Anmarie Calgaro v. St. Louis County, et al.

Anmarie Calgaro sued several parties alleging violations of her parental rights

over one of her minor children under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The district court1 granted the defendants’ dispositive motions and

dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Calgaro appeals, and we affirm.

According to Calgaro’s complaint, she is the mother of E.J.K. and three

younger, minor children. In May 2015, E.J.K. moved out of Calgaro’s home in St.

Louis County, Minnesota. Calgaro never surrendered her parental rights, but E.J.K.

obtained a letter from Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid describing E.J.K.’s father and

Calgaro as “hav[ing] given up control and custody of their child.” The letter

concluded that E.J.K. was therefore “legally emancipated under Minnesota law.”

Although this letter from a legal aid association had no legal effect, E.J.K.

presented the letter to several state agencies as evidence of emancipation. Under

Minnesota law, a child under age eighteen is eligible for general public assistance if

she is “legally emancipated.” Minn. Stat. § 256D.05, subdiv. 1(a)(9). Based on

E.J.K.’s claims of emancipation, St. Louis County provided E.J.K. with funding for

medical services and other living expenses, and E.J.K. obtained gender transition care

from Park Nicollet Health Services. E.J.K. also received prescription medication

1The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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from Fairview Health Services. Both providers thought E.J.K. could give effective

consent to treatment under Minnesota law because she was living apart from her

parents and managing her personal financial matters. See Minn. Stat. § 144.341.

When Calgaro attempted to acquire E.J.K.’s medical records from Park Nicollet

and Fairview, both providers denied her request under the standard of Minnesota

Statutes § 144.346. That provision allows disclosure of treatment information if

“failure to inform the parent or guardian would seriously jeopardize the health of the

minor patient.” Id. Calgaro also approached the St. Louis County School District and

Michael Johnson, the principal of E.J.K.’s high school, requesting access to E.J.K.’s

educational records and an opportunity to participate in certain educational decisions.

Johnson and the School District denied those requests.

Calgaro then sued St. Louis County, the interim director of St. Louis County

Public Health and Human Services (individually and in her official capacity), medical

providers Fairview and Park Nicollet, the St. Louis County School District, Principal

Johnson (individually and in his official capacity), and E.J.K., as an interested party.

She alleged that the defendants had violated a fundamental right of a parent, under

the Due Process Clause, to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control

of her children. Calgaro claimed damages and also sought declaratory and injunctive

relief that would prevent the defendants from providing services to any of her minor

children until a state court adjudicated the scope of her parental rights.

Calgaro moved for summary judgment, and the defendants filed cross-motions

in response. St. Louis County moved for judgment on the pleadings and for summary

judgment, and the other defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The

district court granted the defendants’ motions, denied Calgaro’s motion, and

dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We review those dismissals de novo.

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The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for St. Louis

County (including the official-capacity claim against the interim director) because

Calgaro did not adequately plead a claim under § 1983. A county may be liable for

a constitutional violation under § 1983 only if the violation resulted from a policy or

custom of the municipality. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

There is no respondeat superior liability for actions of an individual employee. Id.

at 691. Although Calgaro alleges that the County’s “policies, customs, practices, or

procedures (or lack of procedures)” led to violations of her due process rights, she

never specified a policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged

violation. She pleads only that the County “determined” that E.J.K. was emancipated

and paid for her medical services. But one erroneous determination by a county

employee that E.J.K. was emancipated does not establish a policy or custom of the

County that deprives parents of their constitutional rights. Calgaro’s conclusory

assertion that the County acted based on a policy or custom is insufficient to state a

claim, and the district court correctly granted judgment on the pleadings.

Calgaro also fails to state a claim for damages against the then-interim director

of Public Health and Human Services, Linnea Mirsch. The complaint lists Mirsch’s

position and title, and alleges that “[t]he director is the final decision and policy

maker for the Department.” But the complaint does not allege that Mirsch personally

took any action that violated Calgaro’s constitutional rights, and Mirsch cannot be

held liable for the unconstitutional acts of her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 676 (2009). The district court correctly ruled that Calgaro failed to state

a claim against Mirsch in her individual capacity.

Calgaro’s claims for money damages against the medical providers fare no

better. To state a claim under § 1983, Calgaro must show that Park Nicollet and

Fairview acted “under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526

U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Although both facilities provided medical services to E.J.K.

without parental consent, and allegedly honored E.J.K.’s consent in accordance with

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§ 144.341 of the Minnesota Statutes, these actions did not transform either medical

provider into a state actor. 526 U.S. at 52. Calgaro contends that the providers

exercised a “public function” by terminating her parental rights concerning health

care decisions, but this claim mischaracterizes what happened. Section 144.341 states

that certain minors may give effective consent to medical services, but a provider

does not terminate parental rights by recognizing a minor’s consent, even if the

provider is mistaken. Only a Minnesota court can terminate parental rights. See

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301.

Calgaro next claims that the St. Louis County School District (including

Principal Johnson in his official capacity) violated her rights by carrying out a

“policy, practice, and custom” of declining to give notice or to hold a hearing with

parents before determining that a minor student is emancipated. We agree with the

district court that Calgaro alleged only a legal conclusion on this point. The

complaint identifies no actual policy or established custom of the District about

making emancipation determinations. Calgaro cites only the single incident at issue

here, in which the District refused to disclose E.J.K.’s educational records or to allow

Calgaro to participate in E.J.K.’s educational decisions. The District’s alleged

handling of this particular case, even assuming that it interfered with Calgaro’s

constitutional rights, is insufficient to establish a custom or practice under Monell.

436 U.S. at 694.

Calgaro also sued Johnson individually for damages on the ground that he

violated her constitutional rights by denying access to educational records and

excluding her from educational decisions. But it remains “open to question whether

and to what extent the fundamental liberty interest in the custody, care, and

management of one’s children mandates parental access to school records.” Schmidt

v. Des Moines Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 811, 819 (8th Cir. 2011). Nor is it clearly

established that parents have a constitutional right to manage all details of their

children’s education or to obtain consultation with school officials on everyday

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matters. See Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5, 800 F.3d 955, 966 (8th Cir. 2015).

Because existing precedent does not clearly establish the rights that Calgaro asserts,

Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741

(2011).

Calgaro’s remaining claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the

several defendants are moot. E.J.K. has turned eighteen years old, ceased to be a

minor under Minnesota law, and completed her education in the St. Louis County

School District. See Minn. Stat. § 645.451, subdiv. 2. There is no ongoing case or

controversy over Calgaro’s parental rights to make decisions for E.J.K. as a minor or

to access her medical or educational records. That Calgaro has three other minor

children does not preserve a controversy. There is an exception to mootness for cases

that are capable of repetition yet evading review, but the exception applies only when

there is a reasonable expectation that the alleged actions of the defendant will recur.

Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam). Calgaro seeks an injunction

against actions directed toward “the minor children of Ms. Calgaro deemed

emancipated by Defendants without Ms. Calgaro’s consent.” But Calgaro has not

established a reasonable expectation that any of her three minor children will be

deemed emancipated by the defendants. The claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief are therefore moot.

E.J.K. was joined in the lawsuit as an interested party under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 19(a)(1)(B)(i). Given that none of Calgaro’s claims against the other

defendants may proceed, the district court properly dismissed any claims against

E.J.K. as well.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.