring Sampra to her prior position, job description, and

salary as a field engineer did not violate her FMLA rights. Because

Sampra failed to offer evidence sufficient to rely on the

three‐year limitation for willful violations, her FMLA interference

claim is barred by the two‐year statute of limitations.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.